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This dissertation argues that the figure of Tipu Sultan and the spectacle of the 
Mysore Wars were a key contributor to shifting British attitudes about empire in the late 
eighteenth century. Tipu was the ruler of the India state of Mysore, acknowledged by 
contemporaries to be a powerful ruler, a military commander of great distinction – and a 
hated foe of the British East India Company. Tipu fo ght three separate wars against the 
Company; during the course of these conflicts, he was portrayed by the British as a cruel 
and tyrannical despot, a fanatical Muslim who forced his subjects to convert to Islam and 
tortured captured British soldiers in his foul dungeons. The widespread presence of this 
negative "Tipu Legend" testified to the impact that empire and imperial themes exhibited 
on British popular culture of the era.  
Tyrant! explores two key research questions. First of all, how did the Tipu Legend 
originate, and why was it so successful at replacing alternate representations of Tipu? 
Secondly, what can this story tell us about how the British came to terms with empire – 
despite initial reluctance – and forged a new imperial identity between 1780 and 1800? 
Using archival records, newspaper print culture, and popular art and theatre sources, I 
 
 
argue that the vilification of Tipu was linked to the development of an imperial culture. 
Expansionist Governor-Generals consciously blackened th  character of Tipu to make 
their own aggressive actions more palatable to British audiences at home. Through a 
process of reversal, preventive war came to be justified as defensive in nature, protecting 
the native inhabitants of Mysore from the depredations of an unspeakable despot. The 
increasingly vilified and caricatured representations f Tipu allowed the East India 
Company to portray itself as fighting as moral crusade to liberate southern India from the 
depredations of a savage ruler. Company servants were recast in the British popular 
imagination from unscrupulous nabobs into virtuous soldier-heroes that embodied the 
finest qualities of the British nation. The study of the faithless and violent character of 
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 In the collections of the Victoria and Albert Musem, there is a mechanical pipe 
organ known as "Tippoo's Tiger".1 Captured and brought back from India by the East 
India Company's soldiers, the apparatus consists of a huge tiger lying atop a prostrate 
man, the tiger sinking its fangs and claws into the helpless individual who, with his pale 
skin, red coat, and military attire, is easily identifiable as a British soldier. The tiger is 
also an organ, however, which when wound up would growl and roar menacingly to all 
nearby, although the passage of time has today robbed this fierce customer of his prior 
voice.2 Created by local artisans on the specific order of the Indian ruler Tipu Sultan 
during the 1790s, Tippoo’s Tiger was designed to encapsulate the fear and terror that the 
Sultan inspired in Europeans, the savagery of the tiger goring its unfortunate victim a 
reflection of Tipu’s own military prowess. The mechanical pipe organ represented the 
threat posed by Tipu, the mastery that he wielded over the bodies of Europeans who fell 
into his power, and the dread that the Sultan inspired in the contemporary East India 
Company. 
 Tipu Sultan (1750-1799) was the ruler of the India state of Mysore during the 
final two decades of the eighteenth century. He was known by the name of Tipu Sahib 
until succeeding his father, Haider Ali, to the throne of Mysore at the end of 1782, and 
thereafter claimed the Islamic title of Sultan as a means of legitimizing his own rule.3 
Tipu (often spelled phonetically by contemporary British writers as "Tippoo") was 
                                                
1 “Tippoo’s Tiger.” Collections of the Victoria and Albert Museum. 
2 Mildred Archer. Tippoo’s Tiger (London: H.M. Stationery Off, 1959) 
3 Kate Brittlebank. Tipu Sultan's Search for Legitimacy: Islam and Kingship in a Hindu Domain (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 
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acknowledged by contemporaries to be a powerful ruler, a military commander of great 
distinction – and a hated foe of the British East India Company. Tipu fought three 
separate wars against the Company in the last two decades of the eighteenth century; 
during the course of these conflicts, he was portrayed by the British as a cruel and 
tyrannical despot, a fanatical Muslim who forced his subjects to convert to Islam and 
tortured captured British soldiers in his foul dungeons. This villainous caricature of Tipu 
proved to be extremely influential in the British metropole, and it would endure long after 
his death as a popular subject in imperial literature, still appearing today occasionally in 
works of historical fiction.4 The creation, dissemination, and ultimate widespread 
acceptance of this negative representation of the Sultan, referenced in this study as the 
"Tipu Legend", played an important role in reshaping contemporary British imperialism 
and is the subject of this dissertation.  
 Some of the most frequent imagery associated with Tipu Sultan was based around 
the use of the tiger symbol, as demonstrated by the mechanical pipe organ. Tipu actively 
cultivated the nickname, originally used by the British, of “The Tiger of Mysore”.  He 
used the animal as his own personal symbol. Tipu ket a number of tigers as pets in his 
palace at Seringapatam, and tiger stripes adorned the uniforms of his elite soldiers. The 
tiger itself was a symbol of extreme, savage ferocity to the British, and Tipu Sultan was 
often characterized as a "wild beast", possessed with "inordinate passion", who 
threatened the peace and security of southern India.5 Tipu was portrayed by Britons living 
in India as a monster, "seeking whom he may devour", prowling about "in savage 
                                                
4 G. A. Henty. The Tiger of Mysore: A Story of the War with Tippoo Saib (London: Blackie & Son, 2001, 
1896); Bernard Cornwell. Sharpe’s Tiger (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997) 
5 Resident at Poonah [Pune] to Bengal Government 28 October 1787 (p. 327-28) IOR/H/248 
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barbarity, and wanton cruelty."6 Tipu was represented as a savage animal, just like his 
pipe organ, waiting to pounce on and devour unwary Europeans. There was also an 
undeniable element of sexual conquest to the tiger organ as well, straddling atop the 
British solider in a position of masculine dominance, which reflected back on British 
anxieties about how their prisoners captured in battle by Tipu were being treated in his 
dungeons. War stories such as these, especially ones that took place in imperial settings, 
played a crucial role in the creation of British masculinity.7 
 As a result of the Anglo-Mysore Wars fought against Tipu, the image of the tiger 
took on a distinctly oriental context for the British, specifically as something imagined as 
ferocious and in needs of taming by means justifiably violent.8 Tippoo's Tiger 
symbolized the fear that Europeans traveling overseas would be swallowed up and 
devoured, their British morals and identity lost forever, their attempts at building empire 
abroad doomed to failure. And it was in the Company's military triumph over Tipu, the 
capture of his fortresses and the subjugation of his tigers, that helped the British public 
shift away from earlier anxieties about imperialism and embrace the project of overseas 
colonization in a way that had been unthinkable a fw decades earlier.  
Historiographical Background 
 British fears about empire were not uniquely applied to Tipu Sultan in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, but were felt broadly across political and class divisions 
throughout the British nation. The eighteenth century was the first period in which a truly 
"British" identity was in the process of construction for the peoples of England, Scotland, 
                                                
6 Calcutta Chronicle and General Advertiser (Calcutta, India) 28 May 1789, Issue 175 
7 Graham Dawson. Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire, and the Imagining of Masculinities 
(London: Routledge, 1994) 
8 John Barrell. The Infections of Thomas De Quincey: A Psychopathology of Imperialism (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1991): 49-50 
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and Wales.9 Driven on by the tremendous growth in print media, Britons increasingly 
began to perceive themselves as one cultural entity, a people that defined itself as 
Protestant, maritime, commercial, and free.10 This was an era of constant warfare against 
France, and the emerging British nation defined itself in contrast to an imagined French 
"other" which was the antithesis of British values.11 While the French were perceived as 
Catholic and despotic, the British believed themselves to stand for commerce and liberty; 
Britain's possession of a maritime empire based on trade would allow them to avoid 
falling into the tyrannical rule associated with prior land-based empires of the past.12 
 However, the growing acquisition of overseas territory by the East India 
Company in the second half of the eighteenth century began to undermine and call into 
question this understanding of what it meant to be British. Company rule over tens of 
millions of Indian subjects were difficult to reconcile with the popular belief that Britain 
stood for a commercial and maritime empire of liberty, or at best only with extreme 
difficulty, giving rise to various scandals of empire.13 Company soldiers and 
administrators in India during the second half of the eighteenth century were increasingly 
known as "nabobs", as dubbed by a contemporary satirical play on the subject, accused of 
ruling India in despotic fashion before returning home to the metropole with vast sums of 
ill-gained wealth.14 Domestic critics viewed the nabobs as dangerous threats to the British 
                                                
9 Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin andSpread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1983); Kathleen Wilson. The Island Race: Englishness, Empire, and Gender in the 
Eighteenth Century (London: Routledge, 2003) 
10 David Armitage. The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000) 
11 Linda Colley. Britons: Forging the Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) 
12 David Armitage. The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (2000): 8 
13 Nicholas Dirks. The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006) 
14 Samuel Foote. The Nabob (London: Printed by T. Sherlock, 1773, 1778); Tillman Nechtman. Nabobs: 
Empire and Identity in Eighteenth Century Britain. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)  
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nation, interlopers of low birth who had been infected with the luxury and vice of the 
Orient, and now threatened to corrupt the metropole upon their return home.15 The most 
conspicuous of the nabobs engaged in profligate and highly visible spending, purchasing 
luxurious country estates and buying their way intoParliament through the exploitation 
of corrupt boroughs. The nabobs enjoyed decorating their new estates with Indian-themed 
art, which only emphasized their apparent alienatio fr m the rest of the British public.16 
It appeared to contemporaries that the nabobs had brought with them all the vices of the 
East, and threatened to destroy the fabric of the British nation.17 
 These profound anxieties about the dangers of overseas empire were 
commonplace in the second half of the eighteenth century, and manifested themselves 
frequently in the print culture of the period. Satirical cartoons and metropolitan plays 
criticized the nabobs, and the East India Company more generally, providing a source of 
contested ideologies, and a public space in which imperialism could be undermined.18 
The popular belief that the Company was governing in reckless and tyrannical fashion in 
India led to increasing calls for Parliament to overse  and regulate its actions in the 1760s 
and 1770s.19 Although the Company had been a political actor as well as a commercial 
one from its origin in the seventeenth century, it was not until the second half of the 
eighteenth century that Parliament began to regulate its activities on a regular basis and 
                                                
15 Philip Lawson and Jim Phillips. “‘Our Execrable Banditti’: Perceptions of Nabobs in Mid-Eighteenth 
Century Britain” in Albion XVI (1984): 225-41 
16 Pratapaditya Pal and Vidya Dehejia. From Merchants to Emperors: British Artists and India 1757-1930 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986) 
17 Nicholas Dirks. The Scandal of Empire (2006): 12-13 
18 Mary Dorothy George. Catalogue of Political and Personal Satires Preserved in the Department of 
Prints and Drawings in the British Musuem, Vol. 5-7. (London: British Museum Publications, 1978); David 
Worrall. Harlequin Empire: Race, Ethnicity, and the Drama of the Popular Enlightenment (London: 
Pickering & Chatto, 2007) 
19 H. V. Bowen. Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics 1757-1773 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
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intervene more directly in Indian affairs, eventually creating a Board of Control to 
provide the government with direct input into the Company's affairs.20 Perhaps the most 
visible demonstration of the popular fears surrounding overseas empire during this period 
was the trial of Warren Hastings, who as the former Governor General of India was 
publicly called to stand to account for his supposed crimes. In the dramatic opening 
speech to the trial in 1788, Edmund Burke accused Hastings of crimes against humanity 
and against natural law, for enriching himself while ruling India in despotic fashion.21 
While Hastings was eventually acquitted of all charges, the immense public spectacle of 
the trial testified to the popularity of imperial, nd specifically Indian, subject matter 
amongst contemporaries.  
 For Company administrators who traveled to India during the eighteenth century, 
there was a real fear that the Britons under their authority living in the subcontinent 
would be swallowed up and made to disappear, their European identity consumed by the 
ancient civilization of India. In contrast to the later Victorian stereotype of Britons and 
Indians living in strictly separate worlds that did not meet, there were no such rigid 
cultural divisions in the eighteenth century, and a great many Europeans responded to 
India by crossing over from one culture to another.22 This was a period of surprisingly 
widespread cultural assimilation and hybridity, with virtually all Europeans in the 
subcontinent Indianizing themselves to some extent. Britons were able to self-fashion 
their own fluid identities, moving back and forth between European and Indian identities 
                                                
20 Philip Stern. The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundation of the 
British Empire in India (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Lucy Stuart Sutherland. The East 
India Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952)  
21 Edmund Burke. “Speech on Opening of Impeachment 15, 16, 18, 19 February 1788” in The Writings and 
Speeches of Edmund Burke, Vol. 6. Peter Marshall (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) 




as the needs of the moment dictated.23 This posed a terrifying threat to the Company's 
policymakers, who feared that the traders and soldiers under their command would cease 
to follow orders and divest themselves of loyalty to their mother country in favor of their 
new Indian identities.  
 It was very common in the eighteenth century for Eu opeans to serve in the 
armies of native Indian rulers, particularly as techni al experts for use in servicing 
artillery and designing fortifications.24 This was aided and abetted by a widespread 
Enlightenment respect of Asian civilizations up until the close of the eighteenth century, 
without the presence of the highly racialized worldview which would come to 
characterize the nineteenth century.25 Many European political thinkers of this period 
attacked the very foundations of imperialism, arguin  passionately that empire-building 
was not only unworkable, costly, and dangerous, but manifestly unjust. They held that 
moral judgments of cultural superiority could not be made about entire peoples, nor many 
of their cultural practices.26  
 The situation of Europeans in other parts of the world was also far from secure. 
Britons overseas were often captured, subjected to alien laws and customs, forced to live 
in conditions of terror and vulnerability; these uncomfortable situations were also an 
important part of the early imperial project which would later be written out of the British 
historical memory.27 The task of governing and policing the territories conquered by the 
East India Company was constantly undermined by these anxieties, the fear that Britons 
                                                
23 Maya Jasanoff. Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750-1850 (New York: Knopf, 
2005) 
24 Pradeep Barua. “Military Developments in India, 1750-1850” in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, 
No. 4 (1994): 599-616 
25 Holden Furber. Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1976): 338 
26 Sankar Muthu. Enlightenment Against Empire. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) 
27 Linda Colley. Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World 1600-1850 (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002) 
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would be allured by the temptations of India into "g ing native", and would renounce 
their European identity in favor of a new Indian one. It was this very belief that sons of 
Britain had been seduced and corrupted by the luxuries of the east which was responsible 
for the consternation over the nabobs in the metropole.28 
 The growing British empire in India therefore existed in an ideological quandary. 
The "Protestant, maritime, commercial, and free" empire as conceived by the British 
clearly did not describe the Company's military dominion in India, and the type of rule 
being practiced by the Company appeared to be despotic in nature, due to the way in 
which it ignored private property and had no representative assemblies.29 As the 
eighteenth century drew to a close, therefore, there was a growing need for a new 
legitimation of empire. Thus, for example, in the immediate aftermath of the Company's 
conquest of Bengal, policymakers sought to justify their actions by referencing India's 
Mughal past, in particular through the claim that they were working in accordance with 
the region's own "ancient constitution." According to this frame of thought, the Company 
was merely reestablishing Bengal's old system of government, which had fallen into 
disuse.30 However, the attempt to rehabilitate the ancient co stitution of Bengal and 
represent the Mughal Empire as a state that respected law and property was ultimately too 
restricting and confusing to gain popular acceptance. 
 Instead, during a transitional period between roughly 1780-1830, the British 
nation came to embrace a new despotism of law underpinned by racial segregation and 
                                                
28 Philip Lawson and Jim Phillips. “‘Our Execrable Banditti’” in Albion XVI (1984): 226 
29 Richard Koebner. “Despot and Despotism: Vicissitudes of a Political Term” in Journal of the Warburg 
and Courtauld Institutes 1951 14 (3/4): 275-302; Franco Venturi. “Oriental Despotism” in Journal of the 
History of Ideas 1963 24 (1): 133-42 
30 Robert Travers. Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth Century India: The British in Bengal (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
9 
 
rule of force, which was increasingly justified by Europe's supposedly higher place on the 
ladder of civilization.31 The earlier scandals of empire were erased from the British 
historical memory and became remembered as a natural s age in the colonization process; 
the scandals associated with the nabobs allowed empir  to be reformed, its problems 
"solved", and its structure institutionalized.32 At its most basic level, empire was justified 
to the British public through shifting the burden of culpability for any wrongdoings from 
unscrupulous British actors, such as the nabobs, onto immoral and savage Indian actors, 
such as Tipu Sultan. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, Enlightenment approval for 
the stability of Asian civilizations began to be replaced by a chorus of vilification of 
Indians for their supposed corruption. It was the immoral and tyrannical actions of Indian 
merchants and princes who were undermining the Company's rule overseas, not the 
servants of the Company themselves.33 These claims had begun earlier, when Company 
merchants had portrayed the rule of Bengal's nawabs as a ruthless despotism moved by 
the will of an irresponsible tyrant, and would only grow in intensity towards the close of 
the eighteenth century.34 
 The Second British Empire that was under construction beginning in this period 
was characterized by increasingly aristocratic and utocratic forms of rule, in which 
hierarchy and racial subordination were stressed.35 Within the East India Company's 
administrative structure, the creation of the Board of Control and Governor Generalship 
                                                
31 Ibid, 29-30 
32 Nicholas Dirks. The Scandal of Empire (2006): 26-31 
33 C. A. Bayly. Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988): 77-78 
34 Peter Marshall. Bengal: The British Bridgehead. Eastern India 1740-1828 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988): 67 
35 Vincent Harlow. The Founding of the Second British Empire (London, New York: Longmans and Green, 




centralized power, shifting authority away from councils of merchants and towards 
hereditary aristocrats with military backgrounds appointed by the government.36 As the 
eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth, formerly loose attitudes about Europeans 
crossing over and adopting Indian customs came under i creasing official criticism, due 
to pressure from Christian missionary groups and new id as of racial and ethnic 
hierarchies.37 Britain's turn to empire in this period was characterized by a vastly 
increased sense of cultural or civilizational confidence, in contrast to earlier thinkers who 
had been doubtful of their country's achievements ad showed greater respect for other 
non-European peoples.38 The rise of empire was linked together with the ris  of 
liberalism; the universalist tendencies inherent in political liberalism lent themselves 
towards viewing history and civilizations as moving forward through progressive stages 
of development. Britons infantilized Indians and other colonial peoples by putting them 
at an earlier stage of development, in need of tutoring by paternalistic British parents.39  
 The growth of this liberal imperialism, which began t the end of the eighteenth 
century, coincided with increasingly exclusive conceptions of the national community 
and political capacity, frequently based on biological difference, along with the 
widespread use of crude dichotomies between barbarity and civilization.40 Humanitarian 
movements designed to help colonial peoples declined during the nineteenth century, due 
to a growing belief in polygenesis and separate unrlated racial stocks.41 Imperialism was 
                                                
36 Philip Lawson. The East India Company: A History (London: Longman, 1993): 141-42 
37 William Dalrymple. White Mughals (2003): 36-41 
38 Jennifer Pitts. A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005) 
39 Uday Singh  Mehta. Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century B itish Liberal Thought 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999) 
40 Jennifer Pitts. A Turn to Empire (2005): 2 
41 Catherine Hall. Civilizing Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) 
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also tied to the growth of Romanticism, which made frequent use of colonial peoples and 
themes as subject matter, with one historian suggestin  that the two subjects were linked 
too closely to be understood in isolation from one a other.42 Early Romantic writers 
addressing the subject of the Orient were full of deep anxieties about the building of 
empire; later Victorians misread these fears as mere asquerade over imperial support.43 
In this fashion, early Romantic writings which had been skeptical of overseas 
colonization were reinterpreted as advocates for the civilizing mission. Even the 
performances on the London stage in this period shifted from a focus on inward-looking 
critiques of the nation to forms of spectacle that emphasized cultural and racial 
supremacy. Audiences were encouraged to shed distinct e hnic and political affiliations in 
favor of militaristic, heterosexual, and white definitions of national unity.44 
 Within this transitional period of shifting popular opinions about empire, the 
decade of the 1790s was perhaps the most important in changing British perceptions of 
overseas rule. In earlier decades, there was little sign that opinion in the metropole 
regarded Britain's role in India as anything other t an commercial, nor was there much 
coherent drive for empire by Company servants on the subcontinent.45 However, by the 
last decade of the eighteenth century, "a real transformation of attitudes had taken place", 
with empire viewed no longer as a source of contamin tion for the body politic, but an 
                                                
42 Saree Makdisi. Romantic Imperialism: Universal Empire and the Culture of Modernity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
43 Nigel Leask. British Romantic Writers and the East: Anxieties of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992) 
44 Daniel O’Quinn. Staging Governance: Theatrical Imperialism in Londo, 1770-1800 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2007) 
45 Peter Marshall.. “British Expansion in India in the Eighteenth Century: A Historical Revision”, History 
1975 60 (198): 37 
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opportunity to do good overseas.46 Company servants were no longer viewed by the 
public as avaricious nabobs, but as long-serving experts and administrators, often with 
some kind of military background. Company soldiers were embraced by the public as 
patriotic heroes, with Lord Cornwallis' reception in the metropole during the 1790s 
serving as one particularly choice example. The Governor General was greeted as a 
conquering hero, feted with lavish celebrations, and showered with honors from all sides. 
The shift in public perception compared to the earli r scorn and condemnation faced by 
Clive and Hastings indicated the changing mood regarding imperial exploits in the British 
metropole.  
 The effusions provoked by the Mysore Wars against Tipu Sultan suggest that the 
British were coming to see themselves not only as agre t military power, but as a people 
of justice and moderation. Thus the British invaded Mysore not as conquerors but as 
liberators of the mass of the population from the tyranny of Tipu Sultan.47 This was a 
decisive shift in public opinion, one that rejected earlier criticisms of the nabobs. Pride in 
British rule in India as well as pride in British military successes there had become 
widely accepted elements of British nationalism. These changes were never to be 
reversed, and British activities in India were never again to be subjected to prolonged 
hostile scrutiny from mainstream public opinion until the twentieth century.48 
 
 
                                                
46 P. J. Marshall. A Free though Conquering People: Eighteenth Century Britain and its Empire 
(Hampshire: Ashgate, 2003) 
47 Peter Marshall. “Cornwallis Triumphant: War in India and the British Public in the Late Eighteenth 
Century” in War, Strategy, and International Politics. Lawrence Freeman, Paul Hayes, and Robert O’Neill 
(ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992): 71-72 
48 Ibid, 73 
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Tyrant: Tipu Sultan and the Reconception of British Imperial Identity 
 This study builds off of the work of Peter Marshall in arguing that the figure of 
Tipu Sultan and the spectacle of the Mysore Wars were k y contributors to shifting 
British attitudes about the East India Company, and empire more generally, in the last 
decades of the eighteenth century. T rant! explores two key research questions. First of 
all, how did the negative Tipu Legend originate, and why was it so successful at 
replacing alternate representations of Tipu? Secondly, what can this story tell us about 
how the British came to terms with empire – despite initial reluctance – and forged a new 
imperial identity during this transitional period between 1780 and 1800? Using archival 
records, newspaper print culture, and popular art and theatre sources, this study argues 
that the vilification of Tipu was linked to the development of an imperial culture in 
Britain. Expansionist Governor-Generals consciously blackened the character of Tipu to 
make their own aggressive actions more palatable to Bri ish audiences at home. Through 
a process of reversal, preventive war came to be justified as defensive in nature, 
protecting the native inhabitants of Mysore from the depredations of an unspeakable 
despot. The increasingly vilified and caricatured rpresentations of Tipu allowed the East 
India Company to portray itself as fighting a moral crusade to liberate southern India 
from the depredations of a savage ruler. Company servants were recast in the British 
popular imagination from unscrupulous nabobs into virtuous soldier-heroes that 
embodied the finest qualities of the British nation. The study of the faithless and violent 
character of "Tippoo the Tyrant" ultimately reveals much about how empire is 
constructed at home and abroad.  
14 
 
 This study is organized thematically into five chapters. The first chapter examines 
the chronology of the Mysore Wars, providing an overview of the important individuals 
and events that took place in southern India during the period 1780-1800. This chapter is 
designed to provide the non-specialist in this area with a suitable background and 
familiarity to engage with the discussion in the remaining sections.  
 The second chapter, "British Prisoners and European Musselmen", examines the 
situation of the British captives taken and held by Tipu, which was the primary reason 
why the Sultan initially gained so much notoriety in the metropole. This chapter 
investigates the numerous and popular captive accounts written about Tipu's prisoners, 
and the stories of forced religious conversion in which Tipu was accused of turning his 
prisoners into Muslims against their will. As these ceremonies were said to include the 
practice of circumcision, they were also attacks on the masculinity and sexuality of the 
prisoners. Tipu's power to transform the religious and cultural identity of his captives 
demonstrated the deep anxieties that lurked beneath the imperial project, and the fear that 
Europeans would be devoured by the wild and exotic Or ent. The presence of the British 
prisoners and the captive narratives that they generated were viewed both within India 
and in the metropole as deeply shaming, creating a ready-made narrative of redemption 
whereby the Company could remove the stain on the national honor by returning to war 
and defeating Tipu Sultan. The eventual defeat of Tipu and conquest of his kingdom in 
1799 served as a repudiation of earlier British weakn ss, lending confidence to nineteenth 
century claims of racial superiority over Indians.  
 The third chapter, "Tippoo the Tyrant", addresses th  political language of 
tyranny and despotism which came to be associated with Tipu Sultan in the minds of the 
15 
 
British public. The pejorative label of "tyrant" became inextricably linked with Tipu over 
time, most likely due to the easy alliterative association between the words, and belief in 
Tippoo the Tyrant became the defining image of the Sultan for the British populace. This 
chapter traces the development of Tipu's association w th tyranny and despotism, 
beginning with its origin upon the capture of the first British prisoners, and tracks the 
alterations throughout the rest of the Mysore Wars. The chapter argues that the claims of 
Tipu's tyrannical rule emerged in response to criticism that the Company's own 
policymakers had been acting as tyrannical nabobs; much of the public discussion on this 
subject in the 1780s and 1790s focused upon who were th  true tyrants, Indian rulers or 
Company nabobs? Expanding upon the belief that Tipuwas an Oriental despot, he was 
also accused of being faithless and untrustworthy, failing to adhere to past treaties, which 
served to justify the Company's own aggressive dealings. Tipu's supposed brutalization of 
his own populace in Mysore led to claims that the Company's invasions of the region 
were undertaken as acts of liberation, designed to safeguard the local population from the 
depredations of a mad tyrant in true paternalistic fashion. By fighting against an imagined 
despotism in southern India, the Company rehabilitated its own reputation in the realm of 
British popular opinion.  
 The fourth chapter, "Tippoo in Company and Party Politics", investigates the role 
that Tipu Sultan and the Mysore Wars played in the contemporary politics of the British 
metropole. Representations of Tipu reflected wider disagreements about the role of 
overseas imperialism, and public opinion on the subject was far from unified until the 
very end of the period under study. This chapter discusses the public disdain in the mid 
eighteenth century for the nabobs, who were perceived as a stain upon the national honor, 
16 
 
having been corrupted by the vices of the Orient. These popular perceptions were then 
reversed in the final two decades of the eighteenth century, as the struggle against Tipu 
Sultan during the Mysore Wars allowed for the rehabilit tion of the East India Company, 
its nabobs reconceived as patriotic soldier heroes. These decades were a transitional 
period for popular attitudes about empire, and change did not take place overnight. 
Throughout the 1780s and 1790s, there were lengthy debates about Tipu and the Mysore 
Wars within Parliament and the print culture of theday, with a minority political 
Opposition heavily criticizing the conduct of the government and the Company overseas. 
These voices argued that the wars of conquest in India were immoral and antithetical to 
British liberty, calling upon the same political language which had been used to villainize 
the nabobs in earlier decades. However, the eventual cr shing victories won by the 
Company's military served to stifle debate, making it politically untenable to criticize its 
actions overseas. Tipu Sultan was effectively depoliticized as an issue over time. The 
earlier representations of the Company and its servants as nabobs eventually faded away 
from view, as they became reimagined by the British public as virtuous defenders of the 
national honor.  
 The fifth chapter, "The French Alliance and the Storming of Seringapatam" looks 
more closely at Tipu's connections to the French. Tipu's tumultuous relationship with 
France helped to cement his status as an inveterate foe of the British nation, a figure who 
could never be trusted due to his ties with Britain's longtime enemy. These ties attracted 
even more public attention in the 1790s due to the revolutionary situation taking place 
within France, with Tipu's willingness to adopt a liberty cap and style himself as "Citizen 
Tippoo" in the hopes of attracting further French support only serving to fan the flames. 
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This chapter details Tipu's uneven relationship with France over the course of two 
decades, with particular attention given to his final attempts to secure an alliance in 1798 
and 1799. Tipu's misguided efforts to secure French assistance served as a carte blanche 
for the new Governor General of India, Richard Wellesley, to invade Mysore once again 
and eliminate Tipu. The chapter argues that Wellesly consciously played up the threat 
posed by France to serve as a justification for his preemptive war of conquest, despite 
knowing that British India was in no actual danger. Wellesley's shrewd use of Tipu's 
"alliance" with France (and his quick and overwhelming victory) served to insulate him 
from any criticism in the British metropole. The final defeat and death of Tipu in 1799 
provided the breaking point at which alternate, competing viewpoints of Tipu Sultan, and 
more broadly the East India Company's role in empire building, were pushed aside from 
the mainstream of public opinion. There no longer exist d a political space in which Tipu 
could be defended, or the actions of the Company criticized as immoral.  
 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the histor cal memory of Tipu Sultan 
and the Mysore Wars had effectively been fixed and ceased to change further. Tipu 
became remembered by the British as a tyrannical Oriental despot in league with the 
French, and the Mysore Wars as a moral stand against Tipu's tyrannical rule. The 
conclusion of the study, "Remembering Tipu", provides a short overview of how Tipu 
was portrayed within the British historical memory f the period, typically as a 
caricatured stock villain for imperially-themed subject matter. It was not until the 
twentieth century that historians began to rehabilit te the image of Tipu, led by the work 
of South Asian historians in particular, and rediscover the earlier contested period of the 
Mysore Wars at the end of the eighteenth century.   
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 Tyrant! provides an understanding of how the British public eventually resolved 
the tension between their belief that they were a pople of liberty and the problem of 
ruling over tens of millions of Indians on the other side of the world in what was 
unquestionably an unfree system of government. By imag ning themselves to be fighting 
against vicious Oriental despots like Tippoo the Tyrant, the British could convince 
themselves that they were serving as a moral force f r progress and civilization. The 
rulers of India were mere savages, and the people of the subcontinent were locked into a 
hopelessly backwards state of stagnation and superstition. To remedy the problems, India 
and its wild tigers needed to be hunted down and brought under control:  
 India, symbolized by the tigers of Mysore that the British had vanquished at 
 Seringapatam in 1799, was a murky, violent, dangerous place filled with ferocious 
 animals... The carefully cultivated reputation for savagery and sexual prowess of 
 Tipu's Mysore translated ready-made into the propaganda of imperialists seeking 
 to demonize and possess India as a whole. India would have to be ridden of its 
 violent energies in the years to come: its tigers had to be corralled and killed, its 
 inhabitants and their rampant sexuality had to be tamed, and its terrifyingly 
 beautiful landscapes... had to be domesticated to the nice forms of an English 
 suburban garden.49 
 
When the British captured Tipu's capital of Seringapat m at the end of the last Mysore 
War, they symbolically shot all of Tipu's pet tigers and carted Tipu's mechanical tiger 
organ back to London as a trophy prize. The Tiger of Mysore was no more; imperialism 
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 Three separate wars took place between the East India Company and the kingdom 
of Mysore ruled by Tipu Sultan during the 1780s and1790s, known collectively as the 
Anglo-Mysore Wars or more briefly as simply the Mysore Wars. There had been an 
earlier conflict between the two in the 1760s known as the First Mysore War, resulting in 
the wars against Tipu becoming known to history as the Second, Third, and Fourth 
Mysore Wars. This introductory chapter is designed to familiarize the reader with these 
events taking place in southern India at the close of the eighteenth century. The Mysore 
Wars are not generally well known today outside of specialist fields, and their events 
provide the necessary context for the subject matter of this study.  
 These conflicts had sharply different styles, and took place under very different 
circumstances for the British Company. The Second Mysore War (1780-84) was a 
desperate struggle for the Company, initiated by Tipu and his father Haider Ali, one 
which caught the British completely off guard and unprepared. A series of military 
disasters resulted in thousands of Company soldiers being taken prisoner by Tipu, held 
for the remainder of the war and not released untilthe signing of peace in 1784. The 
conflict was unpopular in the British metropole, and viewed by many as a sign that the 
Company was out of control, plagued by poor leadership and avaricious nabobery. The 
Company was very fortunate to escape the war with a return to the status quo antebellum.  
 The subsequent Third Mysore War (1790-92) was contested in a situation far 
more auspicious for the Company. Governor General Ch rles Cornwallis was able to 
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secure alliances with the other principal states in southern India, the Marathas and the 
Nizam of Hyderabad, which joined together with the Company to combat the rising 
power of Mysore. Tipu’s French allies from the previous war also made no appearance in 
this conflict, due to their preoccupation with the nascent French Revolution. Despite 
occasional military setbacks, over the course of three years of campaigning Cornwallis 
was able to carry out a systematic reduction of the ortified positions across Tipu’s 
kingdom, and carry the war into the heart of Mysore. When his capital of Seringapatam 
was on the verge of capture, Tipu was forced to sue for an unhappy peace. The 1792 
Treaty of Seringapatam stripped Tipu of much of his territory, forced him to pay a large 
indemnity, and insisted on the surrender of two of his sons over to Cornwallis as hostages 
to guarantee the peace. This was the decisive breakthrough that the Company had been so 
desperate to achieve, enormously strengthening its position in the Carnatic and 
minimizing the danger posed by Tipu, if not removing t entirely. The Third Mysore War 
was politically controversial in the British metropole throughout its duration, but quickly 
became wildly popular after victory had been achieved, and served as a turning point of 
sorts in the public support of overseas empire.1  
 The Fourth and final Mysore War (1799) arose from Tipu’s desperate search for 
allies to offset his crushing losses in the previous engagement. The Sultan was drawn into 
a confusing series of negotiations with the French, with Tipu hoping for military 
assistance from the revolutionary republic, but insead receiving virtually nothing beyond 
vague promises of future succor. Tipu’s dalliance with the French was used as a pretext 
for a new war of conquest by the new Governor General Richard Wellesley, who 
                                                
1 Peter Marshall. “Cornwallis Triumphant: War in India and the British Public in the Late Eighteenth 
Century” in War, Strategy, and International Politics. Lawrence Freeman, Paul Hayes, and Robert O’Neill 
(ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 
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methodically built up the Company’s military resources for six months before invading 
Mysore in the spring of 1799. Tipu’s kingdom was quickly overrun, Seringapatam was 
first put under siege and later stormed by the Company’s soldiers, and Tipu Sultan 
himself was killed in the fighting. In the aftermath of the campaign, Mysore was further 
partitioned and the remaining rump state became a subsidiary ally of the Company, with 
a British resident controlling revenue collection and military affairs in the name of an 
adolescent puppet ruler.  
Tipu’s defeat and death were symbolic of the ascension of the Company to the 
status of dominant power in southern India. The popular perception in the metropole was 
that British prisoners would never again be terrorized and placed at the mercy of a 
foreign ruler. In the span of two decades, the Company had gone from one political entity 
among many, struggling to avoid being swept away, to a near-hegemonic actor able to do 
as it pleased in southern India. British representations of Tipu Sultan and the Mysore 
Wars were responsible for helping to shift attitudes about empire in these final decades of 
the eighteenth century, with the events of these confli ts providing the context for a 
newfound support of the imperial project.  
The First (1767-69) and Second (1780-84) Mysore Wars 
 The East India Company at the time of the Mysore Wars was a complicated entity 
with a long prior history, and care must be taken not to view it as a monolithic body. The 
Company in the late eighteenth century was going through a series of structural changes, 
many of them forced by acts of Parliament in the British metropole, as it adapted to its 
new role as a territorial sovereign. The Company had tr ditionally been headed by a 
group known as the Council of Directors, a mercantile body based in London appointed 
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by the proprietors who owned East India Company stock. Administration of Indian 
territory was divided into the three Presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, 
each of which possessed its own Governor and Council. I  addition, there was also a 
small British community living in each of the Presidency towns, referred to today as the 
Anglo-Indian community, which published their own Eglish-language newspapers and 
engaged in the print culture debates of the period. The governors and their councils of 
these Presidency towns suffered from chronic disagreements, and their inability to work 
together often proved to be a major drain on the Company's military resources, as would 
again be the case during the wars against Tipu Sultan. 
 In the closing decades of the eighteenth century, his loose and decentralized 
administrative structure was replaced with a much more authoritarian system of rule, to 
be exercised by hereditary aristocrats appointed by the British government. The 
Regulating Act of 1773 established that Parliament had the right to sovereignty over the 
Company and its territory, as well as the ability to pass legislation overseeing its actions. 
It also created the office of a Governor General who ould have priority and 
administrative power over the rest of British India. A further India Bill passed in 1784 
created the Board of Control, a political body that included the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, the Secretary of State, and four Privy Councilors, establishing that the 
Company was under the direct control of the British government. Future Governor 
Generals would be appointed directly by the Crown. The boundaries between the East 
India Company and the British government were highly nebulous and ill-defined during 
this period, and led to frequent disagreements between the Directors, the Board of 
Control, the Governor General, and the individuals Governors and Councils of the 
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Presidency towns. The disputes between these groups are important to keep in mind in 
order to understand the chronology of the Mysore Wars.2 
  Conflict between the Company and the kingdom of Mysore took place in southern 
India over the course of four wars in the second half of the eighteenth century. This 
period of struggle began in the 1760s and was not resolved until culminating in the 
complete defeat of Mysore, including the death of its ruler Tipu Sultan, in 1799. The 
source of the dispute concerned the territory surrounding the presidency town of Madras, 
known as the Carnatic. This region was the source of ontention between four competing 
powers in this period: the British Company, the kingdom of Mysore, the Maratha polity, 
and the Nizam of Hyderabad. These were the major territorial powers in southern India 
during the second half of the eighteenth century; the French also intervened at times to 
undermine the British, but no longer possessed significa t territory of their own in India. 
The state of Mysore was ruled at this time by Haider Ali, a Muslim soldier who 
rose to power from humble origins by overthrowing the previous Hindu ruling dynasty in 
1760 through a successful coup d’etat. Haider proved to be a skilled and ruthless military 
leader, acquitting himself well in a series of wars gainst the other powers in the region 
and expanding Mysore’s territory. The rising power of Haider's state of Mysore 
inevitably drew it into conflict with the other regional powers in southern India. The First 
Mysore War (1767-69) was a confusing and indecisive eries of campaigns, in which 
both the Marathas and the Nizam switched sides at various points in time, fighting for or 
against Mysore depending on the circumstances of the moment. In the end, Haider fought 
the Company to a stalemate that eventually restored the status quo antebellum. The 
                                                




primary result of the war was the signing of a treaty of mutual defense between the 
Company and Haider in Madras on 29 March 1769, in which both sides agreed to support 
the other if attacked. Haider had sought an alliance with the Company to protect Mysore 
from the Marathas, against whom he would end up fightin  in a series of conflicts that 
lasted throughout the 1770s. Despite the terms of the 1769 peace agreement, the 
Company failed to honor its pledge to assist Haider against the Marathas in these wars. 
The result was a grudge that Haider would hold for the rest of his life, and which would 
be passed on to his son Tipu Sahib. Haider awaited  chance to renew the struggle with 
the British Company, and found his opportunity in 1780.3 
Unlike the other Mysore Wars, the Second Mysore War(1780-84) was a 
defensive war for the British Company, one in which it faced a coalition of the other 
powers in southern India. The war was initiated by Haider Ali, with the assistance of the 
Marathas, the Nizam, and the French, and can be seen as part of the worldwide conflict 
generated by the American Revolution. It was a war hich the East India Company had 
no intention of fighting, and was ill-prepared to contest in its opening stages. The conflict 
grew out of the larger worldwide war taking place between Britain and France; earlier, in 
1778, the British Company had initiated hostilities against the remaining French 
possessions in India. Company forces captured Pondicherry with relative ease, then 
proceeded to attack the French port of Mahé on the Malabar coast the following year in 
1779. This was a contentious location, however, as M hé was located within Mysorean 
territory and Company soldiers had to march through Mysore in order to reach the port. 
Furthermore, Haider Ali had explicitly told the British that the city was under his 
                                                
3 H.H. Dodwell. The Cambridge History of India, Vol. 5: British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1963, 1929) Chapter 15, “The Carnatic 1761-84” p. 273-92 
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protection, and sent forces to contribute to its defense. When the Company attacked and 
captured Mahé despite this warning, Haider began preparations to enter the war against 
the British, along with the two other great powers in outhern India, the Marathas and the 
Nizam of Hyderabad. The East India Company would soon find itself in dire straights, at 
war with the French and all three Indian powers toge her in confederation.4 
 Despite this dangerous predicament, the Madras government in charge of the 
Company’s possessions in southern India remained unconcerned about potential attack 
from Haider Ali, and took no precautionary steps against the threat of impending attack. 
A military observer in Madras wrote in May 1780 that widespread rumors existed of 
imminent attack from Haider, but considered the repo ts to be without foundation, due to 
the “unsuspicious tranquility” of the Madras governing council.5 When word did arrive 
that Haider had descended the mountainous Ghats from his own kingdom and invaded 
the Carnatic with an army, “no attention was paid by the people in power to this 
intelligence, which they treated with contempt.”6 Sir Eyre Coote, who was later 
appointed to command the Company forces in southern India after a series of military 
disasters, blamed the situation on poor policy, and rue  the folly of unnecessarily creating 
an enemy of Haider, which was the fault of Company dministrators in Madras.7 This 
combination of Indian powers was extremely dangerous t  the Company’s tenuous 
holdings in the south, and the very poor military performance of the Company’s forces 
would bear witness to this difficult situation.  
Haider and Tipu brought the Mysorean army into the Carnatic during the summer 
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5 Captain Innes Munro. A Narrative of the Military Operations of the Coromandel Coast (London: Printed 
for the author by T. Bensley, 1789): 97 
6 Norman Macleod to Charles Jenkinson [Madras] 13 October 1780 (p. 543-49) IOR/H/150 p. 545 
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of 1780, and had little difficulty overrunning the territory claimed by the Madras 
Presidency. Accounts differ on their treatment of the Indian populace during this 
campaign, with initial sources reporting widespread clemency and leniency, but later 
British sources accusing the Mysoreans of mass slaughter and cruelty.8 Company forces 
under the command of General Hector Munro moved to oppose the passage of Haider’s 
army. On 10 September 1780, Haider managed to isolate and surround a group of 3800 
British reinforcements under the command of Colonel Wil iam Baillie near the village of 
Pollilur. According to descriptions of the battle, the grossly outnumbered Company 
soldiers formed into squares, which were successful at repelling the attacks of Haider’s 
mostly cavalry force, although they took heavy firerom Haider’s siege guns. At the 
climax of the engagement, two tumbrils (ammunition carts) were hit by artillery shells 
and exploded, tearing open huge gaps in the Company squares which the Mysorean 
cavalry poured through and ended the battle.9 While there is some dispute over whether 
the tumbrils actually exploded, or if this was simply a convenient excuse for Baillie’s 
defeat, the facts of the battle are relatively clear, with a smaller Company force 
overwhelmed and defeated by a much larger Mysorean one.10 In the aftermath of the 
battle, hundreds of Company soldiers were taken prisoner by Haider and Tipu, where 
they would spend the remainder of the war in captivity.  
The British defeat at Pollilur forced the Company ito a defensive struggle in the 
Carnatic, primarily centered on the capture and investiture of various fortified locations 
by each side. Haider wisely kept his army out of pitched battles, in which the Company 
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of Mysoor, Volume 3(London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, 1810-1817): 2 
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had a major advantage, and concentrated on using his advantage in cavalry to raid and 
pillage throughout the region. This was a very successful strategy of asymmetrical 
warfare, but for the same reason Haider was unable to consolidate his conquest of the 
Carnatic, leading to an indecisive conflict.11 Two events of interest took place during 
1782, the first involving another military victory by Tipu over a detachment of Company 
soldiers. In an engagement near Annagudi on February 18, Tipu surrounded a force of 
about 1500 soldiers led by Colonel Braithwaite; after heavy shelling by Tipu’s cannon 
and rockets, Braithwaite gave the order to surrender his entire force.12 While Annagudi 
never achieved the same fame or notoriety as the earli r battle at Pollilur, it was 
nevertheless reported upon in the London newspapers nd added to the growing 
reputation of Tipu as a skillful military commander.13 
Another incident which would arouse a disproportionate amount of controversy 
took place on the Malabar Coast in 1782. As part of the ongoing Anglo-French conflict, 
the French Admiral Suffrein captured several British ships, most notably the man of war 
known as the Hannibal. Suffrein was unable to provision the sailors he had taken as 
prisoners, and after failing to work out a captive exchange with the Madras government, 
he turned them over to France’s Mysorean allies.14 This situation was an embarrassment 
for the East India Company that reflected poorly on its reputation and claims to territorial 
governance in India, inciting criticisms of its servants as corrupt and inept nabobs. 
Unfortunately for the Company, worse military disaster  were soon to follow.  
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12 Lieutenant Charles Salmon to unknown, 19 February 1782 (p.251-59) IOR/H/177  
13 London Packet or New Lloyd’s Evening Post (London, England): 22 July 1782, Issue 1889 
14 Captain Innes Munro. Narrative of the Military Operations of the Coromandel Coast (London: Printed 
for the author by T. Bensley, 1789): 277-78 
28 
 
 Perhaps the most dramatic controversy of the war took place in the early months 
of 1783, involving the British General Mathews and the unlawful conduct of his forces. 
According to the report of two Company officers published in the New Annual Register 
for the year 1784, Mathews began his campaign on 5 January 1783 by capturing the city 
of Onore and putting every inhabitant to the sword. One of the officers wrote, “The 
carnage was great; we trampled thick on the dead bodies that were strewed in the way. It 
was rather shocking to humanity, but such are only secondary considerations, and to a 
soldier whose bosom glows with heroic glory, they are thought accidents of course.”15 
The Register’s account claims that Mathews privately plundered a significant amount of 
jewels and diamonds from Onore, which the rest of the soldiery protested should have 
been divided evenly amongst the whole force.16 Mathews then secured an even larger 
share of Indian treasure for himself at Hydernagur, the next city successfully invested, to 
an estimated sum of £1.2 million. This bit of nabobery proved so unpopular that a 
subordinate officer named Colonel Macleod led a group f virtual deserters back to 
Bombay, where they attempted to relieve Mathews of his command of the expeditionary 
force.17 
 Worse accusations against Mathews were yet to come. The Register’s account 
charged Mathews with a wholesale slaughter of the def nding populace in the city of 
Annanpur, including many defenseless women, worth quoting at length: 
When a practical breach was effected, orders were issued for a storm, and no 
quarter: they were received with alacrity, and put in execution without delay. 
Every man in the place was put to the sword, except one horseman, who made his 
                                                
15 New Annual Register 1784, p. 96. Quoted in A Vindication of the Conduct of the English Forces, 
Employed in the Late War, Under the Command of Brigadier General Mathews, against the Nabob Tippoo 
Sultan (London: Logographic Press, 1787): 18-19 
16 Ibid, p. 96 in the original, p. 19-20 as quoted here 
17 Ibid, p. 97 in the original, p. 22-26 quoted here 
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escape after being wounded in three different places. The women, unwilling to be 
separated from their relations, or exposed to the brutal licentiousness of the 
soldiery, threw themselves in multitudes, into the moats with which the fort was 
surrounded. Four hundred beautiful women, pierced with the bayonet, and 
expiring in one another’s arms, were in this situaton reated by the British with 
every kind of outrage: for this conduct the troops, however, we are told, 
afterwards received a reprimand.18 
 
This series of circumstances would have been extraordinary enough; however, the 
campaign of Mathews had drawn the attention of Tipu, who marched to meet Mathews 
with a much larger army. Mathews found himself besieged inside the city of Bednur, and 
after a siege lasting seventeen days, agreed to surrender the fort to Tipu on 28 April 1783. 
The terms of the surrender were that the British defenders would march out with all the 
honors of war, laying down their arms in the process, and leaving inside Bednur the 
various wealth that had been looted during the course of the campaign.19 Accounts differ 
on what transpired when Mathews and the Company soldiers exited the city; some 
versions claim that Tipu discovered Mathews attempting to make off with the Bednur 
treasury by hiding it inside the baggage train, while others argued that Tipu simply 
surrounded and seized the Company soldiers due to his duplicitous character. All 
accounts agree that Mathews and his men spent the remainder of the war as prisoners 
deep inside Mysore, where many of them, including Mathews himself, perished before 
the end of the conflict. 
Haider Ali passed away suddenly and with little warning in his military camp on 6 
December 1782 due to a cancerous growth on his back, leaving the rulership of Mysore 
and command of the war to his son Tipu. Upon taking control of the kingdom, Tipu Sahib 
changed his title to Tipu Sultan, the new position claiming religious as well as political 
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authority over his domains. Like his father Haider b fore him, who had also claimed the 
title of sultan, Tipu was employing Islamic symbols designed to contribute to the 
legitimacy of his rule, always a potential issue du to Haider's low birth and rise to power 
through the overthrow of Mysore's previous rajah.20 From this point forward, Tipu 
became the main subject of attention for British observers of the Mysore Wars in India 
and in London.  
 As the Second Mysore War began to wind down in 1783, the major scene of 
military action centered around the city of Mangalore, on the western Malabar coast of 
Tipu's domains. Mangalore had earlier been captured by Company forces, and a small 
garrison of British soldiers and sepoys were trying to hold the city's fort against a vastly 
larger Mysorean army.21 Tipu was frustrated by the desertion of his French allies during 
the siege, as word had arrived from Europe of the peace treaty signed in Paris ending the 
war generated by the American Revolution. The French commander General Bussy and 
Tipu were both thoroughly disillusioned with one another by the end of the war for 
failing to support one another properly.22 As one anonymous member of the Company 
wrote at the time, "Tippoo, who was angry with the Fr nch for having forsaken him, 
made large demands upon them on account of supplies afforded by him during the War 
and in consequence of their non-compliance, is said to have threatened to march an Army 
to Pondicherry."23 This was far from the last time that Tipu would be let down by his 
French allies, with whom he entertained a complicated and strained relationship.  
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 Similar frustrations of anger and resentment were expressed by the outnumbered 
defenders of Mangalore, in this case towards the East India Company for not sending a 
relief force to the assistance of the starving garrison. John Wolseley kept a diary of the 
events unfolding at Mangalore, which he published after the war's end, one which is full 
of the privations that he and his fellow soldiers suffered through as they slowly starved to 
death. Wolseley had nothing but scorn for the Company after it failed to provide more 
supplies by sea, with the soldiers threatening mutiny and dying in large numbers in 
deplorable conditions, cursing the Company with their last breaths.24 Eventually, reduced 
to eating "horses, frogs, dogs, crows, cat-fish, black gram, etc. in the utmost distress for 
every necessity of life," the Mangalore garrison was forced to surrender to Tipu.25 The 
commanding officer at Mangalore, Major Campbell, negotiated the official terms of the 
capitulation with Tipu in person. 
British sources disagreed on how the surrender of Mangalore took place, with 
some accusing Tipu of violating the terms of the agreement and others insisting that Tipu 
treated the surviving garrison with honor and lenity.26 The Company sent a group of 
peace commissioners to meet with Tipu during this period of truce, hoping that the exit of 
France from the war would incline Tipu to end hostilities. The result was the signing of 
the Treaty of Mangalore and an official end to the war in March 1784, in which both 
sides agreed to return to the status quo ante bellum.27 The Company placed an extremely 
high priority on securing the release of the prisoners captured during the course of the 
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war, the ones lost in battle and taken from captured ships, which was written into the 
second article of the treaty. Tipu did in fact releas  thousands of prisoners after the 
signing of the treaty, including large numbers of sepoys serving in the Company's 
military.28 However, a dispute soon arose over the status of a small number of "European 
Musselmen", who were not released from Mysore and co tinued to remain under the 
control of Tipu. The subject of these men, who were believed by the Company to be 
British soldiers forcibly converted to Islam against their will, would remain a major issue 
of dispute throughout the next decade.29 
The Second Mysore War had been an ill-planned disaster for the British Company 
from start to finish. It enjoyed no military victories of note and failed to acquire any new 
territory, while running up large debts that were politically unpopular in the metropole.30 
The Company was very fortunate simply to achieve a r turn to the status quo, largely due 
to the weakness of Haider and Tipu's forces in set piece battles and siege warfare. The 
humiliating capture of British prisoners, many of whom spent long years languishing in 
Tipu's dungeons, led to charges of corruption and incompetence from critics in Britain. 
The Company needed an opportunity to change its image in southern India, and found it 
in the form of new political leadership. 
The Third Mysore War (1790-92) 
After the furor surrounding the Second Mysore War came to a close in 1784, 
there was little mention of Tipu Sultan in Britain during the next few years. Tipu's war 
against the Marathas in 1787 received only passing interest in the London newspapers, 
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and what few mentions there were tended to concentrat  on lingering issues from the 
previous war, such as the British prisoners remaining in captivity or an editorial 
supporting or condemning the behavior of General Mathews.31 Although Britons 
remained more interested in Tipu than in any other Indian prince, and East India hands 
continued to worry about Tipu's commitment to the peace, public interest had clearly 
shifted to other subjects for the moment. 
 Following the conclusion of his war with the Marath s, Tipu spent much of 1788 
putting down a rebellion in the coastal Malabar region of his domains, suppressing the 
high-caste Hindu Nairs of the region.32 This provoked the fears of the neighboring Rajah 
of Travancore, who worried that Tipu would advance a ross the border and attack his 
kingdom next. Travancore was protected along its northern border with Mysore by a 
system of defenses known as the Travancore Lines, a series of ditches and ramparts 
running between the coast and the mountains that protected Travancore from the east. 
Just beyond these lines were two ancient Dutch forts, Jaikottai and Kranganur, which had 
been captured from the Portuguese back in the 17th century. The Rajah of Travancore 
purchased these two forts from the Dutch in 1789, and incorporated them into his 
defensive system, initiating a diplomatic controversy.  
 John Holland, the Governor of Madras, was not at all pleased with the purchase of 
these forts, which was done without consulting the East India Company. Holland rightly 
feared that the purchase would provoke Tipu into military action, and since Travancore 
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had signed a subsidiary alliance with the Company, would lead to a general engagement 
in southern India. Under the terms of the subsidiary alliance, the Company was obligated 
to come to the assistance of Travancore if it were attacked, but the Rajah was also 
forbidden from entering into alliance with other European powers, or instigating a 
conflict for his own purposes. As Holland had anticipated, Tipu Sultan was indeed 
enraged by the transfer of the two forts. Tipu argued that the forts belonged to his own 
tributary ruler, the Rajah of Cochin, and that the Dutch had only leased the forts from him, 
and could not sell them to another state. The legality of the sale remains a disputed topic 
amongst modern scholars.33 
 Regardless of the debate surrounding the sale's validity, Tipu responded by 
bringing a large military force to the Travancore Lines. Tipu demanded the evacuation of 
the forts and the surrender of his rebellious subjects, many of whom had fled Malabar and 
found asylum in Travancore. When the Rajah of Travancore refused these demands, Tipu 
ordered the attack in December of 1789. The military assault itself was a surprising 
failure, with the Mysorean soldiers repulsed and Tipu himself suffering a minor injury in 
the fighting. As Tipu paused to bring up more of his army and prepare his siege train for 
a more proper assault, the East India Company began to intervene in the conflict for the 
first time.34 
 The Governor General of India at the time of the dispute was Charles Cornwallis, 
a military man of long experience best remembered today for his surrender at Yorktown 
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during the American Revolution. Cornwallis had traveled to India to replace the outgoing 
Governor General Warren Hastings in 1786, with the Company hoping that Cornwallis 
would restore integrity to its administration and improve its military standing. Cornwallis 
chose to overrule Governor Holland of Madras in this dispute, charging Tipu with 
breaking the previous Treaty of Mangalore by his actions in Travancore, and he began to 
prepare the Company for a new conflict. Tipu had hoped to avoid another war with the 
Company, but he soon found himself forced to respond t  the actions of Cornwallis, 
leading to the onset of the Third Mysore War (1790-92).  
 During the first year of the war in 1790, the East India Company enjoyed few 
military successes. Cornwallis' great triumph was to ecure treaties of alliance with the 
other two great powers in southern India, with the Marathas on 1 June 1790 and the 
Nizam of Hyderabad on 4 July.35 Both Indian states were concerned by the growing 
power of Tipu's Mysore, and agreed to enter into the war on the side of the Company and 
share in an equitable division of territorial conquests. The Whig opposition in London 
objected to these alliances as antithetical to the dictates of Parliament, which forbade the 
East India Company from engaging in wars of conquest, since the treaties bound 
Cornwallis into a war of territorial annexation against Tipu's Mysore. Their objections 
caused a great deal of political debate in the metropole, but had no effect on the 
operations taking place in India.36 Militarily, Cornwallis had secured an enormous 
advantage for the Company's side, adding some 20,000 Indian cavalry to make up for the 
Company's deficiency in horse, and reversing the situation from the Second Mysore War. 
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Instead of a military coalition of native princes formed against the East India Company, 
the Third Mysore War would instead consist of a general alliance against Tipu Sultan.  
 The kingdom of Mysore itself presented formidable natural barriers to invasion; a 
pair of mountain ranges known as the Eastern and Western Ghats defended the entrances 
to the central Mysore plateau wherein the capital of Seringapatam was located. In order 
to reach the heart of Tipu's domain, the Company's forces would have to ascend the steep 
passes through the Ghats, with all of their heavy guns and equipment, and then continue 
to supply themselves in hostile territory [Figure 1].37 This would prove to be no easy task. 
General Medows attempted to pass through the Ghats during the summer and fall of 1790, 
but proved completely unable to do so, and nearly sw the complete destruction of one of 
his detachments under the command of Colonel Floyd.38 Tipu's superior mobility and 
excellent use of his forces had prevented Medows from making any gains at all during 
the first year of the war. Company soldiers were unable to reach Mysore, and Tipu had 
been able to descend the mountain passes and invade the Carnatic once again. 
 Given the lack of success enjoyed by the Company forces under the command of 
Medows, Cornwallis decided to travel to Madras and ssume personal control of the war 
at the beginning of 1791. In many ways this was intended as a political gesture, designed 
to shore up the alliances with the Marathas and the Nizam, both of whom had been slow 
to provide support for the war effort. Instead of pursuing Tipu's mobile army throughout 
the Carnatic, Cornwallis moved instead to invade Mysore via the most direct route 
straight up and through the Eastern Ghats. Catching Tipu by surprise, Cornwallis 
successfully scaled the mountain passes and entered the kingdom of Mysore, placing the 
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important city of Bangalore under siege and eventually c pturing it at the end of March.39 
The fall of the city had important political ramifications, reinvigorating the Company's 
Indian allies and prompting them to launch their own invasions of Mysore. There was a 
general expectation that Cornwallis would advance on Seringapatam and capture Tipu's 
capital, putting a speedy end to the war.  
 After the fall of Bangalore, Cornwallis was forced to pause briefly to restore his 
food and ammunition supplies. Once reinforcements arrived in May of 1791, Cornwallis 
pushed on towards Seringapatam with the intention of placing the city under siege. 
Unfortunately for the Company forces, the monsoon season began early and played 
havoc with the advancing army, exhausting and killing the draft cattle that served as the 
logistical lifeblood of all armies in India. Cornwallis had no choice but to order a retreat 
to Bangalore, due to lack of supplies, destroying the same siege guns which had been 
laboriously hauled up the Eastern Ghats. Tipu celebrat d the retreat as a major victory, 
believing that this had proved the futility of an attack against his capital. In the British 
metropole, doom and gloom once more descended upon the public perception of the war 
effort.40 
 Cornwallis used the rest of 1791 to make preparations for another campaign 
against Seringapatam. His first task was to ensure his supply routes from the Carnatic up 
through the Ghats to Bangalore, which were defended by a number of mountainous forts. 
The Company's military forces succeeded in capturing nearly all of these locations 
through a series of small engagements, many of which were recorded in sketches or 
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paintings.41 These rocky hill forts had been considered to be impregnable by the Indian 
armies, and their fall seemed to reinforce the belief in the invincibility of the Company's 
white soldiers. Although the taking of the hill forts largely passed without undue attention, 
a great deal of notoriety eventually came to surround the capture of Ossure, which fell in 
July of 1791. It appeared that Tipu had ordered the execution of several European 
captives at Ossure shortly before it was evacuated, th reby reinforcing all of the long-
standing beliefs about prisoner atrocities from the previous war. Accounts of the prisoner 
killings at Ossure would appear in virtually all of the later literature about Tipu, as an 
example of his cruelty and savagery.42 
 The preparations of Cornwallis were completed shortly after the beginning of the 
new year, and his forces set out again for Seringapatam in February 1792. The reduction 
of Tipu's hill forts ensured a steady flow of supplies for the Company's army, eliminating 
the logistical problems which had crippled the previous campaign. Tipu decided not to 
challenge Cornwallis in a set piece battle, which was probably the correct decision given 
the superiority of the Company's infantry, and chose in tead to rely on the formidable 
natural defenses of Seringapatam [Figure 2].43 The city itself was located on an island in 
the middle of the river Cauvery, and Tipu had constructed a series of strong fortifications 
on the island itself and the terrain to its north. T e Sultan hoped to defend his capital 
against a siege until the seasons turned, bringing back the monsoon rains and forcing 
another retreat of the Company forces due to lack of provisions. The strategy itself was 
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sound, and similar tactics had previously defeated many European armies in India, but it 
would not prove effective on this occasion.44  
 Cornwallis arrived at Seringapatam on 5 February 1792, and immediately 
launched a daring midnight assault on Tipu's fortifications on the night of 6 February. 
Tipu's soldiers were caught completely by surprise, having expected that the Company 
army would wait to bring its siege guns into position before challenging the defenses, and 
soon fled back to the island itself. Cornwallis was now able to move up his siege guns 
and begin reducing the fortifications of Seringapatm; after two weeks of bombardment 
the walls were almost completely destroyed, and it was apparent to all that an attack 
would soon commence and capture the city. Tipu had no choice but to sue for peace 
terms with the invading armies.45 
 Tipu had in fact been trying to negotiate a separate peace with Cornwallis for 
some time. Unfortunately for the Sultan, Cornwallis had stipulated earlier that peace 
could only arrive as part of a general agreement with the Company's allies, the Marathas 
and Nizam.46 The Opposition politicians and newspapers in London charged that these 
alliances were being cynically manipulated to justify the continuation of an 
expansionistic war of conquest, an accusation which seems rather accurate. Cornwallis 
himself wrote repeatedly that Tipu's duplicitous character made it impossible to trust him 
during negotiations, exaggerating Tipu's negative qualities as a means to extract harsher 
concessions: "But with what confidence can a negotiati n be carried on with a man, who 
not only violates treaties of peace, but also disrega ds the faith of Capitulation during 
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war."47 Cornwallis also made frequent mention of the prisoners issue from the previous 
conflict in his correspondences, using it as a signof the faithless character of the Sultan. 
By playing up the cruelty and violence of Tipu's character, Cornwallis was able to justify 
a series of very harsh peace terms, as necessary to reign in the "tyrant" that threatened all 
of southern India. At the same time, Cornwallis himself could appear magnanimous in 
victory, and claim to be disinterested in the spoils f war - even as the Company received 
enormous sums of money and vast tracts of land as part of the treaty. 
 After several weeks of negotiation, the Treaty of Seringapatam was concluded on 
17 March 1792. Tipu was forced to surrender half of his dominions, pay an indemnity of 
6 crore rupees (60 million rupees, an astronomically high sum at the time), and release all 
prisoners still held in his territory.48 The lands surrendered by Tipu were to be split 
between the East India Company, the Marathas, and the Nizam, with each party receiving 
territory that bordered areas already under their control. After the initial terms of peace 
had been agreed upon, Cornwallis pulled a diplomatic sleight-of-hand and added into the 
final treaty that Tipu would have to surrender the lands of the Rajah of Coorg as well, one 
of his rebellious subjects whose territory did not b rder any of the attackers. This 
diplomatic trickery nearly reignited the conflict and infuriated Tipu, but ultimately the 
Sultan was left with no choice but to sign the treaty. 
 The most controversial aspect of the treaty was the way in which Cornwallis 
sought to guarantee the peace. Written into the treaty was the following clause: "Until the 
due performance of the three foregoing articles [territorial exchange, indemnity payment, 
and prisoner release] two of the sons of the said Tippoo Sultaun shall be detained as 
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hostages."49 The use of hostages during diplomatic negotiations wa  common during the 
eighteenth century, but the taking of young children c rtainly was not, nor was it at all 
ordinary to hold the family members of heads of state in virtual captivity for years after 
the signing of peace. During the negotiations that led up to the treaty, this was the term to 
which Tipu objected the most strenuously, even more s  than surrendering Mysorean 
territory. Tipu's emissary Ghulam Ali related how "Tipu from a sense of shame at being 
reduced to so low an ebb, would be extremely loath to part with them [his sons]", and a 
few days later his negotiators "demanded if two or three of Tippoo's principal and most 
confidential Officers would not be taken," instead of Tipu's sons, which Cornwallis 
rejected.50  
 The insistence of Cornwallis on taking Tipu's young sons as hostages, rather than 
some other members of Tipu's court, remains a mystery. The best explanation is that 
Cornwallis and the rest of the British community living in India saw this as an 
opportunity to humiliate the Sultan on a personal leve , paying him back in some sense 
for the captivity of the British soldiers by taking his own sons prisoner. Given the 
"revenge" motifs that surrounded so much of the Anglo-Indian writing about the Third 
Mysore War, it was quite likely that the captivity of Tipu's own children was demanded 
as a symbolic response to Tipu's imprisonment of the sons of Britain.51 Cornwallis may 
also have perceived Tipu as a savage, as suggested by he frequent disparaging remarks 
about the Sultan contained in his correspondences, and thus believed that only "savage" 
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measures would serve to contain him.52 The hostage princes were held by the Company 
in Madras for the next two years, and only returned to Tipu when the massive indemnity 
specified in the treaty was paid in full. The spectacle of the princes also aroused 
considerable interest from the British public in the metropole, and was commemorated in 
the popular art and theatre of the day.53 
 Cornwallis himself received universal accolade for his military victory in India. 
The public uncertainty and unpopularity that had exist d during the course of the war 
evaporated immediately upon its successful conclusion. Cornwallis had always remained 
a popular figure in the public eye, even when the war against Tipu was faring poorly, and 
his triumph over Tipu ensured that he would be celebrat d as a hero throughout the 
British Empire. He was awarded the Freedom of the City of London, voted the official 
congratulations of both the Lords and Commons, promoted to the peerage, and feted with 
a massive celebration on his return to the capital in 1794.54 The peace treaty itself was not 
quite so universally popular as Cornwallis himself, although a strong majority of the 
public gave their approval. The general consensus was that the war had been extremely 
well prosecuted, and the treaty itself an example of Cornwallis' fairness and moderation 
in victory, but opinion was split as to whether theconflict should have been prosecuted to 
Tipu's final defeat and destruction. Nonetheless, it was difficult for even the harshest 
critics of the East India Company to object to the results of the conflict. The Third 
Mysore War reversed the Company's fortunes in southern India, greatly weakening the 
power of Tipu's Mysore while enriching the British in the process, and all without 
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suffering any of the military disasters of the previous conflict. Desperately seeking a way 
to offset his losses, Tipu turned to the one power that could potentially oppose the rising 
strength of the British Company: an alliance with the French.  
The Fourth Mysore War (1799) 
 The years following the return of the hostage princes to Tipu were once again 
tense and uncertain for the servants of Company in India. Lord Cornwallis returned home 
in 1793 and was replaced as Governor General by Sir John Shore, a longtime Company 
servant entirely lacking the forceful personality of his predecessors and successor. Shore 
did not come from an aristocratic family, and his administration was reminiscent of 
earlier periods when men from more humble and commercial backgrounds were in 
charge of the Company's Indian affairs. Shore was content to make few adjustments to 
the administrative systems put into place by Cornwallis, and had no interest in wars of 
conquest. His five years as Governor General (1793-98) were largely uneventful and 
unexciting, characterized by a policy of non-intervention into the affairs of other Indian 
states - a policy which would be thoroughly repudiated by Lord Wellesley, the man to 
follow him in office.55 
 Nevertheless, there remained a great deal of uncertainty regarding Tipu Sultan, in 
particular whether he would choose to ally himself with the cause of the French. Without 
the benefit of hindsight, the policy-makers of the Company were never entirely sure 
whether or not Tipu was planning to initiate another round of warfare in southern India. 
The fear of Tipu joining with the French, at the time in the midst of their own turbulent 
revolutionary period, remained a bogeyman haunting the minds of Company servants. 
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Repeated false rumors of war with Tipu, always linked in some way to an alliance with 
France, permeated discussions of Indian affairs in 1797 and 1798, reflecting the overall 
uncertainty of the period.56 
 Tipu was indeed considering the possibility of an alliance with France, in the 
hopes that it would allow him to restore the lost terri ory from the previous war. The path 
towards this French alliance began with an unlikely source. A French privateer and 
adventurer named Francois Ripaud landed at the port of Mangalore in 1797 seeking an 
audience with Tipu. Ripaud led Tipu to believe that e had been sent as an envoy from 
the French colony of Mauritius, on a small island i the Indian Ocean, promising the 
arrival of a large French contingent of soldiers which would join with the Sultan to expel 
the British from India. Tipu's ministers correctly deduced that Ripaud was a fraud who 
had no real backing from the French colonial governme t, which should have been the 
end of this escapade. Nevertheless, Tipu accepted the false promises of Ripaud and began 
planning his own embassy to Mauritius in response. Tipu's desire for revenge and 
desperate search for allies against the British Company appear to have overridden more 
sensible judgment and led him into this poor decision. The contemporary Indian historian 
Mir Hussain Kirmani wrote afterwards in 1802 that "the Sultan in certain matters 
frequently acted precipitately and without thought, and in these cases would attend to no 
representation, even from his most faithful servants," specifically referring to Tipu's 
unwise decision to trust Ripaud as an example of por judgment.57 Tipu chose to ignore 
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the advice of his advisors and actively pursue the assistance of this phantom force of 
French soldiers, which would have grave consequences for the Sultan. 
 Tipu sent a group of ambassadors to Mauritius in 1797 to negotiate the terms of 
this alliance with France, intending their mission t  be kept strictly secret. Instead, the 
French Governor Malartic publicly welcomed the ambassadors with a great show of 
pageantry, and then foolishly issued a public proclamation calling for citizens to come 
and serve in Tipu's military.58 In the end, the mission failed to provide anything more 
than token French support for Tipu's cause, while givin  away his intentions of working 
closely together with Britain's most dire antagonist. Tipu's repeated requests for military 
assistance from the French would be in vain. His embassy to Mauritius gained him 
nothing, while simultaneously revealing all of his most secret negotiations. Tipu did not 
have an alliance with France, and did not have any substantial number of French soldiers, 
but had given ample justification to associate himself with Britain's military enemies. 
This would be used by the new Governor General as the pretext for the Fourth Mysore 
War. 
 Sir John Shore was replaced as Governor General in 1798 by Richard Wellesley, 
known at the time as Lord Mornington, who was the older brother of the future Duke of 
Wellington.59 Wellesley had entered politics at a young age, taking a seat in the Irish 
House of Lords in 1781 at the tender age of 21. His ambitious personality and close 
friendship with William Pitt and Henry Dundas secured him first appointment to the East 
India Company's Board of Control in 1793, and later th  Governor Generalship in 1798. 
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A born autocrat who sharply disagreed with Shore's management of India, Wellesley had 
an aggressive, expansionistic view of what the Company's role in India should be, with 
the goal of extending British rule over as much of the subcontinent as possible. He did 
not subscribe to the older view of the Company as atrading entity which only possessed 
territory to facilitate commerce, but saw it instead as a sovereign power forming the basis 
of a new empire in the East.60 
 Wellesley sought to solve the problem of India's chronic instability by outright 
annexing the weakest of the states allied with the Company, and warring against the 
remaining powerful independent states of Mysore and the Marathas. Wellesley was 
notorious for his arrogance and difficulty in dealing with others, and he made no attempt 
to follow the instructions of the Company's Directors, being contemptuous of the 
commercial elements within London's India House.61 The new Governor General had 
little interest in turning a profit or keeping military expenditures low, and instead was 
determined to eliminate all French influence from India to secure British rule. The 
increasingly imperial style of Wellesley's administration was another demonstration of 
the Company's changing role as the eighteenth century came to a close. The Company 
may have been a political entity from the very start, but the accession of men like 
Wellesley into positions of leadership demonstrated how the British state and the 
traditional landed elements within British society were in the process of conquering the 
Company.62 
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 Although it has been argued by some historians that Wellesley simply reacted to 
events as they took place, a closer reading of the sources suggests that he already had a 
clear plan for India in mind before arriving, one which was bent on further expansion and 
conquest.63 Henry Dundas and the Company's Board of Control in Lo don were much 
more concerned than Wellesley about the threat posed by France; they were prepared to 
sanction Wellesley's wars in India, but only insofar as they achieved the goal of 
protecting British India from the French threat. These two motives overlapped at times, 
but they were not the same.64 The Company's administration in London was not 
interested in further wars of conquest in India, and insisted that any military conflicts 
should be defensive in nature. Wellesley would have to be very careful about shaping the 
context of the Fourth Mysore War such that it would meet this requirement of defensive 
warfare. Adding urgency to the situation was the departure of a French naval expedition 
from Toulon in late May 1798. The result would be Napoleon's ill-fated Egyptian 
invasion, but the destination of this force was not immediately known at the time, and 
there was much anxiety that the French were planning to land in India. The context of 
this threat posed by France was crucial in understanding how Wellesley chose to 
approach his dealings with Tipu Sultan.  
 Wellesley's view of the situation in India was strikingly different from that of the 
Directors, and geared towards bringing about offensiv  operations as soon as possible. 
Wellesley first heard mention of the Malartic Proclamation in June 1798 and immediately 
determined to go to war with Tipu. In his letter of 21 November 1798 to the Court of 
Directors, Wellesley wrote that he issued "final orders" for war to the governments of 
                                                
63 See C. A. Bayly. Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988): 81 
64 Edward Ingram (ed.) Two Views of British India (1969): 4 
48 
 
Madras and Bombay as far back as 20 June, calling their armies into the field against 
Tipu.65 From this early date, Wellesley was committed to war against Tipu, long before 
he received any word of the French naval expedition. It did not factor into his decision to 
go to war with Tipu at all; the Malartic Proclamation alone was sufficient justification for 
Wellesley. During the following months, Wellesley engaged in a series of sham 
correspondences with Tipu, stringing along the Sultan to allow time for the Company's 
military to prepare an aggressive invasion. Wellesley also misled the Directors in London 
as well, suggesting that an attack on Mysore was necessary to ward off a potential French 
invasion of India, and making it appear that his actions were strictly defensive in nature. 
Knowing full well that Tipu had no plans for war, and that the French army was 
hopelessly mired in Egypt, posing no threat to British India, Wellesley carefully 
manipulated the image of Tipu as a tyrannical ruler and used it to justify his pre-emptive 
attack on Mysore. The result was the onset of the Fourth Mysore War in February 1799.66 
 Wellesley had a far easier task in confronting Tipu at the tactical level compared 
to his predecessors in the previous Mysore Wars. The territorial losses suffered by 
Mysore in the previous conflict made it much easier for the Company's forces to 
penetrate into the heart of Tipu's domains, no longer eeding to ascend the Ghats and go 
through the tedious reduction of the hill forts therein. This was a critical setback for 
Tipu's strategy, as his Indian soldiers fared poorly in pitched battles against the Company 
and relied instead on using high mobility to raid and pillage in a form of asymmetrical 
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warfare.67 Without the ability to descend from the high passes and plunder the Carnatic, 
Tipu was forced into a losing defensive strategy. Tipu's army had also been significantly 
reduced in size since the past war; after an estimated high of 130,000 soldiers in 1789, the 
Sultan had downsized to a mere 50,000 troops in 1798, although he began recruiting 
again when the rumors of war began to swirl. The best estimate suggests that Tipu had 
slightly over 60,000 soldiers at his disposal for the war, still less than half of what he 
marshaled in the Third Mysore War.68 
 Wellesley had also used the months of military buildup to great success in the 
diplomatic realm, seeking to revive the triple alliance from the Third Mysore War and 
once again invade Mysore with the assistance of the Marathas and the Nizam of 
Hyderabad. In the latter case, Wellesley virtually engineered a palace coup, with 
Company soldiers moving into Hyderabad to forcibly disband the French officers who 
commanded the Nizam's forces. In place of these units, the Nizam agreed to sign a 
subsidiary alliance with the Company, creating six battalions of Company sepoys 
commanded by British offiers.69 Hyderabad would survive as a princely state under the 
British Raj for the next 150 years, with the Nizam effectively becoming a puppet ruler. 
As for the other power in southern India, the Marathas were too divided with their own 
internal disputes at this point to offer much assistance, with the Peshwa responding 
evasively to Wellesley's requests for assistance against Tipu. The Governor General 
charged the Marathas with exhibiting the same sort of behavior as Tipu Sultan, their 
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actions "betrayed a systematic jealousy, suspicion, and even insincerity," indicating the 
same mindset that he employed against Tipu.70 Less than four years later, Wellesley 
would instigate a war against the Marathas in 1803 on similarly dubious pretexts of 
aggression, suggesting that his pattern of behavior with Tipu was not unique.71  
 Nevertheless, Wellesley had managed to ensure that the other major powers in 
southern India would either be allied with the Company or out of the conflict entirely. 
Outnumbered by the Company's armies and with no French aid forthcoming, Tipu had 
little choice but to retreat into the heart of Mysore and attempt the best military defense 
he could muster. His attempts at a scorched earth defense, which had succeeded in 
driving away Cornwallis' 1791 invasion, were undermined by Wellesley's careful 
preparations. The Madras government had amassed over 100,000 bullocks and massive 
stores of grain for supplying the soldiers. The Company armies wasted no time on the 
campaign, joining with the Nizam's subsidiary forces and marching to Seringapatam, 
which they reached in early April 1799. Tipu's best hope was to withstand a siege until 
the middle of May, when the monsoon season would cause the river to rise and postpone 
military operations for the next six months. This was not to be, as the Company set up its 
artillery train without opposition and began reducing the walls of the fortress. Within a 
few weeks, it was obvious to all parties that Seringapatam would not be able to withstand 
an assault for much longer.72 
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 General Harris, the commanding officer of the Company's forces, sent Tipu a 
letter on 20 April proposing to hold a conference to discuss peace terms. The proposed 
treaty outlined what the Company hoped to gain from the war, if Tipu had agreed to the 
terms. Written in eleven articles, it required Tipu to accept an "ambassador" from each of 
the allies, in other words essentially turning Mysore into a client state of the Company, 
with the British resident controlling policy. Tipu was also asked to remove all Frenchmen 
from his domains (robbing Mysore of their technical expertise as military officers and 
designers of fortifications), renounce all connections with the French nation, pay an 
indemnity of 2 crore rupees, and further cede another half of his territory, not counting 
the domains already lost in the previous war. As security for the treaty, four of Tipu's 
principal officers and four of his sons (to be chosen by General Harris) were to be 
delivered into the Company's hands, and not to be relinquished until the exchange of 
territories and indemnity payment were received. Tipu was given 24 hours to respond, 
and the hostages were to arrive in the British camp within a further 24 hours.73 
 Taken in full, these terms constituted an even more severe redux of the 1792 
Treaty of Seringapatam. Mysore would cease to be a significant power in southern India, 
and Tipu would become a puppet ruler, further humiliated by having to give up four more 
of his sons as hostages. Although this treaty was never signed, it is interesting to see what 
the Company valued, and in what order. Tipu's connection to the French had become the 
paramount issue, as symbolized by its inclusion in the opening treaty articles, while the 
subject of British prisoners had become little more than an afterthought, mentioned only 
in a single line in the seventh article of the treaty.74 
                                                




 Tipu offered to send two of his vakils to Harris for negotiation, which was 
rejected by the general. Harris insisted that Tipu must accept the terms of the treaty as 
they were stated without any room for compromise.75 There was no further response from 
the Sultan, and no records to indicate his thoughts in these final days. On 4 May, Harris 
judged that enough of a breach had been created in the walls to launch a full assault, and 
charged General Baird, who had been a captive of Tipu for several years during the 
Second Mysore War, to lead the attack. The subsequent "Storming of Seringapatam" 
would become one of the iconic images of the Mysore Wars, commemorated later in a 
series of dramatic paintings of the event.76 In military terms the operation was a striking 
success; despite fierce fighting at the walls, within a few hours the city was in the hands 
of the Company, and resistance quickly subjugated.  
 The whereabouts of Tipu were a great mystery for several hours, leading to 
further anxiety that he may have escaped during the confusion, before the palace's 
killedar informed General Baird that Tipu had been wounded by a gateway on the north 
end of the fort. Upon reaching the scene, Baird found Tipu's body mixed in with a large 
group of dead and wounded men, the Sultan identifiable only due to his rich clothes. Tipu 
had received several wounds from a bayonet in his right side; during the hand to hand 
fighting, a British solider tried to steal the gold buckle from his sword belt, and when 
Tipu responded by attacking with his saber, the British soldier shot him through the head 
a little above the right ear.77 The Sultan looked so lifelike that many of the Company's 
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officers initially thought that he was still alive, but upon checking his pulse it was 
confirmed that Tipu had indeed perished, bringing the war to a decisive conclusion.  
 With Tipu dead and Seringapatam in their possession, the Company had won a 
complete and overwhelming victory. Losses for the Company were relatively light, the 
official lists published afterwards detailing 389 casualties sustained in the assault, and 
roughly 1500 for the campaign as a whole.78 The city of Seringapatam was given over to 
the soldiers for looting and plundering that night, drawing uncomfortable parallels to the 
behavior of the Company's soldiers at Annanpur in the Second Mysore War, with order 
being restored the following day. The Company also captured vast stores of military 
equipment in the fortress, albeit much of it of inferior quality, and a king's ransom in 
treasure and jewels. Beatson valued the bullion at 2.5 million star pagodas, or £1.143 
million.79 Wellesley turned down his share of the prize money (although his other senior 
officers did very well for themselves), hoping for an English peerage and an invitation to 
the Order of the Garter; he would be bitterly disappointed to receive only an Irish 
lordship for his services.  
 The official treaty ending the war was not concluded until 13 July 1799, time 
having been taken to more fully divide up the spoils f war. Known as the Partition 
Treaty of Mysore, it devoted the overwhelming bulk of its length to the division of 
territory between the Company, the Nizam, the Marathas (who were granted minor 
districts despite not taking part in the war) and the remaining rump state of Mysore. 
However, the treaty did insist one final time that the blame for the war's outbreak rested 
upon the shoulders of the departed Sultan and his connection with the French: 
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Whereas the deceased Tippoo Sultaun, unprovoked by any act of aggression on 
the part of the allies, entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the 
French, and admitted a French force into his army... [the allied armies] proceeded 
to hostilities, in vindication of their rights, and for the preservation of their 
respective dominions from the perils of foreign invasion, and from the ravages of 
a cruel and relentless enemy.80 
 
Wellesley's fiction that it had been a "defensive" war was therefore written into the very 
treaty itself, intended to be preserved as the final capstone of the conflict for all time.  
 Regarding the future of the kingdom of Mysore, the gr atly reduced state would 
not be ruled by Tipu's heirs, as it was believed by the Company that they could not be 
trusted to guarantee the peace. Beatson wrote that such an arrangement would have 
contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction, for with Tipu's heirs, "no sincere 
alliance, no concord of sentiments, nor union of views, could ever have been 
established."81 Instead, the throne of Mysore was restored to the Hindu Wodeyar dynasty 
unseated by Haider Ali in 1760, the new Rajah a young boy who was all of five years old 
and obviously intended to serve as a British puppet. The kingdom was controlled in 
practice by the British Resident, Mark Wilks, who spent much of the next decade using 
his new position to write a vehemently anti-Tipu history of the wars in southern India.82 
Mysore was forcibly included into the Company's subsidiary alliance system, and as 
Beatson explained in his narrative, "his Lordship [Wellesley] resolved to reserve to the 
Company, the most extensive and indisputable powers of interposition in the internal 
affairs of Mysore, as well as an unlimited right of assuming the direct management of the 
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country."83 Mysore had become a client state of the British Company, with the resident 
controlling all decisions and the new rajah an adolescent figurehead.  
 The military campaign of the Fourth Mysore War had been an unparalleled 
success, exceeding the wildest hopes of its supporters. Victory had been achieved quickly, 
at little cost in lives or military expenditures, and had resulted in the death of the 
fearsome Tipu Sultan, along with virtual annexation of his large and prosperous kingdom. 
Accolades for the victors began pouring in immediately, full of triumphant rhetoric and 
bombastic support for the growing British Empire in the East.84 The public reaction was 
one of wild celebration and excitement, mixed with a eavy dose of cultural arrogance 
and feeling of British superiority over the Indian populace. The long anxiety over Tipu 
had finally been resolved, and the Company’s territories were considered to be 
permanently secured. Lord Wellesley, the man who had done more than anyone else to 
engineer the war against Tipu, was granted an enthusiastic reception and showered with 
praises from all corners of the British domains. While Wellesley remained in India and 
did not return to Britain to bask in the spoils of victory, the reaction he received was 
similar to that garnered by Lord Cornwallis seven yars earlier. He received the thanks of 
Parliament, widespread public accolade, and an Irish lordship for his services. Wellesley 
faced virtually no criticism or opposition at home for his decision to enter into the war, 
which was a marked contrast from the public reception surrounding the earlier Mysore 
Wars. Tipu's "alliance" with the hated and feared specter of revolutionary France appears 
to be the crucial factor responsible for this difference.  
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 Wellesley’s victory over Tipu brought an end to theCompany’s wars against 
Mysore, although they were soon replaced by the Governor General’s wars against the 
Marathas. Tipu’s defeat represented the end of an era for the Company’s role in southern 
India, as it had become the dominant power in the region instead of simply one power 
among many. This newfound position brought with it an increased confidence in the 
ability of Britons to rule over Indians. Earlier military setbacks had suggested that the 
Company’s position in India was tentative, and potentially one step away from disaster. 
Tipu’s dominance of the captured British prisoners similarly served to highlight some of 
the anxieties underlying the imperial project, the fear that Britons would be swallowed up 
and devoured by the wild and untamed Orient.  
However, many of these worries were rapidly diminishing in the aftermath of 
victory over Mysore. Tipu’s defeat suggested that British arms could overcome their 
rivals, and British virtues triumph over Indian vices. The cruel and despotic tyrant of 
Mysore had been cast down from power, and the Company’s territories secured against 
every available contingency.85 British paintings and dramatic productions in the 
metropole exhibited to the public the spectacle of the great victories that had been 
achieved by the heroic soldiers of the East India Company.86 The Mysore Wars were 
therefore important not just politically and militarily for the strategic benefits gained by 
the Company in southern India, but at a cultural level as well, and it is the distinct way in 
which these conflicts resonated for the British public in the metropole that will be the 
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focus of the remainder of this study. The wars against Tipu Sultan played an important 
role in reshaping how Britons felt about their empire, and particularly in their growing 
acceptance of overseas conquests. In order to trace the development of this process, the 
next chapter begins with the origins of the negative Tipu Legend, in the capture of so 


























The image of Tipu Sultan was first defined within the context of the British 
prisoners captured during the Mysore Wars. British servants of the East India Company 
and Britons in the metropole first came into contact with Tipu through the lurid 
descriptions found in prisoner accounts, detailing various atrocities committed against 
helpless captives. It was the presence of these British prisoners that set Tipu apart from 
any number of other Indian princes, and drew wider attention to the spectacle of the 
Mysore Wars. The prisoner experience came to define the arly wars for the British, 
becoming part of the historical memory of the conflicts, later used as an exotic set piece 
for imperial adventures in fiction and drama.1 
Many of the prisoners wrote narratives of their period of captivity, which were 
widely published in popular print culture during the 1780s and 1790s. Captive narratives 
describing exotic locations overseas were commonplace in the eighteenth century, and 
their frequent reprinting in new editions testified to their popularity.2 Accounts described 
the poor treatment and foul living conditions that c ptives faced in the dungeons of 
Mysore, where many of them remained for years at a time before their eventual release. 
Prisoners were often chained together, good food was sc rce and disease commonplace, 
with many of the British soldiers failing to survive their period of captivity. Making 
matters more troubling still was the prospect of religious conversion; Tipu Sultan was 
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said to have forced British captives to convert to Islam against their will, renouncing their 
European identity by adopting Indian dress and becoming soldiers in the armies of 
Mysore. These “European Musselmen” were symbolically emasculated through the 
process of circumcision, turned into the dependent tool of a tyrannical oriental despot. 
They were cut off from their former lives as members of the British nation, their 
identities remade against their will, potentially lost forever to families and loved ones at 
home. This was an often overlooked aspect of the British experience overseas: facing 
captivity, subjected to alien rule, forced to live n terror and vulnerability.3 
At the same time, of course, this failed to tell the complete story of the prisoners. 
Troubling accounts from India suggested that many of the Company’s soldiers and even 
officers had been acting in unscrupulous fashion, failing to keep their word and making 
off with vast sums of money for their personal enrichment. Tipu’s imprisonment of these 
men was designed as a punishment for failing to adhere to signed agreements and for 
despoiling the landscape of his kingdom. Other prisoner accounts contradicted the 
sensationalist claims in the popular press, indicating that many of the captives were 
reasonably well treated during their time in Mysore. The supposedly forced conversions 
to Islam could equally have been a deliberate choice n the part of some captives, 
preferring to cross over into a self-fashioned India  identity and take up service under 
Tipu rather than remain in a prison cell indefinitely.4 When weighed as a whole, the 
evidence behind the prisoner experience painted a much ore complex picture than the 
rather simplistic narrative of a cruel Eastern tyrant lording over stalwart British captives.  
The presence of the British prisoners and the captive narratives that they 
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generated were nevertheless instrumental in shaping how the British public came to view 
Tipu Sultan and the Mysore Wars. The very existence of the prisoners was a symbol of 
shame and humiliation for the East India Company, oe that it worked very hard to erase. 
The captive accounts greatly influenced the popular perceptions of Tipu, lending support 
to the belief that he was a capricious despot out to destroy the British presence in India. 
The prisoners issue was also ready-made for a narrative of redemption, suggesting that 
the Company could remove the stain on British honor by returning to war with Tipu and 
defeating him once and for all. Rhetoric of this sort was common in the years following 
the Second Mysore War (1780-84), both inside and outside of Company circles. The 
prisoner dilemma also served as a further way to spin their captivity into a morality play 
of empire. British captives were portrayed in song a d on the stage as embodying the 
national honor, bravely refusing their blandishments of Tipu to convert to Islam and enter 
his service at great personal cost to themselves. Thi  served as a means to transform 
weakness into strength, demonstrating the moral superiority of the British over the 
Indians, and provided further justification for the imperial project.5 
 It should be noted that the large majority of these prisoners were Indian sepoys 
employed in the Company’s service, who were mostly ignored by the British both in 
India and in the metropole, in their fixation on the white captives taken. Both the Anglo-
Indian community living in the subcontinent and thelarger British public barely 
mentioned the sepoys at all, and an uninformed observer would have been led to believe 
from their writings that the Company's forces were composed entirely of Britons. The 
outpouring of literature about the captured prisoners also made little mention of the 
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multinational character of the Company's armies, in which Scots, Irish, and other 
Europeans of Continental descent were commonplace. It was far easier to project a 
universal "Englishness" onto the bodies of the imprsoned soldiers, making their plight 
more sympathetic to British audiences in the metropole. Since a perceived threat to 
British identity was at the heart of the prisoner dilemma, it was best for the Company and 
its supporters not to dig too deeply into the actual "Britishness" of the captives 
themselves.  
 These (European) prisoners were the overriding focus f both the Company and 
the British public during the Second Mysore War, and therefore serve as the focus of this 
chapter as well. They represented the weakness of the Company’s military and the 
serious threat posed by Tipu Sultan, the terrifying a d savage Tiger of Mysore who held 
the power of life and death over his captives. However, with the passage of time, the 
prisoners became less and less important to the British, eventually disappearing almost 
entirely as a subject of discussion by the time of the Fourth Mysore War in 1799. With 
their growing strength in southern India, the British no longer experienced the same deep-
rooted anxieties that they had felt in the early 1780s, when it appeared as though they 
might be forced from the region entirely. The Company nd the British public no longer 
wanted to focus on the weakness and powerlessness that the prisoners had represented for 
an earlier generation. Popular discourse instead turned to triumphant and celebratory 
displays, especially after Tipu’s final defeat and death in 1799. The dread that the Sultan 
used to inspire had been conquered, and the prisones had been symbolically freed 
forever.6 This was an indication of the growing confidence in mpire as the eighteenth 
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century gave way to the nineteenth century, with the earlier gloom and uncertainty about 
the conquest of territory overseas replaced by an embrace of the Company’s masculine 
soldier-heroes.7 
The Shock of Captivity and Assigning Blame 
 The experience of captivity at the hands of Tipu Sultan and his father Haider Ali 
was unsettling and deeply humiliating for most of the Company's British soldiers. 
Accustomed to looking down at Indians as their racial and social inferiors, these men 
now found themselves at the mercy of these supposedly avage individuals. This first 
component of the captive experience necessarily involved a loss of freedom and the 
passing into the custody of the Sultan's men. In most cases, this took the form of defeat in 
battle, the transfer of custody from the French to the Mysoreans, or the overrunning of 
territory previously held by the British Company. The humiliating process through which 
Europeans were put under the control of Indians greatly shaped the way in which Tipu 
came to be viewed, as the prisoners invariably blamed Tipu for the sufferings that they 
endured during captivity. This was the genesis for the image of the tyrannical and cruel 
Oriental despot of the Tipu Legend, which would later come to characterize 
representations of the Sultan.8  
 It was perhaps inevitable that the process of capture also invariably turned into a 
search for scapegoats, both within the East India Company's ranks and amongst the wider 
British public. When disasters befell the Company's military and delivered British sons 
into the hands of its enemies, attention quickly shifted into a search to assign blame. One 
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line of thinking suggested that incompetent nabobs were responsible for the British 
captives in India, men of low birth who were more interested in their own enrichment 
than safeguarding the interests of the British natio . This was a subject of great debate 
during the last few decades of the 18th century.9 However, it was far easier to place the 
blame for the Company's losses on its opponents, the Indian princes who had no ability to 
represent themselves within the sphere of British public discourse. Scapegoating Haider 
and Tipu into terrible monsters was the path of least resistance for the Company to take, 
and also worked in accordance with changing racial attitudes about the backwardness of 
Indian civilization at the end of the eighteenth century.10 As a result, the process of 
capture for the British prisoners became interlinked with the villainization of Tipu Sultan. 
This was visible on multiple occasions during the Mysore Wars.   
 The first sizable group of British prisoners were taken directly at the start of the 
Second Mysore War in 1780, in the aftermath of their d feat at Pollilur. Reports from the 
battlefield immediately accused Haider and Tipu of massacring the Company soldiers 
after Colonel Baillie had issued an order of surrender. Soldier Francis Gowdie wrote to 
his brother after the war that Baillie had held up a white handkerchief and was instructed 
to lay down arms; when the Company soldiers did so, “the Horse immediately broke in 
amongst us, and a most Shocking Massacre issued.”11 William Thomson, an officer in 
Baillie’s detachment, told a very similar account of he battle’s ending. After Baillie 
signaled for the surrender, “Our men received orders to lay down their arms, with 
intimation that quarter would be given. This order was scarcely compiled with, when the 
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enemy rushed upon them in the most savage and brutal manner, sparing neither age nor 
infancy, nor any condition of life…”12 Robert Latham, one of the prisoners taken after th 
battle, provided a lurid description of violence that verges on the point of hyperbole: 
...we were at last ordered to throw down our Arms. At this Instant the Horse 
rushed in upon us. They killed or wounded most of us; few escaping except those 
who threw themselves amongst the Slain. The Cruelties exercised upon this 
occasion, and of which I was an unhappy witness, surpass all description. They 
were so enormous, that at this moment I can hardly help doubting my own 
Testimony of their evidence. Women and Children seemed particularly marked 
out as Objects of Vengeance. I saw a well dressed Woman, with an Infant in her 
Arms, implore the Mercy of a Man whose Sword was uplifted for her destruction: 
He paused and listened with a specious attention to her Prayers. The Barbarian 
then assumed an aspect expressive of his Diabolical Thoughts, and with one 
stroke cleaved the Infant to the waist. The Mother fondly endeavoring to avert the 
Blow, her left Breast was cut off. A Second Stroke put a period at once to her 
Misery and to her life. Many Officers were dragged from the crowd, with 
Promises of Protection, and after being stript to the Skin, were driven upon the 
Plain, and there massacred. All the sick and wounded were butchered in their 
Palanquins.13 
 
These sorts of atrocities were commonly attributed to Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan by the 
prisoners afterwards, as a means of demonstrating the Indian “savages” against which the 
Company was fighting. The truth or fiction of these claims is less important for our 
purposes than their representation of Haider and Tipu before a public audience. The 
prisoners were predisposed to cast Tipu and his father in an unflattering light when they 
wrote on their experiences after the war.  
 After the slaughter on the battlefield had run its course, the victorious Mysorean 
army began the process of collecting hundreds of surviving prisoners, who would be 
taken back to Mysore and endure years of captivity. Many authors alleged that Haider 
showed further unnecessary cruelty to the prisoners after the battle was finished. One 
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report claimed that Baillie was stripped naked and forced to appear in chains before 
Haider, who exulted in his power over the defeated British colonel.14 Another account 
insisted that wounded soldiers were left for dead on the battlefield, suffering from the 
attacks of wild animals and terrible thirst: “While the enemy’s horse and elephants 
marched again and again in barbarian triumph over the field of battle, the wounded and 
bleeding English, who were not instantly trodden to death by the feet of those animals, 
lingered out a miserable existence, exposed in the day to the burning rays of a vertical 
sun, and in the night to the ravages of foxes, jackalls, and tygers, allured to that horrid 
scene by the scent of human blood.”15 The repeated use of references to “savage” and 
“barbarous” behavior suggested that the actions of Indian rulers like Haider and Tipu 
were beyond the boundaries of decent, civilized behavior. 
 However, other sources from Pollilur argued exactly the opposite regarding the 
treatment of the prisoners, namely that Tipu Sultan h d been kind and generous to the 
defeated. John Baillie, another captive from the unfortunate detachment, wrote that, “A 
great many Officers and Soldiers when taken were carried before Hyder in the condition 
they were in who looked at them with great unconcer and desired them to sit down. 
Many were also carried before Tippoo Saheb who treated them with great kindness,” 
although Baillie goes on to state that Tipu later acted much more cruelly towards the 
prisoners.16 William Thomson, whose account of the battle was not at all favorably 
inclined towards Haider and Tipu, nonetheless wrote that Tipu treated the British officers 
with great humanity, inviting them into his tent and providing them with biscuits and five 
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pagodas. Thomson related an anecdotal story of Tipu passing on a letter from Captain 
Monteith to his wife at Madras, as a further gesture of humanity.17  
 Early mentions of Pollilur in the newspaper press in London also had nothing 
negative to say about Tipu, instead praising his skill as a military commander. An early 
appearance from the London Chronicle in 1781 wrote how “Tippoo Saheb, with that 
Celerity which distinguishes every Operation of that g llant Prince, saw the Moment of 
Advantage, and without waiting for Orders, made a rapid Charge with the Mogul and 
Carnatic Horse, penetrated the broken Square, and… completed the Overthrow of that 
gallant Band.”18 The Morning Herald and Public Advertiser wrote of "the brave Prince 
Tippoo-Saib", who saw an opportunity in battle and moved "with that promptitude and 
rapidity which characterizes all his actions", leading the charge of cavalry at its head that 
broke the British ranks.19 There was genuine respect and admiration for Tipu's military 
abilities, even if he happened to be fighting for the opposing side. This praise for Tipu’s 
clemency after Pollilur, and his representation as a “gallant prince” in his first 
appearances in public discourse, demonstrated how te later vilification of Tipu’s image 
was yet to develop. If anything, most of the early impressions included favorable 
commentary on his abilities as a military commander. 
In the case of both John Baillie's and William Thoms n's accounts, a distinction 
was drawn between the generous conduct of Tipu towards the prisoners and the 
barbarous conduct of Haider towards the same. Yet wh n Tipu inherited the throne upon 
his father’s passing at the end of 1782, the same sources insisted that Tipu’s behavior had 
changed, and he became much crueler towards the captives. While it is possible that 
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Tipu’s demeanor changed during the intervening period, a more likely explanation is that 
those who wanted to defend the Company’s record required their opponent to be a ruler 
with despotic qualities. So long as Haider was the head of Mysore, Tipu’s character and 
abilities could be praised and contrasted to his father; once Tipu assumed power, however, 
he also had to become a stereotyped Oriental despot. It was necessary that the ruler of 
Mysore possess a villainous reputation, so that the war could be interpreted as a morality 
play highlighting the bravery and masculine qualities of the British soldier contrasted 
against the tyranny of his Indian opponents. Imaginin  the conflict in these simplistic 
terms was a way to divert attention away from the de ply unsettling and humiliating 
reality of British defeat and captivity.  It is difficult otherwise to explain such a dramatic 
personality shift in Tipu Sultan over the span of a few months. 
 A similar process was in operation during the controversy surrounding the 
captured sailors on board the Hannibal. These British sailors had been taken prisoner by 
the French Admiral Suffrein in 1782, then transferred to Tipu's custody after failing to 
work out an exchange of captives with the Madras government.20 These men would 
spend the remaining years of the war in prison, dealing nother blow to the prestige of the 
Company, and a search was soon underway for new scapego ts to blame. The Madras 
Council came under scrutiny for not acting decisively to secure the release of the British 
sailors when it had the chance. In the words of one Company military officer, “It 
appeared, however, that the unanimity requisite to effect a business, even of this trivial 
importance, did not subsist between the members of the Council and Commander of the 
army at Madras; and it consequently became the fate o  upwards of three hundred British 
                                                
20 Captain Innes Munro. A Narrative of the Military Operations of the Coromandel Coast (London: Printed 
for the author by T. Bensley, 1789): 277-78 
68 
 
subjects, like too many others before them, to be immured in the prisons of Bangalore, 
and other garrisons in the Misore country…”21 The Governor and Council of Madras, 
embroiled at this moment in controversy over a bribery scandal with the Nawab of Arcot, 
appeared more interested in their own enrichment than securing the release of Britain’s 
native sons captured in war. Critics charged that it was another sign of corrupt 
nabobery.22  
But it was much easier to blame the military opponents of the Company for the 
imprisonment of the British sailors, and Admiral Suffrein and Tipu Sultan ended up 
receiving the lion’s share of criticism on this subject. The General Evening Post of 
London detailed some of the pains suffered by these captives at the hands of Tipu: "Mons. 
Suffrein, who, under pretense of the British Commander in Chief not agreeing to a 
mutual exchange, delivered them over to Tippoo Saib’s people, who treated them so 
barbarously, that most of them perished. Forty-three of these brave unhappy Britons died 
in one day from hunger and fatigue, and were buried in a hole in Travencore."23 The 
General Evening Post was a newspaper that usually adopted a Tory stance in politics, and 
with the Pitt ministry actively supporting the East India Company, it should come as no 
surprise that the paper took this opinion. Note the "pr tense" of not agreeing to an 
exchange of prisoners in this passage, with the wording removing culpability from the 
Company's administration. In this fashion, blame for the fate of the captives was shifted 
from the mismanagement of the Company’s leadership onto the Indian prince that held 
the sailors in bondage. The supposedly cruel persona of Tipu Sultan here came to 
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embody British anxieties over the exotic and savage customs of the East.  
 This mixture of shock at the military setbacks of the Company and subsequent 
process of debate over how to assign appropriate blme reached its apogee during the 
controversy surrounding General Mathews. This public outcry surrounded a series of 
events taking place in 1783, which culminated in Mathews and his entire army 
surrendering the city of Bednur and becoming the prisoners of Tipu for the remainder of 
the war.24 The Mathews campaign was another embarrassment for the East India 
Company, and not simply because it ended in military disaster for the soldiers involved. 
Mathews embodied all of the qualities of the nabob that the Company was trying to shed 
in the process of reforming its negative image.25 Mathews was greedy, unscrupulous, and 
accused of massacring the defenseless Indian population of Annanpur; in short, he had 
been acting in despotic fashion. Members of the British public reading about the 
plundering of Indian wealth at the hands of Mathews would have been unavoidably 
reminded of the nabob scandals of earlier decades, with Mathews appearing to confirm 
all of their worst qualities.26 
 The solution that the Company's advocates seized upon was to flip the story 
around and respond to criticism surrounding the British prisoners by vilifying the 
character of Tipu. This would serve both to redirect attention away from the 
embarrassment of the Mathews disaster and to provide a justification for the Company's 
actions in the war. By making the argument that Tipu Sultan was an Oriental despot, the 
reputation of Mathews (and the East India Company more broadly) could be rehabilitated. 
                                                
24 See Chapter 1. 
25 Philip Lawson and Jim Phillips. “‘Our Execrable Banditti’: Perceptions of Nabobs in Mid-Eighteenth 
Century Britain” in Albion XVI (1984): 225-41 
26 Nicholas Dirks. The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006): 55-56 
70 
 
If Tipu were an untrustworthy despot, then Mathews had done no wrong in trying to 
sneak away with the loot from the city of Bednur, since Tipu would only have cheated 
him and broken the deal anyway. Pre-emptive action was the only successful way to deal 
with such a ruler. The way in which the Mathews camp ign played out in the popular 
press demonstrates how this process of reversal worked.  
 The initial news of the fall of Bednur contained few details of the events that 
transpired. Newspaper accounts based upon British correspondences from India reported 
that Mathews and his army had been captured, and there was little interest in the subject 
at first during the summer of 1783.27 By November of the same year many of the 
particulars of the campaign began to emerge into the print culture of the day, and the fate 
of Mathews became a recurring subject of discussion in the newspaper press, spurred on 
by the simultaneous debate taking place on Charles Fox’s India Bill in Parliament. Much 
of the early reaction was sympathetic to Mathews, as the full story of Annanpur and 
Bednur was not well known, and Mathews himself had already perished in captivity. 
Although this was an unfortunate result from the pers ctive of Mathews himself, it was 
a boon to his reputation in Britain, allowing Mathews to be portrayed as a martyr who 
had been terrorized by a cruel Oriental sultan. Widespread rumors sprang up in the press 
that Tipu had poisoned Mathews while he was imprisoned; he had been separated from 
his captive army and thrown into a filthy dungeon where he was forced to drink a lethal 
concoction.28 The factual basis for these rumors was shaky at best; the original account 
had the news coming second hand by means of a “washerman” and some writing 
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supposedly found in Mathews’ prison cell.29 Whether Tipu actually ordered the execution 
of Mathews, or if he died of natural sickness from poor prison conditions, the fact 
remains that his death was widely believed both by Company servants and the public 
back home in Britain to have been an atrocity.  
 The initial rumors of Mathews’ death by poison quickly mushroomed into more 
and more fantastic accounts of his demise, all of them casting Tipu in a sinister fashion. 
One story claimed that Mathews had been murdered as the result of a failed coup attempt 
to restore the former Hindu rajah to the throne of Mysore. In this account, Mathews fell 
as “a sacrifice to the suspicions of a tyrant” as Tipu enacted vengeance on any suspected 
targets.30 Another report had a dramatic confrontation occur between Tipu and Mathews, 
wherein the latter “upbraided the Indian with his breach of faith, which so provoked 
Tippoo, that he is said to have instantly drawn his sabre, and cut the General to pieces.”31 
As spectacular as this rumor might appear, theatrical productions on the London stage a 
decade later would use very similar events as a morlity play to showcase how Britons 
never surrendered to their foes.32 Even more outlandish was a rumor spread by the 
Gazette and New Daily Advertiser, which attributed Mathews’ death to Tipu pouring 
boiling lead down his throat; the same piece speculated that there was strong reason to 
believe the other British prisoners “were all equally the victims of Asiatic barbarity.”33 
These sort of cruelties, real or imagined, went a long way towards reshaping the image of 
Tipu Sultan in the popular consciousness, away from the spirited young prince of the 
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initial war reports and towards the monstrous tyrant envisioned by the Company. 
 However, at this early period during the Second Mysore War, the image of both 
Tipu Sultan and the East India Company remained disputed subjects, with advocates 
supporting and demonizing each of the two competing powers. Unlike later periods, there 
were always commentators willing to defend the character of Tipu, and argue against the 
interpretation of events put forth by the Company ad its servants. The ongoing debate 
surrounding Mathews served as an example of this process in action. Shortly after the 
London newspapers reported on the boiling lead rumos of Mathews' death, the St. James 
Chronicle backed away from hyperbole and placed the story in larger perspective: 
General Mathews was undoubtedly destroyed, and it was universally supposed by 
Poison; the Field Officers, most of the Captains, ad some of the Subalterns were 
also put to Death; but the Tortures of melted Lead an  boiled Oil poured upon 
them seem to have been a mere Invention. What princi ally incited Tippoo-Saib 
to go beyond the native Ferocity of his Disposition, was the Circumstance of 
General Mathews having removed the greatest Part of the Treasures from 
Benamour [Bednur], before it was invested by the Nabob’s Army.34 
 
Although this account was hardly a positive endorsement of Tipu’s conduct, it provided a 
rational explanation for why Mathews had been put to death, and made Tipu appear less 
like a capricious Oriental despot. The same paper added further context to the situation a 
few days later, including the first details of the Annual Register account covering the 
actions of Mathews’ army prior to its surrender:  
The Cause of their deliberately murdering our Peopl, while Prisoners, is reported 
to have arisen from the General [Mathews] having allowed his Troops, in the 
Sunshine of his Prosperity, to massacre all the Menth y found in the Fortress of 
Oonore, on the Malabar Coast, which he took by Storm a short Time previous to 
his Defeat. The Women, in this Scene of Slaughter, w e treated with the most 
horrid Indecency; and the eldest of the Brahmins, with two of his Priests, 
destroyed by the Fury of the Soldiers.35 
 
                                                
34 St. James Chronicle or the British Evening Post (London, England) 4 December 1784, Issue 3705 
35 St. James’ Chronicle or the British Evening Post (London, England) 9 December 1784, Issue 3707 
73 
 
With this additional context added, Mathews appeared more as a greedy status-seeker out 
for his own interests, and Tipu Sultan an opposing commander with at least probable 
cause for his actions.  
 London newspapers were not the only ones covering th s story. The Bath 
Chronicle related the same information on Mathews’ conduct at Onore, and went further 
in editorializing on the controversy. After criticizing Mathews for bringing back immense 
wealth and several children (of various hues and complexions) to Britain, the Chronicle 
detailed the slaughter of 500 Indians and concluded, “Who can say that Tippoo Saib was 
not justified even in the cruelty of his retaliation?”36 The criticisms of Mathews listed by 
the Bath Chronicle were the same ongoing ones that had been directed at he nabobs for 
the past two decades: greed, cruelty, decadence, and corrupted morals.37 These 
newspaper accounts therefore provided an alternate and competing narrative of the war. 
They argued that it was the East India Company who as to blame for the sufferings of 
the British prisoners, with its soldiers intent only on enriching themselves through Indian 
plunder, and its administrators too incompetent to carry out even something so simple as 
a proper prisoner exchange. In these accounts, the conduct of Tipu Sultan, barbarous or 
not, was no excuse for the poor example set by the Company overseas. 
Throughout the Second Mysore War, attacks against the character of Tipu were 
therefore met with equal fervor by attacks against the conduct of the East India Company. 
A damning Annual Register eport containing details of the alleged atrocities committed 
by Mathews' army broke in the London newspaper in January 1785, and much of the 
coverage which had been sympathetic to Mathews earlier now swung in the other 
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direction. The Morning Post and Daily Advertiser detailed the purported massacre at 
Annanpur, and editorialized: “The barbarities committed by Tippoo Saib on General 
Matthews and his captive army, now seem to have been merely a retaliation for similar 
enormities committed by the troops of the Company.”38 The Gazetteer and New Daily 
Advertiser related the same incident, and used it to attack the morality of the Company as 
a whole, claiming that the cruelties practiced upon Mathews and his captured men were a 
retaliation for injuries which had been committed on the natives of India: "It is the 
unprincipled oppression practiced by rapacious Governors and their dependants, which 
has made the very name of European detested in most part  of the Asiatic continent… 
The India powers will never be otherwise inclined till rapine ceases, which can never be 
expected while any degree of peculation remains."39 These editorials were couched in the 
same language of moral tropes that had been employed f r decades against the nabobs, 
charging the Company and its servants with endemic corruption and avarice. The actions 
of Mathews called to mind the actions of unsympathetic figures like Clive and Hastings, 
resulting in the same political language once again criticizing the Company in print 
culture.  
Further information later seeped out concerning the violation of the treaty signed 
at Bednur, and which side was responsible. An account printed in the General Evening 
Post contended that the articles of surrender stipulated ll public property should remain 
in the fort; however, Mathews held onto public treasure worth fifty thousand pagodas, 
and attempted to sneak it out by distributing it amongst his officers. The ruse was 
discovered when a bed belonging to one of the officers was dropped, and four hundred 
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pagodas fell out, at which time Tipu had the remainder of the Company army searched 
and taken into captivity.40 These sorts of stories cast doubt upon which force was truly 
acting despotically in India, the armies of Tipu Sultan or the armies of the Company, and 
did little to dispel the negative public perception that continued to dog the Company and 
its servants. 
 The defenders of the Company had to respond to these allegations, and their own 
account of the Mathews campaign appeared in a pamphlet entitled A Vindication of the 
Conduct of the English Forces, Employed in the Late War, Under the Command of 
Brigadier General Mathews, Against the Nabob Tippoo Sultan. This short publication 
went through the claims of the Annual Register eport paragraph by paragraph, disputing 
each of them in full in order to defend the conduct of the soldiers and officers involved. 
There is no question that this pamphlet was produce as a direct response to the public 
criticism of General Mathews, and it demonstrated how the military officers and civilian 
administrators of the Company were active participants in the realm of late eighteenth 
century British print culture.  Excerpts from A Vindication of the Conduct of the English 
Forces were printed in many of the popular metropolitan newspapers, ensuring its 
dissemination amongst a wide audience of readers.41 
 The authors denied that Mathews had taken any plunder at Onore, and the amount 
captured at Hydernagur was used only on pay for the soldiers that was in arrears.42 Their 
description of Annanpur charged the defending India g rrison with violating two flags 
of truce, and imprisoning the officers sent to parlay. A storming of the fort then took 
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place, but quarter was given and the enemy wounded were cared for in hospitals 
afterwards, while the story of the four hundred slaughtered women was “as false as it was 
infamous.”43 The pamphlet ended with a seemingly random attack on Tipu’s character, 
which helped to reveal the connections between perce tions of the Company and 
perceptions of Tipu: 
We were ordered into the Canara country to draw Tippoo Saib from the Carnatic, 
where he had been ravaging, with unrelenting barbarity, from the commencement 
of the war; reducing large and populous villages and cities to ashes, plundering 
the inhabitants, destroying the appearance of agriculture, and, to fill up the 
measure of his cruelty, driving the unfortunate wretch s to distant and 
uncultivated parts of his own empire, there to toil under the heavy hand of power 
and oppression. Let his advocates among our countrymen contemplate this picture, 
and compare it with that we have impartially drawn of our conduct against his 
dominions – then let them blush at declaring the sufferings which we endured 
were “just and merited.”44 
 
This conclusion was an unabashed attempt to draw blme away from the Company 
soldiers in Mathews’ army, and project it onto the s oulders of Tipu. Despite the fact that 
the rest of the pamphlet had nothing to do with Tipu at all, the reader would be left with 
the image of heroic British soldiers resisting the advances of a cruel Asiatic despot. 
Playing up the image of “Tippoo the Tyrant” was one f the most effective ways of 
shifting attention away from the humiliating situation of the British prisoners, and 
recasting the East India Company in a more positive light.  
 The use of the negative characterization of Tipu Sultan in this pamphlet, which 
was a direct response to the criticism of the Company's military forces, suggests that the 
villainization of Tipu was not an unrelated byproduct of the Mysore Wars. It was instead 
deliberately crafted as a response to the negative perception of the Company in many 
segments of contemporary popular culture. The portrayal of Tipu as a tyrannical Asiatic 
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despot distracted attention away from embarrassing co duct like that of Mathews, and 
provided a justification for the costly war effort. The Mysore Wars became recast as a 
righteous crusade to liberate the British prisoners languishing in Tipu's foul dungeons. 
Their unhappy experience in jail was one that became n enduring image in the minds of 
the British public.  
The Prisoner Experience 
 The battles at Pollilur and Annagudi, the sailors f the Hannibal captured by 
Admiral Suffrein, and the disastrous aftermath to the Mathews campaign all had one 
feature in common: the survivors became prisoners who spent the rest of the war in 
captivity under Tipu. The captive narratives of these individuals drew widespread 
attention both in India and amongst Britons in the metropole, as well as from modern 
historians.45 The prisoners were kept in captivity for years, during which time many of 
them converted to Islam and adopted service in the armies of Mysore, discussed in 
further detail in the next section. The adoption of this new Indian identity on the part of 
the captives, whether or not it was forced under duress, struck at the heart of British fears 
about empire. It suggested that these men could be induced to renounce their 
"Britishness", become corrupted by the decadent morals f the East, and could potentially 
be turned against their fellow countrymen in battle. During the eighteenth century, it was 
not uncommon for Europeans in India to adopt local customs of dress and speech, 
sometimes even serving as high ranking Islamic noblemen in native courts.46 This 
scenario was anathema to Britons at home in the metropole, and therefore the captives 
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were instead portrayed as victims, forced against their will into religious conversion by 
the depredations of a cruel Oriental tyrant. The lengthy captive accounts detailing the 
great suffering endured by the British prisoners brought home feelings of national shame 
and humiliation to the metropole, and therefore furthered the growth of a negative 
perception of Tipu Sultan. As a result, the prisoner experience of these captives went a 
long way towards establishing the villainous Tipu Legend in the popular consciousness, 
as well as creating a rationale for future wars of revenge against Mysore to restore the 
honor of the British nation. 
 In each case, the prisoners were marched from their place of capture to one of the 
primary cities of Tipu’s domains. Multiple accounts detail how the prisoners were 
marched through different villages in Mysore, where th  inhabitants were gathered 
together to gaze at them as they passed through.47 Innes Muro wrote that the captives 
were escorted around by a strong guard past every little village on the road, as a public 
testimony of the heroic exploits of the Mysorean soldiers.48 William Thomson provided a 
vivid description of this phenomenon from his personal memory as a captive: “Whenever 
we approached near a village, tom-toms, a kind of drums, and winding collery horns, 
advanced in front, that the inhabitants might, by this discordant music, be assembled 
together to gaze at us, as we passed through.”49 This appears to have been a deliberate 
strategy on the part of Haider and Tipu, as a means of demonstrating their power and 
mastery over the British. The Company’s claim to rule in India was based in large part 
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upon a belief in the invincibility of white soldiers in battle. By parading about captured 
British soldiers from village to village in this fashion, Tipu posed a serious threat to the 
image of invulnerability that the Company tried to pr ject. 
 Once brought to their place of confinement, the prisoners were put to work and 
subjected to a variety of humiliating conditions. Captain Henry Oakes wrote one of the 
earliest captivity narratives published in 1785, detailing how he and his fellow officers 
were imprisoned in one of Tipu’s fortresses and put to work grinding rice. Although their 
situation was a miserable one, in which many officers perished due to exposure to the 
elements and poor medical treatment, they do not appear to have been the victims of 
deliberate cruelty or torture.50  
 Other captive narratives accused their Mysorean overseers of much more brutal 
atrocities. Francis Gowdie claimed that the captured soldiers were forced to work as 
coolies, with irons on their legs, on an insufficient diet; anyone who made the least 
objection was beaten without mercy.51 The London Chronicle passed on a rumor to the 
effect that the prisoners were chained together without distinction (an affront to ingrained 
eighteenth century class divisions), and an officer was forced to remain chained to a 
common sailor for three days after the latter had die of dysentery.52 Another captive 
account contained some melancholy verses that the prisoners sang to one another while 
imprisoned in Bangalore: 
VI. As famine approaches our gate, 
More saving we grow in our fare; 
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Resolv’d to encounter our fate, 
We bury the thoughts of despair. 
We feel with regret our decay, 
So meagre, so lank, and so pale; 
Like ghosts we are rang’d in array, 
When muster’d in Bangalore jail. 
 
VII. Then while the best days of our prime, 
Walk slowly and wretchedly on; 
We pass the dull hours of our time 
With marbles, cards, dice, or a song; 
While others sit mending their clothes, 
Which long since began for to fail; 
Amusements that lighten the woes 
Of the captive in Bangalore jail.53 
 
The captive narratives abound with similar descriptions of days spent bound in chains, 
trying to stave off boredom and remain alive despite the unsanitary prison conditions. 
Their miserable fate was a constant reminder of British weakness and humiliation.  
 An unknown composer created a similar song entitled "Hyder Alley", which was 
published in 1800 but almost certainly originally written during the 1780s. "Hyder Alley" 
was a melancholy song about the British defeat and disaster at Pollilur, with the bitterest 
scorn in the song cast upon General Medows for failing to come to the aid of Baillie’s 
doomed detachment: 
 The succour we expected from General Merow,  
 Which would have been a signal of a glorious victory, 
 But his laying at a distance off, all for a sum of g ld, 
 So we marched back to Chingley Pot where poor Bayley he was sold. 
 
 Surrounded on all quarters, and from them cannot fly, 
 We hoisted out a flag of truce their mercy for to try.
 But instantly on every side on us came marching down, 
 They stripped us naked to the skin and then they cut us down... 
 
 Now in Seringay in irons we do lay, 
 Great numbers of us wounded with sickness we do die, 
                                                




 Here we are for to remain all in this prison strong. 
 When I get clear from all my foes then I’ll conclude my song.54 
 
"Hyder Alley" touched upon the anxieties about overseas empire that were commonplace 
in the 1770s and 1780s. The song suggested that Medows was more interested in his own 
enrichment than ensuring the safety of British soldiers; as a result, the Company's troops 
were now languishing in captivity. In stark contras to later representations of India, 
"Hyder Alley" depicted British soldiers who were weak and vulnerable, dying in 
captivity at the mercy of Indian rulers such as Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan. 
 Captive accounts detailing the horrors of the prisoner experience continued to 
appear during the Third Mysore War (1790-92), despit  the far superior military fortunes 
of the Company. If anything, when they appeared, these accounts were distinguished 
from earlier captive narratives by alleging even worse treatment on the part of Tipu 
Sultan, with sheer boredom and neglect replaced by outright cruelty and execution. 
Captivity was no longer described as mere drudgery and boredom, but posing a dire peril 
to life itself due to the innate savagery of the Sultan. Although there was considerably 
less focus overall on the British prisoners during this conflict, when captive narratives did 
appear they were often filled with the most lurid details of abuse.  
 A letter from Madras dated from 1791 wrote on how “the Tyrant caused poor 
Captain Rutlidge of the Coast Artillery to be blewn from a Gun on the top of a Rock,” 
after a captivity of ten years and when freedom wasithin reach.55 Stories once again 
circulated regarding the fate of General Mathews from the previous war, although 
without the context and public debate explaining why he had become a captive in the first 
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place.56 The Anglo-Indian newspapers continued to be the most c ncerned with the 
subject of British prisoners remaining in captivity, endlessly harping on about the topic. 
The Madras Courier wrote for example in August 1791 on the fate of the Company’s 
sepoys: "In the heat of battle our Sepoys mixed with those of Tippoo’s and were 
unavoidably made prisoners; they were immediately thrown into dungeons, and treated 
with every cruelty... such are the execrable effects of imported fury; such the traits that 
mark the conduct of a russian; such the returns which a despotic barbarian makes for 
extended generously."57 The treatment of these unfortunate individuals remained one of 
the principle justifications for the ongoing wars against Mysore. 
 A book of landscape art published in 1794 by Lieutenant R.H. Colebrooke, who 
had traveled with the army of Cornwallis during theThird Mysore War as a surveyor, 
continued to emphasize the continuing plight of the remaining British captives. 
Colebrooke took jabs at the character of Tipu throughout his publication, writing in the 
description for “East View of Bangalore” how Tipu bilt an extravagant palace as a sign 
of his despotism, and chained British soldiers in iro s down in the dungeons of the city.58 
Colebrooke also painted the mausoleum of Haider Ali at Seringapatam, but unlike other 
British painters in India barely mentioned the building at all, instead commenting in the 
accompanying description how Tipu had ordered four British prisoners clubbed to death: 
“They were tied to stakes, affixed to the four corners of the tomb; and in order that a flow 
of their blood might not pollute the hallowed ground, the inhuman Tyrant caused them to 
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be beat to death with bludgeons.”59 This account was based upon very dubious 
information, Colebrooke admitting he had the story from a Mr. Cadman who himself 
heard the story from an officer in Tipu’s service, and furthermore it had no bearing on the 
image that it accompanied. Nevertheless, it served as another example of the vilification 
of Tipu Sultan, helping to justify the war in which Colebrooke had served in the army of 
Cornwallis. 
 The greatest outcry from the conflict surrounded the alleged prisoner atrocities 
committed in the hill fortress of Ossure. Major Alexander Dirom's narrative of the 
campaign provided this description: 
Some poor people, who remained in the pettah, said there had been three 
Europeans, one of them called Hamilton, prisoners at this place; who were all 
very much respected, and regretted by the inhabitants; that they were alive till 
after the capture of Bangalore, when Tippoo sent orders to put them to death... 
They shewed the place where the unfortunate men were beheaded and buried; and, 
on digging up the graves, the heads were found severed from the bodies, and, 
from the appearance of the hair, and some remnants of their clothes, no doubt 
remained of the truth of this murder; which is one f the many Tippoo appears to 
have committed, to prevent his false assertions being detected, of there having 
been no British subjects detained by force in his country, since the last war.60 
 
This story, or some variation of it, appeared in virtually all of the later Tipu literature. If 
true, it demonstrated exactly the sort of injustice h  British imagined themselves to be 
fighting against in India. Tipu Sultan was a brutal and callous despot, as seen from this 
perspective, an Indian prince who had to be removed from power. Lieutenant Roderick 
Mackenzie's history of the war provided further information on Ossure, relating that the 
man Hamilton had been a British sailor who adopted an Indian identity, married a local 
woman, and had several mixed-race children. Mackenzie claimed that he had visited the 
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graves himself, and (somewhat morbidly) possessed a lock of hair from the severed heads 
of the three Europeans.61 The body of evidence for the prisoner massacre at Ossure is 
much stronger than most of the other atrocities allegedly committed by Tipu, and it is 
very likely he did order an execution of some kind. Whether or not these killings took 
place, the British believed that they did, and thisshaped their opinions of Tipu 
accordingly. 
 Ossure caused the greatest reaction in the Anglo-Idian communities of Calcutta 
and Madras. Already the group that had most desired a vindictive war of retribution 
against Tipu, Anglo-Indians responded to Ossure by hurling more epithets against the 
name of the Sultan. The Madras Courier expressed hope that the stories were untrue, but 
in the event that they were correct, "Tippoo must indeed be the most depraved of 
mankind, a monster whose murderous deeds language would ant force sufficiently to 
describe."62 The same paper lumped in Ossure with the prisoner cru lties from the past 
war, when discussing a possible peace settlement: 
When the generous MacNamara interested himself with Tippoo to procure the 
Liberty of our Fellow Countrymen, who then groaned un er the most Deplorable 
Captivity – the Despicable Despot flew to the meanest sophistry, and declared He 
has not a british subject in His domains detained by force; although He had at that 
time given orders to put every one To Death who should attempt to make their 
escape, and Which Orders were too often Carried Into Execution. 
 
The murder of Mathews and Baillie, and their unhappy Fellow Prisoners, is 
deeply imprinted on the minds of their Fellow Soldiers, and the butchery of Lieu. 
Hamilton and two others, the companions of his miseries, is of very recent date 
[Ossure]. 
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And yet the Monster can presume to proceed in his course of treachery and deceit, 
and dare to violate the terms of a capitulation, and then date a falsehood in the 
hope of evading the consequences.63 
 
As the newspaper suggested, the Anglo-Indian community remained the group most 
consistently hostile to Tipu Sultan, with events like Ossure only adding fuel to the fire. 
They were the group most directly affected by the wars taking place in southern India, 
and consequently the ones who had the most impassioned pinions on the subject.  
 There was much less newspaper coverage of this prisoner massacre in the London 
newspapers, with only a few brief mentions of the Ossure controversy. The St. James 
Chronicle wrote that Tipu had been guilty of the greatest cruelties since the war began, 
and "puts to death every Englishman he can obtain possession of."64 However, since the 
source for this information was a letter written by the printer of the same Madras Courier, 
the sentiments were more reflective of the Anglo-India  community than the London one. 
The Morning Herald also wrote briefly on the surrender of the British garrison of 
Coimbatore, charging that Tipu violated the terms of their capitulation and suggesting 
that they might suffer the same fate as General Mathews.65  
 For the most part, however, there was relatively little mention of British captives 
in the London press during the Third Mysore War. This was a direct contrast to the 
previous war against Tipu a decade earlier, in which the treatment of prisoners was 
overwhelmingly the most discussed subject. British newspapers were generally much less 
interested in these stories, no doubt due to the distances involved, but would on occasion 
reprint excerpts and editorials from the Anglo-Indian press. However, they failed to 
arouse the same public interest as the Mathews controversy from the previous war, and 
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took a back seat to the debate about the morality of the conflict being played out in 
Parliament.66 While captive accounts continued to be published, these stories had largely 
shifted away from the daily reporting of the newspaper press, and instead were 
increasingly fictionalized as a background setting for imperial adventure stories.  
Religious Conversion and European Musselmen 
 Despite all of the brutal circumstances mentioned above, crude and unsanitary 
living conditions for captured soldiers were hardly unusual in the eighteenth century, 
especially outside of Europe. What made Tipu's captivity so intimidating to 
contemporaries was the threat that he posed to the very identity of his British subjects. 
Tipu Sultan sought to offset the technological and organizational advantages of his 
opponents by inducing Europeans of all nationalities o enter into his service, casting off 
their previous loyalties to become soldiers of Mysore. This process required a conversion 
to Islam and the renunciation of a European identity, complete with the process of 
circumcision, which accompanied the oath of loyalty to the Sultan. According to the  
contemporary British accounts, this was a mandatory ritual for all Europeans who 
intended to enter the service of Mysore. British captive accounts accused Tipu of forcing 
prisoners to convert to Islam against their will and become "European Musselmen", while 
Tipu insisted that he only held out encouragement for captives to join his forces, and that 
he kept no British prisoners after the signing of peace in 1784.  
 This crisis of identity lay at the heart of British anxieties and insecurities about 
overseas empire, the fear that the Company's servants would be enticed by the exotic 
Orient and "go native", turning their back on traditional British virtues. It was not 
uncommon for Europeans in India to take on a new Indian identity during the eighteenth 
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century, crossing over and adopting the language, dress, and customs of a foreign culture 
that they found desirable.67 Tipu's attempts to convert Company soldiers into his own 
service existed as part of this long continuity of past history, in which personal identities 
were fluid and self-fashioned, and individuals moved back and forth between different 
cultures as need suited them. However, increasingly  the last decades of the eighteenth 
century and the beginning of the 19th century, this practice of self-fashioning multiple 
identities and living between two cultures became actively discouraged by the officials of 
the East India Company, due to growing cultural Anglicization and new theories of racial 
and ethnic hierarchies.68 The inducements of Tipu Sultan therefore posed a threa  to the 
very core of the imperial project, suggesting an alternate Indian identity for British 
soldiers outside the purvey of the Company's control. Instead of understanding the 
complicated cultural context in which Tipu offered service in his armies, captive accounts 
portrayed the Sultan as a monstrous figure that forced prisoners to convert to a new 
religion against their will. This image of the brave British soldier valiantly refusing the 
temptations of an Oriental despot could (and would) then be spun into a morality play of 
empire, with the heroic white Europeans triumphing over the corrupted and morally 
degenerate Indians.  
There were many examples of these religious conversion stories. John Baillie’s 
captive narrative covers the main features of these incidents: 
When on the 19th [Sep 1781] we were struck with horror at hearing that Several 
of the poor Soldiers had been taken out of Prison, circumcised and forced into the 
Service of the Nabob… We dreaded his approach as much as Criminals the day of 
execution and determined to die rather than be slave  for life, for this these 
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unhappy men were told was to be their fate. They were called the Children of the 
Nabob and desired to think no more of their Native Country.69 
 
In each case, the religious conversion of the British soldiers to Islam was linked with the 
creation of a new Muslim identity for themselves; Baillie described how these men were 
to become known as “Children of the Nabob.” What remained controversial was whether 
these conversions were forced or voluntary; which interpretation one chose to believe had 
a great influence on how Tipu’s character was perceived. At least some of the British 
soldiers in the Company’s employ undoubtedly chose t  switch over to Tipu’s side of 
their own free will. One Company report from 1784 writes of “many European Deserters 
from the Garrison of Mangalore… and other Garrisons, in his [Tipu’s] Army,” and 
includes these individuals separately from those who had been forced into Tipu’s 
service.70Another newspaper story detailed how six midshipmen captured by Admiral 
Suffrein from the Hannibal “have renounced both their country and religion, and
voluntarily turned Mahometans; they have married Mahometan women.”71 It is important 
to recall here that many of the Company's white soldiers were not English in origin, or 
even from the British Isles, and may not have felt any particular national loyalty to the 
British Company. 
British commentators in the metropole, outside of the context of the cultural 
traditions of South Asia, were highly skeptical that some of the Company prisoners might 
have voluntarily decided to switch sides rather than sit out the rest of the war in captivity, 
or may simply have preferred an Indian lifestyle to their prior European one. Instead, the 
narrative of this experience as understood in London, and at times actively promulgated 
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by the East India Company, was that all religious conversions were forced upon the 
victims on threat of death. The General Evening Post related one account from a 
Company soldier, who was invited during his period of captivity to join in Tipu's service 
with the offer of handsome wages. However, according to this story, the British men "did 
not hesitate a moment to treat his offer with scorn" and upon being threatened with death 
for refusing to serve "some of our officers were taken out three times, and were mounted 
on a gallows, with the ropes about their necks, but they were firm in their behavior, and 
with manly fortitude resisted to the last." This was t ken as a sign of the "cruelty, and 
arbitrary proceedings of a despotic Prince."72  
The ability to link these religious conversion episodes with commentary on the 
barbarous character of Tipu only made them more effective in shaping public opinion 
about the ongoing conflict. The Mysore Wars could then be transformed into the 
aforementioned morality play, with the virtuous British forces of the Company heroically 
resisting the temptation to join Tipu’s forces, even on pain of death as detailed in another 
newspaper report: 
It was much to the honour of the British soldiery in India that they rejected, 
surrounded with dangers, the temptations thrown out to them to enter into the 
Nabob’s service. Some of Tippoo’s head people promised them very handsome 
wages: “No!” said a young spirited officer, with the general consent, “No! we are 
Englishmen! we despise your offers!” Some of the officers were actually mounted 
on a gallows for having refused to enter into the service of the Nabob, and ropes 
were put round their necks. But this did not warp the virtue of their hearts! They 
were taken down; and Indian barbarity was relaxed by the all-glorious example of 
virtue in its fullest purity!73 
 
This reimagining of the events taking place in Tipu’s dungeons could have been taken 
directly from the London stage; it served to demonstrate how the virtues of the British 
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character would no longer be corrupted by their contact with decadent Asiatic luxury. 
The soldiers of the Company were explicitly linked to the broader nation (“we are 
Englishmen!”) in rejecting the offer of Tipu Sultan. This patriotic recasting of the 
Company’s image began to shift opinion away from the stereotyped nabobs of the 
preceding decades, by means of contrasting the actions of white Europeans to Indian 
“barbarity.” 
 More sympathy could be generated for the captives hrough lurid descriptions of 
the conversion ceremonies they were forced to endur. Innes Munro wrote of thirty 
“comely youths” who were selected out for Tipu’s service, stripped naked, and had every 
hair shaved from their bodies. They were then forced to swallow strong opiates before 
undergoing the process of circumcision; after thirty days of recovery, the youths were 
trained as Mysorean soldiers and said to exhibit great ferocity in Tipu’s service.74 
William Thomson’s account of the conversion process wa  nearly identical, including the 
description that after recovering from the treatment these men were dressed in Islamic 
garb and expected to lead soldiers in Tipu’s armies.75 One wild rumor had Tipu 
delivering thirty young men, “whom he had made Musselmen,” to the Turkish court of 
the Grand Signor.76 These boys were intended to serve as janissaries in the Ottoman 
Sultan’s court, and would presumably never return to Britain or reclaim their European 
identity.  
According to the captive accounts, the converts felt a deep sense of depression 
and alienation due to their position standing betwen two cultures: "It was the horror that 
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the [European slave] boys felt at the thought of being for ever shut out from the society of 
their countrymen, and the hope of returning to their country, that wrung their souls with 
tender anguish."77 Thomson indicated that the boys were experiencing great social 
anxiety, as a new identity was thrust upon them, but were not physically abused in any 
way. These individuals were in fact well-treated by all surviving accounts, educated in 
Persian and mathematics, intended to become part of the household of the Sultan. The 
symbolic message behind these actions was readily apparent: Tipu was demonstrating his 
absolute control over the British by remaking the id ntity of his captives, forcing 
Europeans to serve Indians instead of the opposite way around. Despite the attention and 
care lavished on Tipu’s youthful converts, they were nonetheless a powerful ideological 
statement of the Sultan’s opposition to British rule in India.  
 The new status of these boys was anathema to the reputation of the Company, and 
to British society more generally. The stories of the prisoners generated fear and anxiety 
not only from the actual conversion ceremonies themselves, but from the loss of identity 
that they entailed. By adopting (or being forced into) an Indian identity, the British 
individuals in question were cut off from their former lives. These accounts suggested 
that Tipu had power and mastery over Europeans, with the ability to call their very 
identity into question and remake it as he saw fit. This genuinely frightening prospect 
ensured that prisoner conversions would be represent d i  the worst possible light in 
British print culture, and depicted as acts of forced torture perpetrated by an Oriental 
tyrant.  
                                                




Examples of these stories from the period are easy to find. Perhaps the most 
famous and widely read captive account to emerge from the Mysore Wars was written by 
James Bristow, published as A Narrative of the Sufferings of James Bristow, at the 
conclusion of the Third Mysore War in 1793. It provides one of the best examples of a 
captive narrative, describing in great detail the prisoner experience of captivity under 
Tipu. Bristow’s account details an imprisonment of over ten years, in which he found 
himself “in the clutches of barbarians” that treated him with cruelty and scorn.78 He was 
captured in 1781, forcibly converted to Islam the following year, and spent the remainder 
of his imprisonment serving in a cheylah battalion, commanding soldiers in Tipu’s 
service. Bristow’s account invariably referred to Tipu as a “barbarian”, “tyrant”, 
“usurper”, or some similar pejorative turn of phrase; he also attributed the death of not 
just General Mathews to Tipu’s order, but also other captured officers named Rumley, 
Frazer, and Sampson.79  
 Although Bristow claimed that he lived in constant terror for his life, and was 
imprisoned for most of the ten years, there are various inconsistencies in his 
sensationalistic account. Bristow boasted to have escaped certain death on multiple 
occasions through the performance of heroic personal actions, especially during his 
escape sequence in which he traveled extensively for five days with no food or water. 
The superhuman feats of endurance that Bristow claimed for himself cast doubt on the 
validity of his statements, and suggested that much of his narrative was designed to 
bolster sales through an exciting tale of adventure in exotic locales. Furthermore, during 
his captivity Bristow offhandedly mentioned that he was drawing a monthly salary as pay 
                                                
78 James Bristow. Narrative of the Sufferings of James Bristow (Calcutta: unknown publisher, 1792; 
London: Reprinted by J. Murray, 1793; 1794; 1801; 1828): 7 
79 Ibid, 32 
93 
 
from Tipu, and went so far as to grumble at times about reductions in what he earned, all 
of which constituted rather strange behavior for a supposed prisoner!80 Fellow captive 
Henry Becher wrote in similar fashion about his own not-so-rigorous imprisonment, 
noting that “I came out of Nagur (after being eighteen months prisoner there) richer than 
I went in,” due to the accumulation of many material possessions during his period of 
captivity.81 These accounts suggested that conditions were not nearly as bad as portrayed 
for at least some of the British captives.  
 A closer reading of the prisoner narratives also undermined many of the more 
sensationalistic claims. For example, William Thomsn’  captive account grudgingly 
admits that the officers left wounded at Bednur received better treatment than some of 
Tipu’s other prisoners. They were allowed to keep many of their personal articles, have 
free use of pen and paper, allowed the attentions of a French surgeon, and given 
permission to keep their servants and have them shop daily in the bazaar for meals.82 
Thomson would later complain that there was insufficient sympathy in Britain for those 
who had languished in Tipu’s dungeons, and many at home in Britain during the time of 
the Second Mysore War felt that their sufferings were well deserved.83 Another 
correspondent argued that the character of Admiral Suffrein had unfairly come under 
attack for surrendering his captured sailors to Tipu. As for the prisoners themselves, this 
author stated that the accounts of Tipu's cruelty towards the captives were so exaggerated 
"as to make the Whole appear a Fable", and the fact o  the matter was that "The Asiaticks 
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are not yet sufficiently civilized to make War on European Principles, consequently they 
use their Prisoners roughly, but are not guilty of a fourth Part of the Barbarity ascribed to 
them."84 These sources indicated once more that many of the captive accounts were 
exaggerated, designed to emphasize Tipu in the most unflattering light possible, as a 
means to disguise the much more complicated situation of newly created alternate and 
potentially subversive Indian identities for British prisoners.  
Unraveling the mystery of the religious conversions is far from an easy task. The 
degree to which these conversions were genuine or compelled at the point of Tipu’s 
sword remains the subject of dispute. As a way of cutting through the confusion 
surrounding this topic, Henry Becher provided what is likely the most accurate 
description of how European prisoners were treated by Tipu, worth quoting at length: 
There were about thirty [prisoners] left: these men had been several times sent for 
to the Kudjaree, and asked, if they would take servic , at their different 
occupations; which on their refusing, they were sent back to prison to live on their 
seir of rice, and single piece a day…. Some time being lapsed, they were again 
called to the Kudjaree by Adam Caun La Wannee killidaur, who instead of using 
the method Bahauder Jub Caun had done, reasoned with them: telling them they 
did not consider their own interest, and were very wrong to remain close prisoners, 
when they might by taking service, live comfortably [on] their pay: besides, 
having liberty of walking about, and taking fresh air, whenever they pleased 
within the pettah [fort]: That the Sultaun would never release them, and therefore 
advised them to take his pay: it would not prevent their going away, when God 
Almighty would please to release them; and by way of further encouragement, 
promised, if they wished to write to their families in Bombay, he would sent 
[send] their letters, and they should receive the ansivers [answers]: good words 
had better effect than the chaubuck [chains], and they ook service; amongst the 
rest several boys who had been servants to officers n camp, turned out to be made 
carpenters, and by the instruction of those who knew their trade managed very 
well…. they now enjoy fresh air and exercise, and did not die so fast as before.85 
 
This appears to be the most reasonable explanation of the actual treatment of the 
European prisoners. They were kept in confinement, in poor living conditions, and 
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pressured to enter Tipu’s service, in these cheylah battalions. Tipu’s men held out all 
sorts of incentives to get them to do so: better food, freedom within the fort, a regular 
salary, and so on. Those that did convert were forced to adopt Islamic dress, were likely 
circumcised, and then worked for Tipu as officers and technical experts in his military.  
These men likely still thought of themselves as prioners, though they were not in 
the traditional sense. Due to the degree of pressur placed on these men, they could well 
argue that they were “forced” to convert to Islam, although that also falls short of the full 
story. The subtleties of their situation were generally lost on most British observers, and 
it was far easier to suggest that all of the prisoners were forced into conversion to Islam 
by a tyrannical and bigoted Oriental despot. It required only a little imagination to turn 
the narrative Becher provided into the cartoonish adventure story of James Bristow. 
 Becher’s narrative of imprisonment ran through a limited printing in Bombay, 
attracting few readers and little attention. Meanwhile, Bristow’s sensationalistic captive 
tale was a huge success and would go through five different printed editions, including an 
American edition published in Philadelphia in 1801. The public sphere in London was 
therefore permeated with stories about the villainous Tipu Sultan of Bristow’s account, 
one who gave four European women over to black slave  for their entertainment, and 
who demolished Hindu temples and was detested by the majority of his subjects.86 The 
long-running public interest in these captive narratives and the fierceness of the response 
that they generated towards Tipu indicated the depth of he fear and anxiety that the 
Sultan inspired. The incentives that he offered to switch sides and "go native" called into 
question the very foundations of the overseas imperial nterprise. It was far easier and 
more pleasant to imagine indomitable British soldiers who never bowed down to foreign 
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tyrants, rather than acknowledge the complex reality of eighteenth century South Asia, 
where both Europeans and Indians were able to construct alternate self-fashioned 
identities for themselves and move between two different cultures as need dictated.87 
 The great majority of the Company forces held by Tipu were released from 
captivity upon the signing of the Treaty of Mangalore in early 1784, at the end of the 
Second Mysore War. John Baillie provided a list of he soldiers that returned into 
Company service, consisting of 1100 Europeans (198 officers and gentlemen) and 
upwards of 3000 sepoys.88 The same numbers were reported in a short pamphlet entitled 
Prisoners in Mysore: "In conformity to the stipulations of the Treaty, 1200 Europeans 
and about 3000 Sepoys were sent home. This circumstance is incidentally mentioned in a 
letter from the Government of Madras to the Governor General dated 20th April [1784], 
at which time they supposed that all of the prisoners were released."89 Taken together, 
these sources appear to provide a clear accounting of the number of prisoners released in 
the treaty.  
 However, Baillie's source also identified some 150individuals referred to as 
"European Musselmen" or "circumcised Europeans" whodid not return back to the 
Company's territory, and remained part of Tipu's servic . The London newspapers soon 
picked up on this story, increasing the number of soldiers retained from 150 to 300 in the 
process. The General Evening Post made clear that these were the prisoners whom Tipu 
had "made Musselmen by force."90 A certain Captain Dallas made a circuit of the 
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Mysorean prisons after the conclusion of the peace treaty, rounding up some 200 officers, 
1100 European privates, and roughly 2000 sepoys, all in much better health than he 
expected due to the miserable conditions of their captivity. However, he also heard it 
alleged "that three Madras officers and five midshipmen, with about two hundred 
European privates, whom he had converted to Mahomedanism, were secreted by Tippo 
Sahib for his own service, as no account could everaft wards be got of them."91 These 
accounts suggest that roughly 200-300 individuals of European descent were not released 
by Tipu following the treaty, and those individuals were ones who had made the 
conversion to Islam in some form. 
 It was the status of these "European Musselmen" which continued to arouse anger 
and controversy. These appeared to be the prisoners who had converted to Islam during 
their period of captivity, and were therefore not released with the rest of the Company 
soldiers. Tipu Sultan, for his part, claimed that he no longer held any prisoners, only his 
own subjects who had taken up pay within his own armed forces. One of the London 
newspapers summarized this position: 
There are six Midshipmen, and about one hundred and twenty British Seamen, 
now in the military service of Tippoo Saib. They were sent to that Prince by 
Monsieur Suffrein, as French prisoners; and, after enduring the severest hardships 
of a long captivity, they were liberated on condition of abjuring their religion, and 
entering the service of Tippoo Saib… They are now lst to their relatives, and to 
their country, beyond the probability of redemption; for if a formal application 
were made to Tippoo Saib for their delivery, his anwer would be, that he had not 
any French prisoners in his dominions; by entering his service, they had become 
his subjects.92 
 
When the British prisoners agreed (or were compelled to agree) to enter Tipu’s service, 
they gave up their right to be included in the prisoner exchange after the peace, since 
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technically they were no longer prisoners at all. Nor was this process of "crossing over" 
an unusual occurrence in 18th century India; Indian armies of the period were always 
multinational, and Europeans from many different countries, including Britain, frequently 
served as officers in the armies of native princes. Changing service from one ruler to 
another after imprisonment was also commonplace, and the Company made use of this 
itself on many occasions.93 Tipu was acting in accordance with the tradition of other 
Islamic sovereigns, in similar fashion to the infamous janissaries of the Ottoman state.  
 Nevertheless, this was not an acceptable outcome in the eyes of the East India 
Company's officials, or within the British metropole. From the perspective of the British 
public, these captives had been forced to convert to Islam against their will, using cruel 
tortures and other threats, and Tipu's continued retention of these individuals was a 
shame upon the national honor. It never occurred to most British commentators that some 
of these prisoners may well have voluntarily chosen a new Islamic lifestyle as an officer 
commanding Tipu's forces, over that of languishing indefinitely in a rotting prison cell. 
Whether or not the conversions were forced upon threa  of violence and death, the public 
perception was that of Britons being held against their will as slaves, in violation of the 
peace treaty that Tipu had signed. This served as a significant contributing factor for 
future conflict between Tipu Sultan and the East India Company, as well as doing much 
to paint Tipu as a cruel tyrant in the British popular imagination.  
Prisoner Masculinity and Sexuality 
The conversion stories of the prisoners were also rife with sexual anxieties, as 
Tipu demonstrated his mastery over the prisoners through a process of forced 
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emasculation. Tipu Sultan was portrayed as possessing an insatiable sexual appetite, one 
that demanded a constant stream of young women for his harem. Tipu’s supposed 
voracious sexuality represented another way in which India stood for the wild and 
untamed lure of the exotic East. His control over th  British prisoners was made manifest 
most starkly in the form of their religious conversion ceremonies, as they were quite 
literally emasculated through the process of circumision. These very real fears about 
masculinity and sexuality were reflected in the captive accounts, which continued to 
respond to British insecurities by demonizing Tipu Sultan as a threat that had to be 
defeated. 
The many references to circumcision as part of the conversion process serve as 
the best example of this process, but there were oth r such cases as well. William Drake, 
one of the midshipmen captured on the Hannibal, wrote of young European boys who 
were “taught dancing in the Country Stile and forced to dance in female dresses before 
Tippoo - it was said that of late as they grew up they were transferred to the Cheylas 
Battalions.”94 Henry Becher corroborates this story in his own captive narrative, writing 
about a European boy named Willie: "When it was the pleasure of Tippoo, Willie was 
dressed as a dancing girl, covered with joys – and in this manner danced before him. He 
was not the only boy who was under the necessity of submitting to this degrading method 
of amusing the tyrant: most of them were dead or sent to different places..."95  
These accounts help to demonstrate why Tipu prompted so much anxiety from 
British observers, quite aside from the military threat that he posed. Tipu’s hold over 
British captives, and his ability to reshape their image into effeminate dancing girls, was 
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a direct challenge to the widespread belief in the invincibility of white soldiers. His 
flaunting of power over Company prisoners was not only a means to force conversion 
into his military service, but also an effective pro aganda tactic to inspire dread in the 
hearts of his opponents. Forcing captured British boys to dress in feminine clothing and 
dance for his amusement was another way for Tipu to exert his dominance over 
Europeans. It suggested that he was superior to his pponents not only militarily, but in 
terms of masculinity as well.  
One of these additions to the characterization of Tipu during the Third Mysore 
War was his portrayal as a sex-crazed individual with an insatiable lust for women, 
playing upon the old trope of the East as the setting for harems and concubines. Lloyd’s 
Evening Post related the standard criticisms of Tipu’s personality, how he had “disgraced 
his personal prowess by an exampled perfidity and cruelty towards his enemies,” before 
moving on to a description of Tipu's lasciviousness towards women: "And yet, like other 
Monsters, Tippoo is not without his susceptibility, which is passion f r the fair-sex fully 
evinces. Indeed his gallantries, like his warfares, have always been on the great scale; in 
proof of which, it need only be adduced, that the Seraglio of his present Camp exceeds 
2000 women, selected for their superiority of personal attractions!"96 Tipu was 
characterized in this source as a beast, wholly dominated by his base passions and 
instincts, the sort of savage animal that could only be tamed through the use of force. 
This was a new thread in the larger tapestry of the Tipu Legend, expanding Tipu’s 
hotheaded or emotional character into an irresistible desire to chase after women.  
 In a similar account written by Company military officer John Murray, Tipu was 
accused of murdering the beautiful daughter of a chieftain for “attempting to resist his 
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infamous Sensuality.”97 British authors writing on the subject of the Mysore Wars in later 
decades also came to accept this characterization of Tipu. Sir Walter Scott used this 
setting in his 1827 short story The Surgeon's Daughter, depicting Tipu as a lustful tyrant 
obsessed with capturing white women for inclusion into his seraglio.98 These portrayals 
of Tipu were likely a reaction to the sexual anxieties raised by the stories of prisoners 
forcibly being converted to Islam. British soldiers in India were afraid of losing their 
masculinity if they were captured by Tipu, forced to convert to an alternate native 
identity in which they would become emasculated. The response was the characterization 
of Tipu as hyper-masculine, ntirely controlled through physical passions and desires, 
and unable to achieve the manners and proper restraint of a civilized gentleman. The 
supposed sensuality of Tipu became another example of his savagery, transforming his 
superior masculine potency from a virtue into a vice. Tipu’s sexual obsessions became in 
time another example of why the Company was ultimately more deserving of rule over 
the people of Mysore.  
These same themes appeared in the dramatic productins of the London stage, 
which seized upon the popular enthusiasm for the Mysore Wars and used them as subject 
material for their shows. The Sadler’s Wells production entitled Tippoo Sultan; or, East 
India Campaigning was the first such show to enjoy widespread success, debuting on 25 
July 1791. East India Campaigning promised in its advertisements to showcase a series 
of exotic Indian characters and scenes for its viewers, including The Friendly Brahmins 
(“With the attack and destruction of their Pagoda by Tippoo’s Soldiery”), Prisons At 
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Seringapatam (“The cruel treatment of the English Officers under General Mathews, 
when confined”), Tippoo Saib’s Camp (“with the Army in Motion, and an Eastern 
Divertisement with Parasols”) and even an Elephant.99 The themes of the play were very 
much in accordance with contemporary pro-Company and pro-ministry opinion, 
portraying Tipu Sultan as a tyrannical despot who tortured British prisoners and 
oppressed his non-Islamic subjects. Company soldiers w e represented heroically, as the 
liberators would who put an end to the dark rule of the Sultan. The Company servants 
were no longer the immoral banditti of previous decades, having become instead virtuous 
soldier-heroes that embodied the British nation. 
The Sadler’s Wells production was a very elaborate affair, promoting itself with 
entirely new costumes and set designs, along with an elaborate musical score. East India 
Campaigning would prove popular enough that the music to the play was printed 
separately, as The Overture, Favorite Songs, and Finale in the Musical Entertainment of 
Tippoo Saib. These song lyrics contained a number of revealing passages, making 
frequent mention of Irish soldiers serving in the Company military (complete with brogue 
in the lyrics) and referencing longstanding fears of exual dominance and forced 
effeminacy implicit in the prisoners controversy. The song “Buac’aill lion Deoc’” sung 
by an Irish soldier demonstrated both of these traits, s the character Dennis O’Neal 
refuses the blandishments of Tipu and insists he will not lose his masculinity due to 
captivity: 
(Verse) 1 
Tippoo, your Highness, give over your fun, 
By my Soul you have got the wrong Sow by the Tail; 
I’m neither Widow nor Maid, but a Soldier by Trade, 
And my Name, if you like it, is Dennis O’Neal: 
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And a ranting, chaunting, 
Drinking, fighting, capering, pipering, 
Conjuring, blundering, skylarking, dram tippling, 
Dev’l of a Fellow is Dennis O’Neal! 
Arrah. Buac’aill lion deoc’ for Dennis O’Neal… 
(Verse) 4 
Tippoo take it from Dennis, he speaks to your face, 
Tis’n’t in your Black looks to make him turn pale; 
Put a Sword in his hand and he’ll die like a Man, 
But you won’t make a Judy of Dennis O’Neal.  
With your Jumping, Jungling, grinning, mouthing, 
Clout headed, thick headed, brazen nos’d, copper fac’d, 
Ill looking Thief! Who made you a Chief? 
I wish, for your sake, I had an Oak Stake, 
For a Dev’l of a Fellow is Dennis O’Neal. 
Arrah. Buac’aill lion deoc’ for Dennis O’Neal.100  
The notes to the production indicate that this was one of its most popular songs, most 
likely to a special degree for the poorer elements of he audience.  
While there were indeed significant numbers of Irish soldiers serving in the 
Company’s military forces, which perhaps the authors of the piece wished to recognize, 
the song was far more noteworthy for its bold assertions of masculinity, as a rejection of 
the threat posed by Tipu’s captivity of British prisoners. Dennis O’Neal asserted not only 
that he was neither “Widow nor Maid”, but also went o  to insist that “you won’t make a 
Judy of Dennis O’Neal”, likely a reference to the stories of the “dancing boys” in Tipu’s 
service that had filtered back to Britain. The song was also explicitly racist in its mention 
of Tipu’s “Black looks”, and it reflected deep-rooted anxieties of defeat and implied 
feminization at the hands of the Sultan, which were commonplace in 1791.101 This was 
mentioned again in the concluding Finale to the production, with the cast singing together 
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how with the danger now passed, and Tipu fled at last, “We are Britons once again.”102 
This odd phrasing served as another indication of how Tipu “unmanned” his captives 
through forced conversions (including circumcisions), and the implied effeminacy that 
resulted. Only after being freed from captivity could these prisoners reclaim their identity 
and once again become part of the British nation.  
There was no question that Sadler’s Wells had a hitproduction on its hands. The 
day after its debut performance, Woodfall’s Register wrote a glowing review of the 
production, praising East India Campaigning as “one of the most elegant exhibitions the 
town has witnessed for many years”, which produced universal calls for encore from all 
sections of the audience. The review lavished extra praise on the set design for portraying 
a series of different Indian scenes, and upon the Irish songs discussed above, which “gave 
the publick as much pleasure any actor has had an opportunity of effecting on stage for 
some time.”103 Woodfall’s Register was far from the only newspaper to deliver a positive 
verdict on the show, with the Public Advertiser also following suit, and World going so 
far as to claim “we fairly predict Tippoo Saib will be the greatest favourite ever produced 
at Sadler’s Wells.”104 Discussion of the play continued to appear in the London print 
culture throughout the following months, as it had clearly become a popular topic in 
public opinion. Newspapers mentioned how East India Campaigning filled the house 
every night, and was “undoubtedly the best Entertainment that Sadler’s Wells has ever 
yet set before the public.”105 In an attempt to make the production even more exotic, 
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Sadler’s Wells introduced a group of “black musicians” into the procession of Tipu, 
further reinforcing the growth of racial stereotypes in the metropole.106 The London 
public reacted with great approval, continuing to sell out every performance and pack 
Sadler's Wells on a daily basis until the end of the theatre season. 
 On the one hand, East India Campaigning created a stereotyped and racialized 
portrayal of the Mysore Wars, focusing on creating a  exotic spectacle of elephants, 
subterranean dungeons, Eastern grandeur and “the voluptu us amusements of the 
Tyrant’s Seraglio.”107 In this sense, the production created a fantasy of native capitulation 
that mediated the threat posed by the capture and imprisonment of British soldiers.108 On 
the other hand, the play constructed an idealized portrayal of the Company’s military, 
creating morally upstanding soldier-heroes that the British public could embrace as 
representing the best aspects of the national charater. Far from the embarrassment and 
potential for moral decay embodied by the nabobs, these new Company servants were 
both masculine and incorruptible. The Public Advertiser even suggested using the 
Company soldiers in East India Campaigning as an example for the rest of the British 
army to follow, a comparison which would have been unheard of a few decades earlier:  
The sentiment of true bravery, so nobly displayed by the Tyrant Tippoo’s English 
prisoners, in the representation at Sadler’s Wells, is worthy of being deeply 
engraven on the mind of every British Officer who tries the chance of war in an 
East India Campaign: 
 
Tyrant – behold the triumph of the brave, 
Whom Death affrights not when disgrace would save. 
Fain would we live, our country’s foe to face; 
Gladly we die, when Death prevents disgrace.109 
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This was a perfect example of how empire was constructed at home in the metropole 
through the use of popular culture.110 
 In practice, it was not uncommon for British soldiers in captivity to renounce their 
identity and enter into the service of Tipu, becoming the "European Musselmen" that 
aroused so much consternation, but the London stage refused to admit this possibility, 
and offered up instead a pleasant fantasy of British soldiers who would always choose 
death over disgrace. These sentiments help explain why East India Campaigning proved 
to be so successful; in addition to being an exciting spectacle, it showed Britons the way 
they would like to see themselves, with brave and defiant Company soldiers standing up 
against vicious and cruel eastern tyrants. British prisoners refused to bow before the 
caricatured despotic figure of Tipu Sultan, boldly asserting on the stage their own 
masculinity identity and freedom from imprisonment. This was the crux of the shift in 
popular perceptions of empire taking place at the close of the eighteenth century, and the 
Tipu plays of the 1790s like East India Campaigning were an important component of 
these larger changes.  
Disappearance of the Prisoners Controversy 
 The subject of the British captives attracted the lion's share of the British public's 
attention when Tipu Sultan first appeared on the scene during the Second Mysore War. 
Nearly everything that was written by British onlookers at the time could be traced back 
to the fate of the captives in some way. It was the very presence of these prisoners that 
caused the East India Company and the wider British public to devote so much interest to 
one particular prince in southern India. Rumors that Tipu had failed to keep his word and 
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release all of the British soldiers in his prisons served as a rallying cry for future wars of 
aggression against Mysore, indicating the high valuation of this subject for the Company.  
 However, over the course of the following two decades, the importance of Tipu's 
captives gradually disappeared from view, until they ad almost faded away completely 
by the year 1800. The withering away of interest in the prisoners partially reflected the 
smaller number of British soldiers held within Mysore; Tipu Sultan was forced to release 
all of his British captives in the 1784 Treaty of Mangalore, and the same demand was 
repeated in the 1792 Treaty of Seringapatam. Tipu never again held as many European 
prisoners as he had possessed during the Second Mysore War. But this fact alone remains 
an incomplete explanation for the diminishing role played by the captives in the British 
popular imagination. With the growing power of the British Company in India during the 
last two decades of the eighteenth century, combined with the simultaneously dwindling 
power of Tipu Sultan, the British felt a newfound sen e of confidence in the project of 
empire overseas.111 Earlier fears and pessimism associated with the British presence in 
India increasingly gave way to triumphant and celebratory passages extolling the might 
of the Company's soldiers. The British prisoners were a reminder of earlier periods of 
weakness and humiliation, when white Europeans had been placed at the total mercy of 
dark-skinned Indian rulers. It was a historical memory that the British in the metropole 
were eager to forget. By the close of the Fourth Mysore War at the turn of the century, 
the subject of the earlier British captives was rarely mentioned, both within the Company 
and amongst the wider discourse of British print cul ure. The conquest of Tipu's kingdom 
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in 1799 had served to wipe away the earlier stain on the national honor, replacing 
uncomfortable anxieties with bombastic celebrations f imperial triumph.  
 In the early years of conflict with Tipu, obtaining the freedom of the British 
captives took precedence over everything else. The internal documents of the East India 
Company make it very clear that securing the releas of the British prisoners taken during 
the Second Mysore War was the top priority. Even before the war's conclusion, the 
Madras government emphasized the importance of returning the captive officers: "That 
no Measure can be considered as a part of a cordial Dispostition of Peace, until at least 
the English Officers now in the Hands of Tippoo shall be released on Parole, as many are 
detained contrary to the express words of the Capitul tion."112 During the peace 
negotiations with Tipu in 1784, Governor-General Warren Hastings sent the following 
instructions to the Madras government in charge of the treaty process: 
On the 1st Article, If a mutual restitution of Territo y shall be found Indispensably 
necessary to that which we feel as our principal object, namely, the recovery of 
the English Prisoners, and the Servants of the Nabob, who are also Prisoners in 
Tippoo's Hands, and who have an equal claim to our Inte position, We must 
consent, but we have hopes that you will not find it difficult to effect this point, by 
agreeing to a restitution of the Places taken.... [list of disputed territories] But 
even these we are willing to surrender rather than H zard the actual Peace and the 
lives of so many of our Countrymen who have lingered during 3 years of 
Imprisonment in his Hands whatever concessions are m de are on our part are 
optional and ought to be so declared to him since he has no right to them by the 
Treaties existing... nevertheless we are willing to yield so much to the urging of 
the Commands of the Court of Directors, and your repeated requisitions, and this 
Point we have intirely to your discretion.113 
 
The East India Company was therefore willing to sacrifice any potential gains made 
during the conflict in exchange for the guaranteed return of the British prisoners. The 
Madras government concurred, noting in their own miutes that the Company reverses in 
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the war made it impossible to gain territorial acquisitions, and therefore, "a pressing and 
principal object was the saving the lives and the speedy recovery of the Liberty of the 
numerous Prisoners of ours, in the hands of the Enemy. To that humane End, the 
Sacrifice of our late acquisitions on the Malabar Coast was admitted."114 Removing the 
embarrassment of having British prisoners under the control of Tipu was more important 
than any other goals to be achieved in the impending peace agreement.  
 When the Treaty of Mangalore officially ended the war in March 1784, both sides 
agreed to return to the status quo. The second article of the treaty, immediately after a 
standard eighteenth century invocation of the desire for universal peace on both sides, 
stipulated the return of the British prisoners:  "Article 2.... The said Nabob [Tipu] shall 
also immediately after signing the Treaty, send orders for the release of all the Persons 
who were taken and made Prisoners in the late War, and now a Live, whether European 
or Native and for their being safely conducted to and delivered at such English Forts and 
Settlements as shall be nearest to the Places where they now are."115 The appearance of 
the prisoners in the first real article of the treay gain confirmed the importance attached 
to their release in the eyes of the East India Company. 
 When a small number of captives failed to be released from Mysore, accusations 
that Tipu continued to retain prisoners in violation of the treaty began appearing almost 
immediately. Lord Macartney, President of Madras, wrote to Tipu on the subject mere 
weeks after the conclusion of peace, on 20 May 1784, charging him with retaining a "few 
people" in breach of the treaty. Macartney asked Tipu to release these men without delay, 
and assured the Sultan that he had "numerous, absolute and undeniable Evidence" of their 
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continued captivity.116 Macartney would write to Tipu again on 21 July, insisting that "It 
is in vain for you to deny the existence of these people in your Country, for the 
Commissioners deputed by the Madras Government to neg tiate the Peace, as well as 
other Englishmen, saw them; and Letters have been received from them; written since the 
conclusion of the Treaty."117 Tipu responded by writing back that he held no prisoners, 
only his own subjects, as part of the differing understanding of these individuals detailed 
above. This was clearly an insufficient response in the eyes of Lord Macartney, who 
continued to work to secure the release of those he beli ved to be prisoners.  
 The ongoing controversy surrounding these "European Musselmen" further 
colored Macartney's opinion of Tipu Sultan: "I must however observe that no Confidence 
can safely be placed in his professions. He [Tipu] s not likely, it is true, to break his 
Engagements for a trivial Consideration, but where any great Interest or Object can be 
promoted with a fair prospect of Success He is not to be restrained by any tie 
whatsoever."118 Macartney's choice of words here closely match the "faithless and 
violent" characterization of Tipu which would later be applied by Lord Cornwallis. 
Macartney was either unable or unwilling to see the situation from a perspective of 
shifting and intermingling cultural exchanges, in which individuals could pass between 
different self-fashioned identities at their leisure. It was simply not acceptable from the 
point of view of Macartney, and the East India Company in general, to have their soldiers 
accept service in the pay of an Indian prince. Therefore, from Macartney's perspective, 
the remaining Europeans in Tipu's service had to be seen as prisoners, which made Tipu 
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an untrustworthy and duplicitous individual in violation of the treaty. The ongoing 
unresolved situation of the "European Musselmen" therefore did much to contribute to 
the changing popular perception of Tipu. 
 In sharp contrast to the situation during the Second Mysore War, by the end of the 
1790s the captives issue had disappeared almost completely. Cornwallis rarely mentioned 
the prisoners still believed to be held by Tipu in h s correspondences with the Sultan, and 
although Tipu was again demanded to release all British subjects in his dungeons in the 
1792 Treaty of Seringapatam, there was far more attention paid to the territorial and 
monetary sums written into the agreement.119 Wellesley did not reference British 
prisoners even one time in his correspondences with Tipu during the final months of 1798, 
and instead based his case for war entirely on Tipu's connections with France.120 In the 
final peace settlement after the Fourth Mysore War, the subject of prisoners held by Tipu, 
such a crucial element of earlier conflicts, did not make an appearance until Article Seven 
of the proposed treaty, and merited only a single lin  requesting, "All prisoners in the 
hands of the several powers to be fairly and unequivocally released."121 Wellesley's 
extremely lengthy letter to the Court of Directors explaining his reasons for going to war 
in 1799 made no mention of needing to secure the releas  of British prisoners; they no 
longer appeared to factor into the Company's decision-making process.122 Clearly, the 
captives issue was little more than an afterthought, no longer considered to be vital by 
this point, suggesting the superior strategic position and greater cultural confidence felt 
by the Company's military in this period. 
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 The lack of attention placed on the British prisoners was equally reflected in the 
wider sphere of popular culture in the metropole. The most popular Tipu play during the 
early 1790s had been East India Campaigning, described earlier in this chapter as 
featuring captured British soldiers who refused to swear themselves into the Sultan's 
service. Productions of this type were a means to transform British weakness in India into 
a symbol of national virtue, through the brave resistance to the machinations of an Asiatic 
tyrant, but they were still an acknowledgement of the power that Tipu had over his 
European foes. By the late 1790s, this show had ended its run and been replaced with T e 
Storming of Seringapatam, a production of Astley’s Royal Saloon and Amphitheatre that 
depicted the military conquest of Tipu's capital, complete with acrobatics, large animals, 
and soldiers drilling in formation.123 The focus was no longer on British prisoners at the 
mercy of Tipu, but instead British soldiers storming an Indian city and killing Tipu Sultan.  
 The same themes were on display in the largest and most popular piece of artwork 
from the Fourth Mysore War, Robert Ker Porter's Storming of Seringapatam.124 
Exhibited to the public on a massive canvas stretching over 120 feet long at a height of 
21 feet, Porter's enormous work depicted the overthrow of Tipu by the force of the 
Company's arms. There was no mention of prisoners, and no implication that Britons had 
ever been subjugated by their Indian opponents. The earlier period of weakness and 
vulnerability had largely passed out of the British popular imagination, replaced with 
images of strength and martial masculinity. 
Conclusion 
                                                
123 As advertised in E. Johnson’s British Gazette and Sunday Monitor (London, England) 29 September 
1799, Issue 1039 
124 Robert Ker Porter. The Storming of Seringapatam (1800). Private collection. This subject is considered 
in more detail in Chapter 5.  
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 The controversy surrounding the prisoners served as an introduction to Tipu 
Sultan and the Mysore Wars for most of the British public. Captive accounts suggested 
that Tipu was a cruel tyrant, one who tortured the poor soldiers at his mercy and forced 
them to convert to his religion at the point of a sword. The existence of the prisoners was 
a great embarrassment for the Company, a living symbol of its failure to protect its own 
soldiers from falling into the hands of a foreign ruler. Much of the antipathy generated 
against Tipu was a reaction to his control of these prisoners, an objection to his total 
power of life and death over British subjects. Tipu seemingly had the ability to remake 
their identity as he willed, converting them into Muslims and unearthing all of the fears 
and anxieties associated with the project of overseas colonialism.  
 The villainous reputation ascribed to Tipu was both a reaction to this deep-rooted 
fear and a means of striking back against it. The Sultan’s treatment of the prisoners 
became a rationale for further wars of revenge, design d to conquer Mysore and remove 
Tipu as a threat for good. British prisoners were transformed into living embodiments of 
the idealized qualities of the British nation, heroically refusing to bow before foreign 
tyrants. The wars against Mysore became reinterpreted as a struggle between freedom 
and despotism, between liberty and subjugation, with the British happily portraying 
themselves as a “free though conquering people.”125 The next chapter investigates more 
fully this connection between Tipu Sultan and the concepts of tyranny and despotism, the 
political systems that Britons believed were characteristic of his rule. Popular belief in 
"Tippoo the Tyrant" also became an important part of shifting attitudes about empire in 
the closing decades of the eighteenth century.  
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Tippoo the Tyrant 
 
Introduction 
 While the British prisoners of the Second Mysore War had been responsible for 
the initial public interest in Tipu Sultan, it was his image as an Oriental despot that 
helped to keep Tipu in the public sphere for the better part of two decades. British 
representations of Tipu drew upon older, pre-existing political tropes about tyranny and 
despotism. According to these beliefs, Tipu was a tyr nt who ruled in capricious fashion, 
granting no rights to the subjects in his domains and cting as he saw fit, holding the 
power of life and death over the poor souls living i  Mysore, much as he had over the 
captives in his possession. These characterizations of the Sultan, which were initially rare 
but became increasingly commonplace during the 1790s, shifted Tipu's reputation for 
cruelty from the relatively small number of European prisoners onto a much larger group. 
All of the people of Mysore were effectively victims of Tippoo the Tyrant, subject to the 
mad whims of a savage monster. 
 This villainous reputation emerged in part as a response to earlier criticism of the 
East India Company. Identical charges centered uponthe concepts of tyranny and 
despotism had been leveled against the Company and its servants in the years following 
Plassey.1 The soldiers and administrators of the Company were accused of acting in 
unscrupulous fashion during their time overseas, ruling over their Indian subjects in 
despotic fashion, pillaging and plundering Bengal without a care for the destruction that 
they left in their wake. The increasing emphasis on Tipu's own supposed Oriental 
                                                
1 Tillman Nechtman. Nabobs: Empire and Identity in Eighteenth Century Bitain. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010): 11-12 
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despotism during the course of the Mysore Wars was a means to counter these charges. It 
was argued that vile Indian rulers like Tipu Sultan were the true tyrants, best 
demonstrated by his treatment of the captured British prisoners, while the Company was 
in fact a progressive force that embodied the best qualities of the British nation. This 
allowed the Third Mysore War to be portrayed not as an expansionist war undertaken to 
acquire more wealth and territory in southern India, but as a war of liberation designed to 
free British prisoners and unshackle the people of Mysore from their horrible ruler. It was 
a much more positive way of envisioning the rule of the East India Company overseas.  
 In addition to the endless association of tyranny a d despotism with Tipu, the 
Sultan was also accused of being a faithless ruler who could not be trusted. Tipu was said 
to break treaties whenever it suited him, making it impossible to honor his word. This 
became a convenient rationale both for explaining away some of the military disasters of 
the Company, due to the "broken word" of the faithless Sultan, and the justification for 
imposing very severe and humiliating terms on Mysore after the war's conclusion. 
Governor General Charles Cornwallis argued that Tipu's lack of humanity forced him 
into taking Tipu's two sons as hostages to guarantee the peace in 1792, an otherwise 
extraordinary and morally dubious act. This explanatio  was widely accepted in the 
British metropole, and Cornwallis was held up as a paragon of justice and moderation. He 
became the anti-Tipu in the mind of the British public, an example of the superior British 
character, and all of the values that the depraved Tipu Sultan was lacking.2 
 Tipu was furthermore represented as a poor ruler in his own right. It was claimed 
that Tipu was a fanatical Islamic bigot, in another expansion of the conversion 
                                                
2 Peter Marshall. “Cornwallis Triumphant: War in India and the British Public in the Late Eighteenth 
Century” in War, Strategy, and International Politics. Lawrence Freeman, Paul Hayes, and Robert O’Neill 
(ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992): 61-63 
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ceremonies associated with the British prisoners earlier. Tipu was said to persecute the 
mostly Hindu populace of his kingdom, by destroying their temples and forcing them to 
convert to Islam or face execution. Although these claims proved to be untrue, British 
commentators used the widespread belief that Tipu was a despotic ruler to suggest that 
Mysore would be better governed by the British Company, and the people would prefer 
the blessings of British rule to their current state. In similar fashion, just as Tipu was 
argued to be a poor ruler over Mysore, the great public interest surrounding the two 
hostage princes was employed to suggest that Tipu was a poor and uncaring father as 
well. Written accounts and formal paintings of the hostage princes implied that 
Cornwallis was a superior parent when compared to Tipu, and that he would do a much 
better job of instructing the young boys in the proper manly virtues.3 British written 
accounts of the hostage princes even suggested that the boys preferred their new living 
arrangements to their original home, due to the despotic nature of Tipu. The wildly 
popular images of the hostage princes therefore anticipated many of the paternalistic 
elements of the nineteenth century British Raj, with childlike and backwards Indians 
looking up to a kindly British parental figure.4 
 This broadening of the despotic aspects of Tipu's image, from tyranny over his 
captives to tyranny over his entire kingdom, did much to shift popular perceptions about 
the Mysore Wars, and overseas empire more broadly. Although the Second Mysore War 
(1780-84) had received a mixed reaction in the British metropole, victory in the Third 
Mysore War (1790-92) led to a much wider acceptance of the East India Company and its 
                                                
3 Constance McPhee. “Tipu Sultan of Mysore and British Medievalism in the Paintings of Mather Brown” 
in Orientalism Transposed : The Impact of the Colonies on British Culture. Dianne Sachko MacLeod and 
Julie F. Codell (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998): 202-03 
4 Hermione De Almeida and George Gilpin. I dian Renaissance: British Romantic Art and the Prospect of 
India (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005): 149 
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servants in the British popular imagination. The conflicts against Tipu in the 1790s were 
frequently portrayed in the popular press as wars of liberation fought against a faithless 
and cruel Oriental despot. This allowed for a wider embrace of the Company and its 
military, who were increasingly represented as British patriots that embodied the national 
honor. Instead of the older fears and pessimism about the dangers that empire posed, the 
British public increasingly identified with imperial heroes like Cornwallis and Wellesley. 
By fighting against an imagined despotism in southern India, the Company salvaged and 
remade its own reputation.  
Tyranny and Despotism 
 Out of all of the various pejorative terms attributed to Tipu Sultan, the epithet that 
was employed the most often by the British was that of "Tippoo the Tyrant". It was an 
association that almost seemed to flow off the tongue in a fit of alliteration, and 
innumerable British writers connected Tipu together with the concept of tyrannical rule 
over his subjects in India. In making this association, British authors were not only 
making a case for the Company's superior moral claim to rule over the Indian populace, 
they were also tapping into an established language about despotism and despotic rule. 
For centuries, Europeans had argued that what separat d them from peoples in other parts 
of the world was their love of freedom and liberty, in comparison to the tyranny and 
Oriental despotism practiced by Asiatic monarchs.5 The representation of Tipu Sultan as 
a tyrannical ruler provided a means to tap into these long-standing tropes about despotism, 
arguing his own unfitness to rule and the superior claim of the East India Company to 
provide governance.  
                                                
5 Richard Koebner. “Despot and Despotism: Vicissitudes of a Political Term” in Journal of the Warburg 
and Courtauld Institutes 1951 14 (3/4): 300-01 
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 The innumerable portrayals of Tippoo the Tyrant were also a means to reject the 
claim that the Company's own servants were acting in despotic fashion in India, and were 
guilty of practicing Warren Hastings' famous "geographical morality" when they traveled 
overseas. Many of the early anxieties associated with the Company’s rule were bound up 
in these concepts of tyranny and despotism, the fear that the exercise of absolute power in 
the Orient was corrupting the native sons of Britain. Despotism had long been associated 
with Asiatic rulers by Europeans, but the assumption of Company rule over Bengal 
introduced a new urgency to the subject, in the form f the nabobs who threatened to 
bring back “Oriental despotism” with them from the East.6 
 The crux of the problem could be summed up in succinct fashion: who were the 
ones acting despotically in India? Was it the Company’s own governors and 
administrators, the nabobs who immiserated the local populace in the process of 
enriching themselves? Or was it the Indian princes, rulers like Tipu Sultan, who were the 
true tyrants? During the course of the Mysore Wars at the end of the eighteenth century, 
popular representations of Tipu Sultan were responsible for shifting British public 
opinion towards the latter group, replacing the image of the greedy nabob with the heroic 
soldier and the incorrigible administrator. The label of “tyrant” would be increasingly 
applied to Indian rulers, their supposed crimes used as pretexts to invade and occupy 
more and more territory.7 Tipu Sultan served as perhaps the best such example of this 
process, with his vilification as a stereotypical Oriental despot providing the perfect foil 
                                                
6 Philip Lawson and Jim Phillips. “‘Our Execrable Banditti’: Perceptions of Nabobs in Mid-Eighteenth 
Century Britain” in Albion XVI (1984): 225-41 
7 Wellesley made very similar claims to justify his later war against the Marathas, referring to the Peshwa 
in correspondences as treacherous, hostile, insincere, systematically jealous, and guilty of despicable policy. 
See for examples Lord Mornington to Colonel William Palmer 19 February 1799 (p. 257-63) IOR/H/574 
and Lord Mornington to Colonel William Palmer 10 May 1799 (p. 455-60) IOR/H/574 
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for the military efforts of the Company. Through the spectacle of the Mysore Wars, the 
servants and soldiers of the Company came to embody the best qualities of the British 
nation, fighting a virtuous war of liberation to free southern India from the degradations 
of Tippoo the Tyrant. It was a vision of empire that the British public found easy to 
embrace.  
The concept of "despotism" had its origins in anciet Greek, derived from the 
word despotes and referring to the relationship between master and slave. Aristotle made 
occasional remarks connecting arbitrary and tyrannical rulers with barbarian kingdoms; 
this was the original genesis of the phrase "Oriental despotism."8 However, it did not 
enter the political lexicon of Europe until a relatively late period, revived by the French 
pamphlet wars of the late seventeenth century and use in reference to Louis XIV's 
absolutism, which was said to remove political liberty and destroy private property. In 
particular, the reign of Louis was compared by his cr tics to the tyranny of the Turkish 
Sultan, demonstrating again how despotic rule was understood through reference to Asian 
political systems.9  
The encounters between European travelers and powerful Indian rulers served to 
reinforce the concept of despotism as a mode of governance that characterized Eastern 
states. Visitors to the Mughal court during the seventeenth century such as Thomas Roe 
and Francois Bernier suggested that Indian rulers acted in despotic fashion, accruing vast 
sums of wealth while denying their subjects the right to own private property. Bernier 
wrote in 1671 that this system of "oriental despotism" resulted in tyrannical rulership, and 
brought about the destruction of the landscape: "Take away the right of private property 
                                                
8 Koebner, Richard. “Despot and Despotism: Vicissitudes of a Political Term” in Journal of the Warburg 
and Courtauld Institutes 1951 14 (3/4): 277-78 
9 Ibid, 300-01 
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in land, and you introduce, as a sure and necessary consequence, tyranny, slavery, 
injustice, beggary, and barbarism: the ground will cease to be cultivated and become a 
dreary wilderness."10 The lack of property ownership and intermediary bodies between 
the absolute monarch and the individual (such as parliaments or juries) were seen as the 
chief characteristics of this system, which was how Europeans believed Asian states to be 
governed.  
Although the usage of the term "despotism" had changed over time from its 
original usage in ancient Greek, by the middle of the eighteenth century it had come to 
embody a standard set of political tropes. A despotic system of government was 
characterized by an all-powerful sovereign, in which individuals were nothing more than 
instruments of the ruler's will. A despotic system not only denied personal liberties, but 
also abrogated private property and all corporate bodies. Laws did not exist under such a 
system, and trade and cultivation of land were believ d to be heavily retarded due to the 
constraints of the sovereign.11 Despotism was very frequently associated with non-
European rulers, most often the Turkish Sultan, but increasingly with regards to Indian 
rulers as well. As the Mughal Empire continued to decline during the eighteenth century, 
the notion of "Oriental despotism" was increasingly invoked by Europeans as an 
explanation, arguing that this tyrannical system of rule had impoverished the peasantry 
and brought about the faltering state of affairs. It was only a short step from this position 
to advocating Company rule over India as a remedy, replacing the corrupt native political 
system with superior British institutions. These arguments would become a common 
refrain during the Third and Fourth Mysore Wars of the 1790s.  
                                                
10 Francois Bernier. “Letter to Colbert” from Travels in the Mogul Empire, Vol. 2 (Delhi: S. Chand, 1968; 
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One such example of the way in which this discourse on oriental despotism 
informed British understanding of India in this period can be seen in Alexander Dow's 
History of Hindostan (1768). Dow was a disaffected former Company servant who wrote 
critically about its actions overseas in his history f the subcontinent. Nevertheless, he 
still viewed India through the framework of despotism, writing how "The [Mughal] 
Emperor is absolute and sole arbiter in every thing, a d controlled by no law. The lives 
and properties of the greatest Omrahs are as much at his disposal, as those of the meanest 
subjects."12 In the preface to his third volume, Dow wrote a "Dissertation on the Origins 
of Despotism in Indostan", in which he argued that e hot climate of the subcontinent 
predisposed its peoples towards despotic forms of rule.13 He also found that Islam as a 
religion was "peculiarly calculated for despotism", based on the life of Muhammad and 
the Muslim family structure.14  
However, despite these conditions, Dow claimed that Bengal was prosperous 
under the Mughals and commerce flourished to a wide ext nt. It was only after they were 
replaced by the local nawabs that conditions began to deteriorate, a process which 
reached its nadir after the Company's administrators assumed control of the region: 
The distemper of avarice, in the extreme, seemed to infect all... Nothing in the 
conquered provinces was premeditated but rapine. Evry thing, but plunder, was 
left to chance and necessity, who impose their own la s. The farmers, having no 
certainty of holding the lands beyond the year, made no improvements. Their 
profit must be immediate, to satisfy the hand of Avarice, which was suspended 
over their heads... Year after year brought new tyrants, or confirmed thereof, in 
the practice of their former oppressors. The tenants, being, at length, ruined, the 
farmers were unable to make good their contracts with government...15  
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Dow explicitly referred to the British servants of the East India Company as tyrants in 
this particular passage. When the peasants were unable to pay their taxes due to this 
exploitation, Dow wrote that the Company became more oppressive still, and turned to 
armed military force for collection. They brought terror and ruin throughout the 
Company's domains, ruling over an immiserated populace through military dictatorship.16 
These descriptions of the sufferings of the Indian peasantry were not imaginary, as 
modern historians have estimated that the Bengal Famine of 1770 was responsible for the 
death of 10 million people, or roughly a third of the region's population.17 The system of 
Company rule in Bengal portrayed by Dow was unquestionably despotic in its own 
makeup, abrogating the right to private property from poor Indian farmers and exploiting 
them for revenue. At least under the Mughals there ad not been such a destructive 
famine. The prevailing political philosophy of this period further suggested that empires 
of conquest were likely to bring enslavement eventually to both conquered and conqueror 
alike, which meant that the actions of the Company's servants overseas had potentially 
dire consequences for the British nation at home.18 
 This language of tyranny and despotism was explicitly referenced in British 
popular culture as a way to criticize the actions of the East India Company. For example, 
a simple cartoon designed to mock Robert Clive from 1772 played upon these political 
tropes. "The Madras Tyrant" depicts a British man in military uniform riding on 
horseback, with a haughty expression on his face and a riding crop in his hand ready to 
                                                
16 Ibid, Vol. 3, lxviii 
17 Romesh Chunder Dutt. The Economic History of India under Early British Rule (New York: A. M. Kelly, 
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18 See P. J. Marshall. A Free though Conquering People: Eighteenth Century Britain and its Empire 
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spur on the animal to greater speed [Figure 1].19 The caption below the image reads "Jos. 
or the Father of Murder. Rapine etc." While this was indeed a very basic cartoon, it was 
useful nonetheless for its unequivocal evidence of negative popular perceptions of the 
Company, and in particular its leading figures. The association of tyranny with the 
governors and administrators of the East India Company in this period holds great 
significance in light of how the same political language would be later deployed against 
the Company's Indian opponents. In the 1770s there was public condemnation of the 
nabobs, as in this image of the "Madras Tyrant"; by the 1790s, the same epithets had been 
transferred successfully to the Indian prince Tipu Sultan, who became "Tippoo the 
Tyrant." The continued deployment of this language of tyranny was not a coincidence, 
and Enlightenment thinkers across Europe had used similar terminology to argue that 
overseas imperialism was inherently unjust.20 
 References to the Company's overseas servants as tyrants had a long currency in 
popular opinion. A dozen years after the appearance of "The Madras Tyrant", satirist 
W.G. Phillips continued to use the same terminology to characterize the nabobs in his 
prints. His cartoon "The Mirror" shows Charles Fox addressing an election crowd in 
London, making the case for why Fox should be returned to his former post as prime 
minister. More importantly for this project, the image includes the presence of a well-
dressed British man in the crowd labeled “Indian Tyrant”, who stated: “Had he [Fox] 
passed the India Bill/ I could no more my Coffers fill/ With Rupees. Or in Blood have 
                                                
19 J. S. "The Madras Tyrant, or the Director of Directors." Published by M. Darly, 16 March 1772. Image 
#5017 in Mary Dorothy George. Catalogue of Political and Personal Satires Preserved in the Department 
of Prints and Drawings in the British Musuem, Vol. 5-7. (London: British Museum Publications, 1978) 
20 Sankar Muthu. Enlightenment Against Empire. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) 
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glutted/ Oh! I should like the Reformer gutted.”21 When Phillips created this cartoon in 
1784, the notion of the "Indian Tyrant" still referr d to the traders and soldiers of the East 
India Company, the British men who had traveled across the oceans and then been 
corrupted by the decadent morals of the East. While Asian rulers could also be associated 
with tyranny and despotic rule, prior to the Mysore Wars of the late eighteenth century 
they were no more likely to be portrayed as such than Europeans were. The rehabilitation 
of the Company's public image in the following decades was intimately connected with 
the redefinition of who and what constituted an "Indian Tyrant", which makes the use of 
this terminology of such interest. 
 This same language of tyranny and despotism was reinte preted during the 
Mysore Wars, directed away from the Company's own servants and targeted at Tipu 
Sultan instead. This redeployment of which party was acting tyrannically in India played 
a crucial role in reshaping British popular attitudes about empire, and it began almost 
immediately when Tipu first appeared on the scene. When Tipu and his father Haider 
invaded the Carnatic at the start of the Second Mysore War in 1780, they were accused at 
once of acting in despotic fashion towards the populace of the region. A letter from the 
Madras council written in November 1780 gave evidence to the contrary, and stated that 
Haider “has conducted himself with a degree of Policy which was hardly to be expected 
from a Man of his tyrannical and sanguinary dispositi n. The Inhabitants of Arcot and 
other conquered Places have been treated with great lenity.”22 Similar arguments have 
been advanced by modern Indian historians, who viewth  destruction attributed to 
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Haider’s invasion as British exaggerations or fabrications.23 However, other British 
writers publishing for a much larger public audienc in the metropole associated the 
arrival of Haider and Tipu with mass slaughter and cruelty: 
Mean-while, his [Haider’s] numerous cavalry over-ran and ravaged the country. 
Numbers of inoffensive and unresisting people were sacrificed to a savage thirst 
of blood: some were cruelly tortured that they might be induced to give up 
treasures they were supposed to conceal; others were wantonly mutilated, and at 
this day, many wretched men, without their hands, or ears, or noses, record the 
inhumanity of a barbarous conqueror. Women were subjected to the brutality of 
lust, or forced to save their honour by the forfeit of heir lives; a ransom which 
some had the fortitude to pay.24 
 
This description by William Thomson mirrored the situation laid out in Dow's history of 
Bengal above, with poor Indian peasants ravaged by a callous and unstoppable force. 
Notably, however, the subject of the despotic actors had changed. Thomson's atrocities 
were committed not by British nabobs acting out of control, but by savage Indian rulers 
whom the Company had to defeat to restore order.  
 This situation provided an early example of the divergence in how Haider and 
Tipu were portrayed by the British, between competing views of honorable and 
tyrannical behavior. This divergence in opinion was characteristic of the debate that 
surrounded the Indian prince during the early years of the Mysore Wars, before more 
negative characterizations eventually won out. With the passage of more time after 
Haider and Tipu's initial invasion of the Carnatic, he atrocity stories surrounding the 
events became more elaborate and fanciful. For example, Mark Wilks, author of one of 
the first formal histories of the Mysore Wars, wrote in 1817 that Haider “drew a line of 
merciless desolation, marked by the continuous blaze of flaming towns and villages. He 
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directed the indiscriminate mutilation of every human being who should linger near the 
ashes.”25 The original, alternative descriptions of Haider's invasion became lost as 
eyewitness accounts receded into historical memory. Although the 1780s was a period of 
competing viewpoints about Tipu, with the passage of time the supporters of the 
villainous Tipu Legend's interpretation of events gained more and more credibility 
amongst the general public. 
 There were many British authors who praised Tipu's character during the early 
period of the Second Mysore War, and offered a verydifferent interpretation from later 
accounts. These characterizations frequently drew upon the same language of despotism 
to make their case, arguing that Tipu was not the monstrous figure that he was often 
portrayed. Lord Macartney of Madras provided this glowing opinion of his character in 
early 1783: "The youthful and spirited heir of Hyder without the odium of his Father's 
vices, or his tyranny, seems by some popular acts, nd by the hopes which a new reign 
inspires and by the adoption of European discipline, lik ly to become a more formidable 
foe even than his father."26 Perhaps holding this same impression in mind, Macartney 
encouraged a policy of diplomatic engagement with Tpu after the war's conclusion, 
believing that Tipu would hold to the terms of the r aty: "There seems a friendly, or 
rather a pacifistic Inclination on his part which is favourable to the public Tranquility, 
and I am inclined to think he will not break with this, unless some extraordinary, and 
certain Advantage should tempt him."27 Macartney was far from the only individual 
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within the Company who suggested a policy of engagement with Tipu, hoping to turn 
him into an ally against the Marathas.28 
 Major Alexander Dirom’s narrative of the Third Mysore War adopted a slightly 
different stance on this subject. It lauded the pros erity of Tipu’s kingdom, stating that 
the countryside was full of inhabitants and the soil cultivated to its full extent. Although 
according to Dirom Tipu's government was strict andrbitrary, it was “the despotism of a 
politic and able sovereign, who nourishes, not oppresses, the subjects who are to be the 
means of his future aggrandizement: and his cruelties were, in general, only inflicted on 
those whom he considered as his enemies.”29 This representation suggested that Tipu's 
method of rule fell short of European standards of liberty, but was nonetheless effective 
and prosperous in its own right.  
 Others waxed poetically on the character of Tipu himself. The French author 
Maistre de la Tour compared Haider and Tipu to Philip and Alexander of Macedon: "The 
total defeat of a detachment commanded by Colonel Brawlie [Bailey] is likewise an 
exploit of Tippou Saeb; who having began, like Alexander, to gain battles at the age of 
eighteen, continues to march in the step of that Grecian hero, who he may one day 
resemble as well by the heroism of his actions as by the multiplicity of his conquests."30 
This was not an uncommon comparison, referencing Philip and Alexander, and was used 
by other authors in addition to de la Tour's translted account of the Second Mysore War. 
William Thomson praised Tipu's education, and compared his struggle to that of 
Hannibal's against Rome: "Both at once subtle and brave; studious of the knowledge of 
                                                
28 These divergent opinions regarding Tipu within the Company are discussed further in Chapter 4. 
29 Major Alexander Dirom. A Narrative of the Campaign in India, which Terminated the War with Tippoo 
Sultan in 1792 (London: Printed by W. Bulmer, 1793, 1794, 1985): 249-50 
30 Maistre de la Tour. The History of Ayder Ali Khan, Nabob-Bahader, Vol. 1-2. (London: Printed for J. 
Johnson, 1784) French original (Paris, 1783): 309 
128 
 
their times; trained by their fathers in hostility to the first power of the age; exciting the 
vengeance of all nations against that power; and in this career, taking a wider range than 
that which usually bounded their views."31 The comparison to Hannibal portrayed Tipu as 
an antagonist to the British power, but as an honorable one, not as the tyrannical figure of 
the Tipu Legend. Thomson's stress on the education of Tipu, who was instructed in 
multiple languages along with mathematics and military gunnery, undermined the 
accusations of other sources that Tipu was an ignorant savage.   
 Voices critical of the Company in the early 1780s made the case that its injustices 
were far worse than anything that Tipu Sultan had done during the Second Mysore War. 
An editorial letter written in the Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser contended: 
I defy any Asiatic cruelty to exceed the cruelties practiced by some of the English 
servants of the East India Company resident in Asia… Such as have been 
practiced, for example, may be practiced again; as blowing off gun powder in an 
Indian’s ear, flicking an awl through an Indian’s ear to peg him to the boarded 
side of a room, putting lengths of gun-match between another’s fingers bound 
together and lighted, to bring them to confessions about treasures to be plundered. 
Oh! shameful, dishonourable, shocking to humanity – and this by the servants of 
the United Company of Merchants trading (monopolizing and plundering) to the 
East Indies.32 
 
This unnamed individual blamed the Company for inflicting the same kind of savage 
cruelties upon the Indian people as those alleged of Tipu. This was a direct reference to 
the controversy surrounding the captives taken by Tipu during the war; it was therefore 
no surprise that British prisoners received cruel treatment back in turn from the Sultan, 
due to the injustices committed by the British thems lves. The anonymous open letter 
serves as an interesting reversal of the typical narrative of Asiatic despotism, charging 
that the East India Company was guilty of being the tru  tyrants in India. 
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 Innes Munro, despite being an officer in the Company's military, wrote to criticize 
how the Company combined war and commerce, and disgraced the British nation 
overseas: "They soon became so formidable and renowned in arms as to take the 
responsibility of invasion, conquest, and innocent bloodshed, upon themselves, attacking 
the powers of India upon selfish speculation as their avarice and ambition dictated, and 
continuing wantonly to sport away the lives of their countrymen, until they had, by the 
most dishonourable acts of injustice and oppression, rendered the British name odious in 
all the Indian courts, and usurped the immense territories now in their possession..."33 
Munro published his narrative of the war in 1789, and his critique was likely influenced 
by the proceedings of the Warren Hastings trial, as the wording in the passage above was 
very similar to many of the charges made by Edmund Burke a year earlier.34 Munro's 
critical account further accused the Company of bringing about a mass famine in Madras 
during 1782, writing of the streets and roads strewn with bodies and the "frightful 
skeletons" supplicating for a morsel of rice to eat.35 This was very much not the image of 
itself that the Company wanted to promote, and represented a direct attack upon its 
legitimacy as a territorial sovereign. All of these sources grounded their criticism of the 
Company in regard to its treatment of Indian subjects, often accusing the Company of the 
very same prisoner atrocities as Tipu Sultan had been charged. The implication was that 
the Company's servants were no better than Tipu, if not worse, and they were guilty of 
acting in despotic fashion towards the people of India.  
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 These competing claims that drew upon the language of tyranny to criticize the 
East India Company continued to appear into the early 1790s during the Third Mysore 
War. The Bee or Literary Intelligencer of London wrote in early 1792 about how the 
British people had been told that Tipu was one of “the most cruel despots that ever ruled 
over a nation,” detested by all his subjects, only to find that “all these assertions have 
been contradicted by the most undeniable facts” as his oldiers and subjects stood firm 
and resisted the Company’s military. The B e then further compared the character of 
Tipu with the character of the East India Company: "It now appears that this ferocious 
monster... is a kind and affectionate son, and an indulgent master, that he has been busied 
during his whole reign in protecting the lower orders of his people from the ruinous grip 
of grandees… all this [the war] for what? To satisfy the caprice of banditti who are eager 
to share in the spoils."36 This journal made a strong case for defending Tipu, both in 
terms of his character and his military prowess. It charged that the British public had been 
lied to about the war, and for no reason other thane enrichment of individuals in the 
East India Company, specifically using the term “banditti” which had been popularized 
during the nabob controversies of the 1760s and 1770s.37 
 This same line of reasoning was continued and expanded upon by the anonymous 
author Benevolus, writing in an editorial entitled “The Tyrant” for the General Magazine 
of 1792. In this lengthy diatribe against the Company, Benevolus turned the usage of the 
“tyrant” epithet on its head, directing it back against the merchants and administrators of 
Leadenhall Street. Benevolus wrote that the use of the word tyrant to describe Tipu was a 
particularly good choice, as he was convinced that “we could not have invented a title for 
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Tippoo that would more effectually have prejudiced the good people of this country 
against him,” as a means of duping the public into supporting a war carried out for the 
enrichment of a very few.38 Benevolus asked the reader to suppose that the reverse had 
taken place, and imagine that Indian soldiers had invaded Britain: "Let us reverse it – 
suppose, then, all that we have done in I dia, realized by their troops here, our King 
called a tyrant, our country over run and laid waste, thousands of harmless people 
destroyed, our wives and daughters violated... would s ch circumstances excite our love 
and respect for them? Would we treat such visitors with hospitality and lenity?"39  
 This justification provided for the behavior of Tipu, Benevolus concluded by 
predicting a pessimistic outcome for the future of British India, as the karmic just desserts 
for the actions of the Company’s servants overseas: 
As an Englishman, I find my character degraded, my judgment insulted, and my 
humanity sported with by them; and in these sentiments, I am persuaded, I shall 
not stand alone; for he that can read the accounts from India without grief and 
concern for the wounded honour of his country, and the cause of humanity must 
possess feelings I do not covet. “The glorious peace” we have made, from its 
nature, we cannot expect will be lasting, as compulsive acts are never considered 
as binding on the party they are imposed on, of course they never outlive 
necessity; we must, therefore, not be surprised, if “the tyrant,” out of whose 
power, I fear, we have put it to forgive us, should ere long be able to form a 
league against us in turn, get hold of some of our people, and then retaliate on us 
what we have so fair a claim to… that India would, probably, at a period not very 
distant, become another America to us.40 
 
The editorial by Benevolus serves as an extremely important source, consisting of one of 
the most comprehensive denials and rejections of the negative Tipu Legend to be found 
anywhere in print during this period. The author denied the allegations of Tipu’s cruelty 
as exaggerations of the Company, and touched upon all f the major anti-Company 
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themes of the late eighteenth century: greed and avarice amongst the Company’s servants, 
cruelty towards Indians, irresponsible style of rule, and deception towards the British 
public. Benevolus also exhibited the spirit of pessimi m regarding the future of India so 
common amongst the Opposition critics of the war, making an explicit comparison to the 
recent loss of the American colonies.41 Benevolus posed the by now familiar question of 
which party was acting tyrannically in India, and argued that the Company was much 
more guilty of that term than Tipu. The continued usage of this same language indicated 
how popular perceptions of Tipu Sultan were linked to the broader debate about the 
morality of overseas empire.  
 As a means of combating these claims, supporters of the East India Company also 
made use of despotism as a theme to contend that Company was engaged in a series of 
wars against Tippoo the Tyrant, a dangerous and fanatical ruler who represented the 
antithesis of British liberties. The struggle against Tipu was portrayed as a battle between 
British virtue and Indian vice, with the Company's soldiers and administrators embodying 
the British nation. Tipu Sultan was represented as a stereotypical Oriental despot, who 
exercised rule over his subjects and over the captured British prisoners in a master and 
slave relationship. The repeated and unending assertions of Tipu's tyrannical behavior in 
the sphere of British popular culture were responsible for helping to change the earlier 
skeptical attitudes towards the Company mentioned pr viously. Although these images of 
Tipu Sultan and the Mysore Wars were far from the only factor contributing to shifting 
perceptions of empire, they nevertheless played an important role in this process.  
 Tipu's representation as a despotic figure in the British metropole began during 
the Second Mysore War of the early 1780s. In one early xample, Tipu briefly appeared 
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during a speech in the House of Commons praising the conduct of Governor General 
Warren Hastings. In the words of Commodore Jobastone, "He [Hastings] had... 
signalized himself in those very fields on which the Macedonian Chief had been 
victorious, and he had completely overset all the powerful operations, and all the 
diabolical machinations of Tippoo Saib, that bold an  formidable invader of British 
liberty."42 Even at this very early period in 1783, the speaker us d Tipu as a villainous 
prop that threatened British freedoms in order to win support for the administrative 
leadership of the Company. It was noteworthy that an e rly appearance of Tipu in 
parliamentary politics was again linked to an explicit threat to British freedom.  
 The first clear association of Tipu together with the concept of tyranny appeared 
in the London newspapers in early 1784. Quoting an "anonymous officer" in the 
Company's service, the text stated: "Tippoo Saib is far from the character he has been 
represented to us; instead of being a friend to peace, he had proved himself a restless, 
treacherous, inhuman tyrant. He is entirely influenced by French politics, and has four 
battalions of Dutch, Portuguese, and French in his service... his army is well appointed, 
and more formidable than that of his father Hyder Ally.43 This was one of the first 
associations of the word "tyrant" with Tipu, which in time was to become inextricably 
linked with his method of rule for the British public. The lack of sourcing for this account 
was also significant. Up to this point in time, no description of this sort about Tipu had 
appeared anywhere in British popular print culture, ntil it was supplied here by an 
anonymous Company officer. The officer notably failed to state why Tipu should be 
viewed as a treacherous tyrant, leaving this point unexamined. Although these assertions 
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were rare during the early 1780s, and contested by opposition figures who favored 
peaceful engagement with Tipu when they did appear, they would become enormously 
more influential during the following decade.  
 By the time of the Third Mysore War (1790-92), Tipu was much more frequently 
portrayed both within Company documents and in the British popular press as a ruthless 
Oriental despot. The Public Advertiser wrote during this period of shifting attitudes in 
1791, suggesting that although the Sultan was an exceptionally talented individual, he 
was unfortunately twisted by cruelty:  
That he is a Prince of uncommon ability; that he has a genius of vast extent, but a 
genius turned to ill, that he has a rapid succession of ideas, both as a Politician 
and as a General; that he has a bold and investigative mind in all his operations 
and pursuits; that the din of war, and the clangor of arms, are the music to which 
his ears are organized, must be readily admitted… But all the brilliancy of parts, 
all the elevation and splendor of talents which distinguish this Oriental Monarch, 
are shaded and degraded by a lust of ambition, a thirst for power, and an exercise 
of cruelty, which dishonour and debase the human chracter, be it in what sphere 
it may, or however signalized by nature abilities. This haughty tyrant, cultivated 
and educated as his mind is, follows, like a brute, th  mere impression of passions, 
and, counteracting both reason and humanity, disgraces his species.44 
 
This summation of Tipu’s character existed in a transitional state, bridging the earlier 
praise for Tipu the skilled general with the growing belief in Tipu the brutal despot. 
Viewed from this perspective, Tipu was all the more f a disappointing ruler, as he had 
the potential to rise above his station and instead succumbed to baser instincts, much in 
the same vein as other accounts charging him with excessive sensual lust. Despite all of 
his talents, Tipu still ultimately remained a tyrant d a brute.  
 The World newspaper echoed similar thoughts, suggesting that Tipu’s education 
and military prowess were both compromised by his atrocities: “Tippoo Saib then is 
possessed of every qualification that can form the great warrior, but he is most defective 
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in that particular which can render the character most respected in the eyes of civilized 
society – he is without Humanity. His treatment of he British prisoners will mark him to 
all posterity as an unrelenting and sanguinary Tyrant, nd the constitutional greatness of 
his mind, will be obscured by the ferocity and depravity of his heart.”45 This criticism 
further implied that this was the difference between the “civilized society” of the British 
and the more “barbarous” Indian one encountered overseas, with the British possessing 
the superior quality of “Humanity.” This was the criti al difference between Tipu and the 
British, best symbolized by Lord Cornwallis, as thelatter's possession of civility and 
morality justified his superior right to rule over Mysore's Indian population. 
 Further sources from the early 1790s were yet more critical of Tipu, failing even 
to acknowledge that he was a capable ruler and skilled military leader. A minute drawn 
up by the Madras presidency charged that Tipu was abu ive towards his subordinates, his 
words false and hypocritical, with his overall policy differing widely from his father 
Haider and contributing to the ruinous state of his revenues.46 London’s Evening Mail 
echoed these charges, stating that Tipu’s disposition was “naturally cruel, passionate and 
revengeful,” his understanding and judgment much inferior to his father. The Evening 
Mail had no confidence in Tipu’s military prowess either: “He is a good soldier but an 
unskillful General: he punishes more from the influence of passion and prejudice, than 
attention to justice; and sometimes retains the pay of his troops for several months, whilst 
his own Saucars lend money at an enormous interest, which is stopped when they pay is 
issued.”47 Other newspapers leveled more fantastic claims about Tipu’s character; the 
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Bath Chronicle reported that Tipu and his father Haider had a habit of cutting off the 
heads of captured foes, then preserving them in pickling barrels afterwards for sport.48 
These were the sort of capricious and cruel actions expected of Oriental despots.  
 This theme was one of many taken up by Col. John Murray in an extraordinary 
short account entitled “Sketches of the Character of Tippoo Sultaun.” Written shortly 
before the outbreak of the Third Mysore War in the hopes of encouraging the Company 
to begin another conflict, Murray’s hyperbolic tirade painted Tipu as an inhuman 
abomination, completely beyond redemption and withou  virtues. Describing Tipu’s 
interactions with the Nairs of the Malabar Coast, Murray wrote that Tipu “has tortured 
the Inhabitants, Violated and Plundered their Pagods, Murdered every man of 
consequence who has not immediately shewn an example to his dependants by adopting 
the faith, and has at length thrown the Country into a Scene of Blood and Confusion, 
seldom to be equalled in the most inhuman actions of any Tyrant who ever existed.”49 In 
summarizing Tipu’s deceptive nature, Murray stated: 
If an agreeable demeanor be a Virtue, he is a man possessed of the most pleasing 
and courteous manners, under which he endeavors to conceal the most Blackest 
Crimes, and the most inexorable Cruelty of dispositi n o gratify his insatiable 
Avarice, and under the Mask of Religious enthusiasm, he drinks the Blood of his 
Subjects with a Savage Joy; and opens with his unrelenting Sword a Scene which 
plunges the Soul into the deepest emotions of Melancholy and Woe.50 
 
This particular account's vivid, colorful language illustrated the intense hatred that Tipu 
inspired within some factions of the East India Company. The Sultan was represented in 
these sketches as the worst sort of tyrant imaginable, given the most savage and demonic 
qualities that the author could call to mind.  
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 Murray’s account provided one of the earliest examples of the fully developed, 
mature incarnation of the Tipu Legend. Tipu was represented as an inhuman monster, and 
his character employed as a means to persuade the rad r in supporting the cause of the 
East India Company. When Murray wrote his Sketches in April 1789, it was done with 
the purpose of persuading Company officials to declar  war on Tipu and intervene with 
the Nairs on the Malabar Coast. This was before Tipu's dispute with the Rajah of 
Travancore took place and drew the Company into another conflict in southern India.51 
At the time, his characterization of Tipu represented the fringe element of extremist 
rhetoric, supported only by the Anglo-India community and their desire for a war of 
revenge. By the end of the Third Mysore War, however, this sort of polemicizing had 
become widespread, spurred on by the political debate etween parties in Parliament, and 
the villainous incarnation of Tipu had become widely accepted in British popular culture. 
The sending of “Sketches of the Character of Tippoo Sultaun” back to London in 
September 1792 for publication after the war nicely symbolized this shift in Tipu’s image 
that had taken place over the duration of the conflict.  
 The contemporary literature surrounding the Fourth Mysore War in 1798 and 
1799 was noteworthy for the failure of any positive m ntions of Tipu to appear in the 
British popular press. Following a long period of debate and competing representations of 
the Sultan during the previous wars, the Fourth Mysore War firmly established the image 
of Tipu as a tyrannical Oriental despot in public discourse. This is apparent both from the 
negative descriptions of his character published during and after the war, along with the 
complete lack of more positive representations that called to mind the "youthful and 
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spirited heir" of two decades earlier. The image of Tippoo the Tyrant became firmly 
crystallized afterward this point as the historical memory of the Mysore Wars.  
 One such example was the rapid publication of Authentic Memoirs of Tippoo 
Sultan, written by an anonymous "Officer in the East India Service." It was little more 
than a biographical sketch of Tipu, written to capit lize on the public fascination with the 
Sultan in the last months of 1799. The account was rushed to publication in order to 
capture this market, and therefore was far from the most reputable of sources, but 
nonetheless served as a barometer of the public sentiment of the moment. The memoirs 
referred to Haider Ali as the "great and despotic usurper", who instructed Tipu in the 
general qualifications of Indian rulers, ambition and ferocity: "The use of warlike 
instruments is there esteemed the first part of education; cruelty too often mistaken for 
heroism, and impetuosity for magnanimity. Tippoo gave early proofs of all these Indian 
virtues, and was always admitted to his father’s councils..."52 As these opening lines to 
the memoirs indicate, they provided an extremely negative portrayal of Tipu's personality, 
one perfectly fitting with Wellesley’s characterization during the final conflict. The 
authentic memoirs summarized their characterization of Tipu in the following manner: 
From the example of his father he united all the qualities of a warrior and a 
statesman, but he inherited more of his turbulence and less of his policy. Young 
and enterprising, he was superior to his father in military talents, as he was 
inferior to him in the dissimulation of Indian politics… He was also more 
addicted to grandeur and pleasure, and discovered stronger traits of despotism and 
cruelty.53 
 
Tipu was portrayed as a capricious Asiatic tyrant, with his great military skill offset by 
his savagery and cruelty. There was also a reprisal of the claims of Tipu's sensuality and 
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uncontrollable lust, which would also become incorporated into the historical memory of 
Tipu in later decades.54 Like other Indians, Tipu had been a savage ruled entirely by his 
passions, lacking the civilized sophistication of the superior British character.  
 E. Johnson’s British Gazette denounced Tipu as a restless tyrant whose 
"boundless cruelties excited the indignation of his own subjects, and aroused even the 
meek Hindoo from his habitual submission." The Sultan had advanced forward without 
pause, until finally he was brought to bay by the Company, putting an end to "his career 
of despotism, cruelty, and oppression."55 This was a standard denunciation of Tipu's 
character, and can be taken as representative of th spectrum of public opinion on the 
subject, once again making explicit reference to despotism as a concept. Similar 
descriptions were commonplace in British print culture in the final months of 1799-1800. 
The Whitehall Evening Post claimed that Tipu had been a poor ruler in addition o a cruel 
depot, expressing surprise that such a "weak Potentate" had been able to maintain his 
position for so long. Instead, his absurd and unprovoked antipathy against the Company 
had resulted in his downfall.56 This was a more subtle change from earlier accounts of the 
Sultan, where even Tipu's detractors who considered him a tyrant also conceded that he 
was a powerful and dangerous monarch. The reflections on Tipu written after the Fourth 
Mysore War's conclusion were not even willing to grant that he had been a capable ruler, 
as if to deny the fear and anxiety that Tipu had provoked for so long. 
 Alexander Beatson provided an extended sketch of Tipu's character at the end of 
his campaign narrative of the Fourth Mysore War, describing Tipu as a weak ruler 
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completely incapable of making decisions and untrustworthy due to the constant 
changing of his tyrannical whims. Tipu was "an awful example of the instability of 
human power, unsupported by justice or moderation", his conduct a continued scene of 
"folly, caprice, and weakness."57 He paid no respect to rank or position, undermined th  
administration of Mysore, and was under a delusion that the walls of Seringapatam were 
impregnable. The whole of his conduct therefore "proves him to have been a weak, 
headstrong, and tyrannical prince... totally unequal to the government of a kingdom, 
which had been usurped by the hardiness, intrigue, and talents of his father."58 Once 
again, Tipu was given no credit for being an effective ruler, and was instead characterized 
as a foppish prince, the very image of a dithering Oriental potentate who acted through 
the caprice of the moment. He was not only cruel and tyrannical, but also an usurper who 
was never qualified to govern at all. These attacks on Tipu's suitability as a monarch were 
new to the Fourth Mysore War, and would have made littl sense in the previous conflicts, 
when Tipu ruled over a large and powerful state. In the aftermath of his death and the 
Company's occupation of Mysore, they were a means to further undermine Tipu's legacy.  
 Finally, the General Evening Post produced an extended characterization of the 
Sultan which demonstrated the mature Tipu Legend, worth quoting at length as a 
summation of how the Sultan came to be perceived. In a passage entitled "Biographical 
Anecdotes of the Late Tippoo Sultaun", the paper offered the following description: 
His disposition is naturally cruel: his temper is passionate and revengeful; and he 
is prone to be abusive; and his worse are false and hypocritical, as suit his purpose. 
His policy, thus far differing widely from his father, has been ruinous to his 
revenues, as well as hurtful to his government. He professes himself Naib to one 
of the twelve prophets, who, the Mahomedans believe, are yet to come; and he 
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persecutes all other casts, forcing numbers to becom  Musselmen. He is jealous of, 
and prejudiced against, his father’s favorites; most of whom he has removed from 
their offices, giving to some lesser appointments. When compared to his father, 
his understanding and judgment are supposed to be inferior: he is esteemed as 
good a soldier, but a less skillful general: and he is wanting in that great resource 
which his father so eminently displayed in all cases of danger. His father 
discriminated merit, rewarded it liberally, and punished guilt with the utmost rigor 
of a despot; he gives little encouragement or reward; nd he punishes more from 
the influence of passion and prejudice than from any attention to justice.59 
 
This lengthy account encapsulated the negative imagery built up around Tipu Sultan, 
with Tipu deficient not only in character, but ineffective and clumsy as a leader as well, 
one who oppressed his subjects and destroyed his own kingdom through poorly chosen 
policies and religious bigotry. It was the completely caricatured vision of an Oriental and 
Islamic despot. With this description, public opinio  had come full circle from the young 
and promising prince of twenty years earlier. The Sultan of these accounts was the sort of 
tyrannical ruler that the Company was fully justified in warring against to protect the 
people of southern India from violent depredations. This vision of Tipu - the one 
promoted by Cornwallis, Wellesley, and the East India Company in general - was the 
image which would establish itself in the British national consciousness and historical 
memory. The earlier, alternative representations of Tipu; the criticisms charging that it 
was the British Company that was truly acting despotically in India; both of these 
viewpoints died out during the Fourth Mysore War, and would largely be forgotten by 
future generations.  
Faithless and Violent Character 
 Although much of the literature on Tipu Sultan directly referred to him as a tyrant, 
and used this as a means to undermine his rule and advance in the interests of the East 
India Company, other sources made similar charges that played upon his supposed role as 
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an Oriental despot. One common argument was that Tipu was capricious and 
untrustworthy, an individual who could not be counted upon to keep his word when it 
came to treaties and prisoner exchanges. Like a true ty ant, Tipu was willing to break past 
agreements whenever it suited his needs, making it mpossible for Company 
administrators to trust his word. In practice, this reputation served as an excuse for 
Company figures to act in aggressive and expansionist fashion in southern India, 
charging Tipu with breaking the peace and then going to war once again to acquire more 
territory. For example, as Cornwallis wrote during the negotiations surrounding the 1792 
Treaty of Seringapatam, "faithless and violent as Tippoo's character was known to be, I 
judged it incumbent upon me to be prepared to support by force if it should prove 
necessary the rights that we had acquired."60 The supposedly untrustworthy nature of 
Tipu Sultan provided a convenient rationale for the Company to pursue its own invasive 
designs against Mysore, in this case swallowing up a sizable portion of territory.  
 The faithless character of Tipu was also employed by British writers through 
means of a comparison with the superior virtue of the British nation. During the 1790s, 
this most frequently took the form of a comparison with Lord Cornwallis, who was 
praised for his humanity and moderation by British observers. Tipu Sultan was portrayed 
as lacking all of the higher character traits that were present in his British counterpart. 
This was another means to justify the Company's invasion and annexation of Mysorean 
territory, through the symbolic suggestion that British men like Cornwallis were 
inherently better suited to rule over India than despotic figures like Tipu. The continuous 
usage of these unflattering comparisons with the Company's Governor Generals indicates 
                                                




that this was another means by which the image of Tippoo the Tyrant helped to reshape 
popular perceptions of overseas empire.  
 The most common early form in which these claims of untrustworthy behavior 
manifested themselves was in the realm of surrender agr ements, which Tipu was 
charged with breaking on multiple occasions. This in tial focus on surrenders was likely a 
result of the attention that was placed on the British captives during the Second Mysore 
War and throughout the rest of the 1780s. It was also  way to divert some of the public's 
focus away from the military disasters suffered by the Company at the hands of Tipu, as 
some of the shock of defeat could be blamed on Tipu's failure to adhere to honorable 
surrender agreements. At the Battle of Pollilur, fo example, William Thomson claimed 
that Haider and Tipu's soldiers had "rushed upon them in the most savage and brutal 
manner" once the Company forces had laid down theirarms as part of a surrender 
agreement.61 General Mathews was also said to have been captured along with his army 
at Bednur after they agreed to surrender the city and leave with all of the honors of war.62 
In both cases, the captivity of the British men in T pu's dungeons for the remainder of the 
conflict was blamed at least in part upon Tipu's failure to adhere to a previously agreed 
upon battlefield arrangement. This suggested that i was Tipu's faithlessness, and not the 
military incompetence of the East India Company, which was responsible for the 
disasters suffered during the war. 
 Later in the Second Mysore War, Tipu was again charged with breaking the terms 
of the surrender of the British garrison in the city of Mangalore. Perhaps seeking a 
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rationale for yet another humiliating defeat, an official correspondence within the East 
India Company written by Charles Crommelin charged Tipu with failing to adhere to the 
cessation of hostilities. "I now enclose you Copies and Extracts of sundry Letters... 
wherein they set forth the Conduct of Tippoo's Officers towards them, since the 
Cessation of Arms... this Conduct plainly shews that e Enemy [Tipu] means to pay little 
or no regard to the Cessation."63 Treachery on the part of Tipu made for a convenient 
excuse covering up the Company's own failures; the surrender of Mangalore could be 
portrayed as due to the machinations of a despotic ruler, rather than due to a failure of 
military logistics. Indeed, this same source described the exemplary conduct of the 
Company's officers and "the Bravery they have shewn on all Occasions", contrasting this 
behavior to the actions of Tipu.64 This comparison between the virtues of the British and 
the vices of the Sultan would become much more commn during the Third and Fourth 
Mysore Wars.  
 However, there was little factual evidence to support these claims of foul play on 
the part of Tipu. Eyewitness accounts of the surrender at Mangalore painted a very 
different picture of Tipu's behavior, just as the earli r circumstances surrounding the 
capture of General Mathews and his men indicated that Tipu was not a serial liar, as he 
was often portrayed.65 Colonel Charles Morgan wrote, "After the Cessation Tippoo 
received Major Campbell very honorably and paid himand his Garrison many 
Compliments on their noble Defence. Tippoo it is said kept very much out of the way and 
the chief use he made of the French was in guarding the Trenches at Night when he could 
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not depend on his own Men."66 John Wolseley's extensive diary of the siege speaks of 
Tipu in generally positive language, as the capitulation terms allowed the surviving 
soldiers to leave the fort unmolested, as well as provide ships and food for them to leave 
his territory. Wolseley also referred to Tipu as "His ighness" and used terms of respect 
in accordance with Tipu's status.67 The General Evening Post of London relayed an 
account of the surrender at Mangalore from sources in India, one in which General 
Macleod was received by Tipu "with the utmost respect and attention." Tipu asked the 
general to travel with him to his capital, where thy would enter into peace negotiations, 
and Tipu "gave him his most solemn assurances that it w s the desire of his heart to have 
the friendship of the English. He engaged to releas all the English officers, his 
prisoners." The article concluded by stating that Tipu showed "throughout the whole of 
the interview, and in his subsequent behavior, his disposition to peace, so that we may 
reasonably indulge the belief, that at this time we are entirely at peace in India."68 
 The portrayal of Tipu in this account was completely different from the tone 
exhibited by Crommelin above. There existed no indication that Tipu was a faithless and 
despotic sovereign who had to be stopped, and nothing o suggest that Tipu was anything 
other than a typical Indian ruler. The descriptions f Tipu in the newspaper press 
covering the later Mysore Wars would have an entirely different viewpoint, inevitably 
mentioning the depredations of the Sultan together with his supposed untrustworthiness. 
This same account of the surrender terms at Mangalore was reprinted in many other 
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newspapers, including provincial newspapers in Bath, Bristol, and Gloucester, indicating 
that this non-tyrannical perception of Tipu Sultan would have had wide currency at the 
time. At this point in 1784, the vilification of Tipu had only a limited sway over popular 
representations in print culture. 
 Much of the belief that Tipu was an untrustworthy ruler derived from the status of 
the British prisoners captured during the Second Mysore War. Although nearly all of the 
prisoners taken  by Tipu during the war were released in 1784 after the signing of the 
Treaty of Mangalore, there were some 200-300 individuals of European descent who 
were not set free by Tipu. These were most likely the "European Musselmen" who had 
converted to Islam and entered into the military servic  of Tipu as officers and technical 
advisors for his army.69 However, the popular perception of these individuals both within 
the Company and in the British metropole was that Tipu had broken his word and failed 
to release all of his European prisoners. Tipu was therefore guilty of violating the Treaty 
of Mangalore, proving his faithless and duplicitous character as a true Oriental despot.  
 This was a common refrain amongst the Anglo-Indian newspapers in the years 
leading up to the Third Mysore War, who saw the conflict when it did arrive as little 
more than payback for the treatment of British prisoners captured during the previous war. 
The Calcutta Chronicle and General Advertiser expounded at length on the horrible 
atrocities committed by Tipu, portraying him as "a tyrant, whose savage barbarity, shall 
for ever blazon on the records of history, and exhibit is name, as the first, the most 
odious, and the most detestable among mankind!"70 With Tipu's character established, the 
paper then went on to proclaim that the moment had arrived for the Sultan to receive his 
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just desserts for his earlier treatment of the British prisoners: "The time is now at hand, 
when we hope to see the tyrant receiving the reward of his cruelties. Our most gracious 
sovereign, recovered and restored to his people. Th British empire, great, powerful, 
authoritative, and at peace…. Officers and men, ardent to convince the world that the 
honor of Britons cannot be insulted with impunity."71 The duplicitous nature of the Sultan, 
and his failure to release all of the Europeans within his service, provided one f the 
strongest motivations for the Company's return to war in 1789.  
 Once the conflict had begun, Cornwallis made frequent mention of the 
untrustworthy nature of Tipu during his correspondences with the Sultan. Writing again 
in reference to a violated surrender agreement, Cornwallis charged, "But with what 
confidence can a negotiation be carried on with a man, who not only violates treaties of 
peace, but also disregards the faith of Capitulation during war.."72 Cornwallis repeatedly 
insisted that Tipu was guilty of acting in despotic fashion, by refusing to adhere to terms 
of surrender. In this particular case at the city of C imbator, it was agreed that the British 
garrison would be allowed to march out with their pr vate property unmolested, but 
instead Cornwallis claimed that they were "detained i  the Pettah [jail] of Coimbetoor, 
and after much correspondence had passed between you [Tipu], and Kummer ud Dien 
Khan, they were at the end of thirteen days, sent prisoners to Seringapatnam by your 
orders."73 These were repetitions of the same claims made about Pollilur, Mangalore, and 
General Mathews in the previous war, once again suggesting the lack of trust that could 
be placed in Tipu. The presence of British captives n Tipu's hands remained a sign of the 
Sultan's faithless nature.  
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 During the negotiations surrounding the 1792 Treaty of Seringapatam, Cornwallis 
would make use of Tipu's duplicitous reputation to advance the Company's agenda. As 
part of the peace treaty to secure the peace, Cornwallis had written that Tipu must offer 
up two of his own sons as hostages to the Company. Having taken such a drastic and 
unorthodox means of securing the peace, Cornwallis had to justify his actions to the 
British public at home, if he were to avoid being labeled himself as a despotic nabob. The 
simplest means was to vilify the character of Tipu Sultan, shifting blame for the young 
hostage princes back onto their own father. John Kennaway, one of the British 
negotiators of the treaty, wrote about "how extremely r pugnant it was to Lord 
Cornwallis' feelings as a father to be under the necessity of strictly adhering to it," 
referring to the treaty article about the hostage princes, however "he could not relax 
without wilfully sacrificing his duty to the Publick and the State he served."74 In this 
particular incidence, Cornwallis appealed to the higher necessity of keeping the peace, as 
a means of shifting focus away from the actual event in question. Cornwallis suggested 
that he had been forced into the unorthodox measure of taking children as hostages due to 
the untrustworthy nature of Tipu. It was only the complete falsity of Tipu's nature, and 
his inability to adhere to past treaties, which hadc used Cornwallis to adopt such an 
unusual measure.  
 In his lengthy letter to the Directors explaining the conclusion of the war, 
Cornwallis justified himself by again attacking Tipu's personality. He stated that he was 
in possession of Tipu's two sons as hostages as well as a great sum of money, which 
would have been sufficient pledge for any other man other than the Sultan. However, 
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"faithless and violent as Tippoo's character was known to be," Cornwallis judged the 
extraordinary measure of taking children hostage necessary to ensure the peace. 75 Tipu's 
nature as a despotic ruler, his reputation for constant lying and evasion, served as the 
rationale for Cornwallis' abduction of the Sultan's two young sons. The rest of the letter 
would go on to describe how this war "into which we re forced by every consideration 
of good faith and sound policy," had resulted in a series of financial and material 
benefits: "in securing [territorial] acquisitions to ourselves, which... add considerably to 
your revenues, and promise to open sources of commerce... that may be looked upon as 
of great importance both to the Company and to the nation."76 It is noteworthy that 
Travancore, the supposed cause of the war, was never mentioned even a single time by 
Cornwallis in this very lengthy letter back to the Directors. 
 This provided a classic expression of the Tipu Legend, with Cornwallis first 
insisting that Tipu’s character made him completely untrustworthy, then going on to 
discuss how the Company was “forced” into war against him, resulting in the gain of 
money and resources that just coincidentally happened to have been conquered from 
Mysore. Cornwallis knew well that playing up the tyrannical nature of Tipu would 
provide a carte blanche for the Company's expansionist c drive in southern India. 
Cornwallis was engaging in an eighteenth century vesion of victimization, transferring 
responsibility for guilt onto the body of the offended party. This allowed Cornwallis to 
keep his own reputation intact, continuing to be perceived in popular culture as an 
incorruptible and moral administrator, while shifting all of the blame for the war onto the 
increasingly villainized Tipu Sultan. This was not mere chance or happenstance; without 
                                                





the presence of Tipu to serve as a foil for Cornwallis, the Governor General would have 
been hard pressed to avoid the charge of nabobery for his actions. 
 In the wider popular discourse surrounding the Third Mysore War, Cornwallis 
was commonly the subject of a direct comparison with T pu Sultan, providing an 
example of the superior virtues of the British nation. Cornwallis received an outpouring 
of popular support when word reached Britain of his victory over Mysore. Soon after 
news of the peace treaty arrived, the City of London v ted to award Cornwallis the 
Freedom of the City for his gallant conduct and essential service, along with the present 
of a golden box worth 100 guineas.77 Ellis Cornelia Knight composed a song in honor of 
Cornwallis, a flowery panegyric thanking him for freeing India from "barbarous rapine" 
and defending the honor of the British nation.78 The Oracle of London was one of many 
newspapers to print their official congratulations to the conquering general, praising his 
"firmness of resolution and promptness of action" in battle, as well as how "victory and 
humanity marked the progress of his arms." The Oracle concluded its praise for 
Cornwallis on a triumphant note: "Thus the Marquis of Cornwallis, having totally 
overthrown the only foe to the British dominions in India, extended our territories, 
confirmed by interest the attachment of our allies, and rendered our power, both Civil and 
Military, superior to all Oriental intrigue, may expect, on his return to England, the most 
cordial congratulations of his countrymen!"79 The optimistic outlook of this commentary 
posed a stark contrast to the doom and gloom regarding India written earlier by the critics 
of the political opposition during the war. The authors of this piece celebrated the 
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expansion of the British power in India, rather than worrying over fears of moral 
corruption due to Eastern luxury, as had been so comm n a generation earlier.80 
 When Cornwallis returned to London in early 1794 after the conclusion of his 
Governor Generalship in India, he was greeted with a huge public celebration. According 
to the daily newspapers, "The triumphal entry of Lord Cornwallis on Saturday last into 
the City of London, bore a great analogy to that of the ceremonial of the Roman Emperor 
Trajan. All ranks have (without exception) borne testimony to the virtues of the gallant 
Marquis, and even the exalted approbation of the Sovereign has been added as the climax 
of applause."81 Cornwallis received the thanks of the East India Company, an annuity of 
£5000, promotion to the peerage, the aforementioned Fr edom of the City, enthusiastic 
public receptions, and the composition of songs and paintings in his honor. He was the 
toast of the town, and continued to receive sumptuous dinners in his name weeks after 
returning to Britain.82 The overwhelming public support for Cornwallis indicated that his 
treatment of the hostage princes had not damaged his reputation in Britain. Cornwallis' 
claim that he had been forced into taking the hostage princes due to the faithless character 
of Tipu was widely accepted in the British metropole. Public commentary specifically 
praised Cornwallis for his morality and his moderation, traits that Tipu was said to be 
lacking. The rhetoric that Cornwallis used to justify he war, his argument that it had been 
fought as a war of liberation to defeat a tyrannical Oriental despot, was met with 
widespread approval, and became the generally accepted narrative of the conflict.   
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 Cornwallis was most often praised for his moderation and justice, which were 
qualities that were believed to embody the national ch racter. The Governor General had 
become the anti-Tipu, the figure that represented th  s erling morality of the British 
nation, and the antithesis of the Sultan's faithless and violent character. As Peter Marshall 
wrote in his article on the public reception shown to Cornwallis after the war: 
The moderation and benevolence which Cornwallis had shown in war was 
thought to be characteristic of the qualities which he had instilled into British rule 
of the East India Company's provinces. Thus the British nvaded Mysore, not as 
conquerors but as liberators of the mass of the population from the "tyranny" of 
Tipu. The annexation of new territories would be an act of benevolence, not of 
ambition.83 
 
The image of Cornwallis as the virtuous and patriotic soldier-hero could therefore replace 
that of the avaricious nabobs of the previous decads. The older pessimism and fears of 
moral corruption could give way to public enthusiasm about expansion of empire. The 
Mysore Wars and the image of Tipu Sultan were enormously important in providing a 
foundation for the creation of an imperial culture. This period in the early 1790s was the 
point at which wars of empire shifted from being perceived as wasteful and morally 
dubious enterprises carried out for self-enrichment to being perceived as missions of 
liberation, spreading the blessings of British rule to backwards subject races. Although it 
is possible to overstate the impact of these changes, this period was nonetheless a 
decisive breaking point with earlier understandings of overseas empire. The public 
reception of Cornwallis and the war's victory suggests that pride in Britain's Indian 
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empire and the military successes of the Company had become widely accepted elements 
of British nationalism in a way that had not existed even a decade earlier.84 
The War of Liberation against Religious Bigotry 
 Wrapped up in these claims about Tipu's role as an Oriental despot was the 
increasingly popular belief in the 1790s that Tipu was a poor ruler and a fanatical Muslim. 
Tipu was represented as an usurper, the illegitimate conqueror of Mysore who had come 
to power by following his father's takeover of the proper Hindu ruling family. Tipu's 
exercise of power took the form of religious bigotry, as he destroyed the Hindu places of 
worship across his kingdom and forced his predominantly Hindu populace to convert to 
Islam against their will. Tipu was in fact a weak ruler, it was argued, and the people of 
Mysore were crying out for the deposition of this tyrant. Tipu's repeated displays of 
religious prejudice were a sign that he was unfit to rule. This new theme was an 
expansion upon the earlier treatment of the captured B itish prisoners; it was suggested 
that Tipu was guilty of excessive cruelties against not only a small number of soldiers, 
but the entire populace of Mysore. In the same fashion that British captives had been 
forced to convert to Islam against their will, the whole kingdom was being terrorized by 
the religious obsessions of their Sultan, demanded to convert to his religion or face death 
and destruction.  
 These claims were almost nonexistent during the Second Mysore War of the 
1780s, but became commonplace during the later Mysore Wars of the 1790s. They 
provided the justification for a war of liberation against Mysore, with the East India 
Company portraying itself as the protector of freedom and religious liberty. When viewed 
from this perspective, the Company's military was no longer fighting aggressive wars of 
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expansion overseas, but acting to protect the people of southern India from the religious 
excesses and cruel abuses of a fanatical Muslim tyrant. Tipu and his father Haider had 
furthermore been base upstarts of low birth to begin with, allowing the Company to 
portray itself as the champions of the traditional ruling family of Mysore. This liberation 
rhetoric, based upon "freeing" the people of southern India from Tipu's rule, became 
increasingly commonplace in the realm of British popular discourse in the last decade of 
the eighteenth century. It provided a much more positive lens through which the British 
public could view their overseas empire in India, one which did not conflict with British 
notions of liberty. Indeed, it could now be argued that the Company had shed its earlier 
role of avaricious nabobery and was working as a moral f rce for progress, trying its best 
to remove Islamic zealots like Tipu Sultan from power.  
 In the Third Mysore War (1790-92), Tipu Sultan was portrayed for the first time 
as a religious bigot and a fanatical Muslim, a characterization which had been absent 
from the previous conflict. This was an attractive claim for the East India Company to 
make as a means of driving a barrier between Tipu and the people of Mysore, a region 
with a Hindu population approaching 90% of the total.85 The Malabar coastal region of 
Tipu’s domains also had a sizeable Christian minority population (about 25%), which 
served as another potentially disaffected group. There was little doubt that Tipu himself 
was a devout practitioner of his Islamic faith; Alexander Dirom wrote in his history of the 
war that Tipu announced himself to be the restorer f the faith, and “sent forth 
proclamations inviting all true Mussulmen to join his standard,” adding the enthusiasm of 
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religion to traditional military discipline.86 Modern historians have concurred with these 
sentiments, and Tipu has frequently been celebrated as a pan-Islamic hero.87 
 However, British accounts supportive of the Company went a step further during 
the war, charging Tipu with being not just a faithful Muslim, but a fanatical one. 
Elaborating upon the conversion ceremonies faced by the captured British prisoners, 
writers portrayed Tipu as a bigoted ruler who forced his subjects to adopt his religion or 
perish by the sword. These measures were proof of Tipu's despotic nature, and his 
unpopularity with his own subjects. An early account from the Calcutta Public Advertiser 
in 1785 suggested that the “arbitrary and oppressiv ystem of government adopted by 
the tyrant, more and more alienates the heart of his people,” while lamenting the 
unfortunate British captives who suffered under “cruelties daily exercised on them.”88 
This was an example of how the supposedly tyrannical behavior of Tipu towards the 
captured British prisoners was expanded in contemporary accounts to include the rest of 
the people of Mysore as well.  
 The Anglo-Indian newspapers anticipated these charges of religious bigotry 
before the Third Mysore War's outbreak, with the Calcutta Gazette writing as early as 
1789 about Tipu, “whose barbarity in circumcising, and persecution of all casts to turn 
Proselytes to the Mahometan faith is well known, and who whilst professing the strongest 
attachment and friendship, is meditating Tortures, murders, oppression.”89 The Calcutta 
Chronicle concurred in this characterization, describing Tipu at one point as driven into 
virtual insanity by the onset of religious fervor: “Extraordinary reports prevail of the 
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turbulent ambition of Tippoo being exalted into a sort of visionary madness; and of his 
assuming, in his holy paroxysms, more Mahometan merit than Mahomet himself.”90 The 
same paper claimed that Tipu boasted of creating 40,000 Muslims in one day, in another 
reference to the conversion ceremonies that aroused so much anxiety.  
A frequent charge leveled against Tipu (and occasionally his father Haider) was 
the claim that they destroyed Hindu temples and drove out or murdered the Brahmins 
who had presided over them. A Company minute from 1792 wrote how the feudal and 
Brahminical system of Malabar was destroyed, with the upper-caste Hindus driven from 
the region.91 Lt. Roderick Mackenzie’s history of the war included a scene describing the 
destruction of a Hindu temple: 
Here, neither respect, for the grandeur and antiquity of their temples, nor 
veneration of the sacred rites of a religion whose rigin no time records, proved 
any protection for the persons or property, even of the first Brahmins. Their 
pagodas, breached with sacrilegious cannon, were forcibly entered, their altars 
defiled, their valuables seized, their dwellings reduced to ashes, and the 
devastation was rendered still more horrible by the scattered remains of men, 
women, and children, mangled beneath a murderous sword, hetted on the 
bloody Koran. To contrast this scene of barbarism, even with the most detestable 
that ever disgraced protestant invasions, would stamp the cruelty of Mahomedan 
superstition and strongly mark the superior humanity of the christian persuasion.92 
 
Tipu's destruction of Hindu temples was another example of his tyrannical status as a 
ruler, and the cruelties that he practiced against his own subjects. Mackenzie suggested in 
the final lines that the Hindu population would be better ruled by the “superior humanity” 
of Christians, an obvious hint that he hoped Mysore would be placed under Company 
rule.  
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 These stories provided an implicit justification for the war against Tipu, to 
remove the tyrant from power, and also for the annexation of territory afterwards, with 
the Company providing a superior and enlightened moe of governance. They expanded 
the cruel treatment of the British prisoners from the previous war, and applied the same 
kind of horrific description to an entire people under Tipu’s rule. The Public Advertiser 
stated this explicitly in an article from 1791, writing how the amongst the high-caste 
Hindu Nairs of the Malabar Coast, “the most intelligent and best informed people think 
there can be no doubt of their continuing firm to their alliance [with Cornwallis] against 
the tyrant.”93 The Oriental Repertory took up the same argument, linking together 
persecution of the Nairs by Tipu with an extension of Company rule in India. The journal 
wrote that when Tipu took possession of the Malabar Coast, he ruled the area “with a 
Rod of Iron”, the inhabitants finding themselves so oppressed that they fled into the 
jungle; the most unwarrantable act of tyranny was “forcing the Nairs and Tiers to 
embrace the Mahometan Religion, which exasperated them beyond every thing.” 
However, since Company soldiers forced out Tipu and gained control of the region, “the 
Country has improved astonishingly, and, I make no doubt, in a few years, will turn out a 
most valuable acquisition to our Honourable Masters.”94 Roderick Mackenzie further 
linked together accusations of Tipu’s religious cruelty with the expansion of Company 
territory by writing in his history of the war how the Hindu rajahs were “the original, 
genuine and true princes of Hindostan,” which now loked to the British nation “for 
protection against the oppressive power of the Mysorean Prince.”95 These accounts 
representing Tipu as an Islamic fanatic were no accident, but a deliberate attempt to 
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provide further justification for the ongoing war, nd pave the way for annexation of 
Company territory afterwards.  
 Due to this portrayal of Tipu as a tyrannical Oriental despot, many British writers 
who sympathized with the East India Company argued that the people of Mysore would 
be eager to throw off Tipu’s barbaric rule. These accounts supported the belief that the 
Third Mysore War would be a war of liberation to overthrow an unpopular monarch, and 
presumably pave the way for a smooth Company takeover thereafter. The Calcutta 
Gazette surmised as far back as 1786 that “the people on the Malabar Coast feel more 
than ever the oppressive tyranny that mark their government, and groan under the yoke 
with impatience to throw it off; they will certainly embrace the first favourable 
opportunity to effect this purpose.”96 The Calcutta Chronicle confidently predicted in 
1790 that the war would be speedily won for the same reason, as Tipu’s populace rose up 
against his rule: "It is well known that Tippoo is obeyed more through fear, than personal 
attachment, even by those near his person... many of his Mysorean subjects will shake off 
his yoke as soon as the British army approaches to his capital, and throw themselves on a 
power from whom they have every reason to expect lenity, protection, and justice."97 
This was another variation on the war of liberation ideal, with the Company soldiers 
enthusiastically welcomed by the people of Mysore, and Tipu’s army disintegrating 
before them because he enforced his rule solely through fear. With the London 
newspapers carrying reports from India detailing how Tipu mutilated his subjects by 
cutting off their arms and legs, this did not appear to be an unreasonable conjecture.98 
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 Another London newspaper editorialized in 1790 that it hoped Cornwallis "will 
not enter into any treaty or compromise with Tippoo Saib. The total extermination of this 
barbarous Usurper of the Throne of Mysore can alone secure permanent peace to the 
Carnatic." Afterwards, it continued, the restoration of the pre-Haider ruling family of 
Mysore would ensure the goodwill of the "oppressed an deluded people" towards the 
British.99 This was one of the first appearances of Cornwallis' liberation rhetoric in 
metropolitan newspapers, used as a justification for the Company's decision to enter 
another Indian war.  
 The theme of Tipu as an usurper had rarely been usd during the previous conflict, 
but it appeared more and more often during the Third Mysore War. These motifs of 
usurpation and restoration managed to turn the removal of Tipu into a defensive act 
carried out purely for the benefit of the native peo l . Kate Brittlebank has argued that 
British expansion in India was frequently justified by portraying Indian rulers as 
illegitimate and tyrannical usurpers of earlier dynasties. This characterization reached its 
apogee under Tipu Sultan.100 The use of such language allowed the Company and its 
defenders to cast the extension of British rule as a benevolent act of protection, rather 
than a naked power grab. These representation of Tipu's rule had been noticeably lacking 
a decade earlier during the Second Mysore War, when the Company had been hard 
pressed merely to defend its own territory instead of making territorial annexations. 
Previous criticisms of the Sultan had focused on his treatment of British prisoners, and 
not been concerned with the governance of the natives of Mysore. The expanded focus of 
British public discourse on the territory of Mysore and its people indicated the greater 
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optimism regarding empire overseas, and Company's growing territorial ambitions in 
southern India.  
 When Company forces entered into Tipu's domains during the military campaigns, 
the soldiers found no rebellious sentiment directed against the Sultan by the populace. 
Instead, the Company servants were surprised to find a high degree of loyalty exhibited 
towards Tipu, and no small measure of resistance directed against the invading armies. 
The Morning Chronicle printed a letter from India dated 12 July 1791, which was 
shocked to find “This Tyrant (as he was supposed) Tippoo Sultan, to our amazement is 
beloved by all his subjects; our army has learned, to their astonishment, that he had kept 
up the best government in his countries the people ever experienced; the inhabitants were 
free, protected, and affluent, speaking of him as their father – they wished not for a 
change; and not a real inhabitant would quit or desert him. These are undeniable facts, 
and not a trace of the smallest oppression seemed to xist.”101 The author went on to state 
that none of Tipu’s military officers had deserted his cause, and only a small handful of 
the rank and file had fled.  
 Roderick Mackenzie confirmed the same sentiments in his history, noting in 
passing “Whither the cruel treatment of inferiors attributed to the Sultaun, be real, or 
exaggerated, or altogether imaginary, it is certain that his subjects in this quarter yielded 
to a change of Government with a degree of reluctance, seldom exhibited by the 
inhabitants of Eastern countries.”102 Mackenzie would go on to write that “however 
bigoted the tenets of the Koran,” there were a vastnumber of decorated Hindu temples 
throughout Mysore which had not been plundered or torn down, and that the people 
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willingly laid waste their own domains and fled away r ther than support the Company 
forces.103 These unexpected accounts were particularly important, as one of the 
fundamental rationales for the war in India was the belief that Tipu oppressed his subjects, 
providing the justification for Tipu’s removal by the morally superior Company. If Tipu 
happened to be a just ruler, or merely an ordinary one without the monstrous vices that 
had been charged, then much of the Company’s rhetoric justifying the conflict stood on 
shaky ground. Firsthand accounts suggested that Tipu was not a horrific ruler to his 
people, and that the overwhelming majority of the populace had no desire to be 
"liberated" by Cornwallis. 
 After the Third Mysore War was over, the Company's annexation of territory was 
justified on the grounds that the British would provide superior administration and more 
humane rule compared to that of Tipu Sultan. The Public Advertiser was highly 
enthusiastic in explaining the benefits of the 1792  treaty, claiming that so much was 
never acquired by any peace in the history of British India. Not only was Tipu thoroughly 
humbled, so much that "it will be impossible for him ever to take the field again with any 
prospect of success," the Company would gain so much revenue from the new territory 
(and the savings on being able to reduce its own forces), that "the profits of the peace are 
equal to six times the expences of the war." This promised great benefits for the new 
subjects newly introduced to British rule: "The natives who have experienced the 
blessings of the British Government, prefer it to every old system of their own, and pay 
their taxes with promptness, in return for the benefits of protection against their ancient 
tyrants."104 This was another deployment of Cornwallis' rhetoric interpreting the Third 
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Mysore War as one fought for the liberation of the people of Tipu's kingdom. Much like 
the coverage of the hostage princes, opinion pieces that supported the Company's peace 
contended that Indians in the annexed territories would prefer British rule to that of the 
tyrant Tipu. Victory over the Sultan was argued as means to spread the virtues of British 
administration; this was a much more attractive justification for expansion than the 
previous self-aggrandizing exploits of the past. 
 Similar lines of argumentation appeared after the conclusion of the Fourth Mysore 
War in 1799. Although there were few mentions of Tipu's supposed religious fanaticism, 
attention having shifted instead to his connections with France, the British popular press 
returned to the liberation rhetoric of the Third Mysore War as a justification for the 
invasion of Tipu's kingdom. Lloyd's Evening Post wrote that the future of the conquered 
territories was quickly settled in a manner "at the same time honourable to our political 
character, and advantageous to our interests", with the Company receiving ample 
compensation for the expenses incurred "in the War into which it was so unjustly forced 
to enter."105 The restoration of the pre-Haider Wodeyar dynasty to power, through the 
placing of a child rajah on the throne of Mysore, was seen as a particularly shrewd move 
in Britain, forcing the puppet ruler into a state of c mplete dependence on the Company 
while avoiding the appearance of territorial aggrandizement through outright annexation. 
It also allowed much of the literature written on the war to portray Tipu Sultan as an 
unlawful "usurper", with Wellesley restoring the pro er pre-Haider Hindu dynasty to the 
throne.106  
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 The General Evening Post wrote enthusiastically on how Wellesley's peace 
settlement demonstrated the greatness of the British character, that it demonstrated "the 
honour, the liberality, the wisdom, and the humanity" of the nation. The treaty was 
carried into effect "with the utmost tranquility, to the entire satisfaction of the native 
inhabitants; and by it our possessions in that part of the globe are secured against every 
contingency."107 Much as Cornwallis had argued in the previous war, the conflict was 
interpreted as a war of liberation to free the peopl  f Mysore from the tyrannous rule of 
Tipu. Seen from this perspective, the Fourth Mysore War became a morality play, in 
which the superior virtues of the British had defeated the vileness of an Asiatic despot, 
leading to the spread of the Company's beneficent and p ternalistic rule across southern 
India. It was an attractive vision of the future which anticipated the nineteenth century 
British Raj. 
 James Salmond wrote one of the earliest histories f the Fourth Mysore War, 
published shortly after its conclusion in 1800. He wrote to contemporaries that the Fourth 
Mysore War was just and necessary, if ever there was a just and necessary war.108 The 
restoration of the child rajah to rule in the aftermath of Tipu's defeat was spun as a family 
"rescued by our arms from the fury of relentless bigotry, insult, danger, and poverty", 
with the Company reserving the right to interfere in the administration of Mysore at any 
time, in order to preserve "the happiness of the people for whom we were now to 
legislate."109 The invasion was therefore justified by Salmond on the grounds of 
protecting the people of Mysore from Tipu, which had been a common line of 
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argumentation in the previous war under Cornwallis, but was rarely employed by Richard 
Wellesley. It was an after-the-fact justification for going to war, and not something that 
the Company's Indian servants and administrators con idered at the time. Nevertheless, it 
too was incorporated into the larger fabric of the Tipu Legend, and would become part of 
the later historical memory for how and why the Mysore Wars had taken place. This was 
another way in which the wars against Tipu helped to form the basis of an imperial 
culture in the British metropole, providing an understanding and justification of empire 
that could exist in concert with British liberty.  
 All of these themes about Tipu, whether they focused upon his role as an usurper, 
his supposed religious fanaticism, or his cruelties towards his own populace, were attacks 
upon Tipu's legitimacy as a ruler. They suggested that Tipu was unfit to exercise 
dominion over Mysore, and that the superior humanity of the British provided the 
Company with a moral justification to exert its own stewardship over the people instead. 
Arguments of a similar nature were applied not only to Tipu's sovereignty towards the 
populace of Mysore, his symbolic children as a ruler, but towards his own flesh and 
blood children as well. These viewpoints appeared during the hostage princes controversy, 
in which the captivity of Tipu's children was employed as a means to argue for Tipu's 
despotic outlook regarding his own progeny.  
The Hostages Princes: Tipu the Uncaring Father 
 One of the most famous and enduring images to emerge from the Mysore Wars 
was the spectacle of the hostage princes, the two young sons of Tipu Sultan who were 
delivered over to Cornwallis as part of the 1792 Treaty of Seringapatam. The hostage 
princes were a subject of great discussion in the British metropole, appearing for many 
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months in the newspaper coverage of Indian affairs, nd they were used as the subject 
matter for a series of popular paintings and plays. Although there were some British 
commentators who were uncomfortable with the abduction of these two young sons of 
Tipu, the majority of the discussion surrounding the hostage princes fell back upon the 
themes of tyranny and despotism that so often accompanied the Sultan. Tipu's apparent 
willingness to deliver up his sons for diplomatic pur oses was another sign of his debased 
character, proof that he lacked the humanity of the British. It was an indication of his 
status as an Oriental despot: Tipu was an uncaring father who used his own children as 
pawns in realpolitik schemes.  
 This characterization was unkind to Tipu and not at all truthful, as he had pleaded 
with Cornwallis not to take away his beloved family members.110 This lack of factual 
veracity did nothing to prevent the despotic portrayal of Tipu from enjoying a great deal 
of popular success, however. Cornwallis again emerged as the virtuous counterexample 
to the supposed depravity of Tipu Sultan. British authors argued that the Governor 
General would provide a superior moral example to the young sons, who would benefit 
from their exposure to a more civilized upbringing. These sentiments were depicted and 
popularized in some of the artwork of the period, which spread the imagery of the 
Mysore Wars to a wider audience. This focus on the humanity of Cornwallis and his kind 
treatment of the hostage princes was a means of deflecting attention away from the 
uncomfortable fact that the East India Company was acting in a morally questionable 
manner. Under Cornwallis, the Company had initiated a war of conquest, annexed a great 
deal of territory, demanded a huge indemnity of Mysore, and taken two young boys as 
                                                




hostages until the further terms of the treaty were carried out. The hostage princes, aged 
eight and five years old, would spend the next two years as the captives of the Company - 
honored and well treated captives, but still captives nonetheless. Only by pointing to the 
faithless and depraved character of Tipu Sultan could it be argued that the taking of the 
hostage princes was anything other than a petty measur  of revenge, extracted from Tipu 
in return for the British prisoners that he had held a decade earlier. The spectacle of the 
hostage princes, and the need for the British public to depict their circumstances in a 
positive light, pointed at many of the anxieties about empire which were still lurking 
underneath the celebration of Cornwallis' military successes.  
 During the negotiations surrounding the 1792 Treaty of Seringapatam, Cornwallis 
had taken the unorthodox measure of demanding two sons of Tipu Sultan as hostages to 
help guarantee the peace. Written into the treaty itself was the following clause: "Until 
the due performance of the three foregoing articles [territorial exchange, indemnity 
payment, and prisoner release] two of the sons of the said Tippoo Sultaun shall be 
detained as hostages."111 This was a very unusual treaty article; although the taking of 
hostages to safeguard the peace was common during the eighteenth century, these 
individuals would typically constitute military or political advisors of a ruler, adults who 
were part of the administration of the polity in question. Tipu had asked in this 
circumstance, for example, that some of his vakils (advisors) take the place of the hostage 
princes, which was rejected by Cornwallis.112 The best explanation for these unusual 
circumstances was the desire amongst the soldiers and administrators of the East India 
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Company to obtain a measure of revenge on Tipu for the British captives of the Second 
Mysore War. Since Tipu had taken the sons of Britain as prisoners in the previous decade, 
his own sons would be forfeit to the Company in the wake of its victory in the Third 
Mysore War. While this was never stated explicitly in the Company's records, it seems a 
reasonable interpretations of the events, given that much of the Anglo-Indian discussion 
surrounding Tipu focused on themes of vengeance for the humiliating losses of the 
Company a decade earlier.113 
 Cornwallis' decision to take the two sons of Tipu as hostages in the peace treaty 
generated a tremendous amount of public interest and commentary. The scene in which 
Tipu's ambassador delivered over the two princes to Cornwallis became one of the most 
iconic images of the Mysore Wars. Major Dirom was an eyewitness to the event, and 
recorded a lengthy description in his history of the conflict: 
Lord Cornwallis, attended by his staff, and some of the principal officers of the 
army, met the Princes at the door of his large tent as they dismounted from the 
elephants; and, after embracing them, led them in, one in each hand, to the tent; 
the eldest, Abdul Kalick, was about ten, the youngest, Mooza-ud-Deen, about 
eight years of age. When they were seated on each side of Lord Cornwallis, 
Gullam Ally, the head vakeel, addressed his Lordship as follows. "These children 
were this morning the sons of the Sultan my master; th ir situation is now 
changed, and they must look up to your Lordship as their father." 
 
Lord Cornwallis, who had received the boys as if they ad been his own sons, 
anxiously assured the vakeel and the young Princes themselves, that every 
attention possible would be shewn to them, and the greatest care taken of their 
persons. Their little faces brightened up; the scene became highly interesting; and 
not only their attendants, but all the spectators were delighted to see that any fears 
they might have harboured were removed, and that they would soon be reconciled 
to their change of situation, and to their new friends.114 
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Dirom recorded a glowing account of the encounter, with Cornwallis' empathy 
overcoming the initial reluctance of the two young princes and relieving all fears over 
their treatment. Everything about this description was designed to reassure the reader that 
it was a tender scene, and not a hostage-taking ceremony. Note how happy the princes 
were made to seem about their captivity, and that they would be reconciled soon to their 
"new friends." Like most other British written accounts or painted portrayals of this scene, 
Dirom overestimated the age of the hostage princes by several years, which was likely an 
attempt to downplay the extremely young age of the actual boys (ages eight and five) and 
render the occasion more palatable to the wider British public.  
 The General Evening Post of London provided a slightly different version of the 
same event, in printing a letter from another anonymous eyewitness, one that captured the 
uncertainty of the moment: "The spectacle [of the princes] was grand and affecting, and 
impressed all present with feelings not easily delineated. It was a proud scene to the 
conquerors, and most humiliating to the vanquished. An awful silence for a moment 
prevailed; and every one seem absorbed in the tumul of ideas which the occasion 
naturally called forth."115 Afterwards, the newspaper related the same particulars 
involving Ghulam Ali and Cornwallis, but the mention f the "awful silence" that 
prevailed for a moment was nonetheless significant. The use of the word "awful" was 
intended here in its alternate eighteenth century connotation, meaning full of awe, but it 
also pointed to the anxiety and discomfort which surro nded this entire enterprise. Much 
as the Company would have liked to pretend that this was a happy scene, it was clearly 
designed by Cornwallis to be a humiliation for Tipu, the fulfillment of a revenge fantasy 
in retaliation for his treatment of British captives. Despite the effort made to present the 
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event in a positive light, it had the potential to undercut the civilized and reformed image 
that the Company was trying to promote about itself, uggesting that Cornwallis was 
himself capable of behaving like a capricious Oriental despot. This was the antithesis of 
the patriotic and virtuous imagining of Cornwallis that the East India Company wanted to 
advertise.  
 The result of this awkward situation was a continued series of paternalistic reports, 
detailing to the British public how merrily the hostage princes were fitting into their new 
surroundings as "guests" hosted by the Oakley family. Reports from the Anglo-Indian 
community of Madras made their way back to London and were printed publicly to 
satisfy curiosity about the princes. A letter from Madras dated 13 September 1792 
described how the princes were being hosted by the high society of the city; taken to 
church, brought to a dinner hosted by the Oakleys, and so on. The readers were reassured 
how Lady Oakley "seems much pleased with the vivacity and pleasantry of the younger 
and fairer prince, who shews a great share of good humour, and a great disposition to 
please, being of a mild and gentle nature."116 Another report painted a congenial family 
portrait of the princes entering the house of the Oakley family: "His Lordship 
[Cornwallis] took each of the Princes by the hand upon entering the room, when Lady 
Oakley rose, and each of them made a low bow... When Sir Charles Oakley’s infant son 
was brought into the room, they most tenderly embraced him, kissing him in the warmest 
raptures."117 These stories made it sound as though Tipu's sons were off visiting family 
friends; there was no mention of how the hostage princes had essentially been kidnapped 
and held for ransom money as part of the peace treaty.  
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 The princes continued to attract public interest for months and even years after the 
conclusion of the war itself, with further stories of their activities passing from India to 
Britain. A gentleman returning from India reassured the public that "the children of 
Tippoo who are hostages... have from acquaintance ad kind treatment become extremely 
attached to the English."118 The tenor of these repeated messages, insisting again nd 
again how pleased the hostages princes were with their situation, suggested that it was 
very important for the public both in India and in Britain to view the situation in the 
proper light of paternalistic benevolence. The message  also hinted at the psychology of 
empire, in which the act of hostage-taking became reimagined as a benevolent act. When 
viewed from this perspective, Cornwallis and the rest of the Anglo-Indian community 
hosting the two boys were doing them a favor, educating them to become proper 
gentlemen and removing them from the corrupting influence of their tyrannical father. In 
this fashion, the actions of Cornwallis anticipated nineteenth century justifications of 
empire that operated according to the ethos of the civilizing mission. The hostage princes 
symbolically stood for a childlike and backwards India, one which required the 
upbringing of a paternalistic British father. With the passage of time, it was argued, the 
young princes would come to prefer the benevolent rulership of Cornwallis to the 
"savagery" of their despotic father.  
 When it finally came time to return the princes back to their father, two years after 
the start of their captivity in 1794, the accounts from India made it seem as though they 
had little desire to leave British society. Captain Doveton was charged with the return of 
the princes, and provided this account of the ceremony:  
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On their entrance into the pavilion, the young Princes sprang forward to the 
throne where their Royal Father sat, and prostrated th mselves before it. And here 
the etiquette of Asiatic courts put nature completely to flight; for the father, 
instead of advancing to embrace his darling children, contented himself with 
coldly placing a hand on the neck of each; and on the instant the Prices arose, and 
respectfully retired. It is a remarkable fact, that no  a syllable was exchanged at 
this extraordinary interview.119 
 
Tipu was depicted as a cold and unloving parent, a portrait which contradicted his 
repeated requests not to give up his sons during the peace negotiations outside 
Seringapatam. While it is likely that this was due to cultural differences between British 
and European views of family relations, differences that Doveton was unable to perceive, 
the same depiction of Tipu as an uncaring parent appe red in much of the British artwork 
involving the hostage princes. More likely, accounts such as these were designed to 
contrast the stern and austere demeanor of Tipu to the warm and parental reception 
granted the young princes by Cornwallis.120 The Governor General was used again in this 
case as the counterpart to the Sultan. While Cornwallis was kind, affectionate, and caring 
towards the young princes, Tipu was cold, aloof, and willing to sacrifice them for 
purposes of statecraft. Cornwallis served as the moral remedy for the corrupting 
despotism symbolized by the Sultan.  
 The rest of Doveton's description portrayed Tipu as a powerful, wealthy, and alien 
Eastern monarch – in short, very much the Oriental despot. These hostile portrayals 
sought to reverse the situation and place blame for the captivity of the princes on Tipu 
himself, once again resorting to victimization theory and suggesting that only a cruel 
monster like the Sultan would send his children away ithout a care for reasons of state. 
At the same time, the vengeful hostage-taking of Cornwallis could be reimagined as an 
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extension of the blessings of British culture and manners to the young princes, during the 
two full years that they were prevented from returning to their original home. The Tipu 
Legend of the savage Eastern tyrant could therefore provide justification even for 
Cornwallis' morally questionable act of taking children as hostages.  
 Due to the popularity of the subject matter, the Mysore Wars and Tipu Sultan 
attracted the attention of many of Britain’s most famous artists at home, who competed to 
produce their own renditions of the latest scenes of imperial glory from overseas. Until 
Tipu's final defeat in 1799, paintings of scenes featuring the hostage princes were by far 
the most popular subject matter to be produced regarding the Mysore Wars. Unlike 
earlier satirical cartoons that largely mocked the Company, the history paintings 
produced in London were unabashed celebrations of the Company’s conquests. The 
British public was captivated by many of these images, turning out in large numbers for 
public viewings, and eagerly sharing in the spectacle of empire. These visual arts went a 
long way towards changing popular opinion about the Company, and incorporating its 
servants into the patriotic fold of the British nation.  
 Formal “history paintings” were popular in the late eighteenth century, rendering 
scenes of national triumph available to a wider audience in an age without radio, 
television, or movies. Often of dubious authenticity to the events they depicted, these 
history paintings sanitized warfare to make it appear gentlemanly and non-violent. Battle 
paintings in particular focused on the valiant and the heroic; war was regarded as a 
glorious event, and painters created the sort of images that their patrons wished to see.121 
The economics of creating this art were such that paintings would be commissioned 
                                                
121 Peter Harrington. British Artists and War: The Face of Battle in Paintings and Prints, 1700-1914 
(London: Greenhill Books, 1993): 6-7 
173 
 
ahead of time, hopefully attracting a patron to support the expenses, and then shown to 
the public in the hopes of gaining subscriptions. Those who subscribed would receive 
engravings of the painting at a later date; virtually l of the history paintings about Tipu 
and the Mysore Wars functioned on this model, trying to sell to the wealthy classes. 
Because most of these paintings gained the patronage of the East India Company, it is 
also not surprising that the artists avoided criticism and portrayed the Company 
heroically in their works. Nevertheless, the subscription model upon which these 
paintings were produced ensured that they were very much a public phenomenon, 
advertised in the newspapers and viewed in London by large audiences. Even these 
examples of “high art” intended for the upper classes would have been disseminated 
amongst a broad spectrum of the populace through prints, engravings, and other 
reproductions. 
 Competition was fierce to be the first artist to render on canvas a dramatic event 
from the exotic imperial locales. Artists who worked quickly were more likely to attract 
attention and gain more subscriptions for their paintings. For example, Mather Brown 
began advertising for subscriptions to his forthcoming historical paintings on 27 July 
1792, a mere three days after news of the hostage princes situation arrived in London.122 
Robert Home’s brother similarly began taking out advertisements in the London 
newspapers for subscriptions of Home’s paintings of the hostage princes, a scene which 
“had such an effect on the spectators, as to make them all shed tears” and was promised 
to be “uncommonly magnificent” when captured in oils.123 Neither Brown nor Home had 
produced the paintings in question when they began advertising for subscriptions, which 
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again was common practice in the eighteenth century. Robert Home, Henry Singleton, 
and Mather Brown would all create paintings depicting the hostage princes in some way, 
helping to make the spectacle of the hostage princes on  of the most memorable events of 
the Mysore Wars.  
 Robert Home was the only one of the formal history painters to be present at the 
actual ceremony in India where Cornwallis received the sons of Tipu Sultan, although his 
rendition of the scene would not be completed until 1794, and not exhibited in London 
until his return from India in 1797. Home had been invited specifically by Cornwallis to 
follow the progress of his army on campaign, and therefore it was no accident that he was 
present to record the dramatic scene of the hostage princes.124 His eventual portrayal of 
the event was entitled Lord Cornwallis Receiving Tipu Sahib’s Sons as Hostages and 
presents an excellent example of a staged spectacle of imperial triumph [Figure 2].125 
Home captured all of the familiar elements of the story associated with the hostage 
princes, verifying the accuracy of the written accounts by including Cornwallis and the 
other military officers of the Company, Tipu’s vakils riding on elephants, and the two 
young princes in their white robes. The scene portrays an elegant Cornwallis kindly 
receiving the two sons of Tipu, the younger of whom holds out his hand for Cornwallis to 
grasp with a longing expression on his face. To the sid s of the Governor General, the 
Company’s military officers form a sharp contrast in heir red uniforms to the medieval-
appearing Indians with their spears, bucklers, and armor. In the background a British flag 
waves over the scene to remind the viewer of the triumph of the Company, as well as 
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further associate the Company with the British nation. Home was so proud of his role in 
capturing the scene that he placed himself in the painting, on the far left side clutching his 
sketchbook. Home’s rendition of the hostage princes would prove to be one of the least 
patronizing of the scene in question, but it still nonetheless was suffused with celebration 
of Cornwallis’ military victory and sanitization of the act of hostage-taking itself.  
 Although Robert Home may have been the sole eyewitn ss to the actual transfer 
of the hostage princes, he was far from the only artist to render the scene on canvas. 
Henry Singleton was the first of the London painters to address the same subject matter, 
producing a companion pair of paintings which were xhibited at the Royal Academy in 
1793, and spread to a much larger audience through en ravings done at the same time. 
Singleton’s first painting was entitled Lord Cornwallis Receiving the Sons of Tipu Sultan 
as Hostages, portraying the same scene as Home but in a more intimate, smaller setting 
[Figure 3].126 Located inside the Governor General’s tent, Cornwallis ppears as a wise 
and kindly figure, with arms outstretched on the verge of embracing the two young 
princes. The “lame vakil” and the other Indian attendants appear to be encouraging the 
princes to deliver themselves up to Cornwallis; the older boy looks up towards 
Cornwallis while the younger boy gazes out towards the audience with an adoring 
expression. In the background through the tent opening, the British flag once again 
proudly waves in the sky against the walls of Seringapatam.127 Singleton’s overall effect 
was to produce a tender scene overflowing with emotion, with the concerned and parental 
Cornwallis almost literally taking the young princes into his arms. British military victory 
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and British paternalism in peace were on display together in this painting; Cornwallis 
embodied the British nation, a kindly but powerful father assuming charge of a childlike 
India.  
 Singleton’s companion work, The Sons of Tipu Sultan Leaving their Father, was 
designed to form a contrast between the conduct of Cornwallis and the conduct of Tipu 
Sultan towards the hostage princes [Figure 4].128 In a purely imagined scene for which 
there were no eyewitness descriptions, Singleton portrayed the departure of the two 
princes from their father. Tipu sits cross-legged on a throne, wearing very rich robes and 
an elaborate turban, staring off into the distance towards the flag of Mysore with an 
absent look on his face. All of the men appear in effeminate white robes with heavy 
jewelry, with the exception of the bored-looking soldier on the right side, there to escort 
away the two princes. Tipu appears oblivious to the presence of his two sons, who 
attempt in vain to catch their father’s eye before their dismissal. Together, these paired 
representations presented a clear message: “Cornwallis s a better soldier and father 
than Tipu, and what’s more, Cornwallis had might, manliness, and humanity on his 
side.”129 The two hostage princes served as a useful prop to demonstrate the superiority 
of the British character. Tipu Sultan, on the other and, was inaccurately portrayed as a 
callous and uncaring father who was perfectly willing to sacrifice his own children for 
reasons of statecraft. 
 These themes would be elaborated upon and made furth r explicit in the paintings 
of Mather Brown, an American artist living in London who also produced a series of 
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works with the hostage princes as their featured subject matter. Brown’s artwork was 
created with the full backing of the East India Company, with Henry Dundas of the Board 
of Control providing the needed funding along with additional information on all of the 
Company officers present to depict the scenes with maximum attention to military 
glory.130 Brown’s Marquis Cornwallis Receiving the Sons of Tippoo Sultaun as Hostages 
[Figure 5] included a brochure written by Daniel Orme, explaining to the audience how 
Cornwallis displayed to his captives “a generosity which would have done honour to the 
brightest hero of the classical pages of antiquity,” and that the hostage princes looked up 
to the Governor General “as their only protector, father and friend.”131  
The visuals of the painting itself reflected the hyperbolic praise of the 
accompanying description, as Brown adopted a more imp rialistic tone than the other 
artists in his portrayal of Cornwallis receiving the ostage princes. The young boys still 
look upon the Governor General with affection, but Cornwallis himself strikes a much 
more aggressive pose in Brown’s scene, striding confide tly, almost bombastically 
forward towards the viewer. Cornwallis is accompanied by his staff in full military dress 
standing in front of the British flag, suggesting the might and power of the Company’s 
armed forces. The princes themselves appear several years older than their actual ages of 
five and eight, looking upwards with affection to the godlike Cornwallis as they clutch at 
his arms for support. To the left side of the painting, Indians appear in weak and servile 
positions, bowing and making themselves subservient to the radiant splendor of the 
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Governor General.132 The spectacle of the hostage princes was employed t  celebrate 
British power and military achievement, while also suggesting that that power was 
tempered by compassion and benevolence. Brown’s renditio  of this scene is an 
unabashed celebration of British power; the fawning weakness of a backwards India 
gives way to the splendor of a rising British star.  
Like Singleton, Mather Brown also painted an imaginry scene of Tipu’s sons 
leaving their father, taking the opportunity again to apply the label of tyrant to the Sultan 
and depict him as a heartless parent. The Departure of the Sons of Tipu from the Zenana 
provided Brown’s interpretation of the departure of Tipu’s sons; Tipu bends towards the 
princes on the left side of the picture, gesturing as he attempts to persuade his sons to 
consign themselves willingly to British captivity [Figure 6].133 Tipu is cast as an 
unalloyed villain, wearing dark robes and hunching over at the waist. The Sultan is 
further depicted as a master manipulator, appearing mongst women, children, and 
servants, all of whom the painting suggests that Tipu was willing to sacrifice for the sake 
of political gain. Constance McPhee has argued that this scene is in fact based on a 
famous painting of Richard III, designed to portray Tipu as a completely ruthless 
individual: 
[Brown] modeled Tipu’s pose and expression on a well-known representation of 
Richard III, and compared the plight of the sultan’s sons to Richard’s persecuted 
nephews, the Little Princes in the Tower. By equating Tipu with one of England’s 
most venal kings, Brown shifted the implied blame for the captivity of the Indian 
princes onto their father’s shoulders. As a result, Cornwallis, who actually 
instigated the hostage plan, could assume the role of b neficent liberator of 
Mysore.134  
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This opinion was supported by a pair of Indian art his orians, who examined the same 
work and concluded that Brown had likely not seen drawings made in India, with Tipu’s 
form and costume configuring much more to European ideals of Oriental subjects than 
what one would have actually encountered in Mysore.135 When paired together with his 
companion painting of Cornwallis receiving the hostage princes, Brown’s works 
persuasively shifted culpability for the harsh terms of the treaty onto the tyrant Tipu, 
allowing the Company to justify its Indian wars and carve out a new patriotic role for 
itself through the glorification of British military arms. 
 Brown’s paintings proved to be popular and were widely viewed by the public 
through open exhibitions and cheap engraving reproductions. Advertisements in the 
Morning Chronicle and other contemporary newspapers called on the London public to 
view the standards captured from Tipu at Bangalore along with the works of Mather 
Brown for the price of one shilling.136 Another newspaper praised the paintings on 
display, stating how Brown’s reception of the princes did the artist “infinite credit”, while 
the introduction of the lame vakil “in the true Olympiad Hero style, was a very 
favourable circumstance to the Composition.”137 Brown’s paintings first went on display 
in March of 1793, and public viewings were still being held as late as February of 1794, 
attesting to the popularity of the subject matter, while advertisements continued to run in 
the newspapers for reproductions of the paintings of both Brown and Singleton.138 Ads 
promoting engravings for scenes of the hostage princes continued to appear in the 
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London newspapers as late as 1798, and would only disappear when subsumed by further 
Tipu artwork after the Fourth Mysore War the following year.  
 These popular representations of India were unlike earlier historical paintings of 
the subcontinent, which had treated Indian potentats with far more dignity, most 
frequently as powerful figures worthy of respect. The historical paintings of the 1790s 
featuring Tipu Sultan and the hostage princes repres nt d a break in continuity from 
earlier works, and a change in the presentation of the British presence in India. Artists 
began to celebrate the romance of a British empire in India, with the spectacle of the 
hostage princes perfectly capturing the new ideal of colonial relations: childlike Indians 
paternalistically entrusting their fate to mighty British fathers.139 Indian rulers who 
refused to fit into this worldview, such as Tipu Sultan, were demonized as tyrants and 
marked for elimination by military means. The visual art of the formal history painters 
during the 1790s were instrumental in establishing the romance of overseas empire, and 
helping to change the popular perception of the East India Company from its low 
standing of the mid-eighteenth century. 
 Depictions of the hostage princes appeared not only in print culture and in history 
paintings, but also took place on the popular stage in London. Inspired by the lucrative 
success of the Tipu play East India Campaigning as performed at Sadler's Wells, 
Astley’s Royal Saloon and Amphitheatre created its own production based upon the news 
of the hostage princes. Beginning its run on 20 August 1792, the new show was entitled 
Tippoo Saib’s Two Sons; or, An East-India Military Divertissement, and promised in its 
advertisements to feature dance, song, and pantomime on the departure of the hostage 
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princes from their father, and then their reception by Cornwallis, complete with an 
"Oriental military festival" which commemorated the occasion.140 Astley's show was 
effectively a live action version of the same scenes portrayed in the artwork of the 
hostage princes by Home, Singleton, and Brown; once again, Cornwallis was envisioned 
as both triumphant commander and loving father. The Governor-General's affective 
sympathy for Tipu's sons emphasized the Sultan's defective paternal care, while also 
downplaying the Company's military aggression in southern India.141 
 Tippoo Saib’s Two Sons proved to be a successful and well-regarded production 
in its own right, drawing huge crowds and widespread applause from the contemporary 
print culture. The Public Advertiser praised the choice of subject matter and noted the full 
house in attendance, while World echoed that a better subject could not have been hit o  
for stage representation.142 The continued praise for the costumes and set designs in the 
newspaper accounts suggest that it was the exotic Oriental spectacle of Tipu Sultan and 
the Mysore Wars which attracted so much attention. The Star praised the show for 
successfully tugging at the emotions of the audience: "Tippoo’s Sons is a fine subject for 
a picture; and indeed it is so heroically performed, that the tear of sympathy is often seen 
in the spectator’s eye," indicating how the hostage princes were once again employed as a 
prop in the staged performance (literally, in this ca e) of empire.143  
 One of the songs from the performance was published, sounding many of the 
same themes as the music employed in East India Campaigning. "From sweet Tipperary 
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to pick up some Honor" was sung by another Irish character on stage, and contained 
further racially explicit lyrics designed to mock Tipu Sultan: 
I. 
From sweet Tipperary to pick up some Honor, 
I’m here to be sure, little Patrick O’Connor, 
With Dennis O’Neal, Teddy Blane and O’Carty, 
By my soul we have routed the Blackamoor Party, 
Och! rub a dub row de dow faith Mister Tippoo, 
Rub a dub row de dow faith Mister Tippoo, 
We have bother’d your Head, and we’ve made you to skip O! 
Devil burn me, your quiet so goodbye Mister Tippoo.  
 
III. 
What good looking Creatures, these Lacks of Rupees Sir, 
Then the two Lads, Great Tippoo’s Sons if you please Sir, 
To be sure Mister Sultan, with us they an’t sleeping, 
Nor you get them again, till you pay for their keeping, 
Och! rub a dub row de dow, saith Mister Tippoo, 
To be sure you won’t pay us for taking a trip O! 
Which we did just to say, “How d’ye do Mister Tippoo.”144 
 
Other verses contained lines detailing how Tipu planned to kill and eat captured British 
soldiers, and in return the Company treated itself o half of his kingdom. The 
reappearance of Dennis O'Neal in the lyrics was likely both a reference to a common 
Irish name and also to the earlier Sadler's Wells production.  
 The song used highly racial terminology to describe Tipu, referring to his forces 
as the "Blackamoor Party", but unlike the music from East India Campaigning, there was 
much less anxiety about capture and forced emasculation while languishing in Tipu's 
dungeons. Instead, the song from Tippoo Saib’s Two Sons concerned itself with the 
looting and plundering of Mysore, making multiple references to rupees and insisting that 
Tipu would not see the return of his sons until he paid the full indemnity owed by the 
peace treaty. The more confident and assertive tone of the second song was likely a result 
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of the year that passed in between their respective ompositions; the Tipu of 1792 had 
been defeated and humbled in battle, in contrast to the much more menacing Tipu of 
1791. As the Company's military fortunes steadily improved over the last two decades of 
the eighteenth century, the visual representations of the Sultan (in artwork and on the 
stage) shifted to reflect less fear of the threat of captivity, and more confidence in the 
superiority of the British character. The hostage taking of Tipu's sons, rather than the 
Sultan's taking of British prisoners, indicated this growing confidence in the Company's 
power. This increasingly paternalistic tone of the discussion of the hostage princes 
anticipated the British Raj of the next century, as Indian rulers like Tipu were less likely 
to be viewed as dangerous military opponents, and more likely to be seen as backwards 
and childlike.  
Conclusion 
 These shifts in British popular opinion reflected how a widespread belief in Tipu's 
tyrannical nature had taken hold by the end of the T ird Mysore War. More and more 
people accepted the claim that the Company had shed its arlier period of nabobery, and 
had become a defender of the British nation and all of the liberties that it stood for. 
Cornwallis appeared to embody this reformed Company, s a gentleman from a properly 
aristocratic background who would be immune to the blandishments of avarice and 
Eastern luxury. His treatment of the hostage princes had demonstrated the superiority of 
British humanity over the callous and depraved Oriental despotism of Tipu Sultan. By the 
time that Wellesley won his final victory in 1799, it was almost universally accepted in 
Britain that the Mysore Wars had been just conflicts fought to put an end to the abuses of 
Tippoo the Tyrant.  
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 This belief had not always been the case, however. Prior to the Company's victory 
in the Third Mysore War, popular opinion was much more divided on the subject of both 
how to view Tipu Sultan, and the proper way to view the East India Company. In the 
years following the Company's assumption of control over Bengal, there had been 
widespread anxiety about the threat posed by the nabobs, and the fear that they would 
contaminate the nation with their degenerate ways. Popular resentment of the nabobs 
continued into the early 1790s, and became tied up in some of the most fundamental 
questions about how to view Britain's empire overseas. Who was truly acting in despotic 
fashion overseas: the East India Company or Indian rulers like Tipu Sultan? This became 
a highly politicized subject, and the legality of the Mysore Wars was debated in the 
popular press and in the halls of Parliament. This leads next to the consideration of Tipu 















Tipu in Company and Party Politics 
 
Introduction 
 In addition to the popular discussion surrounding the captured British prisoners 
and the language of tyranny and despotism, Tipu Sultan and the Mysore Wars also 
figured prominently in parliamentary and East India Company politics during the final 
decades of the eighteenth century. Tipu played an important political role in these 
contemporary debates, as British representations of the Sultan touched upon many of the 
disagreements that lay at the heart of the whole imperial project. There was a sizable 
portion of both the British public and wider Enlightenment intellectual thought that 
remained profoundly skeptical of empire.1 This was best symbolized by the nabobs, 
members of the East India Company who became subjects of public ridicule for their 
possession of supposedly ill-gained Indian wealth and unabashed social climbing.  
The nabobs represented all of the worst fears associated with colonization; it was 
argued that they had been corrupted by Oriental vice and luxury, and would bring about 
the destruction of British liberties in the metropole.2 The nabobs were the antithesis of 
proper virtuous behavior, and they existed in a state completely separate from the British 
national character. The widespread public condemnatio  of the nabobs in the years 
following the Company’s conquest of Bengal attested to the anxieties associated with 
empire, and even led to widespread pessimism about the future of the Company’s 
territorial possessions. Indian subjects who had been acquired in such immoral fashion 
would only be ruled by the Company in despotic fashion, which was doomed to a brief 
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and transient existence. The contemporary disaster unfolding in America in the 1780s 
indicated the inevitable destruction of all such imperial projects overseas.  
 In the British metropole, the image of Tipu and the legality of the Mysore Wars 
became caught up in the parliamentary politics of the day. There was a vigorous debate 
between a larger majority that supported both the Tory government and the East India 
Company, and a smaller but still sizable Whig Opposition that insisted on the immorality 
of the war undertaken against Tipu. This period of the early 1790s was a transitional 
moment for the wider popular attitudes about empire, as Indian princes like Tipu were 
increasingly castigated as cruel despots, but the public was somewhat slower to 
internalize the new discourse about the East India Company itself. During the Third 
Mysore War (1790-92), the print culture of the day produced seemingly endless 
references to the events taking place overseas, in the form of newspapers, cartoons, plays, 
and paintings, all signaling the important role that overseas empire played in constructing 
domestic popular culture. This print culture was also heavily politicized in nature, and the 
subject of Tipu was hotly debated both in the halls of Parliament and in the wider popular 
culture.  
In the end, the crushing victories won by the Company in the Third (1790-92) and 
Fourth (1799) Mysore Wars resulted in a stifling of debate. The political opposition was 
undercut by the success of the Company’s military, nd the British public eagerly 
embraced the victories that had been won overseas. It became politically impossible for 
anyone to challenge the Mysore Wars in their aftermath of runaway military success 
under Cornwallis and Wellesley. This allowed for the earlier representations of the 
Company and its servants as nabobs to fade away from view, and a new reimagining of 
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these same individuals as patriotic soldier-heroes t  take their place. Far from corrupting 
the British nation, the Company now stood for its defense, going to war to protect British 
prisoners from ever again falling into the clutches of Oriental despots like Tippoo the 
Tyrant. With the passage of time, this new understanding of the Mysore Wars established 
itself as the historical memory of the period, and the earlier era of contestation was 
largely forgotten.3 
The Nabobs: Fears and Pessimism of Empire 
 
  The territorial conquests of the East India Company in the mid-eighteenth 
century were a source of both excitement and dread for the British public at home. They 
offered the prospect of further enriching the nation hrough greater access to the India 
trade, as well as potentially increasing the country's military might in its seemingly 
endless wars against its European rivals. However, at the same time the assumption of 
control over Bengal was fraught with its own perils. The East India Company was still 
widely regarded by the British public as a commercial entity, despite the governmental 
functions that it had assumed since its earliest days, nd the British state was only just 
embarking on the slow process of conquering the Company's administrative structure.4 
The responsibility for governing over an enormous foreign populace was a daunting 
prospect. During the 1760s and 1770s, the Company would have to weather the storms of 
repeated famines in Bengal and its own continuing insolvency at home, relying on loans 
from Parliament to stave off bankruptcy.5 At the same time, the conspicuous consumption 
of wealthy Company servants who had returned home t Bri ain gave rise to the popular 
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satire of the nabob, vilified in public opinion for his greed, corruption, and undignified 
status-climbing. The Company and its servants appeared to be out of control, governing 
in tyrannical fashion and exploiting Indians overseas with no thought other than personal 
enrichment. What was supposed to have been a monopoly trading company was widely 
viewed as a rogue state.6 
 Anxieties about the Company and its servants were link d to fears of corruption 
and moral decay, brought on by contact with the very different cultural systems that 
prevailed in India. Politics in this era were still heavily influenced by the language of 
virtues and manners, with topics such as moral degeneracy holding great sway over 
public opinion.7 The nabobs were viewed as a threat to the British nation due to the belief 
that they had been corrupted by Eastern vice and Oriental luxury. Company servants who 
had adopted Indian customs and mannerisms were satiized for their effeminacy, lacking 
the requisite masculinity and toughness that the natio  demanded. Nabobs were the 
subjects of popular hostility because they were themselves the harbingers of a globalized 
and imperial sense of Britishness, one that the populace in the metropole was not fully 
ready to embrace just yet, which manifested itself as a consequence of the material 
culture they brought home with them from South Asia.8 Their profligate spending, 
through the purchase of country estates and corrupt parliamentary seats, served as a threat 
to undermine both the country's social order and its political system. The history of the 
nabobs, as a result, is also a history of the material culture of empire, and the panicked 
reactions of domestic observers when they found the footprints of empire in their 
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metropolitan world.9 While these fears were exaggerated and eventually proved to be 
unfounded, contemporaries believed that the nabobs represented a serious danger to the 
established order of British society.10 Due in part to the reckless manner with which the 
Company was governing its new territories, this wasa period of frequent pessimism 
about the future of the British possessions overseas, especially after the outbreak of the 
American Revolution. Without knowing what the future would hold, it was not 
uncommon for pamphleteers to speak of the impending end of the British Empire in the 
1770s and 1780s. 
 The term "nabob" was an Anglicized corruption of the Bengali word "nawab" 
(), referring to the Indian rulers of various princely states, or more generally to any 
person of great wealth or status. The word had been in use since the early seventeenth 
century, but took on a new and more unsavory meaning in the middle of the eighteenth 
century. Popularized by Samuel Foote's play The Nabob, the word was used as a 
derogatory reference to the men who returned home from India, bringing with them vast 
sums of money and an ill-fated reputation. The nabobs induced widespread revulsion in 
Britain, from their acquired wealth and the means used to achieve it, which were usually 
attributed to exploiting the native peoples of India. Many of the nabobs engaged in 
unabashed status-climbing, using their newfound means to purchase large country estates, 
parliamentary seats in corrupt boroughs, and other signs of high social status. All of these 
actions were viewed as unseemly and in poor taste by Britain's traditional ruling class. 
Like the excessive Eastern luxury that they seemed to mbody, the nabobs appeared to 
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threaten established moral values, the security of imperial interests, and the sanctity of 
Britain's unwritten national constitution.11 
 Although the nabobs came from diverse backgrounds, they nonetheless shared 
certain characteristics as a group. There was a popular misconception that everyone who 
traveled to India came back with fortunes in hand; i  fact, the great majority of 
Europeans who went to India during the eighteenth century died overseas, or returned 
home with very modest sums.12 The nabobs who came back with huge sums to their 
names were very much the exception and not the rule, b t their prominence in the 
decades following the Company's conquest of Bengal gave them an outsized public 
presence. There were some 200-300 individuals in this period who could properly be 
called nabobs, Company servants who brought back enough wealth to entertain notions 
of climbing into the ranks of Britain's social elits. While only a few of them lived 
conspicuously, the ones who did so lived very conspicuously indeed. Thomas Rumbold, a 
former Governor of Madras, spent more than £100,000 on an estate in Essex, while 
Robert Clive, the most famous of all nabobs, used his Indian wealth to acquire the 
prestigious Claremont estate, an Irish peerage, and election to the Order of the Garter.13 
Small wonder then that the nabobs were ripe for public satire, as former nonentities 
suddenly thrust into the company of the nation's political and social elites.  
 Some nabobs also sought election to political office, as another sign of their 
newfound social status. Due to the outdated and non-democratic electoral system that 
returned MPs to Parliament in the eighteenth century, it was relatively easy for men of 
great wealth to secure their election to the Commons through the manipulation of corrupt 
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boroughs, in which a tiny number of voters could be bribed to support the desired 
candidate. As a result, the number of nabobs in Parliament grew steadily during this 
period, starting with twelve in 1761, nineteen in 1768, twenty-two in 1774, and twenty-
seven in 1780.14 Despite the growing number of MPs who had connections to the East 
India Company, the nabobs in Parliament never acted as a coherent political lobby, and 
preferred to stay out of politics whenever possible. However, the nabobs did use their 
political leverage very successfully when the subject of Indian affairs arose, protecting 
themselves from charges of corruption and influencing the government's policy towards 
the East India Company during debates on reform bills and charter renewal. Resentment 
of the nabobs therefore went beyond mere social snobbery, and touched upon fears that 
their ill-gotten wealth was subverting the entire political system. Many observers had the 
feeling that Britain's empire-building overseas hadcreated a beast that was rapidly 
growing out of control. Unease at the Company's uniq e position of governance in India 
ran deep from the very beginning of territorial expansion.15  
 Nabobs were explicitly disassociated in this period fr m the rest of the British 
nation. They were viewed as a source of contaminatio  to the rest of society, seen as 
having been cut off from the rest of the nation dueto their adoption of enervating 
Oriental luxury. For example, during the trial of Warren Hastings, Edmund Burke clearly 
and directly separated the Company and its servants from Britain itself, declaring at one 
point: “The East India Company in India is not the British Nation.”16 Indeed, this was 
part of the reason why Burke was putting Hastings on trial, as the Company’s “state 
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without a nation” had only officeholders, with no people to reign in abuses or curb 
corruption. Burke's statement was particularly notew rthy due to the way in which the 
two would become conflated together in later decades, as the Mysore Wars against Tipu 
Sultan allowed the servants and soldiers of the East India Company to rehabilitate their 
reputation in the eyes of the British public.  
 The conspicuous consumption and material culture of the nabobs was what 
opened them up to ridicule in popular culture, as they made an easy target for satirists and 
opinion pieces. These illustrations testified to the uneasy role that this group occupied 
within the British political sphere. The most famous such example was Samuel Foote's 
1773 play The Nabob, which encapsulated the popular perception of the Company's 
servants at this particular historical moment. The Nabob tells the story of Sir Matthew 
Mite (widely known to be a caricature of Robert Clive), returned from India with a vast 
fortune, and his attempts to purchase his way into respectability and high society. Mite 
was repeatedly shown to be lacking the refined manners of the gentlemanly class, 
needing instruction from his butler in how to play games of chance and flaunting his 
wealth in an attempt to impress the Antiquarian Society.17 Mite runs his household in the 
fashion of a stereotyped oriental despot, holding court in Indian style, trying to buy off 
his opposition with the bestowment of a jaghir, and suggesting that he would like to 
found a seraglio in London.18 Mite is also in the process of purchasing a seat in 
Parliament, in the satirical borough of "Bribe'em"; he negotiates in the process to buy a 
second seat for his black slave from the Indies.19 These corrupt electoral practices were 
typical of the popular beliefs associated with the nabobs in the 1770s, illustrating the fear 
                                                
17 Samuel Foote. The Nabob (London: Printed by T. Sherlock, 1773, 1778): 27-28, 51-56 
18 Ibid, 9, 37 
19 Ibid, 42-47 
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that their contact with the moral degeneration of the Orient would undermine the 
character of the British nation.  
 The central driving plot element of the play concer s Mite's relationship with the 
Oldham family, members of the gentry who have fallen on hard financial times. Mite 
demands that the Oldhams marry their young daughter Sophy to him in exchange for 
paying off their extensive debts. Mite makes it clear that love has nothing to do with this 
match, as he is only interested in obtaining further social status from the pairing; Sophy is 
compared to an adornment for the head of Mite's table,  fine piece of furniture, and an 
antique bust or picture.20 At the conclusion of the play, the Oldham family bands together 
to reject Mite's imperious designs, sending him and his lawyer (named "Rapine") away 
for good. Thomas Oldham concludes the play with a statement repudiating the actions of 
the East India Company: "For, however praiseworthy the spirit of adventure may be, 
whoever keeps his post, and does his duty at home, will be found to render his country 
best service at last!"21 Foote's play therefore not only reinforced and popularized the 
image of the greedy and unrefined nabob, it also suggested that the East India Company 
and its servants were acting against the national interest. True Britons were those who did 
their duty at home, as represented by the traditional gentry of the Oldham family. The ill-
reputed nabobs were a blight on society, corrupting the old pillars of the establishment 
through the temptation of their profligate spending. Foote suggested numerous times that 
the nabobs were not likely to last for long, as pleasures that derived from the ruin of 
others would soon be squandered away.  
                                                
20 Ibid, 36 
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 Foote's satirical play was far from an isolated criticism of the nabob phenomenon; 
his character Lady Oldham, in disparaging Matthew Mite, even states plainly "I only 
echo the voice of the public", and Mite rejoins with "I am sorry, madam, to see one of 
your fashion, concur in the common cry of the times."22 There was a very real visceral 
reaction to the nabobs in this period, as the British public rejected their intrusion into 
polite society. One way to illustrate this reaction comes in the form of illustrations 
themselves, by looking at some of the cartoons and other satirical prints produced during 
the 1770s and 1780s to address the subject of the nabobs. The demand for caricatures of 
the nabobs was so great in this period that certain printing establishments, such as the one 
run by William Holland, specialized in turning out cartoons about the East India 
Company.23 Principal themes of these caricatures included the venality, dishonesty, and 
corruption among Company servants, and the fashions and faux pas committed by the 
nabobs as social misanthropes. Many of these images made use of the political language 
of tyranny and despotism, suggesting that the Company and the nabobs that it generated 
were responsible for bringing Oriental despotism hoe with them to Britain.24 
 An easy target for these prints was the wealth amassed by the nabobs in India, and 
the corrupt means with which they had obtained it. One such cartoon from 1773 was 
engraved for the Oxford Magazine, and entitled "The Nabobs Clive and Colebrooke 
Brought to Account" [Figure 1].25 It depicted two well-known nabobs of the day (Clive 
                                                
22 Ibid, 65-66 
23 Pratapaditya Pal and Vidya Dehejia. From Merchants to Emperors: British Artists and India 1757-1930 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986): 55-56 
24 See Chapter 3  
25 Author unknown. "The Present Times, or the Nabobs Cl__ve and C__l__ke Brought to Account." 
Engraved for the Oxford Magazine, 1 May 1773. Image #5111 in Mary Dorothy George. Catalogue of 
Political and Personal Satires Preserved in the Department of Prints and Drawings in the British Musuem, 
Vol. 5-7. (London: British Museum Publications, 1978). I amindebted to George's guide for help in 
interpreting the satirical prints of the period. 
195 
 
and Colebrooke) kneeling before Lord North in supplication. They are both handing him 
bags of money; North states, “I know the vileness of your deeds! But I must have more 
hush Money.” Colebrooke has a tag on him reading “Job in the Alley £30,000” while 
Clive entices with “You shall have the tenth of my Jaghire”. Clive and Colebrooke are 
both chained to a demon in the foreground, while in the background, a blindfolded Justice 
tries to strike them down, but is held off by another member of the ministry, Lord Bute. 
The message of this cartoon was fairly obvious, charging nabobs like Clive with bribing 
the unpopular North ministry to avoid prosecution fr their unethical acts in India. The 
demonic imagery associated with the two nabobs, and the figure of Justice poised to 
strike them down, together serve as good signs of the general scorn with which the 
popular press treated Company servants in this period. 
 A decade later in 1783, the cartoonist Gillray produced a similar print entitled 
"The Nabob Rumbled" [Figure 2], a play on words poking fun at the aforementioned 
Thomas Rumbold, who was under investigation by Parliament at the time for corruption 
charges related to his time as Governor of Madras.26 The print depicted Rumbold 
vomiting a stream of guineas (golden coins) into a ch mber pot held by Henry Dundas, 
soon to become the head of the East India Company's Board of Control. He is supported 
by a man in military dress, his son Captain Rumbold, who is saying “Ah! these damn’d 
Scotch Pills will kill poor Dad,” the mention of Scottish nationality serving as another 
reference to Dundas. In the background, a man (Captain Rumbold again) sits atop a huge 
sack labeled Roupees while riding an elephant, attended by an Indian servant. This 
particular print visibly displayed the wealth that n bobs such as Rumbold had 
                                                
26 Gillray. "The Nabob Rumbled or a Lord Advocate’s Amusement." Published by E. D’Achery, 21 
January 1783. Image #6169 in Mary Dorothy George. Catalogue of Political and Personal Satires (1978) 
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accumulated overseas, and hinted at the foul means used to obtain it by having the nabob 
expel it physically from the body through vomiting. The dialogue between Rumbold's son 
and his Indian servant suggested that their only decent course of action would be to quit 
Britain, which would be the best way for Rumbold to demonstrate good manners.  
 Other prints attacked the subject of electoral corruption, playing upon fears that 
the nabobs were subverting the British political system through the control of tainted 
parliamentary seats. The Shaftesbury election of 1774 became notorious as a particularly 
rotten piece of electoral fraud, as two different nabobs (Francis Sykes and Thomas 
Rumbold again) both competed to see who could succesfully bribe the electorate. Not 
only were both men caught purchasing votes and called to appear before Parliament, but 
in addition the magistrates of the town were also implicated in the scheme.27 The public 
outcry from this latest exercise in nabob corruption spawned further satirical prints. One 
anonymous author produced "The Shaftesbury Election or the Humors of Punch", a very 
large print showing several different rooms in a house, each room depicting a different 
type of electoral fraud, with an overall theme of bribing voters in the election.28 The 
central room portayed an Indian scene: a corpulent man sits on a canopied howdah on an 
elephant; he is crowned and holds a sceptre; money-bags are piled on both sides of the 
howdah; a mahout sits on the animal’s neck. The elephant appears to be picking up 
money-bags from the ground with its trunk; an India in a turban who lies across these 
bags is being beaten and kicked by a European.29 The image suggested that the nabobs 
had themselves become Oriental despots, corrupted by their wealth and subverted by 
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28 Author unknown. "The Shaftesbury Election or the Humors of Punch" Mezzotint, circa 1776. Image 
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foreign political systems. The use of the elephant imagery made clear that the nabobs had 
become part of an alien, non-British system of exercising authority. The assault on the 
Indian man also raised another long-standing criticism of the nabobs, reminding the 
viewer that they had obtained their fortunes through the exploitation of the Indian masses. 
Cruelty and even savage behavior were often attribued to the Company servants in this 
period, and was reflected in how they were represent d i  the popular media of the day.  
 This is not to suggest that all of the depictions f the nabobs were entirely 
negative; popular representations of any subject are notoriously difficult to categorize, 
and opinion on the Company and its servants was far from monolithic. Cartoons and 
satirical prints by their very nature were designed to poke fun at the popular subjects of 
the period, and the nabobs were an easy target for their mocking. For their part, the 
nabobs used their newfound wealth in an attempt to urchase respectability through the 
commissioning of Indian-themed works of art, which would decorate their expensive new 
country estates. The nouveau riche administrators, civil servants, and officers in the 
Company's armies frequently commissioned portraits or bought engravings to decorate 
their homes, creating a thriving new market in the lat eighteenth century for Indian-
themed art.30 Regardless of their backgrounds prior to arriving in the subcontinent, these 
men desired paintings that could depict the place wh re they had achieved success or 
made their fortune. As a result, the nabobs often had t eir portraits painted in Indian attire 
or in Indian settings, such as the 1765 portrait of Captain John Foote by Joshua Reynolds 
[Figure 3].31 Not only does Foote appear in non-European dress, h  tands in the regal 
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pose of an Indian nawab, with sword in hand and a jeweled turban on his head.32 Aside 
from his skin color and facial features, there is nothing to differentiate Foote in this 
painting from a wealthy Indian prince.  
 Foote's image appeared to be the very embodiment of the nabob stereotype, a 
Company servant who was corrupted by the wealth and luxury of the Orient, and he was 
far from the only individual to be portrayed in this manner. The nabob desire for 
landscapes depicting Indian scenery and trading posts was similarly an apparent rejection 
of the conventional neoclassical art favored by the British gentry, another way in which 
they stood out from conventional polite society. By having themselves painted in scenes 
of their Indian triumphs, the nabobs had hoped to impress upon others a sense of their 
moral responsibility; for the Company, commissioned artwork was "the purchased 
opportunity for good public relations."33 But popular opinion remained skeptical about 
the nabobs prior to the 1790s, and about the East India Company more generally. Opinion 
differed on how to view the growing overseas empire; was it a threatening sign of moral 
corruption, or a valuable addition to the nation? The anxieties and opportunities of empire 
were both apparent in these nabob portraits, the ric  wealth brought back from the East 
along with the potential for foreign contamination. These fears contributed to a number of 
serious critiques of the Company's overseas role during this period, and led to widespread 
feelings of pessimism about the future of the empire. It was entirely possible that the 
nabobs were laying the seeds for the imminent destruction of the British Empire, at the 
very same time that they were creating it. 
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 Criticisms of the East India Company for the threat th t it posed to the nation 
were nothing new in the middle of the eighteenth century, and had long antecedents 
dating back to its founding in 1600. From an early date, the Company's servants had been 
willing to address these anxieties directly by engaging in print culture debates with their 
detractors. These exchanges made clear the fears and pessimism that were commonly 
associated with the Company's actions overseas. In particular, the doubts associated with 
empire that were exhibited by contemporaries are striking to modern observers. The poor 
track record of governance overseas in India and America during the 1770s and 1780s 
offered little confidence at that point that the British Empire would stand the test of time.  
 The East India Company had always been subject to criticism in the realm of print 
culture from its inception. During the early periods of its existence, the Company had 
often tried to use official censorship and regulation of print to eliminate its opposition; 
however, the continued proliferation of print culture made this tactic increasingly difficult 
to enforce during the seventeenth century, and essentially impossible by the middle of the 
eighteenth century. Instead, the Company responded by wading into the realm of popular 
discourse, printing its own counterarguments to defend against attacks on its profitable 
trade and chartered monopoly status.34 Print produced by the Company was often created 
with a parliamentary audience in mind, and could be int nsely political in nature. The 
Company’s willingness to engage in the rough and tumble of popular discourse via print 
culture demonstrated the importance of maintaining a positive image in public opinion. 
From the early days of the Company, the Directors (and later the Board of Control) made 
the Company’s image an important priority.  
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 As far back as 1621, Thomas Mun had written A Discourse of Trade from 
England unto the East Indies to defend the Company from print culture attacks, in isting 
that the India trade enriched the nation rather than causing its poverty due to a drain of 
specie.35 In the late seventeenth century, East India Company Director Josiah Child 
frequently wrote pamphlets under the pseudonym of Philopatris to defend the Company 
and its trade, arguing that the India trade was more valuable to the English nation than 
any other trade, that the Company was deserving of its ficial monopoly status, and so 
on.36 As an influential Director who determined much of the Company’s policy in this 
period, Child’s engagement with print culture reinforced the notion that the Company’s 
leaders believed in the importance of creating a positive public image. These authors and 
others like them were successful in maintaining political support for the Company’s 
status quo, although skepticism about the accumulation of wealth and political influence 
amongst Company shareholders remained a longstanding criticism. 
 Old fears and anxieties associated with the Company received new life in the 
middle of the eighteenth century with the advent of the nabobs, and the widespread 
perception that the Company’s acquisition of territo y was leading to tyrannical and 
despotic rule in India. Fears and pessimism about the future of Britain’s empire overseas 
were still commonplace during this period, prior to the military successes of the 1790s, 
and this pessimism was reflected in many of the writings from the period. The belief that 
the British Empire was on its last legs, and that te overseas colonial project was doomed 
to end in failure, was a widespread sentiment in the British metropole in the late 
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eighteenth century. Robert Orme, the official historiographer of the East India Company, 
chose to conclude his meticulous account of the trading corporation's history with the 
events transpiring in 1762, despite possessing copious materials with which to extend the 
narrative further in time.37 Orme had serious misgivings about the level of corruption that 
existed in the Company’s rule over Bengal, and had witnessed firsthand the graft and 
self-aggrandizement of Company servants during his own visit to Madras. Orme 
predicted in 1767, “Parliament in less than two years will ring with declamation against 
the Plunderers of the East… It is these cursed presents which stop my History. Why 
should I be doomed to commemorate the ignominy of my countrymen… which has 
accompanied every event since the first of April 1757 [since Plassey].”38 Instead of 
continuing the history of the Company after its acquisition of the diwani for Bengal, 
Orme chose instead to write a history of the Mughal Empire in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, seeing no future in the current exploits of his countrymen.  
 Nor was Orme alone in his beliefs, as Alexander Dow and William Bolts, both 
disaffected Company servants, went on to write critical histories of the East India 
Company during the 1770s, singling out Robert Clive in particular for vilification.39 
These historical accounts provide a sharp contrast to the celebratory accounts of the 
Company’s rise to power which would emerge in the early nineteenth century, penned by 
enthusiastic empire-builders such as John Malcolm and Mark Wilks.40 Orme and Dow 
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believed that the Company’s overseas empire was on the verge of disintegrating, not on 
the cusp of massive military and economic expansion. As referenced above, Samuel 
Foote's contemporary play The Nabob echoed the same ephemeral sentiments about the 
future, with the main character Mathew Mite told near the end of the play how 
"possessions arising from plunder very rarely are permanent; we every day see what has 
been treacherously and rapaciously gained, as profusely and full as rapidly squandered."41 
This advice could have applied equally to the ill-gotten gains of the nabobs, or the 
stability of their overseas territorial conquests in India. 
 One of the best ways to demonstrate the skepticism of this period about the future 
of Britain’s overseas holdings comes in the form of an extraordinary cartoon from 1783 
by W.P. Carey. The satirical engraving, entitled "So fickle is the mind of Royalty!", 
depicts Charles Fox, Lord North, and Edmund Burke falling from a pedestal on which 
King George III sits; in other words, a literal falling from favor [Figure 4].42 Its nominal 
purpose was a commentary on the party politics of the day, with Carey suggesting that 
Fox would likely return to power again soon. However, the cartoon also drew a striking 
contrast between the reign of George II (pre-1760) on the left side of the image, with the 
reign of George III on the right side. Underneath a dignified bust of the previous king, 
crowned with a laurel wreath to signify victory, the text on George II’s pedestal reads 
“The Father of his People. British Meridian A.D. 1760. Just & necessary wars with 
natural & perfidious enemies; crownd with victory & success… Great Britain look’d up 
to as the Arbitress of Europe; fear’d by all the world; Sovereign of the Sea and possessed 
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of a greater extent of Territory than Rome in the zenith of her glory!!!”43 On the right 
side of the cartoon, George III cavalierly tips over the pedestal upon which Fox, North, 
and Burke had been standing, with a far less flattering inscription characterizing his 
reign:  
The Father of his – Children! British Sunset 1783… Stamp Act. Boston Port Bill. 
American Remonstrance disregarded… Cornwallis taken. Drawn Battles at sea, in 
the East & West Indies, Europe & Am. Lose the Empire of the Sea… Hyder Ally 
defeats Col. Baily. Anarchy, Confusion & Destruction in East In[dies]. War 
concludes with an exhausted Treasury, distracted Councils, divided Senate 
decay’d Fleet, Enfeebled Army, discontented People & America not only for ever, 
ever lost to England, but thrown into the arms of our natural enemies!!! Oh!!! 
Oh!!! unhappy ___!!!44 
 
As if these obvious contrasts were not enough, Carey dded a winged picture of Fame, 
who blows a trumpet with the word “Good” on it towards George II, and one proclaiming 
“disgrace!! How lost!!! How fallen!!” towards George III. 
 While Carey’s cartoon was of course satirical and not intended to be taken 
completely seriously, it nonetheless demonstrated how t is was a period in which 
pessimism about the future of the British presence overseas was a very real phenomenon. 
The contrast between the reigns of the two monarchs suggested that many Britons had 
lost an earlier sense of cultural confidence, and believed that their role in the world was 
in decline. Indeed, many eighteenth century intellectuals remained doubtful about their 
country’s achievements, and skeptical of the European political and social order in 
general; it was not until the developments of the early nineteenth century 
(industrialization, the ending of the slave trade, th  extension of the franchise, etc.) that 
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British thinkers would begin to feel confident that their political culture was superior to 
the rest of the world.45   
 When Carey produced this cartoon in 1783, there was no way to know that the 
future would bring unparalleled successes for the Company, resulting in his gloomy 
depiction of imperial decay and the belief (sounding strange in retrospect) that Britain’s 
empire had fallen past its “meridian” and had reachd its “sunset”. The mention of Haider 
Ali and the disastrous defeat of Colonel Baillie in Carey’s cartoon anticipated the role 
that the Mysore Wars would later play in reshaping popular opinion of the East India 
Company’s role overseas. The figure of Tipu Sultan w s enormously important in 
shifting British attitudes about their empire; it was increasingly argued during the last two 
decades of the 18th century that the true tyrants were Indian princes like Tipu, and not the 
servants of the East India Company. British victories in the Mysore Wars replaced the 
cultural pessimism regarding empire with a newly strident celebration of imperial 
grandeur, one which the public was happy to embrace. Th  triumphs over Tipu opened up 
a path for the former nabobs to be reintegrated into the British nation, popularly 
embraced as heroic figures who embodied the finest qualities of humanity and virtue. 
This was a gradual process that took place over the course of the Mysore Wars, and even 
within the Company itself opinion was not always universal with regards to Tipu, but in 
the end it had a transformative effect on British perceptions of their empire, and 
established itself as the historical memory for future generations.  
 
 
                                                
45 Sankar Muthu. Enlightenment Against Empire. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Jennif r 
Pitts. A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005): 14-15 
205 
 
Tipu's Role within Company Politics 
 Over the course of the last two decades of the eight enth century, popular 
attitudes about the Company's overseas servants began to change. Increasingly there was 
less mention of the despotic actions of the nabobs, and more focus upon the supposed 
Oriental despotism of Indian rulers such as Tipu Sultan. This debate played out within the 
East India Company's own ranks, as well as amongst the broader British public. The 
competing tug of war between different elements within he Company, and their 
disagreements over how to view Tipu Sultan, indicated the shifting opinion about the role 
of the East India Company in these decades.  
 It is important to keep in mind that the East India Company itself was by no 
means a monolithic entity. There existed real disagreements between individuals and 
between the different presidencies over how to approach the 1784 Treaty of Mangalore, 
and how to view Tipu Sultan. In particular, the Governor General and Council in Bengal 
disagreed sharply with the conduct of the Second Mysore War carried out by the Madras 
Presidency, leading to a fascinating series of exchanges between the two groups which 
played out over the course of 1783 and 1784. The Bengal Council criticized the early 
peace feelers sent out by the Madras government to Tipu Sultan, stating in official 
correspondences, "It would be very painful to our feelings to give you our real 
Sentiments on the Propriety as well as Policy of the Steps you have taken to solicit Peace 
with Tippoo."46 The Bengal Council found it unseemly that representatives of the 
Company sent to Tipu "should be directed to beg [their] Commiseration to our People 
who are Prisoners in his Hands."47 The Madras Council shot back their own response, 
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defending their actions on the grounds that their ngotiations had been necessary to 
separate Tipu from his French allies.48 The Madras Presidency had been coming under 
criticism for their handling of the war effort, due to the poor military record of the 
Company forces in southern India during the conflict. In the process of defending their 
own position, the Madras council would advocate a vry different view of Tipu than that 
promoted by the Governor General in Bengal, one which reflected divergent strands of 
popular opinion within the East India Company’s ranks.  
 General Norman Macleod wrote to the Bombay Council to argue against what he 
saw as an unseemly rush to make peace, believing that Tipu was hard pressed by the 
Marathas and would agree to handsome terms, if the Company was firm in its demands. 
The more dangerous figure in his view was Governor Macartney of Madras, "who grasps 
at all Authority and the management of all business, and would willingly reduce every 
man in India to Cinders, to swell his important figure", and who would conclude peace on 
any terms purely for the credit it would provide to his own reputation.49 This sort of 
infighting between the three presidencies of the East India Company was quite common, 
as there was little agreement on how the war should be conducted, what sort of peace 
should be signed, and how Tipu Sultan should be perceived. The London newspapers 
picked up on these factional disputes from letters s nt home from India, one noting that, 
"The greatest dissentions prevail betwixt the Supreme Council of Bengal and the 
Company’s servants here [Madras]." The same author glo mily predicted, "if some 
vigorous steps are not taken at home immediately to restrain the party spirit, the ambition, 
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the avarice, and the tyranny of the Company’s servants here, Great Britain may bid adieu 
to her power in the East," in a reprise of the familiar nabob themes mentioned above.50  
 The Bengal Council was highly dissatisfied with the peace treaty that ended the 
Second Mysore War, and argued for a more aggressive line to be taken towards Tipu, 
including the possibility of fomenting revolts within Mysore: "They animadverted[?] on 
the cruelty exercised by Tippoo towards his Prisoners, and his Subjects in general and 
were of opinion - that the latter were ripe for rebellion, a circumstance of which the 
Madras Government ought to have taken a due advantage and not manifested so much 
anxiety to conclude a Peace since Tippoo would not have dared to renew the contest."51 
The opinion of the Bengal Council reflected their lack of familiarity with the situation in 
southern India, where there was little evidence to suggest that the people of Mysore were 
eager to rise up against Tipu. Lord Macartney meanwhile defended his record by writing 
to the Company's Directors in London, stating that nothing was more needed than peace 
in the area surrounding Madras, and that he could not subject the inhabitants of the 
country to the horrors of continued warfare.52 In response to the charges of the Governor 
General and the Bengal Council, Macartney shot back a completely different picture of 
the Second Mysore War and of the prisoners taken in battle: 
With respect to General Mathews, the Madras Governmnt were firmly persuaded 
that he was not murdered.... As to the other Officers, Government entertained 
suspicions respecting them, but were not in possession of any proof. The Bengal 
Government had censured the Government of Madras fo the anxiety which they 
had manifested in their endeavors to procure Peace; alleging that Tippoo had no 
less cause to desire it than themselves. In reply to this insinuation the Letter 
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observed that Tippoo's country had been but very little ravaged, and that the 
expenses of his Army had not impoverished him.53 
 
While the main goal of these exchanges was defending the Madras Council against the 
charges of cowardice leveled against them, Macartney nonetheless also promoted an 
opposing characterization of Tipu Sultan, one in which he did not murder his prisoners 
and had equal cause to sign peace with the East India Company. Tipu's kingdom of 
Mysore was well-governed and flourishing, providing no support for the internal 
rebellions or war of liberation promoted by the Calcutta Presidency. These exchanges 
pointed to the existence of a more dovish "Madras" viewpoint which favored peaceful 
engagement with Tipu, opposed to a more hawkish "Bengal" viewpoint which saw the 
Indian prince only as a monstrous stain upon the natio l honor which had to be wiped 
out. Although these internal letters within the East India Company were not shared with 
the wider public, they were nonetheless significant at highlighting the divisions that 
existed within the Company itself. There was no clear consensus in the mid 1780s on 
how to represent Tipu, or how best to engage with him.
 At the outbreak of the Third Mysore War in 1789, there was once again a split 
within the Company over how to react to the diplomatic crisis in Travancore.54 The same 
fault lines emerged within the Company's ranks, with a split between the Madras and 
Calcutta governments over how to regard Tipu Sultan, but with a very different final 
result due to the newly increased authority possessed by Cornwallis as Governor General. 
The Madras Presidency, governed at this point by John Holland, favored a negotiated 
settlement of some kind with Tipu, one which would ensure the preservation of 
Travancore and maintain the status quo in southern India. The Calcutta government 
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headed by Cornwallis was much more hawkish in its ou lo k, seeing the conflict along 
the Travancore Lines as the pretext for a general engagement with the purpose of 
reducing or eliminating Tipu's power as an independent ruler. This continuing split 
between opposing Madras and Calcutta viewpoints indicated the divergent opinions 
within the Company itself about Tipu Sultan, although it is telling that in the Third 
Mysore War, the growing influence of the Governor General allowed Cornwallis' 
viewpoint to win out completely over that of Holland. This served as another example of 
the growing embrace of the Tipu Legend, in this case within the East India Company's 
own ranks. 
 According to papers presented in the House of Commns, Holland remonstrated 
against the purchase of the two forts in his letters o the Rajah of Travancore, and viewed 
their transfer as a violation of the 1784 Treaty of Mangalore. Holland was not at all 
pleased with a subsidiary client state taking independent action that could pull the 
Company into a major war. After Tipu attacked the Travancore lines, Holland "desired 
the Rajah to restore Jacottah and Cranganore to the Dutch, of whom he had purchased 
them; that after Tippoo’s attack on the lines of Travancore, he recommended settling the 
points in dispute by negotiation, to which Tippoo seemed willing to agree."55 Tipu 
appears to have had no desire for a larger war with the Company, writing to Holland that 
his attack was an unintended skirmish, and that he would accept a mediated solution to 
the conflict if the Company would send him a diplomatic representative.56 Holland 
agreed with this viewpoint; he made no preparations f r war and wrote to Cornwallis that 
Tipu "had no intention to break with the Company, and would be prepared to enter into 
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negotiation for the adjustment of the points in dispute."57 Tipu genuinely seemed to have 
believed that his conflict with Travancore was a private dispute, one in which the East 
India Company would not intervene despite the provisi ns of the subsidiary alliance. The 
Company almost certainly could have chosen to settle this dispute through diplomacy 
rather than warfare, and indeed the former was clearly the preference of Holland's Madras 
government.  
 However, Cornwallis' government in Calcutta viewed the situation in a very 
different light. Cornwallis took the view that by attacking the Travancore Lines, Tipu had 
entered into a state of war with the Company, and therefore was guilty of breaking the 
previous Treaty of Mangalore. Despite Tipu's letters to Cornwallis, in which he stated 
that he had no plans for war with the Company, and requested the sending of an envoy to 
negotiate the situation, Cornwallis insisted that te war was entirely the fault of the 
Sultan, quipping at one point: "That mad barbarian h s forced us into war with him."58 
The rest of the Governor General's council in Calcutta supported this interpretation of 
events, and began preparations for a large-scale conflict in southern India. As for 
Holland's Madras government, they were roundly castig ted for their inaction by the rest 
of the Company. A common line of argumentation was th t Holland had been tricked by 
Tipu's untrustworthy nature, with one later analysis stating that Holland and the rest of 
the Madras Council "suffered themselves to be so far deceived by these professions, and 
explanations, as not to make the preparations they ought to have done" with regards to 
orders from Bengal, which had commanded them to assume a state of war with Tipu.59 
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This was one way to provide an excuse for the inacton of Madras, through heaping 
blame on the faithless character of Tipu, a view that was commonplace in British circles 
at the time of the Third Mysore War.60 
 Cornwallis himself was more direct, criticizing the lack of military preparations in 
his letter to the Madras Council and asking why they s emed to have acted in "Disregard 
or Contradiction of our repeated Instructions" to regard Tipu as at war with the Company 
if he committed any hostilities against Travancore. Cornwallis chastised Holland's 
administration for its late public conduct, which "appeared to us in a disadvantageous 
Light ", and demanded the reason for the lack of military buildup.61 Cornwallis took it for 
granted at an early date that the Company would be returning to war with Tipu. In this 
respect, Cornwallis and the rest of the Calcutta administration were acting in accordance 
with Anglo-Indian public opinion, which was strongly in favor of another conflict with 
Mysore out of a desire for revenge due to the captured prisoners in the previous war. The 
possibility of a peaceful rapprochement to the incident at Travancore, the policy favored 
by Holland's Madras government, does not appear to have been considered in the other 
Presidencies of Calcutta and Bombay. 
 With disagreement between Calcutta and Madras over how to approach the 
situation, the reaction of the Directors in London would prove to be crucial. Upon 
reaching news of the diplomatic crisis months later, L adenhall Street chose to support 
the aggressive pro-war policy of the Governor General, and chastised the Madras 
government for its lack of preparations. Their instruc ions to Holland mirrored those of 
Cornwallis: 
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But the Instant you were acquainted, on the 8th [January 1790], that Tippoo had 
actually made a Breach in the Lines of Travancore, not a Moment ought to have 
been lost in preparing for the most vigorous Exertions, most especially with the 
Letter before you of the 8th December, from the Governor-General and Council, 
wherein they declared, that if Tippoo should invade the former Territories of the 
Rajah of Travancore, such an Invasion was to be deemed an Act of Hostilty, and 
the Commencement of a War, which you was to prosecute with all possible 
Vigour and Decision. Under these Circumstances, we must express our 
Astonishment, that any Ideas of an injudicious and misapplied Economy should 
have induced you to refuse Compliance with Colonel Musgrave's 
Recommendation, in ordering the necessary Establishment of Draft and Carriage 
Bullocks for the several Corps that were to take the Field.62 
 
The Directors repeated the same criticisms made by the Governor General, chiding the 
failure to prepare a supply train for war and instruc ing Madras to regard any hostile 
action by Tipu as an immediate declaration of war. As for Holland, he was attacked on 
grounds of personal corruption, and in a strange rev rsal, blamed for the attack on 
Travancore due to his failure to take a hard line against Tipu: "The rupture now 
threatened, is perhaps, in part, chargeable on the i discretion, venality, and corruption, of 
our own civil government in Madras. Mr. Holland is loudly condemned on that score; and 
perhaps a different conduct on his part might have healed the breach, or intercepted the 
violence of the India Powers, and intimidated Tippoo Saib from his late attack on the 
Rajah of Travencore."63 It was now the failure to prosecute a war against an Indian state 
that was inspiring charges of nabobery against Holland from the Directors, precisely the 
opposite of the charges leveled against Warren Hastings during his contemporary trial.  
 Holland himself paid the price for his divergent views with his dismissal, as he 
was replaced by Major General Medows as Governor of Madras. Medows immediately 
set about preparing the logistics for a long campaign gainst Mysore, which he would 
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command under the direction of Cornwallis. The replacement of the civilian Holland with 
the military officer Medows served as an excellent symbol of the victory of the hawkish 
Calcutta viewpoint over the more peaceful Madras one. The older governance of the 
Company by commercial figures such as Hastings and Holland was increasingly dying 
out, to be replaced by soldiers such as Cornwallis nd Wellesley. Military men from the 
traditional landed aristocracy were perceived to be far less susceptible to moral 
corruption and nabobery, making them perfect choices as the figureheads of the post-
Hastings reformed Company. The removal of Holland from Madras was also a symbol of 
the growing centralization of the East India Company's overseas administration, with the 
primacy of the Governor General exerting itself over th  other two Presidency towns. 
Within the East India Company, and more generally amongst the British community in 
India, Cornwallis' aggressive viewpoint about Tipu was increasingly embraced: the 
Sultan was a cancer that had to be removed through martial means, with no room for 
negotiation or compromise.  
 The Third Mysore War (1790-92) was the turning point within the East India 
Company in terms of how Tipu Sultan was perceived. Although there had been real 
disagreement between the Calcutta and Madras Presidencies over whether to engage with 
Tipu peacefully or seek to prosecute another war, by the time of the Fourth Mysore War 
(1798-99), this debate had virtually disappeared. Wellesley wrote repeated letters in the 
autumn of 1798 attacking the Madras government for not acting swiftly enough in 
accumulating wartime supplies, but there was no further discussion on the actual decision 
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to renew another conflict with Tipu.64 Wellesley made the decision to initiate the Fourth 
Mysore War at an early date, in June of 1798, and then spent the next eight months 
carrying out the planning behind the scenes and engagi  in a duplicitous series of 
correspondences with Tipu Sultan to turn his initial v sion into a reality.65 There was no 
wider discussion within the Company about whether to engage with Tipu in more 
peaceful fashion, or to preserve Tipu's rulership over Mysore as a buffer state against the 
Marathas, as had been often debated in earlier periods. By the time of the Fourth Mysore 
War, the villainous reputation of Tipu had been accepted virtually wholesale within the 
Company's ranks, and Wellesley was able to lead the Company's military in a successful 
war of conquest with virtually no opposing voices. The earlier period of debate between 
the Madras and Calcutta Presidencies had disappeared ntirely. 
Tipu in Metropolitan Party Politics 
 At the same time that Tipu's image was being contested within the East India 
Company, the same discussion was taking place amongst the wider British public in the 
metropole. Britain's Parliament had specifically instructed the Company to refrain from 
engaging in wars of territorial conquest, which raised very real questions about the 
legality of the later conflicts initiated by Cornwallis and Wellesley against Tipu.66 The 
period of the Third Mysore War during the early 1790s was the height of the debate 
regarding how Tipu was viewed, with a divided public quarreling back and forth over the 
true character of the Indian prince. The contested and unstable image of Tipu served as a 
proxy for the greater debate over the role of the East India Company in British society. 
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 This topic became entwined within the factional politics of the day, with hotly 
contested parliamentary debates raging over the morality of the war taking place in India. 
A majority of the MPs supported the East India Company and William Pitt's Tory 
government, but a vocal Whig Opposition made it loud y known that they considered the 
war to be aggressive and unjust, with Tipu's reputation wrongly slandered by supporters 
of the Company. This debate further spilled out into the contemporary newspapers and 
journals, part of the vibrant print culture of the eighteenth century, where commentators 
and editorialists contested the image of Tipu. Generally speaking, those who supported 
the Company tended to vilify Tipu Sultan, and had an optimistic view of empire overseas 
that embraced military action and territorial conquest. Those who opposed the Company 
were much more likely to defend or make excuses for Tipu, and quite frequently 
exhibited the familiar pessimistic view of empire, full of fears of being corrupted by 
Eastern luxury and bringing military despotism back home to Britain. This politicized 
debate over Tipu Sultan was therefore intertwined with popular perceptions of the 
Company itself, and the dispute about whether the Company's servants were corrupt 
nabobs or British patriots.  
 The image of Tipu became intertwined with British parliamentary politics at an 
early date, almost as soon as he first appeared in public discourse at the beginning of the 
1780s. While references to Tipu were much less commn during the Second Mysore War 
than during the following conflict, the figure of the Sultan still made appearances in 
parliamentary debate. The figure of Tipu was employed by Pitt's government to justify 
support for the embattled reputation of the East India Company as it fought against the 
supposedly tyrannical character of the Sultan, or used alternately by the political 
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Opposition to point to Tipu's victories as further proof of the incompetence of the 
Company's overseas administration. For example, Charles Fox linked together the 
military successes of Tipu with his scorn for the current state of the Company's affairs 
when arguing for the passage of his India Bill in 1783: 
But the great articles to which Mr. Fox objected were, the debts that the Company 
said were due to them from [Indian princes]…. But how were those vast sums to 
be raised from those princes! By rapine, war, and horrible cruelties…. The only 
recourse the English had was to strike a terror int the country by making 
reprisals. They, accordingly, slaughtered the men of the villages and towns 
through which they passed, and took the women and chil ren prisoners. […] The 
victories of Tippoo Saib, the fallen reputation of the English, and in general, the 
European arms… These were circumstances which did not allow him [Fox] to 
indulge any sanguine hopes of a peace in India.67 
 
Fox joined together the fears of military defeat in India with an anxiety that the Company 
was ruling in a profoundly arbitrary and despotic fashion. He argued at one point that 
India was being misruled to so great an extent that Lord Macartney of Madras might 
already be a prisoner of Tipu.68 Fox and his Whig supporters staked a great deal of 
political capital on this pessimistic view of empire, the belief that India was being poorly 
governed and existed in a constant state of crisis. Thi  viewpoint employed the same 
political tropes that were in contemporary use regading the nabob scandals, referring to 
corruption, avarice, and contamination of the body politic due to bringing back the worst 
excesses of the Orient from India.  
 Meanwhile, the pro-Company Pitt ministry was asserting the opposite, that India 
was in excellent shape and that peace had been signed with Tipu some time ago. The 
constant fear of disaster in India, as promoted by the political opposition, was satirized by 
papers that supported the Tory majority, such as the Morning Post and Daily Advertiser: 
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"It is necessary to the well-doing of Opposition, that the country should be kept in alarm, 
and that war, or at least rumour of war, be propagated from one end of our island to the 
other, to excite jealousies among the people, and lessen the credit of the Administration."  
This was where Tipu entered into the realm of party politics, as "that terrible hero Tippoo 
Saib is now said to have taken up arms, which are nev r to be laid down till he has driven 
the English, root and branch, from the East-Indies."69 The terrible nature of Tipu was 
employed in this case as a means to drum up support for both the Company and its Tory 
supporters in Parliament. It was Tippoo the Tyrant who was at fault for the various 
problems in Indian administration, not the East India Company. 
 The pro-Company Whitehall Evening Post used the threat posed by Tipu as a 
means of attacking Fox's India Bill, which proposed to remove much of the independence 
the Company's agents: "The late fatal news from the East Indies [Mathews' surrender] 
exhibits a striking proof of the extreme futility of parchment regulations [Fox's India Bill], 
formed by economical projectors, for the b tter government of Asiatic affairs." The 
Whitehall Evening Post mocked the notion of governing India from "the office of a 
Paymaster" and suggested that "every particle of Asiatic common sense" had been 
transferred to Edmund Burke, one of the bill's chief supporters.70 The paper argued that 
important decisions about India should be made on the spot by the governors, not 
legislated by ministers in London, thus preserving the Company's traditional independent 
role. The particular example chosen by the Whitehall Evening Post to demonstrate this 
claim was the personality of Tipu, initially seen as "favourably disposed to the English 
interest," but in light of more recent results, thepaper was forced to conclude that either 
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public opinion at home had been in error or "the Asiatic Prince [was] a dissembler."71 In 
either case, the situation reflected poorly on Tipu Sultan and on the Foxite supporters of 
the reforming India Bill. 
 Both ministry and opposition sought to make use of the popular interest in the 
Mysore Wars for their own political ends, with varying degrees of success. Initial reports 
from India were also not always reliable; many of the rumors of disaster and defeat in 
India would later prove untrue when the official dispatches from the Company arrived in 
Britain. When news arrived by ship in 1784 that a ce se-fire had indeed been concluded 
with Mysore, just as the government had earlier claimed, it came as a source of some 
political embarrassment to Fox.72 Tipu's involvement with the party politics of the day 
was relatively minor during the Second Mysore War, but would become paramount in the 
debates surrounding the next war, beginning with the controversy surrounding the attack 
on Travancore. 
 When news of this new conflict in southern India reched Britain and the rest of 
the empire in 1790, it generated a sizable debate about the legality and morality of the 
war against Tipu Sultan. In a reflection of the arguments within the East India Company, 
the majority of commentators supported Cornwallis and believed in the justness of the 
war effort, while a vocal minority contested the actions of the Company as aggressive 
and antithetical to British liberty. These debates ran their course for the next three years 
without a clear conclusion until the end of the war, although the general sentiment of 
public opinion continued a gradual shift towards the villainous characterization of Tipu, 
and a reimagining of the Company's servants as patriotic soldier-heroes.  
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 Much of the initial coverage of the war was favorable, as newspapers expounded 
upon the benefits to be gained from a swift and decisive victory. Many of the sentiments 
expressed in the print culture of the British metropole reflected those of the Anglo-Indian 
community, albeit with less focus on the theme of revenge against Tipu. The St. James 
Chronicle printed a letter from Madras reassuring its readers that "nothing prejudicial to 
the interests of the nation" was to be dreaded fromthe outbreak of war. The fighting 
would instead be "the most probable means of establi hing the British interests in India... 
beyond the probability of all injury" since Tipu's cruelty would turn his subjects against 
him.73 The Public Advertiser believed that this war would demonstrate the good name of 
the British in India, through the Company's support of the Rajah of Travancore, thereby 
gaining the friendship and good wishes of the native princes. The newspaper also pointed 
out other benefits which would accrue to the Company, in the form of "immense wealth" 
to be gained through "ensuring a permanent peace, in the destruction of Tippoo Saib."74 
This writer appeared to have been unaware of the irony in writing about the establishment 
of permanent peace through warfare. This was an argument that was increasingly made 
by those who supported the East India Company in the 1790s, the notion that Tipu was a 
threat to the peace who had to be eliminated, which would be achieved through by going 
to war and conquering his kingdom. It conveniently transferred the burden of aggression 
onto the Sultan, allowing the reputation of the British to remain unblemished, and would 
be employed by both Cornwallis and later Richard Wellesley in their wars against 
Mysore.   
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 Due to the confusing circumstances of the Travancore incident, it was important 
for supporters of the Company to establish that Tipu had been the aggressor in the 
conflict. The Attic Miscellany described the outbreak of the war in these terms for its 
British readers: 
In India, the torch of war is already lighted. Tippoo Saib, (the son of and 
successor of Hyder Ally) by an unprovoked act on the territories of our ally, the 
king of Travancore, has compelled us to take up arms... Fortified by alliances with 
the native Princes, happy in a military commander of approved excellence, and in 
a governor general of solid talents and unshaken int grity, we may reasonably 
hope to subdue this unprincipled tyrant of the East, whose happiness consists in 
spreading devastation around him. But whatever be the vent of the war, we have 
the satisfaction to know that our adversary was the aggressor, and that the 
necessity of preserving inviolate the national faith rendered it unavoidable.75 
 
This passage reassured the public that the Company w s in no way responsible for the 
fighting, and was instead acting to protect the natio l honor from the tyrannical 
aggression of an Oriental despot. The authors also insisted that the war was unavoidable, 
again removing any burden of guilt from the Company d transferring it onto the person 
of Tipu. 
 These reassuring assumptions about how the war had begun were soon challenged 
by a series of revealing debates in the House of Comm ns. The topic of the Third Mysore 
War was also taken up in Parliament, spawning a series of contentious exchanges which 
were widely reported upon in the print media of the day. Prime Minister William Pitt's 
Tory ministry supported the cause of the East India Company, which was vigorously 
contested by a vocal Whig opposition. These MPs charged that the war against Tipu was 
an unjust act of aggression, and one that did not deserve to receive the official support of 
Parliament and the rest of the British nation. The Whigs were never able to succeed in 
passing their motions regarding the war, but the sustained debate in both the Commons 
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and the Lords on this subject reflected the divided attitude of the public with regards to 
both Tipu Sultan and the East India Company itself.  
 Foremost among these critics was John Hippesley (aso spelled Hippisley), a 
former East India Company servant who had resigned from the Company in 1787 and 
was returned to Parliament as an MP from Sudbury in 1790. Hippesley raised the subject 
of the legality of the Company's war against Tipu in a House of Commons debate on 21 
December 1790. As Lloyd's Evening Post reported, "He could not forbear to state, that in 
the present instance Tippoo Saib did not seem to act so as to provoke hostility from us, 
and that the present was a war of injustice." When t  initial purchase of the forts took 
place and Tipu advanced against Travancore, Sir Archibald Campbell had been averse to 
offering Travancore any assistance, but since then, "opinions were changed, and the 
British Government were about to be involved in war."76 
 Hippesley's personal experience as a former paymaster for the Madras 
government gave his objections to the war additional weight and meaning. He was joined 
in his criticisms by Philip Francis, the longtime ant gonist of Warren Hastings both in 
Calcutta and in London, now newly returned to Parliament as an MP from Bletchingley. 
Speaking in the same debate, Francis outlined a vision of British India sharply different 
from that being advocated by the Company's supporters. Francis contended that the goal 
of policy should be "the general preservation of peace throughout India… a particular 
attention to the peace and security of Bengal in particular; and avoiding, above all things, 
the endeavor to make any further acquisition of territory. Next to these, our policy... 
should be to have no alliance what ever with any of the Native Princes, but to cultivate 
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the friendship of all, and preserve by all possible means the balance of power among 
them."77 Judged on these grounds, the war against Tipu was a mi use of the Company's 
resources, and more likely to cause harm than good. Francis doubted that the Company 
would be successful at all militarily, given the adv ntage in cavalry posed by Tipu.78 The 
objections raised by Hippesley and Francis were typical of the overall Whig opposition 
during the Third Mysore War: they argued that the Company was carrying out an unjust 
war of aggression, that it would be too costly, that e motives behind the war involved 
more nabob plundering of Indian wealth, and that they were pessimistic as to whether 
victory over Tipu could be achieved at all.  
 Hippesley continued to defend the position of Tipu and argue against the decision 
to go to war. In a Commons debate the following week on 27 December 1790, Hippesley 
pointed out that Tipu wrote an apology for his conduct to the Madras government, 
declaring his wish to continue in friendship with the English, and to avoid any cause of 
offense towards them. That led to the following conclusion: 
From this statement, Mr. H. conceived that it was probable Tippoo Sultan might 
be less blameable than were aware of, if not strictly justifiable; and consequently 
that our hostile interference might not be so well adapted to conciliate and 
illustrate the system laid down by Parliament for the better governance of India. 
Mr. H. hoped he should not be considered as undertaking the general defense of 
Tippoo Sultan. He considered himself rather as an advocate for the honour and 
justice of the British nation. He admitted the claim of Tippoo to the epithet of a 
merciless tyrant; the tyrant nevertheless had his rights, and consequently his 
wrongs, in common with other men!79 
 
Hippesley adopted an unusual position in this speech, a cepting the claims of Tipu's 
brutality and yet nonetheless criticizing the Company for its actions against the Sultan. 
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Regardless of the character of Tipu, Hippesley argued, that did not justify the Company 
in violating the instructions of Parliament to refrain from campaigns of conquest in India.  
 This appears to have been a transitional period in terms of attitudes towards Tipu 
and the East India Company. Hippesley had internalized the tyrannical discourse about 
Tipu but was not willing to accept a positive reimagining of the Company itself. The 
wider public also appeared to share in this transitional moment, with shifting and 
contested narratives regarding the outbreak of the war. The Morning Chronicle concurred 
with Hippesley in its assessment of the situation: "The origin of the war in India, as 
opened by Mr. Hippesley... deserves the most serious attention of the public. The peace 
of India is of too much importance for us to be duped into a war... or for the unguarded 
ferocity of Tippoo Sultan, to be made a pretext for departing from the system of 
moderation prescribed by Parliament for the Governmt of India."80 The Morning 
Chronicle went on to state a few days later, "The public is under great obligation to Mr. 
Hippesley for explaining the origin of that war, in which it appears that Tippoo Saib was 
not the aggressor till he had reason to believe that he himself was in danger of being 
attacked," providing further support for this interpretation of events.81 The notion that the 
public was being "duped" into supporting an unnecessary war of conquest, in violation of 
the dictates laid down by Parliament, recalled the old charges of nabobery that the 
Company was trying to shed.  
 In opposing this viewpoint, and defending the justne s of the war, Henry Dundas 
pointed to the aggressive and untrustworthy nature of Tipu Sultan: "Respecting the forts 
of Tranganore, and Jachotto... the Rajah of Travancore had as good a right to get a 
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transfer of them as any other person. But the principal reason why he got them into his 
hand, was owing to the constant alarm he was under of an invasion by Tippoo Sultan into 
his kingdom..."82 Dundas was essentially outlining a doctrine of pre-emption: 
Travancore’s actions were justified because they were n cessary to protect the kingdom 
against attack by Tipu, and that explained why the Company also had to take part in the 
war. This was the same logic that Cornwallis would later use in defending the war in his 
letters back to the Directors of the Company: Tipu's character was faithless and violent, 
which necessitated taking decisive military action against him.83 Pre-emptive warfare was 
the only just course of action when faced with a tyr nt such as Tipu.  
 As these exchanges suggested, the debate over Tipu had become a stand-in for a 
wider political argument between the leading figures of the Whig and Tory parties. Men 
like Hippesley and Francis stood for an older version of overseas empire, one that 
conceptualized British power as fundamentally maritime, commercial, Protestant, and 
free.84 They believed that any territorial empire in India could only be despotic in nature, 
and feared the moral consequences of the Company's military conquests on the British 
metropole. In contrast, the Pitt ministry represented the new ethos of the growing Second 
British Empire, one that was far more militaristic and autocratic in nature.85 They 
justified overseas imperialism by placing Indian subjects at a lower place on a hierarchy 
of civilizations, and by vilifying Indian rulers for their supposed moral corruption and 
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savagery.86 The Third Mysore War served as a collision point for these alternate and 
competing views of overseas empire, with the newer perspective of the pro-Company Pitt 
ministry gradually establishing their dominance.  
 Ultimately the views of the Opposition were those f a minority, and they were 
unable to secure passage of motions condemning the war. In a Commons debate on 2 
March 1791, Dundas secured the passage of three resolutions by the House: 
That it is the opinion of this House, that the several attacks made by Tippoo 
Sultan on the lines of Travancore, the 29th of December, 1789, and the 6th of 
March, 1790, were infractions in the treaty of Manglore, made in 1784. 
 
That the conduct of the Governor General of Bengal [Cornwallis], in determining 
to prosecute with vigour the war against Tippoo Sultan, in consequence of his 
attack on the territories of the Rajah of Travancore, was highly meritorious.  
 
That the treaties entered into with the Nizam on the 1st of June, and with the 
Mahrattas on the 7th of July, 1790, are wisely calculated to add vigour to the 
operations of war, and to promote the future tranquility of India; and that the faith 
of the British nation is pledged for the due performance of the engagements 
contained in the said treaties.87 
 
All of these passed without a division (after some angry comments from the Opposition), 
indicating that the general mood was in favor of the war. Fox remonstrated loudly against 
these measures, decrying how the signing of treaties of alliance against Tipu "put it out of 
our power to make any moderate terms with Tippoo, and must pursue him to destruction 
under the specious and delusive pretence of keeping faith with our Allies."88 The majority 
opinion, however, did not agree and supported both the ministry and the East India 
Company.  
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 The situation was much the same in the House of Lords, where Lord Portchester 
gave a speech on 11 April 1791 attacking the situation in India: 
It was a war founded in injustice, in violation of the most sacred treaties, and in 
direct contempt of the recorded policy of the Court of Directors, and of both 
Houses of Parliament. These, he said, were strong assertions, but they were true… 
He contended that the war was planned in this country long before the attack of 
Tippoo Sultan, in the year 1789. It was a war of conquest, a principle which had 
ever been reprobated by every enlightened nation… he therefore considered the 
bargain about the forts [at Travancore] as a mere pretence for entering into a war, 
which he had no hesitation in saying, was dictated by the Board of Control in this 
country. It was, surely, a shameful misapplication of the revenue of the East 
India-Company, to embark them in a war of conquest for the acquisition of 
territories, which, after the expiration of their charter, they could never enjoy.89 
 
After making this attack against the Company, Portchester attempted to pass three anti-
war resolutions, stating that "schemes of conquests and extension of dominion in India" 
were repugnant to the national honor, there was no just cause for a war with Tipu Sultan, 
and that the Directors of the East India Company should issue orders for a speedy 
resolution of peace with Tipu, on moderate and equitable terms. These resolutions failed 
by a wide margin, the Lords voting against 96 to 19. Lord Grenville then advanced two 
pro-war resolutions that were nearly identical to th se passed in the Commons, which 
passed easily on a vote of 62 to 12.90 This exchange demonstrated that the Lords reflected 
the sentiment of the Commons, with a large majority supporting the war against Tipu, but 
a stubborn Opposition making noise by insisting that e Company was pursuing an 
unjust war of conquest. 
 These criticisms of the Company and the ongoing follies of the war effort inspired 
popular cartoonists of the day as well, who made use of the themes of the Mysore Wars 
to provide their own critique of empire. Cornwallis' retreat from Seringapatam in 1791, 
                                                




when the onset of the monsoon season forced a retret of the Company's armies before a 
successful siege of the city could be prosecuted, proved to be an especially popular 
subject for their work. This was a topic ripe for satire, and the cartoonists of the day 
wasted no opportunity. W. Dent was the first printer to take up the subject, publishing 
"Rare News from India, or, Things going on swimmingly in the East" on 5 December 
1791.91 His caricature depicted British soldiers floating downhill in a river, which 
originated from the urination of a rearing horse labeled "Tippoo’s Horse." The soldiers 
(one carrying a royal standard) are swept away by the raging waters, which are entitled 
"Heavy Rains or Monsoon Tip! O!" An officer in the foreground of the print has a speech 
bubble mocking the retreat, stating "They cant call the being driven thus a defeat – its 
only a retreat to return with more vigour – or, why not a compleat Victory – for they 
don’t follow us…." The message of the print was an obvious satire on the military 
setbacks encountered by the Company's armies. Dent was also mocking the Company's 
attempts to claim that the retreat from Seringapatam was a victory of some kind, which 
had been advanced by some of the conservative London ewspapers.92 Dent's print 
indicated how some segments of popular opinion continued to be skeptical of the 
Company's claims, reflecting the same currents of th ught that backed the political 
Opposition and criticized the conduct of the war.  
 Dent's cartoon was popular enough to spawn immediate imitators, as was 
common in eighteenth century print culture. Rival crtoonist Gillray printed "The 
Coming-On of the Monsoons; or, The Retreat from Seringapatam" the very next day on 6 
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December 1791 [Figure 5].93 The print shows Cornwallis retreating backwards, riding an 
ass, with an expression of sheer terror on his face. Tipu Sultan stands on top of a fortress, 
grinning maniacally, as cannons fire and he urinates onto the retreating British soldiers. A 
long reference to Falstaff is printed beneath the action, further satirizing Cornwallis. A 
similar caricature was printed by I. Cruikshank a little over a week later, depicting Tipu 
on the back of a horse galloping past Cornwallis on elephant-back, with Tipu and his 
horse launching a spray of excretion onto Cornwallis.94  
 Although this was a very crudely drawn print, it demonstrates the popularity of 
Tipu in public discourse at this point in time, with three different cartoonists creating 
different renditions of the same event; their repeated use of the urination motif also shows 
how the artists were in communication with one another as part of a larger print culture. 
The cartoons from Gillray and Cruikshank demonstrated the same themes as the one 
published by Dent, mocking the retreat from Seringapat m and serving as much harsher 
attacks on the person of Cornwallis. These criticisms of the Governor General would later 
disappear in the wake of Cornwallis' triumphant vicory, but during the course of the war 
itself, popular opinion was still very much divided on the Third Mysore War, and dubious 
about the morality of the Company engaging in India wars of conquest. Tipu Sultan was 
not seen in a particularly negative light in these representations of the conflict, and if 
anything appeared as a rather jovial figure, laughin  at the incompetence of his Company 
opponents.  
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 The retreat from Seringapatam in 1791 was the low p int of the war for the 
Company's military fortunes, and as such produced th  most critical response from 
contemporary print culture. In addition to the cartoons mocking the onset of the monsoon 
with urination references, this period also produce an extraordinary companion piece to 
an earlier cartoon entitled "Good News from Madras." Once again bearing the same title, 
this time the cartoonist's print shows not a Company victory, but a British observer 
gazing on the triumph of Tipu Sultan over the British n India [Figure 6].95 Tipu sits atop 
an elephant, receiving the sword of Cornwallis as prt of an official surrender. British 
corpses, broken cannons, and dead oxen lay strewn about the ground next to the Sultan's 
elephant. On the fortress in the background, the British flag is being lowered to the 
ground, with Tipu's own flag flying atop it. Beneath the scene, the caption for the print 
reads "Lord Cornwallis defeated, Tippoo Sultan Triumphant, and the British Oppressors 
extirpated from India."  
 This was a truly extraordinary cartoon, especially when compared to its 
companion piece from earlier in the war, which predicted an easy victory for the 
Company over Tipu. While the print may possibly have been intended as a satire against 
the political Opposition (hinting that they wanted the Company to lose the war), it could 
just as easily be argued that the cartoon's message w s intended as written, showing a 
realistic depiction of a British defeat. Tipu is not caricatured in the print, and he and his 
men appear in rather dignified positions. If anything, H.W.'s print was created in support 
of the war's critics, flipping the script around to argue that it was the Company who was 
acting tyrannically in India, much as John Hippesley and Philip Francis had been arguing 
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in Parliament. The print from W.H. served as a plebian strand of protest against the East 
India Company, mocking their claims by styling the British themselves as “oppressors." 
While the outcome of the war was in doubt, this wasa very real current of public opinion.  
 The subject of the war's morality continued to be raised in Parliament fully two 
years after the war's outbreak, with the same Opposition figures insisting that the East 
India Company and its servants were acting in despotic fashion in India. During a 
meeting of Parliament on 9 February 1792, Major Thomas Maitland once again reopened 
the question of how the conflict had begun, drawing the conclusion that "Tippoo had 
committed no offense, by breach of existing treaties, to justify an offensive alliance." 
Maitland then turned the standard narrative of Tipu and Cornwallis on its head by 
reversing their roles: "It had been much the fashion of late to launch forth into praises of 
Lord Cornwallis, and reprobation of his antagonist.. he could not but think that the one 
[Cornwallis] had acted with all the rashness and preci itancy of an Eastern tyrant; the 
native Prince had assumed the moderation of a British Governor."96 Maitland's speech 
helped make explicit the way in which image of Cornwallis was deployed as a shining 
contrast to the image of the Sultan. His line of criticism undercut the stainless reputation 
of Cornwallis that the East India Company tried to pr mote, and called to mind the old 
nabob imagery of the British as "Eastern tyrants" once again. This would have been a 
cutting remark because of the underlying fear of Britons being morally compromised by 
Indian luxury, which played such a major role in the reaction against the nabobs.97 The 
notion that Cornwallis had been corrupted by exercis  of absolute power, and was acting 
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in the fashion of an Oriental despot, touched on a number of subjects that made Britons 
very uncomfortable about their growing empire. 
 In a further Commons debate held on 15 March, Maitland once again argued that 
the war "was directly contrary to every principle of p licy; that it was carried out on the 
principle of robbery, and that it would be attended with the ruin of our settlements in 
India."98 Maitland charged the Company with plundering the territory of the Nawab of 
Arcot (Britain's longtime ally in the Carnatic) in order to pay for the war's expenses, and 
went on to propose a resolution of censure against Cornwallis. In Cornwallis' defense, 
Richard Wellesley, MP for Windsor, stated that Cornwallis sought to act through pacific 
measures, but was prevented from doing so by the "violent conduct of Tippoo Sultan," 
and "his cruelties and enmity to the English nation."99 Wellesley further argued that 
Maitland's resolutions would have a pernicious effect on the war in India, undermining 
the confidence of the Company soldiers and elevating the fortunes of Tipu. Wellesley 
also wanted the debate itself to remain secret, to avoid affecting morale in India.  When 
Maitland's resolution was put to a vote, it was soundly defeated by a margin of 159 to 43, 
indicating once again that the opinions of Maitland were not those of the majority. 
Nevertheless, the war itself remained a controversial and even unpopular subject in 
public opinion; a letter printed in Woodfall's Register from the same period mentioned in 
passing how "the war in India appears to be condemned in England."100 It is important to 
establish this more nuanced perspective of the Mysore Wars in the realm of popular 
discourse, in light of how they were portrayed in later decades. 
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 All of this earlier debate vanished overnight in the aftermath of Cornwallis' 
victory, and the arrival in the metropole of news regarding the 1792 Treaty of 
Seringapatam. Cornwallis immediately became a natiol hero, receiving the thanks of 
the East India Company, an annuity of £5000, promotion to the peerage, the Freedom of 
the City of London, enthusiastic public receptions, and the composition of songs and 
paintings in his honor.101 The House of Commons voted on 19 December 1792 to offer its 
official congratulations to Cornwallis, the resolution stating: "That the thanks of this 
House be given to the most Noble Charles Marquis Cornwallis, Knight of the most Noble 
Order of the Garter, for his able, gallant, and meritorious conduct during the late war in 
India, by which an honourable and advantageous peace h s been obtained."102 It is 
perhaps noteworthy that the Commons felt compelled to add that the war had resulted in 
an "honorable peace", which remained in dispute by certain members of the Opposition. 
Philip Francis spoke on the proposed resolution, and was effusive in his praise for 
Cornwallis, but Francis indicated his continued disapproval for the treaty itself, which he 
thought "inconsistent with the principles of the war." Francis also condemned the 
acquisition of further territory for the Company, which he did not feel was consistent 
with the original stated goals of the war.103 His objections were brushed aside, and the 
vote of thanks passed without a division, indicating overwhelming approval. This 
exchange demonstrated how noted Opposition figures lik  Francis were forced to tiptoe 
around the subject of the war, as Francis carefully stated that he supported Cornwallis but 
                                                
101 Peter Marshall. “Cornwallis Triumphant: War in India and the British Public in the Late Eighteenth 
Century” in War, Strategy, and International Politics. Lawrence Freeman, Paul Hayes, and Robert O’Neill 
(ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 




didn't feel that the peace concluded was a just one. Cornwallis himself was untouchably 
popular, leaving critics of the Company in a very weak political position at this juncture. 
 The peace treaty itself was not quite so universally popular as Cornwallis himself, 
although a strong majority of the public gave their approval. Most of the debate 
surrounding the treaty questioned whether or not Cornwallis should have continued the 
war until he achieved the complete destruction of Tipu; hardly anyone outside of Francis 
and a few extremists felt that the treaty itself had been unjust. This shift in the locus of 
debate - no longer about the war itself, but about h w far it should have been prosecuted - 
indicated how successful the Company had been in persuading popular opinion onto its 
side. The Company's Indian wars were no longer considered beyond the pale of morality, 
and it was rather a question of how successful and profitable they could be.  
 The conservative London newspapers certainly had no issues with the peace 
settlement, with the Public Advertiser writing on how "the brilliant success of the gallant 
Cornwallis, has so completely dazzled and confused the false Prophets, that all is at 
present silence in their discomfited corps." The mention of false prophets was a swipe at 
the Whig Opposition, who were now ripe for mocking over their earlier criticism of the 
fighting: "Those who condemned the War last year, who said it could not be so speedily 
ended, and who at the same time urged the impolicy f annihilating Tippoo, will surely 
be unable to open their patriotic mouths against Lord Cornwallis – for he has, to indulge 
them, speedily ended the war, and he had not annihilated, but contented himself by 
completely crippling their friend."104 The Evening Mail reassured its readers that the 
expenses of the war would not be as large as imagined, due to contributions from the 
Marathas and the Nizam. Furthermore, the Ev ning Mail argued, the treaty concluded by 
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Cornwallis showed that the goal of the war was not the extirpation of Tipu, but the 
settlement of a safe and honorable peace.105 
 Histories of the military campaigns written by officers of the East India Company 
tended to share the same glowing outlook on the peace. Roderick Mackenzie provided a 
standard defense of the treaty in his account: "This glorious conclusion of the war was 
celebrated from the center to the utmost extremities of the British empire, with the most 
brilliant rejoicings; few indeed affected to disapprove of the treaty, and these were 
actuated by a desire of seeing the house of Hyder totally extirpated."106 Mackenzie did 
not favor a harsher peace out of fear that this would upset the balance of power in 
southern India, and professed the opinion that Tipu was far too crippled to pose a threat 
to the Company for many years to come. Alexander Dirom felt compelled to provide a 
list of the treaty's benefits at the conclusion of his history, going so far as to state that 
although the war was not profitable financially, it resulted in very important strategic 
advantages in southern India. Foremost among these in his opinion was security, with no 
further apprehension of being disturbed by the restles  ambition of Tipu. Dirom 
ultimately concluded: 
Finally; this war has vindicated the honour of the nation; has given the additional 
possessions and security to the settlements in India wh ch they required; has 
effected the wished-for balance amongst the native powers on the Peninsula; has, 
beyond all former example, raised the character of the British arms in India; and 
has afforded an instance of good faith in alliance, and moderation in conquest, so 
eminent, as ought to constitute the English the arbiters of power, worthy of 
holding the sword and scales of justice in the East.107 
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Much like the other sources, Dirom believed that the war had demonstrated the good faith 
and honorable conduct of the Company's officers, bet symbolized in the person of 
Cornwallis. This reformed image of the Company was much more responsible than it had 
been in the past, and patrician military officers like Cornwallis could be trusted to rule 
over India without fear of moral corruption or other nabobery.  
 The Anglo-Indian community had a slightly different reaction, mixing exuberant 
joy over the defeat of Tipu with regret that Mysore had not been conquered completely. 
The Madras Courier contented itself for the moment with tallying up the benefits accrued 
from the peace settlement: "In the present instance, we have greatly triumphed... [our 
troops] have elevated the English name in India to the utmost height of glory, and 
directed by the wisdom, and cumulating the ardour, f their brave leader have dictated a 
peace to the enemy... which, in its consequences, will be productive of a vast influx of 
wealth to their country."108 The Anglo-Indian community of Calcutta heaped praise after 
praise on the figure of Cornwallis, asking rhetorically "how exalted that magnanimity 
which stopped short amidst victory, and spared the prostrate foe," before going on to vote 
for the placement of a statue in his honor at the heart of the city.109 A speech recorded in 
the Calcutta Gazette specifically compared the changes that had taken place in British 
rule over the previous three decades: 
Thus, in Place of the dark prospect that presented its lf seven years ago, we now 
behold our credit, restored our reputation in arms higher than in the days of 
Lawrence and of Clive, our alliance courted and our faith relied on. If we look to 
the internal state of Bengal, we find the contrast Still greater; on the one hand, a 
declining cultivation, a wretched people, destitute of property and of rights, 
groaning under the stripes and blows of a merciless extortioner; on the other, a 
smiling country, a peasantry happy in the secure possession of their cottage and 
                                                
108 Madras Courier (Madras, India) 8 March 1792, Issue 335 
109 Calcutta Gazette (Calcutta, India) 7 November 1793, Issue 506 
236 
 
their field, joyfully rendering to a limited authority, the price of protection and 
safety.110 
 
The speaker contrasted the earlier period of the nabobs against the new administration of 
Cornwallis. Plundering of wealth and exploitation of the Indian populace had been 
replaced by responsible and proper governance. The figure of Cornwallis was deployed 
as an antidote to the earlier corruption in the Company's governance, putting an end to 
the days of bribery and misrule. This new image of the East India Company was one 
which could be folded into British patriotism, allowing the public at home to celebrate 
the military successes of the Company's armies abroad.  
 This reimagining of the Company was especially effective when marshaled 
against the depredations of an Oriental "tyrant" like Tipu. When criticisms of the treaty 
did appear, they tended to reprimand Cornwallis for not finishing the deal and eliminating 
Tipu from power completely. One such report from the Anglo-Indian community 
indicated that "The termination of the war by treaty, is not so popular a measure in India 
as might be expected; but on no other ground than tis, that Tippoo’s perfidious policy, 
and his enormous cruelty to our countrymen, have not been sufficiently punished."111 The 
General Evening Post imilarly reported that Cornwallis' terms of peace did not please all 
of the London politicians, at least in part for thesame reasons: "They think, or affect to 
think, that his Lordship ought not to have made any peace, before he had exterminated 
the tyrant, and got possession of all his dominions, forgetting the infinite difficulties 
under which the war has been carried on, and the inordi ate expence it has cost the 
Company."112  
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 Genuine criticisms of the peace, along the earlier lin s of it being a naked and 
immoral grab for territorial gain, were few and farbetween. Only disaffected individuals 
like Philip Francis and a few staunchly Opposition newspapers were willing to object to 
what was increasingly seen as a patriotic victory f the entire nation to share. Even the 
Morning Chronicle, very much an anti-ministry and anti-Company press, limited itself to 
scoffing at the claims that these new territories would reduce the expenses paid on the 
Company's military: "We have had many promises of reductions of establishments and 
patronage, but unfortunately none of them have been y t fulfilled."113 The popularity of 
the victory over Tipu, and especially of Cornwallis h mself, rendered effective criticism 
all but impossible. The political opposition had been completely hamstrung, and their 
earlier arguments against the Third Mysore War were engulfed under a surge of popular 
patriotic sentiment. Similarly, in the aftermath of Cornwallis' victory, no more satirical 
prints would appear regarding either Tipu Sultan or the Third Mysore War. The 
Company's military triumph came as a crushing blow t  the plebian strands of protest that 
had been uttering the old refrains about the dangers of moral corruption and Oriental 
luxury undermining the British nation. The satirists had evidently moved on to other 
targets, leaving the Company and its apologists the uncontested masters of this particular 
public discourse. With the passage of time, this period of debate would be forgotten 
entirely, and the Company's interpretation of events, the belief that the Third Mysore War 
had been a defensive war fought to stop the depredations of Tippoo the Tyrant, 
established itself as the historical memory of thisperiod in the British popular 
imagination.  
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 Half a decade later in 1799, there was a complete disappearance of political 
debate surrounding the legality of the Fourth Mysore War. In stark contrast to the 
parliamentary and popular furor that the previous conflict attracted, the final conflict 
against Tipu prompted almost no debate whatsoever, largely due to the presence of the 
Sultan's French "alliance".114 News of the war was discussed in the House of Commns, 
although the fierce debates of the early 1790s had now been replaced by votes of 
congratulations and thanks for the Company. In the session of 24 September 1799, Mr. 
Shaw Lefevre rose to express his gratitude for the "gallant exploits and illustrious 
achievements of our able officers and their brave men" over the inveterate and 
irreconcilable foe of Tipu Sultan. Lefevre made what w s now a common claim, 
accepting that the East India Company was interchange ble with and represented the 
British nation. However, even though there was no debate over the final conflict in 
Parliament, Dundas still went out of his way to emphasize that the war was strictly 
reactionary in nature, insisting that it was just and defensive as well as brilliant and 
successful.115 While the military success of the conflict was notin doubt, the argument 
that the war had been defensive in nature strained credibility to the breaking point. 
Nevertheless, this was an important aspect of Tipu's s pposedly despotic nature, and how 
it factored into changing notions of empire; Britons needed to see themselves as the 
defenders of liberty, even while amassing vast territories overseas. By claiming that all of 
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its wars were defensive in nature, and designed to protect India from the whims of mad 
tyrants like Tipu, the Company was able to achieve this goal.116  
 Unlike the widespread usage of satirical cartoons during the Third Mysore War, 
the final war against Tipu conducted by Lord Wellesley would only see the publication of 
a single confusing caricature of Dundas. Published by W. Hixon and entitled "Low 
Comedians Amusing the Wise Men of the East!!", the print depicts Dundas in Scottish 
costume dancing a jig in front of William Pitt [Figure 7].117 The image presents William 
Pitt seated next to Dundas, who is dressed in Scottish Highlands attire and dances a fling. 
Behind them are rows of amused Directors of the East India Company; the outline of the 
East India House can be seen in the background, however the actual pediment above the 
building (which depicted a man standing protectively above a woman with an infant) has 
been replaced by a man making a murderous attack on a prostrate woman. A sign on the 
building indicates that this scene was in reaction to the "Death of Tippoo". Hixon's print 
attempted to tap into the earlier strands of protest against the Company, suggesting 
unwarranted glee from the Directors at the death of Tipu and rapaciousness on the part of 
the Company servants. It does not appear to have been a successful print, however, 
appearing only once and spawning no imitators. The message itself was confusing, with 
its anti-Scottish imagery hearkening back to earlier decades, and the print found little 
resonance with the wider public when set against the context of Britain's wars with 
revolutionary France.  
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 The disappearance of satirical cartoons and prints mocking the Company during 
the Fourth Mysore War was therefore an indication that public opinion on the subject was 
shifting, reflecting the same changes observed in the newspapers and other print media. 
The anti-Company side of the debate was rapidly disappearing, in both elite circles and 
popular print culture. Although there were still a tiny few voices criticizing the Company, 
and protesting over the death of Tipu, this was no lo ger a mainstream opinion as it had 
been during the previous conflict. Instead, the depiction of the Mysore Wars in the visual 
arts had shifted away from satirical cartoons and towards formal history paintings that 
celebrated the military exploits of the Company's soldiers, incorporating the subject 
under the larger tent of the British nation.118 This movement towards triumphant artwork 
demonstrated how the soldiers and administrators that made up the East India Company 
were increasingly embraced by the wider British public, seen no longer as nabobs but as 
defenders of the national character.  
By the end of the Fourth Mysore War in 1799, the earlier negative representations 
of the East India Company had largely faded from view. The runaway military successes 
enjoyed during the 1790s made the British public muh more willing to support imperial 
projects overseas, especially when directed against supposedly despotic figures like Tipu. 
The almost complete disappearance of any British support for Mysore during the final 
conflict against Tipu was also due to the increasing association of the Sultan together 
with the cause of revolutionary France. Tipu was charged with entering into an offensive 
and defensive alliance with the French, against whom the British had been at war for 
                                                
118 These battle scenes celebrating the Fourth Mysore War's conquests are considered in more detail in 
Chapter 5.  
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several years as part of the conflict generated by the French Revolution. Tipu’s 
connection to the French was the final component in the degradation of his own image 
and the redemption of the East India Company as perceived by the British public. This is 



























 One final connection that contributed to Tipu's villainous reputation in the British 
popular imagination was his association with the Frnch. Britain and France had been 
colonial rivals throughout the eighteenth century, and their long-running series of wars 
played an important role in the creation of a British national identity during this same 
period.1 Tipu's connection to the French helped to cement his status as an inveterate foe 
of the British nation, a figure who could never be trusted due to his ties with Britain's 
longtime enemy. Tipu had been allied with France during the Second Mysore War (1780-
84), and worked closely together with French generals and admirals stationed in India, 
even if their partnership often suffered from poor c mmunication. One of the reasons 
why Cornwallis had been inclined to fight another war ith Tipu in 1790 was due to the 
inability of France to provide any assistance, with Paris wrapped up in its own 
revolutionary crisis at the time. Without French military aid, the Third Mysore War 
(1790-92) had been a striking success for the British East India Company.  
 This association with France became even more dangerous in the late 1790s, as 
Tipu was believed to be in league with the French revolutionaries as part of a plot to 
overthrow the Company's holdings in India. Travelers to Mysore carried back rumors 
telling how Tipu had founded a Jacobin club in Seringapatam, and placed a liberty cap 
upon his head.2 The British press mockingly referred to the Sultan as "Citizen Tippoo", 
                                                
1 Linda Colley. Britons: Forging the Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) 
2 Proceedings of a Jacobin Club formed at Seringapatam, by the French Soldiers in the Corps commanded 
by M. Dompard (173-95) Quoted in Official Documents, Relative to the Negotiations Carried on by Tippoo 
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but the situation still held very real fears for the Company. If Tipu had in fact concluded a 
new alliance with revolutionary France, and if French soldiers could somehow find a way 
to land in India, then the British Company had reason to be afraid. This formed the 
justification for Governor General Richard Wellesley's invasion of Mysore that began the 
Fourth Mysore War in 1799. Wellesley argued that Tipu had entered into an "offensive 
and defensive alliance" with the French, in violation of the treaty which had ended the 
previous conflict, and therefore served as a rationle for a new period of conquest.  
 The reality of the situation was more complex than the British public was led to 
believe. Tipu had indeed sought assistance from the French after his defeat in the Third 
Mysore War, but the French colonial government was unable to provide any military aid 
of substance. Tipu's ambassadors broke off the discussions with the understanding that 
they had failed to reach a new agreement. However, in the process of negotiation with the 
French, Tipu's secret plans were publicly announced in a French proclamation calling for 
volunteers to serve in the Sultan's armies. This foolish decision left Tipu with no alliance 
of consequence with France, while simultaneously providing the British with ample cause 
to renew their struggle against Mysore. This association between Tipu and revolutionary 
France made it even easier for the British public to accept the claim that the East India 
Company was representing the interests of the British nation overseas, fighting against an 
Oriental despot who was also in league with Britain's hated enemy. Based on the 
misleading claim that Tipu had an alliance with France, Wellesley was able to prosecute 
a pre-emptive invasion of Mysore with virtually no criticism from the British public, in 
stark contrast to the debate surrounding the previous Mysore Wars of the 1780s and early 
                                                                                                                                      
Sultaun, with the French Nation and Other Foreign States, for Purposes Hostile to the British Nation. 
(Calcutta: Printed at the Honorable Company's Press, 1799): 187-88 
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1790s. Wellesley carefully crafted his correspondences with the Sultan, intending them 
for open publication at a later date, in such a wayas to shift the blame for the conflict 
onto Tipu, insisting that his own invasion was a defensive and just act. Due to the quick 
and easy victory over Mysore, and Tipu's connection with revolutionary France, the 
British populace accepted Wellesley's interpretation of events without question.  
 In the British metropole, there was little anxiety in 1798 and 1799 about the threat 
posed by Tipu to the safety of the Company's possession  in India. That fear was directed 
instead to the potential combination of Tipu together with the French, who inspired 
public panic far out of proportion to the actual danger that they posed to British India. 
Tipu alone no longer inspired the same dread as he had at an earlier date, which was 
reflected in the near total disappearance of prisoner accounts and captive stories during 
the Fourth Mysore War. News of Wellesley's invasion came as a surprise to the British 
public when it arrived in the summer of 1799, but almost before there could be any 
popular unease about the situation in India, news arrived a few weeks later of the 
Company's victory and Tipu's defeat. The short and victorious war led to a festive public 
mood, with widespread celebration over the fall of Mysore and the death of Tipu Sultan. 
This was best embodied in the form of "The Storming of Seringapatam", a series of 
popular paintings and theatre productions designed to capture the moment of victory over 
the Sultan. These public spectacles were unabashedly militaristic and nationalistic, 
bringing the Company and its soldiers into the welcoming embrace of British patriotism. 
Far from serving as a symbol of moral unease, or potentially polluting the British 
metropole, the Company had instead become a pillar of the nation, its military exploits 
serving as an occasion to rally around the flag and si g Rule Britannia.  
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 Ultimately, Tipu's connection to the French was responsible for bringing about his 
final defeat and death. The Fourth Mysore War of 1799 also provided the breaking point 
at which alternate, competing viewpoints of Tipu Sultan, and more broadly the East India 
Company's role in empire building, were pushed aside from the mainstream of public 
opinion. Through Tipu's association with France, even though the connection was often 
more imagined than real, the Sultan was effectively d politicized, a figure forced outside 
the realm of British politics. By the year 1800, it was no longer acceptable for a political 
party to defend the actions of Tipu, or to criticize the morality of the Company's actions, 
as had very much been the case just a decade earlier. It was the same story in British 
popular print media as well, with the earlier satires and mockery of the Company's 
servants disappearing from view, to be replaced with the jingoistic celebration of events 
like the "Storming of Seringapatam". After the Fourth Mysore War, the historical 
memory of Tipu Sultan and the Mysore Wars had effectiv ly been fixed and ceased to 
change further. Tipu became remembered by the British as a tyrannical Oriental despot in 
league with the French, and the Mysore Wars as a jutified stance against oppression. 
Tipu's association with France was the final key comp nent in understanding this shift in 
popular opinion over the last two decades of the eight enth century.  
Tipu's "Alliance" with France 
 The connection between Tipu Sultan and the nation of France in the British 
popular imagination dated back to Tipu's earliest appe rance in the Second Mysore War 
(1780-84). As part of the worldwide conflict generat d by the American Revolution, 
France had earlier declared war on Britain, bringing France's remaining small colonial 
holdings in India into the war as well. It was the British Company's invasion of the 
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French port of Mahé in 1779, a location which Haider Ali had pledged to protect, which 
brought Mysore into the conflict in the first place.3 Tipu and his father Haider worked 
together with the French in a true military alliance for the rest of the Second Mysore War. 
There were two French commanders known as Lally and Pimoran advising Haider and 
Tipu at the Battle of Pollilur in 1780.4 The French Admiral Suffrein had infamously 
delivered captured British sailors from the ship Hannibal over to Tipu, which became 
part of the controversy surrounding the prisoners during and after the war.5 Tipu's forces 
were also joined by his French allies in some of the key events of the conflict, including 
the siege of Mangalore in 1783.  
 This partnership with France was fraught with its own problems, however, and the 
French General Bussy and Tipu were both thoroughly disillusioned with one another by 
the end of the war for failing to support one another properly.6 When the French 
government at home signed the Treaty of Paris in 1783, the French soldiers in India were 
forced to cease their efforts as well, leaving Tipu's Mysore in an uncomfortable position. 
His allies had deserted him at a crucial moment in the war, and this was a major factor in 
the Company's ability to secure a treaty that preserv d the status quo antebellum despite 
its poor combat record. Tipu was so angry with the French for having forsaken him that 
he threatened to march an army to Pondicherry, the larg st and most important French 
establishment in India.7 
                                                
3 H.H. Dodwell. The Cambridge History of India, Vol. 5: British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1963, 1929) Chapter 15, “The Carnatic 1761-84” p. 273-92. See Chapter 1.  
4 Officer of Colonel Baillie’s Detachment [William Thomson]. Memoirs of the Late War in Asia. (London: 
Sold by J. Sewell, 1788, 1789): 162 
5 Captain Innes Munro. A Narrative of the Military Operations of the Coromandel Coast (London: Printed 
for the author by T. Bensley, 1789): 277-78 
6 Mohibbul Hasan, "The French in the Second Anglo-Mysore War" in Confronting Colonialism: Resistance 
and Modernization under Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan. Irfan Habib (ed.) (London: Anthem, 2002): 44-45 
7 Anonymous author [1798?] Notes on Tipu Sultan (p. 281-470) IOR/H/609 p. 289 
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 Tipu Sultan was widely portrayed in the British popular press as a pawn of the 
French, who secretly pulled the strings of Indian tyrants like Tipu and encouraged the 
Sultan's antipathy towards the British Company. Writing in the years following the 
Second Mysore War, William Thomson described how the coalition of Indian powers 
that the Company faced during the conflict had been " ncouraged by emissaries from 
France", which had then been confirmed through "military succours from the French 
islands of Mauritius and Bourbon." This association with France had been "a source of 
great danger and alarm to our government in Asia", and had led to many of the sufferings 
of the British prisoners taken during the war.8 A letter written from an anonymous officer 
stationed in Madras and published in the Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser discussed 
how the French continued to encourage Tipu, in "underhand" fashion, to take advantage 
of the Company's internal disputes by renewing the war, which in the worst case would 
mean "Great Britain may be adieu to her power in the East."9 From this perspective, Tipu 
was part of a wider French plot to weaken the British Company and bring it to eventual 
ruin through endless warring. 
 The Morning Post and Daily Advertiser wrote in 1785 that popular rumor had 
Tipu "assisted with ships and military stores in abundance from the several ports of 
France", while other sources simply stated that Tipu was "surrounded" by the agents of 
France.10 According to the Morning Herald and Daily Advertiser, Tipu Sultan had not 
only "proved himself a restless, treacherous, inhuman tyrant", but he was also "entirely 
                                                
8 Officer of Colonel Baillie’s Detachment [William Thomson]. Memoirs of the Late War in Asia. (1789): 1-
2 
9 Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London, England) 10 May 1784, Issue 17288 
10 Morning Post and Daily Advertiser (London, England) 17 October 1785, Issue 3965; General Evening 
Post (London, England) 12 February 1784, Issue 7796 
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influenced by French politics", with nearly 900 French soldiers entered into his service.11 
This last source from 1784 was particularly noteworthy, as it was one of the first times 
that Tipu was referred to as a "tyrant" in the British popular press. Tyranny was explicitly 
connected in this case to the influence of French politics upon Tipu, suggesting that their 
association together was part of the reason for the negative reputation that grew up 
around Tipu. Along with the treatment of the captured British prisoners during the 
Second Mysore War, Tipu's association with France played a major role in shaping the 
villainous role credited to him in the British popular imagination.  
 When the Travancore controversy broke out at the start of the Third Mysore War 
in 1789-90, most British commentators both in India and in the metropole argued that it 
was a particularly opportune moment to renew the struggle against Tipu, due to the lack 
of assistance that France could provide.12 The Daily Advertiser of Kingston, Jamaica 
wrote on how Tipu "unsupported as he must be by France, or any European State, will 
hardly hazard a rupture with the British Power in India."13 The lack of an alliance with 
France was seen as the rationale for why Tipu would refuse to take further aggressive 
action against Travancore. This colonial newspaper reflected contemporary popular 
opinion in the London press, and was noteworthy in its own right for displaying the 
public interest in Tipu throughout the wider British Empire.  
 Tipu had in fact requested assistance from the local French colonial government, 
only to be turned away. The French would instead observe strict neutrality during the 
                                                
11 Morning Herald and Daily Advertiser (London, England) 21 January 1784, Issue 1009 
12 See Ibrahim Kunju, "Relations Between Travancore and Mysore in the 18th Century" in Confronting 
Colonialism: Resistance and Modernization under Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan. Irfan Habib (ed.) (London: 
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13 Daily Advertiser (Kingston, Jamaica) 20 July 1790, Issue 172 
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Third Mysore War of 1790-92.14 This meant that it was an auspicious time to face Tipu
on the field of battle, according to the English Chronicle: "Tippoo Saib, and his father 
Hyder Ally, owed all of their success last war to the assistance of the French forces. At 
present Tippoo has no such aid, and therefore is not deemed to be an enemy of any 
importance."15 Although this London newspaper underestimated the military prowess of 
Tipu, it pointed to the connection that still existed between Tipu and the French in the 
British popular imagination. Even though France posses ed little territory and few 
soldiers in India, the country remained a dire threat in the minds of the British public, 
particularly when combined together with the anxieties surrounding "Tippoo the Tyrant." 
 The Public Advertiser made this connection between Tipu and the French even
more explicit when commenting on the war: "The power of the House of Bourbon will 
be... considerable curtailed; for in the East we have a right to consider Tippoo Saib as a 
part of that power, and a part that has given us much trouble and alarm – now is the time, 
unshackled by any other objects to destroy him, and prevent, in future wars with France 
or Spain, the possibility of an Eastern diversion in their favor."16 This source viewed Tipu 
as little more than a client state of the French monarchy, which was a factually dubious 
claim, but pointed nonetheless to this continued association of Tipu together with the 
French. Tipu alone was much less frightening than when he was faced in combination 
with the French. The same Public Advertiser had earlier written: "We have now an 
opportunity that never presented itself before, of ensuring a permanent peace, in the 
destruction of Tippoo Saib; for, unaided by France, he never can stand against the 
strength of the British interest in India. The opportunity ought not, and we believe will 
                                                
14 Anonymous author [1798?] Notes on Tipu Sultan (p. 281-470) IOR/H/609 p. 465 
15 English Chronicle or Universal Evening Post (London, England) 24 July 1790, Issue 1692 
16 Public Advertiser (London, England) 16 November 1790, Issue 17586 
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not, be lost."17 For these authors, Tipu's association with France was very much a part of 
the negative reputation that had been built up around the Sultan. Tipu was not only an 
Oriental despot and a religious bigot, he was also  worn enemy of the British nation, his 
implacable hatred best demonstrated by the long-standing connection to France. 
Although these ties to France often existed more in the imagination of the British public 
than in reality, they played an important role in public perceptions of the Sultan.   
 Popular interest in Tipu's possible alliance with France took on new meaning in 
the wake of France's own revolutionary turmoil. Britain had joined in the wider European 
war against the French revolutionaries in 1793, which would continue with only a brief 
interlude of peace until 1815. The potential for an alliance between revolutionary France 
and Tipu Sultan's Mysore summoned up all sorts of fears in the British imagination that 
were wildly out of proportion to the actual events taking place in India. Tipu's misguided 
attempts to gain the support of France would ultimately lead to his doom, providing the 
justification for the Fourth Mysore War of 1799.  
 The years leading up to this final war continued to indicate ongoing British 
anxieties about a connection between Tipu and the French. The Oracle and Public 
Advertiser wrote in 1794 how Tipu continued to possess a more formidable military force 
than ever, despite the diminution of his territory, as the result of an "inundation" of 
French emigrants. In its view, this potential menace therefore justified the continuation of 
the Company's large military expenses, which had often been criticized by the political 
opposition.18 These fears were exaggerated, and Tipu's military h d been significantly 
reduced during these years as a result of his lost territory and revenue, although the 
                                                
17 Public Advertiser (London, England) 26 July 1790, Issue 17488 
18 Oracle and Public Advertiser (London, England) 5 March 1794, Issue 18636 
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Company did not know this at the time.19 Tipu Sultan did retain a number of Frenchmen 
as officers in his army, however, particularly as technical experts for use with artillery 
and fortification design.20 Newspaper accounts and military histories of the Mysore Wars 
frequently made mention of these French officers seving under Tipu. The presence of 
Frenchmen and other Europeans serving in Indian armies was a common practice in 
eighteenth century India, as Europeans living in the interior of the subcontinent 
frequently "went native" and adopted a self-fashioned Indian identity for themselves. 
This often included taking on Indian dress, learning I dian languages, and practicing 
Hindu or Islamic religious customs to take part in he court of Indian princes.21 
Frenchmen and other Europeans serving in Tipu's military forces were unexceptional in 
this regard, no different from the Nizam's court in Hyderabad, which also contained large 
numbers of French soldiers. The presence of French officers in Tipu's army was not 
sufficient pretext on its own as a motivation for war, but in the context of a possible 
military alliance with France, those individuals would appear much more threatening. 
 Despite the general hope that peace would prevail with Tipu, rumors of his 
possible military involvement with France continued to stir up great anxiety in Britain. E. 
Johnson's British Gazette wrote in 1796 that Tipu remained at peace but his friendship 
with the British was "without cordiality", and that he viewed the extension of British 
power and territory with sentiments of jealousy andpprehension.22 The general belief 
was that Tipu would like to gain revenge for his defeat in the previous war, but 
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practically speaking, all sides were well aware that he lacked the means to do so. Thus an 
uneasy peace reigned for the moment, one which could potentially be disturbed by the 
involvement of the French. Writing on this subject in 1796, a dispatch from Calcutta 
noted: "Should the Sultaun of Mysore have entertained any designs hostile to the English 
interest in India, it has probably arisen from the hope of deriving succours from the 
French; but the impractibility of this hope being realized... Tippoo cannot have the most 
distant intention of coming to a rupture, or giving offence to the English Government."23  
 The involvement of the French was the key component for this anonymous 
commentator; so long as there was no possibility of French involvement in India, Tipu 
would not provoke a conflict at this time with the Company. The Oracle and Public 
Advertiser agreed, stating that there was little probability Tipu would choose the current 
moment for hostile action. The French were "not now in a condition to give him the least 
assistance", whatever hopes they both might entertain for regaining their lost territorial 
possessions in India.24 Without the assistance of the French, there was little reason to 
suspect that Tipu could prevail in another war against the Company. By the late 1790s, 
Tipu alone no longer provided a threat to the British power in India; this helped to 
explain why so much of the focus shifted away from the earlier concern with British 
prisoners and concentrated instead upon the possibility of a French alliance.  
 Tipu had made earlier attempts to ink a formal treaty with the French, even going 
so far as to send an embassy to the court of Louis XVI during the spring and summer of 
1788. This was a very popular story in the British popular press, and was widely reported 
upon at the time. Newspapers enjoyed commenting upon the exotic spectacle presented 
                                                
23 East Indies. Calcutta, 28 September 28 1796 (no author given). Printed in the St. James’ Chronicle or the 
British Evening Post (London, England) 13 April 1797, Issue 6134 
24 Oracle and Public Advertiser (London, England) 18 April 1797, Issue 19600 
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by Mysorean ambassadors, such as this passage from the Bath Chronicle: "Tippoo has 
sent some very magnificent presents to the court of France; amongst them is a bedstead 
of solid gold, in which, when ambition take its rest, it may enjoy a splendid repose!"25 
Most observers viewed the embassy as a prelude to further hostile action against the 
British; the Bath Chronicle reported that the French would furnish Tipu with 5000 
European soldiers, while the Whitehall Evening Post saw the stirrings of a larger plot set 
in motion: "The restless ambition of that Indian Chief, and his rooted hatred to the 
English nation, excite him to mediate their destruction and expulsion from the Peninsula 
of India... He therefore sends this Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary, in all the pompous style of Eastern magnificence and splendor, to concert 
measures with the French Cabinet for carrying his horrid plan into execution!"26 The 
Whitehall Evening Post would go on to invent a conversation between the French king 
and Tipu, leaving instructions to attack the Company’s possessions when Britain showed 
weakness. Once again, Tipu was portrayed as a close French ally, and therefore 
inherently hostile to the British Company. While Tipu's delegation ultimately failed to 
achieve anything of significance, due to the French monarchy's growing preoccupation 
with its own revolutionary crisis, the continuing print coverage of the embassy 
demonstrated the genuine interest in news of Tipu Sultan amongst the British public, and 
their preoccupation with his connection to France. Tipu's next attempt to send an 
embassy to the French would have much more lasting co sequences.  
 After suffering major military and territorial losses in the Third Mysore War, Tipu 
Sultan faced an uncertain future, and searched for the means to restore his kingdom to its 
                                                
25 Bath Chronicle (Bath, England) 17 April 1788, Issue 1429 Emphasis in the original. 
26 Whitehall Evening Post (London, England) 24 April 1788, Issue 6382 
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former strength. One of Tipu's attempted solutions in the late 1790s was to renew his 
desire for a closer alliance with the French, in the hopes that they would offset his own 
setbacks and balance the growing power of the British Company. Through a series of 
misunderstandings and political blunders, however, Tipu's purported alliance with France 
would fail to provide him with any substantial assistance, while simultaneously creating 
the justification for a pre-emptive war of aggression on the part of the Company. With the 
benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see that Tipu's pursuit of the French was a disastrous 
miscalculation which brought about his ruin and ultimate death. Tipu was continuously 
misled by French adventurers at his court into believing that the French had vastly more 
military power available in India than actually existed. Tipu appears to have believed 
these fabrications because he fervently wanted themo be true, rejecting the advice of his 
councilors who cautioned that closer ties with France would almost certainly draw the 
attention of the British Company. Tipu's burning desir  to overturn the setbacks of the 
previous war led him into a very serious error in judgment, which was ultimately 
responsible for his final military defeat and death.27  
 Tipu was encouraged to pursue these plans for an alli ce by a French adventurer 
named Ripaud, who arrived at the court of Seringapatam in 1797. Ripaud was an 
individual with an unsavory background who Tipu's advisers correctly deduced to be a 
fraud. But he managed to convince the Sultan that he was an envoy from the French 
colony of Mauritius, leading Tipu on with wild claims that a French army would soon 
arrive to sweep the British out of India. Ripaud an other French adventurers like him 
were unintentionally playing the role of agent provocateurs, encouraging native rulers 
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Ali. Tipu Sultan: A Study in Diplomacy and Confrontation (Mysore: Geetha Book House, 1982): 327-32 
255 
 
like Tipu to entertain designs against the British with promises of French support which 
were impossible in practice.28 Against the wishes of the rest of his court, Tipu agreed to 
move forward with plans for an alliance with the Frnch, and began preparing an 
embassy to travel to Mauritius. Tipu's desire for revenge and desperate search for allies 
against the British Company appear to have overridden more sensible judgment and led 
him into this poor decision. The contemporary India historian Mir Hussain Kirmani 
wrote years later about how sometimes Tipu would act rashly and without thought, 
refusing to listen even to his most faithful servants, and cited the interactions with Ripaud 
as one such example of poor judgment.29 
 Tipu drew up a proposed treaty of alliance with France in April 1797, which is 
instructive in outlining the goals that he hoped to achieve through this agreement. 
Contained within the papers captured at Seringapatam nd published by the Company 
after the war, five separate articles were listed dtailing how the French would assist in 
removing the British from India. After two preliminary articles of friendship, Tipu asked 
in the third article for 10,000 French soldiers and 30,000 French sepoys, to be 
provisioned for and commanded by Tipu's officers. The fourth article detailed how the 
Company possessions were to be divided; Tipu wanted half of the British territories, 
taking Goa for himself and leaving Bombay and Madras to the French. The fifth article 
stipulated that both alliances partners would also declare war on any native princes that 
sided with the British Company.30 This unsigned treaty provided an indication of the 
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quantity of forces Tipu expected to receive, as well as hinting at his lingering 
dissatisfaction with the French from earlier wars, with Tipu desiring command over the 
French soldiers himself. The planned division of Company territory was perhaps more of 
a pleasant fantasy than intended as serious diplomatic policy.  
 Also included in the papers captured in Seringapatam were Tipu's instructions to 
his ambassadors - Mirza Bakir, Mir Yousuf Ali, Mir Ghulam Ali, Hussun Ali, and 
Mohummed Ibrahim - who were sent to Mauritius in 1797 to negotiate the terms of this 
alliance with France. Tipu made it clear that the amb ssadors were to sound out the 
French and determine their level of interest, while making sure to avoid committing Tipu 
to anything unless the French were serious about prviding substantial military aid. As 
Tipu put it, "Having communicated to them [the French] your arrival and heard what they 
have to say, you will tell them, that they must, by no means pay you the compliment of 
going themselves... nor shew open marks of friendship towards the Khoodadaud Sirkar 
[Mysore], nor outwardly shew you any attention, in order that your mission may not 
become public."31 The secrecy of the mission was therefore imperative, in order to avoid 
arousing the suspicions of the British Company.  
 However, Comte Malartic, the French governor of Mauritius, compromised the 
visit of the ambassadors by ignoring any attempt at their concealment. According to 
Hussun Ali, the ambassadors requested that Malartic send for them clandestinely, so that 
their mission would be known to no one; instead, Malartic insisted on sending half a 
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dozen officials to their ship and receiving them with full pomp and circumstance.32 As 
Mohummed Ibrahim described, "Afterwards a boat highly ornamented came off with 
several Sirdars to receive us, and they having placed us in it and brought us on shore, 500 
guns were fired off; and two lines of European troops being formed, and a compliment 
being paid with the colours, we were conducted with the greatest ceremony and respect to 
the house of General Malartic."33 So much for secrecy! 
 The ambassadors were further disappointed to realize that the promised French 
force of soldiers was nothing more than a mirage. Malartic informed Mohummed Ibrahim 
in person that Ripaud had brought them there on a false representation to the Sultan, and 
that at present they had no such forces. Not wanting to send the ambassadors away 
empty-handed, Malartic instead "caused proclamation to be made in the city, by beat of 
drum, and sent letters to the neighboring Island, iviting those to come forward, who 
were desirous of entering into the service of your Highness," essentially calling for 
volunteers who wanted to join the service of Tipu.34 At some point in the course of the 
negotiations, the purpose of the embassy had shifted from bringing back thousands of 
already-present French soldiers to raising untrained recruits from the tiny handful of 
Europeans present on the island. To continue the tragic-comic farce that the embassy had 
become, Ibrahim reported that the ambassadors couldn’t even afford to take on many of 
these individuals, because they had not been planning on raising recruits and had no 
instructions on what monthly pay to offer, or enlistment bonus money to give them.35 The 
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envoys were at a loss on what course of action to take, finding the situation so far 
changed from what they had been led to believe before setting out.  
 The ambassadors submitted six proposals to Malartic before leaving, with only 
the first two being of importance.36 The first proposal consisted of an agreement to send
two of Tipu's envoys on to Paris to continue the negotiations, which was approved. The 
second proposition asked, "That we should enter into a treaty, that their standard [France] 
and that of the Khoodadaud Sirkar [Mysore] should be united." However, Malartic 
responded that he could not agree to this, as he could n t approve such a deal without 
approval from the home government in France.37 Tipu and his ambassadors therefore 
believed that they did not have an alliance with the French, at least not until receiving a 
response of some kind from Paris. In fact, Tipu wrote t  the Directory in France in July 
1798 specifically requesting an alliance and 10,000 to 15,000 French soldiers, a sign that 
he also did not feel himself to be in league with the French.38 Tipu deputized one of his 
ambassadors in the same letter to travel to France d negotiate the terms of this alliance, 
another indication that he was still searching for the promised military assistance. In other 
words, there was no military alliance between France and Mysore, and Tipu continued to 
attempt to persuade the French government in Paris to enter into a formal agreement of 
some kind. However, the inconclusive proposal discus ed by Tipu's ambassadors in 
Mauritius would be greatly misunderstood by the British Company.  
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 Governor Malartic was the one most responsible for this confusion. Thinking to 
help in raising recruits, Malartic issued a public proclamation calling for the citizens of 
Mauritius to join Tipu's forces. As this was the crucial document responsible for 
instigating the Fourth Mysore War, it is worth quoting in full below: 
Citizens, 
 
Having for several years known your zeal and your attachment to the interests and 
to the glory of our Republic, we are very anxious, and we feel it a duty to make 
you acquainted with all the propositions which have be n made to us by Tippoo 
Sultaun, through two ambassadors which he has dispatched to us.  
 
This prince has written particular letters to the Colonial Assembly; to all the 
generals employed under this government; and has addressed to us a packet for 
the Executive Directory.  
 
1. He desires to form an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and 
proposes to maintain at his charge, as long as the war shall last in India, the troops 
which may be sent to him. 
 
2. He promises to furnish every necessary for carrying on the war, wine and 
brandy excepted, with which he is wholly unprovided. 
 
3. He declares that he has made every preparation to receive the succors which 
may be sent to him, and on the arrival of the troops, the commanders and the 
officers will find every thing necessary for making a war, to which the Europeans 
are but little accustomed.   
 
4. In a word he only waits the moment when the French shall come to his 
assistance, to declare war against the English, whom he ardently desires to expel 
from India.  
 
As it is impossible for us to reduce the number of soldiers of the 107th and 108th 
regiments, and of the regular guard of Port Fraternite, on account of the succors 
which we have furnished to our allies the Dutch; we invite the citizens, who may 
be disposed to enter as volunteers, to enroll themselve  in their respective 
municipalities, and to serve under the banner of Tippoo. 
 
This prince desires also to be assisted by the free citiz ns of colour, we therefore 
invite all such who are willing to serve under his flag, to enroll themselves. 
 
We can assure all the citizens who shall enroll themselves, that Tippoo will allow 
them an advantageous rate of pay, the terms of which will be fixed with his 
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ambassadors, who will further engage in the name of their sovereign, that all 
Frenchmen who shall enter into his armies, shall never be detained after they shall 
have expressed a wish to return to their own country.  
 




The text of the Malartic Proclamation rather foolishly revealed all of the aims that Tipu's 
embassy intended to conceal. Tipu had sought to feel out the French and only take the 
fateful step of allying with them if Ripaud's promise of tens of thousands of soliders 
proved to be true. Instead, Tipu would receive only a tiny handful of raw recruits, only a 
few score in total, still without any concrete promises of assistance from France, while 
also simultaneously having the entire negotiations revealed publicly. Malartic's 
Proclamation was not factually incorrect, as it carefully stated that Tipu "desired to form 
an offensive and defensive alliance with the French," rather than stating that he actually 
had signed such an agreement. Most observers were not interested in engaging at that 
level of sophistry, however, and simply read the document as a statement of joint war 
against the British Company. As for stating openly the fourth point, that Tipu "only waits 
the moment when the French shall come to his assistnce, to declare war against the 
English," it is difficult to understand what Malartic was hoping to achieve. He may have 
thought that this would help spur on the recruiting process and make Tipu's offer more 
appealing to patriotic Frenchmen, but it appears to have been a very poor decision of 
statecraft. 
 Fewer than one hundred French volunteers returned to Mysore with the 
ambassadors, a far cry from the thousands that had been promised.40 Tipu continued to 
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correspond with the French colonial administrators at Mauritius, hoping that there had 
been some mistake and that more French soldiers would appear, but to no avail. Admiral 
Sercey, the commander of French naval forces in the Indian Sea, wrote several times to 
Tipu apologizing for his inability to do anything: "Prince Tippoo, your Ambassadors 
have exerted great zeal for your service, but unfortunately we were not at liberty to divert 
to any other object, the means confided to us for the protection of our own colony…”41 In 
his correspondences, Sercey appeared embarrassed at th  lack of French soldiers 
available for use in India, especially in the wake of Malartic's grandiose proclamation. 
With only a trivial number of French recruits arriving from Mauritius in 1798, Tipu was 
forced to continue to wait for word of a true alliance from the French government in Paris, 
and the Sultan made no plans for military action against the British.  
 Tipu even went so far as to adopt the ideological trappings of the French 
revolutionaries in a bid to win foreign support: planting a liberty tree, wearing a cap of 
equality, and in a bizarre spectacle, forming a Jacobin club in Seringapatam. Members 
were asked to swear the following oath: "Citizens, do you swear hatred to all Kings, 
except Tippoo Sultaun the Victorious, the Ally of the French Republic. War against 
Tyrants; and Love to our Country, and that of citizen Tippoo. All exclaimed unanimously, 
Yes, we swear to live free, or die."42 The strange spectacle of "Citizen Tippoo", an 
Islamic monarch pledged to the radicalism of the Frnch Revolution, can only have 
aroused further anxiety and consternation on the part of the British Company. This 
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represented the great remaining fear of Tipu that still existed in the British imagination, a 
figure combining together the tyranny of Oriental despotism with the tyranny of Jacobin 
mob rule. Britons in the metropole were gripped with a terror of Tipu and his potential 
alliance with the French which was blown all out of proportion to the actual danger that 
Tipu posed to the British Company in India. These anxieties provided an opportunity for 
the new Governor General, Richard Wellesley (Lord Mornington), to take action. 
Wellesley and the Company's Response 
 Wellesley had become the new Governor General of India in the spring of 1798, 
replacing the unassuming (and non-aristocrat) John Shore. Unlike his predecessor, 
Wellesley was a vain and ambitious man with dreams of expanding British power over 
the rest of the Indian subcontinent.43 He was well known as an exceedingly difficult man 
to work alongside, and he traveled to India determined to eliminate all French influence 
from the courts of the native rulers.44 Wellesley made little attempt to turn a profit forthe 
Company, and was contemptuous of the mercantile Dircto s on Leadenhall Street. By 
the end of his seven years as Governor General (1798- 805), Wellesley had conducted so 
many wars against Indian princes and run up such large debts in the process that he was 
forcibly recalled home to Britain. Wellesley embodie  the increasing shift of the East 
India Company's administration away from earlier generations of merchants and towards 
an aristocratic and militaristic command. His official portrait painted by Robert Home 
while serving as Governor General in 1801 [Figure 1] suggested the growing imperial 
style of rule practiced by Wellesley in India, far removed from the more humble portrayal 
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of earlier Company administrators.45 Wellesley's appointment to the position of Governor 
General signaled a much more interventionist policy by the Company in the affairs of 
Indian states, a marked contrast to the hands-off approach that had been employed by 
Shore over the previous five years.46  
 When Wellesley learned of the Malartic Proclamation, he immediately resolved to 
invade Mysore, believing that it provided sufficient rationale for a preemptive war of 
conquest. However, with Britain embroiled in an enorm us war against France in Europe, 
there was little enthusiasm at home for further military adventures in India. Henry 
Dundas and the Company's Board of Control in London were prepared to sanction 
Wellesley's wars in India, but only insofar as they achieved the goal of protecting British 
India from the threat posed by France.47 The Company's administration in London was 
not interested in further wars of conquest in India, and insisted that any military conflicts 
should be defensive in nature, only acting to protect existing Company territory, not 
acquire further domains. The British public also exhibited little interest in going to war 
with Tipu Sultan again in 1798, expressing instead f r that he might combine his forces 
with revolutionary France and conquer the Company's holdings.48 The overall sentiment 
coming from the British metropole with regards to India was somewhat of a "wait and 
see" attitude, advising a cautious approach designed to safeguard the Company's 
possessions and wait for further instructions from home.  
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 These restrictions from London greatly influenced Wellesley's response to the 
situation, and dictated how he represented events in the wider public sphere. Wellesley 
had immediately determined to attack Mysore regardless of the actual threat posed by 
Tipu, seeing the Malartic Proclamation as ample justification for his war of conquest, but 
it was very important to portray his actions in theproper context. Wellesley took pains to 
insist that Tipu Sultan was responsible for the conflict, and that the Company's 
preemptive invasion of Mysore was in fact a defensive act, one within the restrictions laid 
down by Parliament and the Board of Control. Wellesley was familiar with the 
controversy surrounding the beginning of the previous Third Mysore War (1790-92), not 
least because he had been a member of Parliament and argued in defense of the Company 
during the debates engendered by that war.49 Wellesley had spoken out against the 
political Opposition at that time, insisting that their criticisms had caused a negative 
effect on the war in India, undermining the confidenc  of the Company soldiers and 
elevating the fortunes of Tipu. As Governor General, Wellesley took steps to play up 
Tipu's supposed alliance with France, placing all of the blame for the fighting on the 
shoulders of Tippoo the Tyrant, and continued to insist that his own invasion was a 
purely defensive act. In these efforts, Wellesley would be extremely successful, helping 
to ensure that there was virtually no criticism of the Fourth Mysore War in the metropole, 
and persuading the British public to accept his interpretation of events wholesale.  
 Wellesley first received word of the Malartic Proclamation in June 1798, while he 
was traveling through Cape Colony en route to India. The Governor General immediately 
determined that he would go to war with Tipu upon receiving this information, even 
before his arrival in India. In his letter of 21 November 1798 to the Court of Directors, 
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Wellesley wrote that he issued "final orders" for war to the governments of Madras and 
Bombay as far back as 20 June, calling their armies into the field against Tipu.50 All of 
the later correspondences between Wellesley and Tipu Sultan were therefore little more 
than a sham, designed to stall for time until the Company's military was prepared to 
invade the country of Mysore. The decision for war h d already been made.  
 It is difficult to say how Wellesley's actions would have been interpreted in the 
British metropole if no further events had taken place; it would not have been out of the 
question for a sizable political opposition to emerge in the same fashion as in the 
previous war against Tipu. However, Wellesley was able to take advantage of unrelated 
military events taking place in Europe to exaggerate the threat posed by Tipu's supposed 
French alliance, and suggest that British India wasin far more danger than actually 
existed. Fear of the contemporary French expedition to Egypt became associated in the 
mind of the British public with fears of Tipu Sultan overrunning the Company's territory, 
and ultimately provided a carte blanche for Wellesley'  own preemptive invasion. In 
point of fact, Wellesley was well aware that the Frnch soldiers in Egypt had no 
possibility of reaching India, but he led the Company's Court of Directors and the British 
public to believe the opposite.  
 At roughly the same time that Wellesley left Britain en route to India, a French 
naval expedition left the port of Toulon in late May 1798. This would become Napoleon's 
ill-fated Egyptian expedition, but the destination of this force was not immediately 
known at the time, and there was much anxiety in Lodon that the French were planning 
to land in India. Henry Dundas learned of the departure of the French expedition on 1 
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June 1798, and shortly thereafter received word of the Malartic Proclamation on 14 June, 
which appeared to confirm the worst fears of a French i vasion of India.51 The 
Company's Court of Directors responded by sending a letter to Wellesley on 18 June 
warning him of the possibility of the French landing i  India. The Directors wrote that it 
was "highly improbable" that Tipu would have entered into an alliance with the French 
without making preparations for war ahead of time; th refore, if it were proven that he 
was building up for war, "it would be neither prudent nor politic to wait for actual 
hostilities on his part" and "to take the most immediate and most decisive measures to 
carry our arms into the enemy's country."52  
 However, at the same time the Directors also warned W llesley to use his utmost 
discretion, so that the Company would not be involved in another war in India without 
the most inevitable necessity. The Directors and the Board of Control were therefore 
authorizing Wellesley to use force, and even invade Mysore if necessary, but only on the 
grounds of stopping a French invasion force from landing there. If it could not be proven 
that Tipu was planning for war, then Wellesley was advised to use his discretion and 
refrain from further conflict. For the Company's policy makers in London, it was the 
French who were the threat, not Tipu Sultan.53 
 News of the French landing in Egypt did not arrive in India until 18 October, and 
due to this late date, the news would not factor into the Governor General's consideration 
of the situation at all. Wellesley had already issued to Madras and Bombay his "final 
orders" for war against Tipu as far back as 20 June, months before any word arrived that 
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the French were in Egypt.54 Wellesley also learned of Admiral Nelson's destruction of the 
French fleet only two weeks after hearing the initial news of its landing in Egypt, on 31 
October, and therefore long before war with Tipu broke out, he knew that Napoleon's 
force had no prospect of making its way to India. All of this information about events 
taking place in the Mediterranean had little bearing o  the situation in India because 
Wellesley had long been committed to war with Mysore, ever since the early summer 
when he initially heard of the Malartic Proclamation. In a later letter to the Directors, 
Wellesley restated that he made his decision for war in June 1798, and added: "I have no 
hesitation in declaring, that my original resolution was (if circumstances would have 
admitted) to have attacked the Sultaun instantly, and on both sides of his dominions, for 
the purpose of defeating his hostile preparations, a d of anticipating their declared 
object."55 He was prevented from doing so only due to the poor state of the Company's 
army, and the lack of supplies for a campaign at tht time. The next six months were 
therefore a stalling period to build up the Company forces for war, as Wellesley readily 
admitted in his dispatches back to Dundas.  
 In order to defend his aggressive policy, Wellesley was preoccupied with finding 
enough local Indian justification for attacking Tipu. All throughout 1798 and 1799, 
Wellesley had to write to the Court of Directors as if Tipu were about to attack the 
Company, when in fact the Company was preparing to attack him. It was necessary to 
suggest great provocation, because when the war was fought the Company's military 
would immediately go onto the offensive into Mysore. 56 The war could only be 
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characterized as defensive in nature if Tipu had provided enough provocation to justify a 
doctrine of pre-emptive invasion. This necessitated emphasizing the familiar themes of 
the Tipu Legend, in which the Sultan was envisioned as a duplicitous and untrustworthy 
negotiator in his correspondences with the Governor General, and exaggerating the threat 
posed by the connection to France. 
 The narrative of the war written by Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Beatson, 
Wellesley's aide-de-camp, provided an example of how t ese negotiations were 
rationalized. Writing on the situation in 1798, Beatson contended, "Although the 
Governor General deemed it his duty, at this period, t  call the armies into the field... his 
Lordship's views and expectations were all devoted to the preservation of peace; which 
there was no prospect of securing, than by a state of forward preparation for war."57 
Passages such as these neatly reversed the burden of culpability, placing responsibility 
for the conflict onto the Sultan. In truth, Wellesly would be negotiating with Tipu in bad 
faith during their exchange of letters, having alredy determined upon going to war 
regardless of Tipu's response. The Sultan's reputation would once again be deployed here 
as a means of justifying aggression overseas and making it palatable to British audiences 
at home. 
 Wellesley's early letters to Tipu in the summer of 1798 were cordial and made no 
mention of the Malartic Proclamation or his plans for war, confining the discussion 
instead to minor issues such as a border dispute in the district of Wynaad.58 Strangely, the 
French were not discussed in these letters at all, given that the "alliance" with France was 
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the alleged justification for going to war later. After receiving word of Admiral Nelson's 
victory over the French fleet, Wellesley wrote to Tipu on 4 November 1798 to taunt him 
with the destruction of his supposed allies. After outlining the details of Nelson's triumph 
and heaping scorn upon the French ("the general enemy of mankind"), Wellesley 
concluded by stating how "confident from the union and attachment subsisting between 
us, that this intelligence will afford you sincere satisfaction, I could not deny myself the 
pleasure of communicating it."59 The last line was an obvious taunting jibe directed at 
Tipu. What makes the message so interesting was the cont xt in which it was delivered; 
this was the first letter Wellesley had sent to Tipu since 7 August, and that message had 
not mentioned France at all. This exchange provided further evidence that Napoleon's 
expedition to Egypt was not a motivating factor in Wellesley's decision to go to war, but 
rather used as a pretext to justify the decision afterwards.  
 Wellesley turned up the pressure on Tipu in his next letter, sent just four days 
later on 8 November 1798. He blamed the French for "perverting the wisdom" of Tipu's 
councils, and instigating him into war against "those who have given you no 
provocation." Without stating precisely the exact relationship between Tipu and the 
French, Wellesley declared that, "It is impossible that you should suppose me to be 
ignorant of the intercourse which subsides between you and the French," warning Tipu of 
the ruinous connections which would result from such a friendship. This allowed 
Wellesley to continue his argument with a classic reve sal of the diplomatic situation, 
very much in keeping with the "untrustworthy" themes often associated with Tipu: 
                                                
59 East India Company. Neil Benjamin Edmonstone (trans.) Official Documents, Relative to the 




Combining these professions of amity on your part, with the proofs that the 
company's government have constantly given of their sincere disposition to 
maintain the relations of friendship and peace with you... it was natural for me to 
be extremely slow to believe the various accounts transmitted to me of your 
negotiations with the French, and your military preparations. But whatever my 
reluctance to credit such reports might be, prudence required both of me and the 
company's allies, that we should adopt certain measur s of precaution and self 
defence; and these have accordingly been taken. 60 
 
The Governor General went on to reassure Tipu that the Company wished to live in peace 
and friendship with all its neighbors, and entertained no projects of ambition, looking 
only to the permanent security and tranquility of its own dominions and subjects. 
Wellesley suggested sending Major Doveton as an envoy (the same Doveton who had 
escorted the hostage princes back to Tipu a few years earlier) to discuss the situation and 
remove any suspicion which had arisen.61  
 Tipu's response to Wellesley's letter was one of understandable confusion. In a 
letter dated 20 November 1798, Tipu stated that he had adhered to peace, and was 
surprised by rumors of war preparations by the Company, which he had the fullest 
confidence were "without foundation." The Sultan claimed to have no other thought than 
"to give increase to friendship" and "strengthen the foundations of harmony and unity."62 
Tipu did not understand why the Company was acting aggressively towards him, as he 
had not made preparations for war and had not signed a  official alliance with France. In 
a later letter dated 18 December, Tipu explained that his envoys to Mauritius had brought 
back forty people who came in search of employment, and that the French had made 
"deceitful reports" about the trip, referring to the infamous proclamation. Tipu reiterated 
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his desire to maintain the articles of the past peace treaty with the Company, suggested 
that sending Doveton as an envoy was not necessary, and expressed his "great surprise" 
at the actions taken by the Company: "I have the strongest hope that the minds of the 
wise and intelligent, but particularly of the four states, will not be sullied by doubts and 
jealousies, but will consider me from my heart desirous of harmony and friendship."63 
Tipu was not being entirely truthful in these messages, as he had indeed enquired about 
the prospects of a French alliance against the British Company. However, when the 
alliance failed to materialize, he had committed himself to peace for the present, as his 
correspondences with the Company indicated. There is no evidence to suggest that Tipu 
had any plans to attack the Company in 1798-99, and he appeared to be genuinely 
confused about the messages he was receiving.  
 Wellesley finally revealed his objective in the following lengthy letter to Tipu 
dated 9 January 1799. Wellesley recounted the expedition of Tipu's ambassadors to 
Mauritius, concluding that they had reached an agreement (codified in the Malartic 
Proclamation) and brought back troops raised in the enemy country for his service. This 
led to eight points, the most important of which stipulated "That the ambassadors, 
dispatched by your highness to the Isle of France [Mauritius], did propose, and actually 
did conclude, an offensive alliance with the French, for the express purpose of 
committing a war of aggression against the company."64 As a result of these actions, 
Wellesley stated, Tipu had violated the treaties of peace and friendship from the last war, 
and therefore forced the Company into the great expense of building up its own military. 
As such, the previous agreements with the Company would no longer be enough to 
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safeguard the peace, and Wellesley demanded that Tipu must meet with Major Doveton 
to work out a new series of arrangements. The exact nature of these arrangements were 
left unstated, but it was implied that Tipu would have to make further commercial and 
territorial concessions to the Company, as well as expelling all Frenchmen permanently 
from his territory. Wellesley wrote in closing that Tipu had best respond within one day 
of receiving the letter or else "dangerous consequences" could result from the delay.65 
 This letter was tantamount to diplomatic extortion, blaming Tipu for breaking the 
peace and then insisting on reparations for aggression that had not taken place. Wellesley 
was careful to insist that it was the Sultan who was responsible for failing to adhere to the 
1792 Treaty of Seringapatam and not the Company, again portraying himself as 
reluctantly pressed into military service to stop the aggrandizement of a tyrant. It seems 
unlikely that Wellesley ever intended this message to be considered seriously, as he had 
already set into motion the Company's machinery for warfare. Insisting on a response 
within one day was a sign of this lack of interest in conducting actual diplomacy. When 
Tipu did not immediately respond, Wellesley incorporated the waiting period into his 
negative portrayal of Tipu as well, interpreting it as a delaying tactic until the season was 
too late for military operations.66 Viewed from this perspective, Tipu the Oriental despot 
could never be trusted to keep his word; he was again the "faithless and violent character" 
as described by Cornwallis in the previous war. As argued from Wellesley's point of view, 
the only way to defend British India from such a monster was to strike preemptively, 
before he could achieve his potential alliance with France.  
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 Once the observer bought into the corrosive worldview of the Tipu Legend, every 
action of the Sultan became suspicious. For example, Alexander Beatson's narrative of 
the war perceived the refusal of Tipu to admit to Wellesley's accusations as an evasion of 
the truth. Beatson argued that Tipu's silence with respect to Major Doveton indicated "an 
additional proof of his disposition to evade the pacific advances of the allies," apparently 
not seeing the irony in his use of the word "pacific" mere weeks before the Company's 
invasion of Mysore began.67 The Company was demanding that Tipu admit to things 
which were factually untrue, such as his supposed imminent invasion of British India; 
when Tipu insisted that he had no such plans, it was interpreted as further evidence of his 
untrustworthy nature and guilt. There was no escape from this Catch-22 situation, which 
only made the Sultan appear more and more culpable; first in the eyes of the Company, 
and later to the wider British public.  
 Tipu's final letter to Wellesley was received on 13 February, and presumably 
written at the end of January. In this short message, Tipu stated that he would receive 
Doveton as an envoy, and was proceeding upon a hunting expedition for the moment.68 It 
was a bizarre response which made little sense in the context of the situation, but Tipu 
did in fact agree to Wellesley's request in the previous letter, accepting Doveton as an 
envoy, and apparently was prepared to accept mediation to resolve the situation. However, 
Wellesley was not interested in any further negotiati ns. The Governor General had 
already given the order for the Company's armies to invade Mysore on 3 February, which 
was long before receiving Tipu's response. Given th slow speed of communications in 
the eighteenth century, Wellesley likely gave the invasion order before a response from 
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his last letter could even have arrived, granting only 25 days for a message to travel from 
Calcutta to Seringapatam and back again.  
 In his final letter to Tipu on 22 February, Wellesey responded by stating that 
Tipu had waited too long to respond, as it was necessary for the Company's forces to 
move before the start of the monsoon season, and tht Tipu's "long silence" on this 
important and pressing occasion, "compelled me to adopt the resolution of ordering the 
British forces to advance."69 At this point, meeting with Doveton was not sufficient to 
stave off the attack; even though Tipu had acceded to Wellesley’s requests in his previous 
letter, the Company had decided upon invasion. Althoug  it was indeed true that the 
monsoon season would put a close to military operations, Wellesley's claims that Tipu 
was deliberately stalling in diplomacy to prepare his own military strike seem wildly 
exaggerated, especially given Wellesley's lack of interest in waiting for a response before 
giving the order to invade.  
 Wellesley continued to place the public blame for the conflict onto the Sultan, 
even though it was very obvious from his private leters that he had planned to attack 
regardless of Tipu's actions. In his official declaration of war, Wellesley wrote that in 
every instance, "the conduct of the British governme t in India towards Tippoo Sultaun 
has been the natural result of those principles of moderation, justice, and good faith" 
which had been established by Parliament as the rule for intercourse with the native states 
of India.70 Here Wellesley suggested that the Company was indeed acting within the 
dictates of Parliament, and that it no longer carried out the irresponsible self-
aggrandizement of the earlier nabobs. Wellesley insisted that he had been forced into 
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conflict, as "Tippoo Sultaun wantonly violated the relations of amity and peace, and 
compelled the allies to arm in defence of their rights, their happiness, and their honour."71 
He argued that it was necessary to attack immediately nd with great force, to prevent 
Tipu from disturbing the tranquility of India, and potentially allowing a French force to 
land in the future.  
 Wellesley echoed these same sentiments in a lengthy let er written to the Court of 
Directors on 20 March 1799, explaining and justifying his actions in going to war. 
According to his official statement to the Company's Directors: 
Tippoo Sultaun therefore, having actually concluded offensive and defensive 
engagements with the French [his emissaries to Mauritius] against the Honourable 
Company... having avowed the object of those preparations to be the subversion 
of the British Empire in India; and finally having declared the delay of the 
meditated blow to proceed from no other cause than his expectation of receiving 
further aid from the Enemy; I could not hesitate to pr nounce, that he had 
flagrantly violated the Treaties of Peace subsisting between him and the 
Honourable Company; and that he had committed an act of direct hostility and 
aggression against the British Government in India.72 
 
As on every other occasion when the subject of treaties was raised, Wellesley made sure 
to insist that it was Tipu who was violating the Treaty of Seringapatam, and not the 
Company. Wellesley admitted that there had been essentially no aid given to Tipu from 
France whatsoever, merely a few dozen volunteers raised in Mauritius, but this did not 
matter. The war was justified on pre-emptive grounds, to prevent a possible connection 
between Tipu and France at some point in the indeterminate future.  
 The Governor General further made it clear that he would have attacked Tipu 
even sooner, had it been possible. Wellesley told the Directors that every principle of 
justice and policy demanded "an instantaneous Effort should be made to reduce his 
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[Tipu's] power and resources" before he could make a connection with the French, and 
only a "defect of means" had prevented the war from beginning the previous year in 
1798.73 This was a clear endorsement for a policy of pre-emption: "Under these 
circumstances, an immediate attack upon Tippoo Sultaun for the purpose of frustrating 
the execution of his unprovoked and unwarranted projects of ambition and revenge 
appeared to me to be demanded by the soundest maxims both of Justice and Policy."74 
These were the very sort of conflicts that had been prohibited by Parliament, and which 
had been criticized so heavily during the trial of Warren Hastings a decade earlier. At this 
particular moment, however, due to the ongoing wars against revolutionary France and 
Wellesley's skillful use of Tipu's negative reputation, the Governor General's bellicose 
militarism would end up largely going unchallenged in Britain. The international 
circumstances of the moment, with the ongoing war ag inst revolutionary France, 
allowed Wellesley to employ these preexisting characterizations of Tipu in a much more 
convincing way than ever before.  
 Wellesley suggested that it was pointless to bother negotiating with a deceitful 
tyrant like Tipu at all, arguing to the Directors: "My opinion had long been decided, that 
no Negotiations with Tippoo Saheb could be successful unless accompanied by such a 
disposition of our Force."75 Military might was the only thing that an Oriental despot like 
Tipu would be able to understand. Beatson's narrative of the campaign concurred, 
arguing that the mere presence of Tipu created "baneful effects" throughout southern 
India, leading to a decay of agriculture and industry due to constant fear of invasion.76 
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Beatson admitted that Tipu had not actually received any aid from France, but this did not 
matter as his demands of military assistance were unlimited, and it was impossible to 
foresee if those demands might once day by satisfied. H  therefore agreed with Wellesley 
that an immediate attack on Tipu was demanded "by the soundest maxims both of justice 
and policy," using the very same phrase as the Govern r General.77 
 The correspondence between Wellesley with the Court of Directors and with Tipu 
Sultan were therefore important for a number of reasons. They demonstratively prove 
that Wellesley's decision to invade Mysore had little connection with the French invasion 
of Egypt, and that the latter was never a factor in his decisions. They furthermore show 
that Wellesley had no real interest in diplomatic negotiations with Tipu, as he issued 
orders to prepare for war months ahead of time, and refused to conduct further mediation 
even when Tipu agreed to Wellesley's requests.78 In order to defend his reputation and 
justify his actions to the British public at home, Wellesley played up Tipu's connection to 
the French and relied upon the imagery of the Tipu Legend. Over and over again, 
Wellesley portrayed Tipu as a lying, scheming despot who could not be trusted under any 
circumstances. The Sultan was the one breaking treaties nd driving the Company into 
war, not the other way around. This reversal of the situation allowed Wellesley to claim 
that he was fighting a defensive war, reluctantly being forced to protect the British 
subjects in India from the aggression of a cruel despot, even as Company forces were 
invading Mysore. Without the pre-existing "tyrannical" representations of Tipu for 
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Wellesley to draw upon, he would have had far less success in convincing so many to 
accept his interpretation of the conflict. The Tipu Legend was therefore a major factor in 
British representations of the Fourth Mysore War, creating a stereotyped Asiatic villain 
full of vice and corruption for the heroic Company to fight against. This was an important 
factor in the reception of the conflict in the British metropole, which differed 
significantly from the previous wars against Tipu.  
The British Reaction: The Storming of Seringapatam  
 The Fourth Mysore War (1799) was received in a very different context by the 
British public at home. Unlike the two previous conflicts in the 1780s and early 1790s, 
popular understandings of the final war against Tipu Sultan were dominated by Tipu's 
supposed alliance with revolutionary France. In the wake of Tipu's defeat at the hands of 
Cornwallis in the Third Mysore War (1790-92), Tipu alone no longer inspired the same 
anxiety as he had represented in the past. Britons were far more confident about the 
Company's military strength overseas, and this was reflected in the disappearance of 
captive narratives and discussion of British prisoners during the Fourth Mysore War. 
There was no more mention of the forced conversion of European prisoners to Islam, and 
the threat that this posed to masculinity and European identity.79 There was also relatively 
little mention of the Fourth Mysore War as a conflict designed to liberate the people of 
Mysore from the rule of an oppressive tyrant, and when these explanations did appear, 
they were justifications offered after the conclusion of the war for the Company's 
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annexation of so much additional territory.80 Wellesley ignored Tipu's Mysorean subjects 
in his dispatches, and did not seem to care about their fate.  
 Instead, it was Tipu's supposed alliance with France which was emphasized 
repeatedly in 1798 and 1799, both in the East India Company's official correspondences 
and amongst the wider British public in the metropole. Although Tipu alone failed to 
inspire the same dread that he had held in the past, the possibility of an alliance between 
revolutionary France and "Citizen Tippoo" was terrifying to Britons, and represented a 
threat that had to be prevented at all costs. As such, Wellesley's flimsy justifications for 
preemptive war against Tipu in 1799 were embraced with enthusiasm by the British 
public, in the popular presses and in the halls of Parliament, preventing the emergence of 
any opposition of note. Unlike the past wars against Tipu, there was no dissenting 
political party that rose to challenge the Company's management of the war and question 
the legality of the invasion of Mysore. Fear of thepotential alliance between Tipu and the 
French, along with Wellesley's careful manipulation of the diplomatic situation to paint 
the Sultan as a military aggressor, was enough to stifle potential criticism of the war's 
morality at home.  
 The Fourth Mysore War also had the great advantage of b ing a short and 
victorious war. Mere weeks passed between the arrival of news from India that the 
Company had invaded Mysore and the announcement that Seringapatam had been 
successfully captured, with Tipu himself among the slain. This was a marked contrast 
from the Second and Third Mysore Wars, both of which had lasted for years and 
underwent long stretches of military setbacks on the part of the Company. It was easy to 
                                                
80 See for example James Salmond. A Review of the Origin, Progress, and Result of the Decisive War with 
the Late Tippoo Sultaun, in Mysore (London: Printed by Luke Hansard, 1800) 
280 
 
accept Wellesley's claims about Tipu and his connections to the French when the 
invasion of Mysore had been such an overwhelming success. In a marked contrast to the 
earlier skepticism of the Company and its servants, who had been viewed separate from 
the British nation and were commonly believed to be parasitic nabobs, now the soldiers 
and administrators of the Company were instead perceived as patriotic heroes, with the 
victory over Tipu celebrated as a nationalistic triumph.  
 This was best represented by the innumerable paintings, songs, plays, and other 
works of creative media portraying "The Storming of Seringapatam", the taking of Tipu's 
capital by the Company's military forces. These popular works demonstrated how public 
opinion about Tipu Sultan and the East India Company had shifted dramatically over the 
previous two decades. Instead of cartoons satirizing the nabobs as the plunderers of the 
East, paintings and plays of the Storming of Seringapatam had become cherished parts of 
the national identity, embraced by Britons on all prts of the political spectrum. With the 
passage of time, these images would pass into the British historical memory of the 
Mysore Wars, with the earlier fears, uncertainties, and debates about the subject matter 
eventually becoming forgotten.  
 In India, Wellesley had used the Malartic Proclamation as an immediate trigger to 
begin preparations for war against Tipu, using the imagery built up over the past two 
decades as justification for his decision. The reaction in Britain to the news of the 
Proclamation was rather different, inspiring not a burning desire for further war but 
instead confusion and uncertainty. Initial observers expressed disbelief, not 
understanding why Malartic would issue such a proclamation and wondering if the whole 
thing was some sort of ruse on the part of the French. The notion that this was a form of 
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deception on the part of the French was more plausible in many ways than the truth of the 
situation.  
 An example of this disbelief was provided by an anonymous author in a letter 
from Mauritius dated 4 April 1798 and published in theBombay Courier. The source 
described the visit of the ambassadors and the issuing of the Malartic Proclamation, while 
wondering "whether there was any truth in the Embassy" or if the whole thing was 
simply a farce created for misdirection.81 News of the Proclamation first appeared in the 
London newspapers in June 1798, where the text was ran lated from French and widely 
printed for mass circulation.82 General confusion was once again the response, as the 
public wondered what exactly to make of this strange ews. Lloyd's Evening Post 
speculated that the French must have made preparations to aid Tipu, as they would hardly 
expose their old ally "to the just indignation of the English" by disclosing his intentions 
publicly.83 The Express and Evening Chronicle b lieved that this proclamation 
announced a new expedition by the French against the Company's holdings on the 
Coromandel Coast, while also acknowledging that neither the military forces nor the 
means of transporting them were enough to justify any serious alarm to the British 
settlements.84  
 Contradictory rumors further muddied the waters about what was taking place in 
India. One account stated that Tipu was making vigorous preparations for war, having 
been promised powerful assistance from France. At the same time, the most recent ships 
                                                
81 Bombay Courier (Bombay, India) 28 July 1798, Issue 305 
82 See Whitehall Evening Post (London, England) 14 June 1798, Issue 8049 for one example.  
83 Lloyd’s Evening Post (London, England) 15 June 1798, Issue 6366 
84 Express and Evening Chronicle (London, England) 16 June 1798, Issue 577 
282 
 
arriving from India in the summer of 1798 insisted hat no war alarms had been raised.85 
As late as February 1799, after Lord Wellesley had already ordered the invasion of 
Mysore, Lloyd's Evening Post still fell compelled to call the veracity of the Malartic 
Proclamation into question: "The authenticity of this document is extremely questionable. 
Would a French Governor so rashly have announced publicly a fact of so much 
importance, and which it was so impolitic to disclose?"86 Mass confusion reigned over 
the Company's relationship with Tipu Sultan, as the news brought by ships indicated 
everything was peaceful while the Proclamation seemed to indicate a war was brewing. 
No one in London was quite sure what was happening overseas. 
 When news of the departure of the French expeditionary force arrived, however, 
the confusion about Tipu rapidly turned to fear andxiety for the safety of British India. 
The London Chronicle pointed out the dangers of Napoleon's French force a riving in 
India to join up with Tipu, which would apprehend "a war more serious, if undertaken in 
the formidable manner threatened, than any with which that country [India] has ever been 
visited."87 Although the same newspaper stated that this was an extremely unlikely 
possibility, it did not stop public fears from runni g wild over the situation. Rumor 
magnified the size of the force Tipu's ambassadors had raised in Mauritius, with one 
newspaper reporting the number at 600 men instead of fewer than 100.88 A report from a 
French newspaper insisted that India was the clear d stination for Napoleon's expedition, 
and that the enterprise was concerted with Tipu at the Sultan's own instigation. It 
suggested that Tipu would dissemble with the Company until his French allies could 
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arrive to support him.89 The Morning Chronicle further reported, "It is said that 
Buonaparte found Envoys from Tippoo Saib in Egypt, who had been long waiting for 
him there."90 Although all of this news was factually untrue, it fit very neatly into the 
portrayal of the war that Wellesley and the Company were trying to present.  
 Napoleon's own actions in Egypt fit neatly into this narrative as well. After 
landing in Egypt, Napoleon issued proclamations preenting himself as a liberator of the 
Egyptian populace from Ottoman oppression, praising the precepts of Islam and claiming 
friendship with Muslims. During a festival celebrating the birth of Muhammad, Napoleon 
garbed himself in Egyptian dress and proclaimed himself a worthy son of the Prophet and 
a favorite of Allah. These gestures proved to be ineffective, leading to a mass revolt of 
the people of Cairo against the French on 22 October 1798, but they lent credulity to the 
claims of a potential union between Napoleon and Tipu, particularly in the British 
metropole.91 
 In an opinion piece entitled "Buonaparte and His Expedition" from August 1798, 
Lloyd's Evening Post waxed poetically on the threat that the French posed to British 
India: "Thus they mean to wreck their vengeance upon us, the only people who have not 
bowed beneath their despotism. They will thus employ at a distance, and disengage 
themselves of the superfluity of troops which might become fatal to them in the hour of 
peace. They have, through all parts of the globe, auxili ries in those dregs of nations, 
always disposed to shake off the restraint of the law…"92 According to this article, Tipu 
Sultan was being employed as a proxy of the French regime. This particular phrasing of 
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the threat supported and reinforced the various "tyrannical" representations of Tipu which 
had been established earlier, now associating the tyranny of an Oriental monarch with the 
despotism of the French revolutionaries. Both of them were presented as threats to British 
liberty that had to be stopped.  
 All throughout the summer of 1798, these fears about an alliance between Tipu 
and the French combined to generate an atmosphere of c isis and uncertainty over the fate 
of British India. However, as the months passed withou  any news arriving of an attack 
by Tipu against the Company's possessions, the tension gradually dissipated. A 
November article in the Observer stated that the latest accounts from India were of the 
most pacifistic tendency, and that Tipu had not manifested the least disposition to 
hostility, but was rather trying to cultivate the friendship of the Madras government.93 
The article was meant to reassure the public that confli t could be avoided in India, and 
assist in easing the tension that had built up surrounding the security of the Company's 
Indian possessions. The Morning Post and Gazetteer went further in reassuring its 
readers on the same subject, suggesting that the rumors of war with Tipu (which had 
depreciated the value of the Company's stock) were the result of "stock jobbers, of the 
gross credulity of stock-holders, and of the shallowness of the political speculators of 
Change Alley." The immediate object of Napoleon hadnever been India; if it had been, 
then an understanding with Tipu would have been establi hed long before leaving France, 
as Napoleon "on the banks of the Nile, without ship, can no more assist Tippoo than if 
he were on the banks of the Mississipi."94  
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 These sources demonstrate how the immediate panic and anxiety over India were 
dying down over time, as it became more and more apparent that the French soldiers in 
Egypt had no way to reach India. They also reveal that the anxiety over British India in 
1798-99 was never caused by Tipu himself, but rathe from the threat of Tipu combining 
with a French expeditionary force. Once the French threat to India was removed, there 
was little interest from the public in engaging in a other Mysore war. This was why it 
was so necessary for Wellesley to write as though Tipu were attacking him, and deploy 
the tropes of the Tipu Legend as a justification for his own actions. It was the French 
alliance that was the crucial factor for the British public in 1798-99, and ultimately 
provided the carte blanche for Wellesley's attack.  
 At the same time that Wellesley was launching his invasion in India, in February 
and March of 1799, the public perception in London was that the threat to India had been 
removed, and the Company's prospects for peace in th  immediate future were excellent. 
It was widely believed that the failure of the French expeditionary force meant that Tipu 
would back down from conflict, ensuring a pacifistic solution to the crisis. In other words, 
the public perception of the situation in the metropole was exactly the opposite of the 
events taking place in southern India. The G neral Evening Post reported in February 
1799 that although it was clear an agreement of some kind existed between Tipu and the 
French, there was no longer any apprehension of danger from the French Egyptian force, 
and therefore it was probable that Tipu's preparations for war would cease.95 There was 
no suggestion from this source that the Company's military might decide to go on the 
offensive of their own accord, nor any indication that this was what the newspaper's 
authors desired. The war scare with Tipu back in Brtain, caused by word of the Malartic 
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Proclamation, was largely finished before the actual war itself began in India. After 
Nelson's victory over the French fleet in August 1798, the British public no longer 
appeared to be worried overmuch about the fate of India. The advocates for pre-emptive 
war came almost entirely from the ranks of the Company's Indian servants and the 
Anglo-Indian community overseas; there was little support for further Indian wars in 
Britain prior to the news of Wellesley's invasion.  
 When news of the outbreak of the Fourth Mysore Wardid arrive from India, the 
newspaper coverage was entirely conducted from within the parameters of the Tipu 
Legend. Wellesley's interpretation of the situation, in which the Company had been 
forced into a defensive war to safeguard the territories and peoples under its protection, 
was the only one offered into the public sphere of print culture. The Times reported on 4 
June 1799 that although Tipu at first appeared disposed to measures of conciliation, he 
was all the while making preparations for war, and stalling for time to await the arrival of 
the French force. Affairs had now been brought to a crisis and Tipu had "thrown off the 
mask", as he marshaled some 100,000 well-disciplined troops while not troubling to 
conceal his designs.96 From the way in which the article was written, it appeared as 
though Tipu Sultan were the one initiating conflict and conducting an invasion of the 
Company's territory, rather than the opposite. The Sun wrote that there was every reason 
to expect success in India, "if the British Army should be compelled by the ingratitude 
and injustice of Tippoo to take the field against him," once again reversing the situation 
and shifting culpability for war onto the Sultan.97 This editorial comment was noteworthy 
not only for maintaining the fiction that the Company forces acted defensively, but also 
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for the way in which the Company's military in India was now called the “British Army” 
and was no longer viewed as a group of adventurers and plunderers, as had been the case 
earlier. Newspaper coverage of the Second Mysore War in the early 1780s had rarely 
made this association between the nation and the Company's military forces. This was 
another sign that the Company was successfully co-opting the patriotic symbols of the 
British nation and associating them with itself. In the earlier period of the nabobs, the fear 
had been that the Company and its servants would corrupt the morals of the nation, not 
embody them in the struggle against tyranny. 
 These villainous characterizations were nothing new, and had been used 
extensively by the Company during the previous Third Mysore War a decade earlier. 
What made the Fourth Mysore War so different from the previous two conflicts, however, 
was the lack of any interest shown by the print culure of the public sphere in supporting 
Tipu or criticizing the actions taken by the Company. There were no commentators 
writing to defend Tipu, or to argue that he did notwarrant this aggression, which was 
nothing less than a seismic shift from the earlier two Mysore wars. If anything, Tipu had 
done much more to justify a military response by the Company in the previous war, when 
he had carried out an attack on a native state (Travancore) allied with the Company.98 But 
while the morality of the Third Mysore War had been heavily debated in Parliament and 
turned into a political issue split along Whig and Tory lines, the ongoing war against 
revolutionary France meant that Wellesley's interprtation of the Fourth Mysore War 
would go almost completely unchallenged. There was no ignificant criticism of the 
Company in the newspapers at all, likely due to contemporary wartime patriotism, and 
virtually nothing written in defense of Tipu's character. The closest thing to praise 
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granted to the Sultan was a backhanded compliment paid by the Courier and Evening 
Gazette, which claimed that Tipu was a wise and intelligent prince, but only in order to 
make a comparison with Zeman Shah of Afghanistan, who as said to be even worse 
than Tipu.99 The complete lack of an alternative narrative of the Fourth Mysore War in 
the public sphere meant that Wellesley's and the Company's discourse on the war would 
go uncontested, presenting itself as a hegemonic worldview of events.  
 News of the capture of Seringapatam and death of Tipu reached Britain in early 
September 1799, bringing word of the Company's total victory. Since news of the 
outbreak of war had only arrived in July, this conflict was extremely short in duration 
compared to the previous Mysore wars, which unquestionably contributed to the 
universally positive reception with which the news as greeted. The announcement of 
victory came mere weeks after the outbreak of the confli t, and it was easy for all parties 
to share in the fruits of such an overwhelming and painless success. The public reaction 
was one of wild celebration and excitement, mixed with a heavy dose of cultural 
arrogance and feeling of British superiority over the Indian people. The long anxiety over 
Tipu had finally been resolved, and the Company’s territories were considered to be 
permanently secured. 
 The Evening Mail wrote that the Mysore country had been reduced by the "British 
armies" (once again associating the Company with the British nation) in little more than 
three months, resulting in the death of "our perfidious and inveterate enemy" Tipu Sultan. 
It was claimed that Tipu had shown no military talents in the latest war, and the capture 
of Seringapatam would result in the flow of "incalculable" resources into the Company's 
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treasury.100 Lloyd's Evening Post exaggerated the wealth captured inside the fort to £3 
million, and happily proclaimed: "Thus at length are ll fears removed, and every danger 
extinguished, which might have threatened our mighty Empire in the East; and thus has 
perished the perfidious Enemy, who was to stretch out his hand to Buonaparte at 
Suez."101 It was evident from these accounts that Tipu had remained a source of anxiety 
in Britain, even after the losses suffered in the previous war. And despite the near-total 
disappearance of the prisoners issue in this final conflict, many of the London 
newspapers took an unseemly delight in announcing the death of Tipu, who was 
perceived as having received his just desserts for the treatment of British captives earlier. 
For example, the Star proclaimed, "It is with the most heartfelt and sincere satisfaction 
that we congratulate our readers on the Capture of Seringapatam, and the Death of that 
inveterate and most invidious of all our enemies in India, Tippoo Saib!"102 The reputation 
of Tipu as a tyrant continued to influence his public perception in Britain, and became 
even more dominant as a result of the latest war.103 
 In a clever public relations move, the Company had m ny of Tipu's private papers 
distributed to the press and printed in the daily newspapers. This included documents 
containing some of Tipu's wild fantasies on what he hoped to achieve in the event of 
defeating the Company’s forces, which were never int nded to be publicly distributed, 
but were used nonetheless to further justify the war th t had taken place. The St. James 
Chronicle expressed indignation on the behalf of the British public, to hear of an 
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"Asiatick Despot" dividing up the Company's territoy and ports alongside the French.104 
Once again the British public was asked to feel empathy with the Company, as a group 
embodying them in the struggle against a foreign India  tyrant. The London papers 
further printed in October 1799 some of the damning correspondence between Tipu and 
the French governor at Mauritius, without mentioning the context in which they were 
written to put them in the most unflattering light possible. Wellesley had forwarded these 
letters to London in order to support his interpretation of the events that had transpired, 
and he seems to have been highly successful in promoting his view of the conflict. For 
example, the Morning Chronicle, an Opposition newspaper which had been highly 
critical of the Third Mysore War, summarized the causes of the Fourth Mysore War in 
the following passage: 
From the Governor General’s letters, it was evident tha  Tippoo had mediated the 
most perfidious designs against the British power in India early in 1798; that he 
had sent Ambassadors to the Mauritius to treat withthe French and engage them 
to co operate with him in hostilities against us. That upon remonstrances strongly 
urged by the Government of Bengal, he temporized by every means that treachery 
could suggest, and made plausible excuses for his very questionable conduct, 
utterly denying his treachery, and asserting the most ardent attachment to the 
British interests. That at length his guilt was so unquestionable, that the Governor 
General thought it his duty to take the field against him...105 
 
These sentiments were typical of the public mood in Lo don. This interpretation placed 
all of the blame on Tipu, and did not consider the notion that the Company forces were 
aggressively invading a neighbor that had taken no military action towards them. At no 
point in time did the Morning Chronicle question the necessity of the war, or invoke 
Parliament's dictum for the Company to avoid engaging in wars of conquest in India. For 
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a paper which had spent much ink decrying the injustice  of the previous conflict, this 
was a dramatic shift in its perception of the Company.  
 Although the news of the victory had been known since mid-September, the East 
India House on Leadenhall Street did not formally convene for discussion until holding a 
large meeting of the Directors on 13 November 1799. These proceedings were later 
published, granting insight into the outlook of theCompany's wealthiest stockholders. A 
Mr. Johnstone spoke and contended that Wellesley's actions had been thoroughly 
justified by a thesis of circumstance, that India had been in a crisis posed by the French 
which excused the taking of extraordinary measures. In his view, pre-emptive war was 
entirely appropriate due to the "great law of self-preservation."106 Johnstone then went on 
to claim a moral progression for the Company forces, who had been "long denounced to 
their country as plunderers and oppressors" and yet now had been accepted as part of the 
British nation, celebrated as patriots and their exploits cheered at home.107 Johnstone's 
reflections further demonstrated how much the public perception of the Company had 
changed in the past few decades, a shift which had been greatly influenced by the 
recurring wars against Tipu Sultan.  
 As the architect of the victory over Tipu, Wellesly was the recipient of an 
outpouring of popular acclaim in the British metropole. Although he remained in India as 
Governor General until 1805, Wellesley was showered with praise and affection from all 
parts of the political spectrum. The official thanks of the House of Commons was voted 
to Wellesley on 4 October 1799, after a lengthy speech by Henry Dundas praising his 
conduct and reiterating many times over the defensiv  nature of the war: "The 
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propositions established by those papers were, that the war was inevitable, and that every 
exertion had been made to avoid hostilities with the late Tippoo Sultaun..."108 The thanks 
of the House were passed unanimously ("nemine contradicente"), or without need for a 
division on the vote, another indication of the shift in opinion since the last Mysore War. 
A similar vote of thanks was championed in the House of Lords by Grenville, and passed 
in the same session of 4 October 1799.  
 One of the results of the conflict was that Tipu had been effectively depoliticized, 
no longer the subject of the partisan politics of the day as in the 1790-92 period. The role 
of the French had unquestionably been key to this process. It was no longer possible for 
members of the political opposition to sympathize with the Sultan and condemn the 
immorality of the Company's overseas servants; instead, the full body politic had united 
around the Company's military forces, as part of the struggle against France, leaving no 
room for alternate interpretations of Tippoo the Tyrant. On the few occasions when the 
Opposition chose to attack the conduct of the governm nt, they now endorsed the pro-
Company stance regarding India, while criticizing the larger conduct of the war against 
France in Europe. For example, when Whig politician Charles Grey spoke out against the 
government in a Commons debate on 27 November, he stated he that viewed the war 
against France in Europe in the most disastrous light, and that it had caused unparalleled 
calamity to the country, comparing Britain to a sick man dying with every symptom of 
health. However, Grey had nothing to say against the conduct of the East India Company 
or the immorality of its wars, merely noting that "we" (again linking the Company with 
the British nation) had acquired an additional portion of territory in the East and 
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dethroned Tipu.109 This was drastic reversal from the politics of a decade earlier, when 
John Hippesley and Philip Francis argued vehemently i  the Commons on the immorality 
of the Mysore Wars. This example demonstrated how Tipu had been effectively 
depoliticized, made over into a contemptible figure that no one in the government was 
interested in defending. The Indian empire had become a subject of national pride, rather 
than an embarrassing stain upon the national honor. 
 Perhaps the best example of this shift in popular perception of the East India 
Company and the overseas empire can be seen in the form of "The Storming of 
Seringapatam", the term that came to be applied to vari us different depictions of the 
conquest of Tipu's capital city in the final battle of the Fourth Mysore War. Created and 
marketed to the public on a wide scale, these images of the Storming of Seringapatam 
celebrated the actions of the Company to the British public, and implicitly justified the 
wars of territorial conquest in India. They served to internalize the narrative that 
Wellesley and the rest of the Company promoted about the Mysore Wars, that they had 
been fought to stop the tyranny of a mad Oriental despot in league with Britain's most 
hated enemy. Paintings and other visual media based on the Fourth Mysore War were 
more overtly military than their predecessors, depicting Company soldiers in the midst of 
raging battle scenes, assaulting the walls of Seringapatam and gaining control over the 
fortress. With direct Company patronage backing the most famous of these paintings, 
they continued to draw together the association of the East India Company with heroic 
patriotism and the British nation, using the conquest of Tipu Sultan as a means to glorify 
the growing overseas empire in the eyes of the British public. Due to their widespread 
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popularity, these representations of the Storming of Seringapatam played a crucial role in 
disseminating new ideas about empire to the wider British populace.  
 Robert Ker Porter was the first artist to advertis for subscriptions on a new work 
of art depicting the death of Tipu and fall of Seringapatam, which appeared in the London 
newspapers on 11 October 1799. This was only a few w eks after the arrival of news 
from India of Tipu's defeat, and reflected again the competition to be first to capture the 
drama of the Mysore Wars on canvass. Porter benefitd from the patronage of the East 
India Company, which helped to supply him with additional details about the individuals 
present on the campaign against Tipu. Porter's painting The Storming of Seringapatam 
was first exhibited to the public on 29 March 1800 at No. 17 Old Bond Street, and 
remained open for weeks afterwards, then shown again more publicly at the Lyceum 
Theatre beginning on 26 April [Figure 2 & 3].110 The painting itself was a gigantic 
panorama, stretching over 120 feet long at a height of 21 feet, and covering 2550 square 
feet of canvass in total. Porter depicted hundreds of individual figures engaged in the 
process of storming Tipu's capital, including 20 portraits of British officers and Tipu 
Sultan himself manning the walls in vain defense, helpfully identified by a descriptive 
sketch of the panorama [Figure 4].111 The painting captures the moment in the battle 
when the walls were breached in two places, and Company soldiers surged into the gaps 
to take possession of the fortress. Full of fire, smoke, and guns on all sides, Porter's 
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enormous work of art portrays the Company in a moment of triumph and dominion, with 
Tipu's Indian soldiers falling before the might of the British conquerors.112 
 As a visual spectacle, The Storming of Seringapatam was without equal for the 
London public at the dawn of the nineteenth century. An advertisement in the newspapers 
explained how the painting was on display to the public at the Lyceum every day 
(Sundays excepted) from nine until dusk, with an admittance fee of one shilling. For 
another two shillings, visitors could pick up the accompanying pamphlet Narrative 
Sketches of the Conquest of Mysore, which was described as "giving a comprehensive 
View of the rise, progress, and termination of the lat War with Tippoo Sultaun... 
collected from the authentic and original Information which regulated the design and 
execution of the Painting."113 Written by an anonymous Company author, the pamphlet 
became so popular that it was reprinted four different times in two editions between 1800 
and 1804, as thousands of viewers sought after moreinformation about the captivating 
scene on display. Narrative Sketches of the Conquest of Mysore drew most of its source 
material from the correspondences of Richard Wellesl y, and predictably reflected the 
same biased interpretation of the events leading to the Fourth Mysore War. The Narrative 
Sketches outlined how "it is now incontestable that Tippoo Sultaun’s thoughts were 
perpetually intent upon the ruin of the British power" which explained why the Company 
was forced into war, due to Tipu's continued "prevaication and falsehood".114 It also 
accused Tipu of further atrocities towards British prisoners, describing graphically how 
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six grenadiers and one drummer boy were strangled through the breaking of their 
necks.115 These accounts of violence towards British prisoners had been rare during the 
Fourth Mysore War, but were revived in this pamphlet as a means of further denigrating 
the character of Tipu. This led up to the triumphant conclusion of the war:  
Thus have the wisdom and energy of British councils, and the steady bravery of 
British soldiers, united to overthrow one of the most powerful tyrants of the east; 
to accomplish as complete and as just a revolution, as can be found on the records 
of history; and to produce such an increase of revenue, resource, commercial 
advantage, and military strength to the British establishment in India, as must for 
years to come ensure a happy and prosperous tranquility, not only to the 
Company’s possessions, but to the native principalit es, and to millions of 
inhabitants on the fertile plains of Hindostan.116 
 
The victory of Tipu was advertised as creating advantages not only for the British, but 
also producing a better lifestyle for the Company's ew Indian subjects as well, 
anticipating the civilizing mission rhetoric of the later nineteenth century. This 
"liberation" rhetoric had not been employed by Wellesley at all, but was broken out in the 
metropole after the war was over as a justification for the annexation of so much territory 
by the Company. The great popularity of Porter's painting helped lead to the widespread 
dissemination of its accompanying pamphlet, which repeated all of the old tyrannical 
representations of the Tipu Legend.  
 Viewers of Porter's artwork were overwhelmed by the size and spectacle of the 
production. The panorama design meant that viewers e encircled by the action taking 
place, causing many to feel that they were themselve  participating in the battle unfolding 
before their eyes. The Reverend Thomas Dibdin recorded his impressions of being 
overwhelmed by the scene: 
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I can never forget its first impression upon my mind. It was a thing dropped from 
the clouds - all fire, energy, intelligence, and animation. You looked a second 
time - the figures moved and were comingled in hot and bloody fight. You saw 
the flash of cannon, the glitter of the bayonet, and the gleam of the falchion. You 
longed to be leaping from craig to craig with Sir David Baird, who is hallooing 
his men on to victory! Then, again, you seemed to be listening to the groans of the 
wounded and the dying - and more than one woman was carried out swooning.117 
 
As mentioned by Dibdin, there were multiple accounts of viewers actually fainting while 
taking in the spectacle, overwhelmed by the violent action of the panorama. After months 
on display in London, Porter's Storming of Seringapatam was taken on a tour of the 
British Isles, awing thousands of further spectators. T ewman’s Exeter Flying Post wrote 
a glowing description of the painting when it toured the city, once again drawing 
"crowded audiences from nine till evening", who expressed their admiration "at the 
grandeur of the scene."118 The painting was even taken to Ireland, where a lighted 
rotunda had to be built in Belfast specially to display the huge work of art. 
 Porter's painting was a novel work, the first battle painting showing the British 
taking active possession of an Indian site. Earlier h storical paintings of India had tended 
to show durbars or treaty ceremonies, much as the works produced by Robert Home and 
Mather Brown from the Third Mysore War had focused upon the exchange of the hostage 
princes. The Storming of Seringapatam did away with the older image of the British in 
India as peace-loving commercial traders, replacing it with a militaristic celebration of 
the Company's martial prowess. Porter was also working with the full financial support 
and patronage of the East India Company; he gained both a substantial fortune from the 
public admission fees of the painting, as well as a knighthood from the British crown. 
The panoramic spectacle of The Storming of Seringapatam changed forever the 
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conception of historical painting, and continued to be influential on later artists long into 
the nineteenth century. Porter heroically captured in paint a staged moment of military 
drama, one that "patriotically advanced and enhanced th  government's full-blown vision 
of empire as a historic spectacle of glory in which all amongst the British populace could 
participate."119 Porter's artwork helped bring the Company's military, earlier reviled and 
feared as an agent of despotism and moral decay, into the fold of British patriotism, 
making it acceptable and even laudatory for the wider public to share in.120 
 The mass popularity of Porter's work ensured that i  would spawn a legion of 
imitators, all of which shared similar themes in expressing their excitement at the success 
of the Company's arms. All of these various paintings featuring the "storming" or 
"assault" or "taking" of Seringapatam depicted the Company military assuming control of 
Tipu's fortress, repeating the earlier messages from the previous war's artwork in a more 
explicitly martial fashion. Alexander Allan's The Assault on Seringapatam was similar in 
overall style to earlier landscape paintings he had done in India, however instead of 
showing the aftermath of the British victory at Tipu's hill forts, this painting depicted the 
Company in the active process of conquest itself [Figure 5].121 Wave after wave of 
soldiers in red coats advance towards the fortress in the background, marching in ranks 
with bayonets thrust over their shoulders. A cannon crew sizes up the scene on the left 
and prepares to fire another round. Off in the distance smoke rises over the walls of 
Seringapatam, as the Company troops advance through the breaches to seize control of 
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the city. Unlike Allan's landscape paintings of India, here the terrain has faded into the 
background and been reduced in importance; the subject matter of this work is 
unmistakably the soldiers that make up the Company's military. The theme of the 
painting, British soldiers seizing control of the fortress and occupying the Indian 
landscape, would have been obvious to the observer.  
 Joseph Turner created a similar work in his watercolo  The Siege of Seringapatam, 
albeit with a bit of a thematic twist [Figure 6].122 The perspective of the viewer is very 
similar to Allan's painting, depicting row after row of impersonal soldiers in their red 
coats, striding towards the fortress with a pall of smoke hanging over the action. However, 
in the foreground of the painting there are several B itish soldiers lying slumped on the 
ground next to an artillery piece, with visible wounds indicating the casualties already 
suffered in the battle. The presence of these injured soldiers changes the tone of the piece 
from an unabashed celebration of triumph into a more reflective and ambiguous work, 
questioning the viewer as to whether the gains of the Company's military ventures were 
worth the cost.123 Few other artists of the period were as discerning or nuanced in their 
portrayals of the battle, however. Thomas Stothard's The Storming of Seringapatam was a 
straightforward glorification of the action, with te familiar waves of British soldiers 
rushing heroically towards the walls of the city with smoke and fire all around them 
[Figure 7].124 G. Thompson produced a rather crude engraving of the battle as well, 
showing the same events with a poor conception of depth and perspective [Figure 8].125 
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Thompson's print indicated that these heroic renditions of the Company's military were 
not limited solely to the artists who gained the patronage of Leadenhall Street, but 
enjoyed a much wider basis of public approval, including from the same sort of printers 
and engravers who had mocked the Company for its nabobery in earlier decades. 
Depictions of Seringapatam's storming were extremely popular in this period, and artists 
of both high and low culture were willing to supply the public with the images that they 
craved. 
 The subject matter of the Fourth Mysore War proved to be so popular that artists 
soon moved beyond the capture of the fortress itself, and began to portray imagined 
scenes of Tipu's last stand, his death, and the recovery of his body. Henry Singleton 
returned to this subject matter to paint The Last Effort and Fall of Tippoo Sultaun, likely 
trying to seize upon the great public desire for artwo k featuring the Mysore Wars [Figure 
9].126 Singleton's work portrays Tipu in his final moments of life, already wounded in the 
side and in the process of falling; the Sultan is depicted in an oddly off-balance position 
that gives no power or grace to his posture. On the left side of the painting, Tipu's 
soldiers appear to be cowering or falling back, unable to stand before the British invaders. 
The redcoated soldiers advance confidently forward from the right side of the image, 
stepping over fallen Indians in the process, one of the men gesturing for a further surge 
ahead. One of the British soldiers has his bayonet raised to strike an Indian man in the 
face, while Tipu himself is being seized by another soldier, their positioning making it 
appear as though an adult is grabbing a child.127 The message of the painting clearly 
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suggests once more the superiority of British soldiers over Indian ones, and invites the 
viewer to take pride in the downfall of Tipu. Singleton's battle painting is an example of 
laudatory praise for the Company's militarism, which would have been almost 
unthinkable a few decades earlier.  
 Other artists took up the subject of the discovery of the body of the fallen Sultan, 
which was not found by the British until several hours after the capture of the city. Robert 
Ker Porter was the first to address this topic once again, painting Finding the Body of 
Tippoo Sultan in early 1800 to go along with his enormous battle piece [Figure 10].128 
Porter places this scene in the dark of night, with a group of British soldiers surrounding 
the body of Tipu using a torch for illumination. The Sultan's head lolls to one side, 
propped up on the knee of a British soldier like a hunting trophy, while an angry 
expression distorts his facial features. The soldier bearing Tipu's body has his hand raised 
upwards, as if to suggest a prayer of thankfulness that the world had been rid of the 
Sultan's menace. In addition to the overwhelming number of British soldiers surrounding 
the body, there is a single elderly Indian man present, with his hands clasped in prayer 
and a pitiful expression on his face.129 Porter's work suggests that the British soldiers 
have brought light to the darkness that was India, exorcizing the demon that was Tipu 
Sultan and making the subcontinent a safer place for all.  
 These discovery scenes were tackled by other artists, such as Arthur William 
Devis in his work Major-General Baird and Col. Arthur Wellesley Discovering the Body 
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of Tippoo Sultaun at Seringapatam [Figure 11].130 Devis uses many of the same themes 
as Porter, employing a night scene brightened by the torches brought by British soldiers, 
but differs in including recognizable Company officers in the painting. David Baird 
kneels to check the body of Tipu to confirm his death, while Arthur Wellesley raises his 
hand in a confident gesture, similar in many ways to the British soldier bearing Tipu's 
body in Porter's work. The fallen Tipu lies slumped to the side, with his face hidden in 
shadow, and most of the other Indians have their backs to the viewer, their faces similarly 
obscured. The one visible Indian looks upwards with an expression of terror on his face; 
the contrast between the tall, confident British officers and the crouching, fearful Indian 
attendants comes across obviously to the viewer.  
 These portrayals of the "Storming of Seringapatam" were not limited only to 
canvas; the same triumphant celebration of victory was depicted on the London stage as 
well. Advertised as The Storming of Seringapatam, or The Death of Tippoo Saib, Astley's 
Royal Amphitheatre sought out to create a grand military spectacle unlike anything seen 
previously by viewing audiences. In addition to new music, scenery, and costumes for 
this production, Astley's promised to portray: 
5th A Correct View of the City of Seringapatam, with the whole of Tippoo’s Army, 
Elephants, Camels, etc. in motion... 6th A British Battery, opening a brisk Fire on 
Tippoo’s Piquet Guard, particularly the blowing up of a Power Mill... 8th The 
Fortifications of Seringapatam, with the springing of a Mine 9th External View of 
Tippoo’s Palace, with his two Sons firing from the Windows. And 10th, The 
Zennana and City on Fire, with a variety of circumstances that attended this 
important conquest.131 
 
More circus production than traditional theatre, Astley's new show was explicitly martial 
to a degree rarely seen before. Just as the artwork from the Fourth Mysore War glorified 
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the occupation of Seringapatam and the death of Tipu Sultan, Astley's The Storming of 
Seringapatam placed the same military spectacle before the British public, incorporating 
new non-theatrical elements such as acrobatics, large nimals, and drilling in formation to 
create a fantastic new form of entertainment. The application of these military techniques 
to the theatre allowed for a subjectification of the viewing audience, opening them up to 
greater control by the state's regulatory powers.132 Within the context of how Tipu Sultan 
was represented by the British public, it meant the elimination of alternate, dissenting 
discourses of thought about the East India Company and the Mysore Wars, further 
reinforcing Wellesley's increasingly dominant narrative of the Company having been 
forced into defensive warfare by the ambitions of Tippoo the Tyrant. 
 As far as the contemporary public was concerned, The Storming of Seringapatam 
was an exciting show that had to be seen. The Oracle and Daily Advertiser wrote that 
Astley's show exhibited a "light superior to every other", forming "a piece complete and 
perfect in every part."133 Other newspapers regretted the closing of the theatre season in 
October 1799 after so few performances; Astley's wa happy to oblige them the following 
year, opening a slightly reworked The Siege and Storming of Seringapatam in May 1800. 
While retaining all of the same scenes from the original production, the reworked show 
also promised "the grandest display of Horsemanship ever exhibited by 20 Equestrians" 
involving a series of jumps, grand trampoline tricks to be carried out through a balloon of 
fire, and over twenty soldiers with muskets and fixed bayonets.134 Astley's production 
would have made a grand spectacle, with its animals and marching soldiers, Indian 
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costumes and exotic Oriental scenery. This martial display encouraged the audience to 
shed political and ethnic divisions in favor of national consolidation, using the 
Company's multinational armies as the model.135 Newspaper records indicate that this 
production was taken on the road and performed in provincial cities, where large crowds 
would have taken in the same messages.136 With the ongoing wars against revolutionary 
France affecting public sentiment, there was no better time to forge a common British 
identity, in which one of the greatest unifying ties was support for the East India 
Company and Britain's overseas empire.137 The earlier criticisms of the Company and its 
servants no longer applied in this context. Instead, the British public joined together to 
celebrate in the spectacle of Tipu's defeat and death, reenacted daily on the stage.  
 These were hardly the only paintings and dramatic works to emerge from the 
Fourth Mysore War; Henry Singleton alone produced more paintings on the subject 
matter of Tipu's death, and there were at least two other imitation theatre productions on 
the London stage.138 However, at the risk of overgeneralization, the works of art featured 
here serve as broadly representational of the whole. Unlike the earlier cartoons and 
caricatures which were so critical of the East India Company, the Third and Fourth 
Mysore Wars saw the emergence of formal history paintings of imperial subject matter, 
employing artists who were frequently patronized by the Company and created artwork 
designed to represent their benefactors in a more psitive light. Paintings and plays 
featuring The Storming of Seringapatam glorified the Company's military conquests, 
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bringing them within the fold of British patriotism and allowing for the widespread 
public embrace of the Company's growing Indian empire. In the same process that was 
taking place in print media, Tipu Sultan was demonized in the visual arts as well, 
portrayed as the cruel and heartless Tyrant of Mysore, whose death was to be celebrated 
as a victory for the forces of progress. Through widespread reproduction in cheap prints 
and engravings, the high art of the formal history painters was disseminated to a mass 
audience, serving to rewrite the earlier critical discourse of the Company that had been 
embodied in satirical caricatures. This artwork was an instrumental factor in shifting 
public opinions, about both Tipu Sultan and the East India Company more generally, at 
the close of the eighteenth century and the dawn of the nineteenth century. 
Conclusion 
 In surveying the popular literature from the three wars that took place against 
Tipu Sultan during the 1780s and 1790s, the difference in tone of the Fourth Mysore War 
(1799) immediately stands out. Whereas the two earlier conflicts witnessed commonplace 
differences of opinion, and frequent debates over th  morality of the East India 
Company's actions, the print media from the period of the Fourth Mysore War contains 
no such disagreements. Instead, the contemporary sou ces unconsciously accepted the 
Company as a component part of the British nation, a sharp contrast to the distinction 
made between the two by earlier commentators, and co tained almost universal praise for 
its actions. Most of the literature regarding the war from 1799 and 1800 was celebratory 
and triumphant in nature, embracing the Company's conquest of Mysore as a cause for 
patriotic displays of pageantry. It begs the obvious q estion: what made this conflict so 
much different from its predecessors? 
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 The best explanation points to the connection betwe n Tipu Sultan and the French, 
which was greatly emphasized during the Fourth Mysore War over any other potential 
motivations for action. Tipu's "alliance" with the French united all segments of British 
opinion against the Sultan, raising the specter of the fearsome Oriental tyrant joined 
together with the terrors of unchecked Jacobin mob rule. Although these fears were 
wildly exaggerated, they prevented any potential criticism of Wellesley's heavy handed 
actions in India, made even more difficult due to the careful manipulation of the dialogue 
surrounding the war by the Governor General. The confli t itself was short and 
overwhelmingly successful from the perspective of the Company, rendering the sort of 
Opposition critiques that had taken place in the past effectively impossible. As for the 
Sultan himself, Tipu had been killed and his family deposed from power at the end of the 
war, effectively ending any further discussion about his image. Tipu certainly could not 
speak in his own defense, or take any actions to change the minds of the British people. 
Wellesley's interpretation of events was embraced by the public in the metropole, and 
became the historical memory of the Mysore Wars. The earlier, alternative 
representations of the events of these conflicts faded with time and were largely forgotten. 
It was not until well into the twentieth century tha  South Asian historians began to 













 As the East India Company began to acquire a territorial empire overseas in the 
years following 1750, Britons in the metropole were faced with an identity crisis. They 
perceived themselves to be a maritime and commercial people who lived in a society 
based upon the protection of individual liberties and private property, and yet they 
increasingly found themselves ruling over a vast India  population which was accorded 
none of the same rights.1 The large amounts of wealth brought back from the 
subcontinent by Company servants, and the conspicuous spending in which they engaged 
upon their return, gave rise to the popular satire of the nabobs, status-seeking men of ill 
repute who had amassed their fortunes overseas throug  the exploitation of helpless 
Indian subjects.2 The nabobs were perceived as a threat to the natural order of British 
society; they had been corrupted by the vice and luxuries of the Orient, and it was feared 
that they would infect the British nation with their decadent morals and political bribery.3 
The result was widespread condemnation of the nabobs fr m across the political 
spectrum, and a public skepticism towards imperial projects in India during the 1760s and 
1770s. For most contemporaries at this time, the Company's Indian territories represented 
the scandals of empire and a source of consternation, not a source of national pride.4 
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 However, during the period between roughly 1780 and 1830, Britons underwent a 
profound shift in their attitudes about empire. The growing Second British Empire came 
to be characterized by more autocratic and aristocra ic methods of rule, with government-
appointed military men who wielded centralized power replacing the loosely organized 
merchant councils from earlier periods of the Company's history.5 There was an 
increasing emphasis upon racial hierarchies and racial difference between Europeans and 
the rest of the world, with Indians placed at a lower point on the scale of civilization.6 
Whereas in the past, European travelers to India had often adopted Indian dress and 
customs to some extent, and learned to speak some of th l cal languages, this process of 
crossing over between cultures was officially repressed by the East India Company's new 
aristocratic leadership as the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth.7 
 At the heart of this shift in attitudes about empire and race was a shift in 
culpability. Whereas in the past, Britons had feared b ing morally corrupted by the 
despotic actions of Company soldiers and administrators acting as nabobs overseas, 
beginning in the final decades of the eighteenth century, Britons instead began to view 
themselves as the paternalistic champions of a benighted and hopelessly backwards 
Indian people. The true tyrants of the East were increasingly perceived to be the native 
rulers of the subcontinent. It was the immoral and tyrannical actions of Indian merchants 
and princes who were undermining the Company's rule overseas, not the servants of the 
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Company themselves.8 This allowed the Company and its servants to be reimagined as 
patriotic heroes of the British nation, as opposed to being a vile force regarded as a 
separate entity to be cordoned off from the rest of the nation. They would serve as a force 
for moral progress and the advancement of civilizaton, thereby anticipating the civilizing 
mission ethos that came to dominate nineteenth century imperialism. 
 The Anglo-Mysore Wars fought against Tipu Sultan, d in particular the 
enormous public interest generated in Tipu during the 1790s, played an important role in 
this shift in British popular attitudes about empire. The final decade of the eighteenth 
century was a period in which a real transformation of attitudes took place, where the 
Company's Indian territories ceased to be regarded as a problem to be solved and began 
to be viewed instead as a source of national pride.9 After attracting initial interest from 
the British public for his capture of large numbers of British prisoners during the Second 
Mysore War (1780-84), Tipu came to be perceived as the quintessential Oriental despot. 
Most often referenced as "Tippoo the Tyrant", Tipu was believed by most of the British 
public to be a monstrous ruler who tortured his British captives and forced them to 
convert to Islam against their will. The Tiger of Mysore became a stand-in for the 
anxieties and uncertainties associated with colonialism; Tipu's absolute power of life and 
death over his British captives, and his ability to remake their Europeans identities as he 
saw fit, inspired terror both within the Company's ranks and at home in the British 
metropole.10  
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 Through the process of fighting extended wars against Tipu and conquering his 
domains, the East India Company was able to overcome these anxieties associated with 
empire, and convince the British public of the legitimacy of its place within the larger 
fabric of the British nation. The widespread popular belief in "Tippoo the Tyrant" became 
a convenient way to disprove allegations of continued nabobery amongst the Company's 
ranks. Within the contemporary print culture of newspapers, journals, and cartoons, as 
well as on the London stage and on painted canvas, the defenders of the Company argued 
that Oriental despots like Tipu Sultan were the tru tyrants, not the East India Company. 
Tipu's supposed repression of his own populace in Mysore led to claims that the 
Company's invasions of the region were undertaken as acts of liberation, designed to 
protect the local population from the depredations f a mad tyrant in true paternalistic 
fashion. By fighting against an imagined despotism in southern India, the Company 
simultaneously reformed its own reputation in the realm of British popular opinion.11 
 These shifts in attitude about the East India Company and its overseas territories 
were not universal, and did not occur overnight. There was a minority political 
Opposition that continued to view the Company's India  territories through the old 
context of the nabobs, and believed the Mysore Wars to be immoral acts of naked 
aggression designed to make off with additional India  plunder. Their voices swelled to a 
crescendo during the Third Mysore War (1790-92), at which time Parliament held 
numerous hearings on charges that the wars of conquest in India were immoral and 
antithetical to British liberty. These political debates were reflected in the contemporary 
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print culture as well, which pulsed with disagreements over who were the true tyrants in 
India: the Company servants or Indian rulers like Tipu Sultan.12 
 However, these were still ultimately minority positions, and the political 
Opposition was never able to secure passage of any resolutions in Parliament 
condemning the actions of the Company, losing every ote on the subject by large 
margins. The military victories won over Tipu by Cornwallis in 1792 and Wellesley in 
1799 were successful in settling most doubters. Their triumphant conquests served to 
stifle debate, making it politically untenable to criti ize the Company's actions overseas; 
Tipu Sultan was effectively depoliticized as an issue over time. Tipu's connections to the 
hated French, skillfully exaggerated in 1798 and 1799 by Wellesley as a means to justify 
his invasion of Mysore, made it virtually impossible for anyone to defend the Sultan, or 
argue against the Company in the same fashion that had been commonplace a decade 
earlier. The final defeat and death of Tipu in the Fourth Mysore War (1799) provided the 
breaking point at which alternate, competing viewpoints of Tipu Sultan, and more 
broadly the East India Company's role in empire building, were pushed aside from the 
mainstream of public opinion. Pride in British rule in India as well as pride in British 
military successes there had become widely accepted elements of British nationalism, and 
would not come under serious sustained criticism once more until the advent of the 
twentieth century.13 
Remembering Tipu 
 Although representations of Tipu Sultan and the Mysore Wars had been heavily 
contested subjects for contemporaries during the 1780s and 1790s, this earlier period of 
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debate would soon become forgotten by later generations and largely written out of the 
historical memory. The villainous and caricatured Tipu Legend of a heroic East India 
Company fighting against a monstrous Oriental despot eventually became the dominant 
memory of these events for the British. This section provides a brief overview of how this 
process unfolded in the early decades of the ninetee th century.  
 During the decade following Tipu's death between 1800 and 1810, many of the 
same members of the political Opposition continued to repeat the old arguments that they 
had leveled against the East India Company a decade e rli r during the Third Mysore 
War. Wellesley's military campaign against the Marathas (1803-1805) attracted many of 
the same political criticisms that had been used to argue against the Mysore Wars, 
namely that it was morally unjust, ruinously expensive, and only fought so that the 
Company's soldiers and servants could make off withmore ill-gained Indian plunder. 
However, there was now a crucial addition to the Opposition's critique of the Company's 
actions overseas: the government's Whig opponents specifically noted that the past wars 
against Tipu were not included in their current objections. For example, Cobbet's Weekly 
Register wrote in an 1806 editorial criticizing Indian wars that, "I must be understood to 
except from this observation the expences of the war with Tippoo, for as that was the 
only war he [Wellesley] entered into of real benefit to the Company."14 The Mysore wars 
against Tipu remained effectively depoliticized, too popular to be criticized and 
demanding a special exemption from the usual Opposition criticisms about Indian 
conflicts. Even if Wellesley himself remained a subject of some controversy, his prior 
war against Tipu was immune from political attack.  
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 When Philip Francis and Charles Fox rose to speak in  Parliamentary debate on 5 
April 1805 regarding the Maratha war, they argued at length about the "abuses" 
committed by Wellesley in his "excessive lust for pwer" and his seemingly endless 
campaigns of territorial annexation. Their objections were easily overrun by Lord 
Castlereagh's speech in favor of the government, who immediately turned to the subject 
of Tipu to make his defense: "The Honourable Gentleman [Francis] had also forgot to 
notice the two Mysore Wars; he surely would not preend to say that these were wars of 
aggression for the sake of conquest only – he would not pretend to say that these wars 
were unjust or dishonourable in their nature."15 Francis made no move to dispute this 
argument from Castlereagh, allowing the morality of the campaigns against Tipu to stand 
unchallenged. Francis and Fox were unable to contest this claim, as the Mysore Wars 
were now overwhelmingly viewed as just conflicts fought to overturn the rule of an 
Oriental despot; the report on the proceedings evenincludes the note "[A cry of hear! 
hear!]" to indicate the large majority that supported Castlereagh's pro-Company opinion. 
The old outlook of men like Francis and Fox regarding empire had become politically 
outdated by this point; most Britons no longer viewed the Company's Indian territories 
with shame or fear, but saw them as a growing source of the country's strength. 
Opposition newspapers almost plaintively called out f r he British public to remember 
the earlier period in which the legality of the Mysore Wars had been heavily debated and 
contested, asking at one point in 1806, "Have we all fallen into forgetfulness about Lord 
Cornwallis? It is quite forgotten that... the most questionable act of any Indian 
government was his war against Tippoo Sultaun, in the year 1790: at least, there never 
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was a measure more questioned in parliament."16 The British public most certainly had 
fallen into forgetfulness on this subject, as these alt rnate representations of the Mysore 
Wars were few and far between by this period, and continuing to fade with the passage of 
each year.  
 Belief in the villainous Tipu Legend had become nearly universal amongst the 
British public by the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century, and it continued to 
be further reinforced through the publication of a series of histories that portrayed Tipu in 
an extremely negative light. Colonel William Kirkpatrick, a close friend of Wellesley 
who had accompanied him in the 1799 campaign, published the translated Select Letters 
of Tippoo Sultan to Various Public Functionaries n 1811. The letters were chosen to 
emphasize Tipu's connections to the French and make him appear as an untrustworthy 
figure; Kirkpatrick's notes on the letters characterized the Sultan as "the cruel and 
relentless enemy; the intolerant bigot or furious fanatic; the oppressive and unjust ruler; 
the harsh and rigid master; the sanguinary tyrant; the perfidious negotiator."17 There was 
a strong implication from Kirkpatrick that the Company was better suited to rule over the 
people of Mysore than Tipu, and that all Indian rule s were duplicitous and unethical by 
nature.  
 Similar messages could be found in histories of British India written during the 
same decade by Major General John Malcolm, a long service military commander in 
India, and Mark Wilks, who became the British Residnt of Mysore following Tipu's 
ouster. Malcolm's Sketch of the Political History of India (1811) was a triumphant 
celebration of the growing British Raj, which he claimed would become "the theme of 
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wonder to succeeding ages."18 Malcolm insisted that all of the Company's wars had been 
defensive in nature, its many campaigns in India fought only due to a principle of self-
preservation. Its rule was justified due to the "tranquility and happiness which they 
[Indians] enjoy under our dominion" in contrast to the "falsehoods and treachery which 
mark the intercourse of the native states of India with each other."19 Malcolm took great 
lengths in his history to place all of the blame for the Mysore Wars upon Tipu, while 
absolving Cornwallis and Wellesley for any culpability. Wellesley's policies in 1798-99 
were "moderate and just", "altogether defensive", and "dictated by a desire of security 
and peace, not by a spirit of ambition or aggrandizement."20 Wilks' Historical Sketches of 
the South of India, published between 1810 and 1817, was the first full history of the 
Company's conquest of Mysore, and was written to present Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan in 
harshly negative fashion.21 They were characterized as savage barbarians, guilty of severe 
atrocities against British prisoners, and incapable of holding to any treaties or prior 
agreements. Wilks denigrated all Indian rulers, even British allies like the Nawab of 
Arcot, whose government was described as possessing "duplicity and iniquity", "an 
audacity of falsehood and ingratitude" towards the British, and suffering from "the 
ordinary misrule of a wretched native government."22 Histories like the ones written by 
Malcolm and Wilks indicated the increasingly racialized view of India and Indians, their 
rulers perceived as inferior brutes. In both cases, native princes were portrayed as morally 
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corrupt and unfit to rule over the populace, thereby providing a legitimation for the 
Company's own governance.  
 On occasion, there were voices in the wilderness that argued against this 
characterization of Tipu Sultan and the Mysore Wars. James Mill published The History 
of British India in three volumes in 1817, which was often highly critical of the 
Company's actions overseas and drew upon many of the older criticisms of the nabobs 
from past decades. In his chronology of the wars against Tipu, Mill compared British 
attitudes towards the Sultan with how Britons had viewed other enemies of the country 
such as Louis XIV and Napoleon, noting, "It is so common for nations to ascribe the 
most odious qualities to every party which they drea ... several remarkable instances 
stand in our history of a sort of epidemical frenzy in abusing our enemies."23 Mill briefly 
recounted how Tipu was invariably described by contemporary Britons as "a hideous 
monster", "covered with almost every vice", and "anobject of dread and abhorrence", 
before concluding that the Sultan's reputation was ildly exaggerated.24 In contrast to the 
claims of the East India Company, Mysore was well-governed and prosperous under Tipu, 
and it was the Company who had repeatedly made the decision to go to war. Mill 
criticized Tipu for excessive pride and poor judgment, but nonetheless believed that he 
had been a strong and capable ruler, with his treatm nt of British prisoners no worse than 
their treatment of captured Indian soldiers.25  
 These arguments were unique to Mill's history, appe ring in none of the other 
major summaries of Indian history from the period, and were reminiscent of the 
Opposition critics of the East India Company during the Third Mysore War (1790-92). 
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These unusual callbacks to an earlier era of politics were perhaps understandable, given 
Mill's liberal political leanings and close friendship with many Whig politicians. His 
history was unorthodox enough to warrant a lengthy response from the pro-Company 
Asiatic Journal, which wrote no less than six articles to discredit the material, concluding 
that Mill had made "deep and vital mistakes" due to "his unjust and indefensible 
prejudices" which "blemish and considerably impair the utility of the elaborate work of 
Mr. Mill". 26 Even Mill's liberal history was derisive in its opinion of the Hindu residents 
of India, viewing them as living under "the most enormous, irrational, and tormenting 
superstition, that ever harassed and degraded any portion of mankind", making the 
Hindus "the most enslaved portion of the human race."27 In this respect, Mill's history 
was not so very different from those penned by Malcolm or Wilks, placing Indians on a 
lower scale of civilization and providing implicit justification for British rule over them, 
even if he regarded Tipu Sultan as an individual in more objective fashion.  
 There was also an appearance of a new Tipu play in 1823 which portrayed the 
Sultan in favorable terms. Henry Milner's Tippoo Saib; or, The Storming of 
Seringapatam depicted Tipu as a tragic hero, fighting to protect his kingdom from the 
cruel invasion of the East India Company. The British were specifically referenced with 
the phrase "English tyrants" in one of Tipu's speech s, and in a remarkable reversal of the 
standard tropes of the Tipu Legend, the Sultan went out of his way to free captured 
British officers as a sign of his faithfulness and proof of safe conduct.28 The stage 
production ended in an arguably melancholy tone, with T pu falling in battle, his fortress 
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captured by Company soldiers, and without any celebratory or patriotic speeches to 
suggest that the audience should approve of the event. This brief revival of alternative 
representations of Tipu was most likely a lower class form of protest that ran counter to 
the triumphalist support of imperialism taking place in elite culture. Playhouses like the 
Royal Coburg Theatre served a more working class and multiracial audience, which 
allowed it to serve as a progressive form of dissent against the ongoing redefinition of 
Britain's imperial role overseas.29 
 The viewpoints offered by Mill's history and Milner's play were very much not 
the norm of British public opinion, however, which only grew more accepting of 
Wellesley's narrative of past events with the passage of time. By the 1820s and 1830s, 
even former bastions of Opposition politics that had strenuously argued against the East 
India Company and its wars in India had come to accept the Tipu Legend interpretation 
of the Mysore Wars. For example, the Morning Chronicle, the same paper which had 
expended vast sums of ink protesting against the morality of the Third Mysore War, now 
suggested in 1825 that the current Governor General of India should look to "the most 
enlightened Statesmen who ever held the office of Governor-General of India: the 
Marquesses Cornwallis, Wellesley, and Hastings."30 This was a complete reversal of the 
politics of the 1790s, and the same message would be repeated in future editions of the 
Chronicle. An 1827 report on the meetings at the India House described Wellesley as the 
man "who had saved our empire in India by the destruction of the power of Tippoo 
Saib".31 An editorial letter to the same paper at the end of Wellesley's life in 1841 went so 
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far as to refer to him as "the greatest statesman this country every produced", and argued 
that "his principles and policy have stood the testof time: and after an interval of forty 
years, they are held forth by the Honourable East India Company as models for the 
guidance of their civil and military servants."32 The seismic shift in the Chronicle's 
treatment of men like Cornwallis and Wellesley, who had been portrayed as avaricious 
and immoral during the period of the Mysore Wars, demonstrated how even formerly 
oppositional political groups had come to embrace overseas imperialism in later decades.   
 The symbolic victory of the East India Company's historical memory of Tipu 
Sultan and the Mysore Wars was perhaps best captured in a painting by the Scottish artist 
David Wilkie in 1839. Titled Sir David Baird Discovering the Body of Sultan Tippoo, it 
used the capture of Tipu's fortress of Seringapatam nd the discovery of the slain Sultan's 
corpse at the end of the Fourth Mysore War as its subject matter [Figure 1].33 Hailed as 
one of the finest paintings to arise from the conflicts against Tipu, Wilkie's painting 
demonstrated the confidence and assurance with which t e British looked back upon the 
fashioning of their Indian empire decades after the fact. Wilkie placed General Baird at 
the center of his painting as a larger than life figure, resplendent in full dress uniform 
with arm upraised to the sky. With one hand Baird gestures to the British soldiers 
surrounding him, while with the other hand he points with his officer's sword to the body 
his fallen opponent. Tipu lies almost naked upon the ground in a prostrate position, 
surrounded by fawning Indian attendants, looking very much like a trophy prize that 
Baird has successfully brought back from the hunt. While Tipu and his companions are 
mostly enshrouded in darkness, Baird's figure is brilliantly illuminated by the torchlight 
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(once again borne by another British soldier), as he tands with feet slightly separated, the 
consummate Christian warrior.34  
 Wilkie's painting was an unabashed celebration of imperial triumph, with the 
deceased Tipu Sultan literally lying at the feet of he saint-like General Baird. Wilkie 
embodied the new values of the nineteenth century towards empire in advertising the 
victory of commerce, civilization, and Christianity over the backwardness and darkness 
of Tipu Sultan's India. Wilkie's portrayal of the slain Tipu represented the antithesis of 
the Sultan's tiger pipe organ described in the introduction to this study. Whereas the 
mechanical Tippoo's Tiger stood for the savage and untamed power of India, a wild beast 
mauling a helpless European soldier, the dreadful anxieties of empire manifested in the 
form of the Tiger of Mysore, Wilkie's painting reprsented the complete opposite: an 
India that had been tamed, and laid prostrate before the rising power of the British empire. 
Through its domination of Tipu Sultan, the East India Company had found a way to make 
empire safe and acceptable to the British public in the metropole. The scandals of empire 
had been reformed, threatening and unscrupulous nabobs had been replaced by virtuous 
soldier-heroes, and the Company had become embraced as part of the wider British 
nation. In combating the imagined despotism of "Tippoo the Tyrant", the East India 
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